You are here: / / Contractor Working for Tenant Could Not Impose Mechanic’s Lien on Property O...
, ,

Contractor Working for Tenant Could Not Impose Mechanic’s Lien on Property Owner; Owner Acquiesced In, But Did Not Affirmatively Consent to, Work

The Second Department determined that the contractor, Matell, who was hired by the tenant to construct a supermarket, could not impose a mechanic’s lien upon the property owner (Fleetwood Park) based on the tenant’s failure to pay.  In affirming the dismissal of two affirmative defenses, the court explained that the lien was timely filed and privity was not required for a valid mechanic’s lien. On the “affirmative consent of the property owner requirement,” the court wrote:

“A contractor who performs work for, or provides equipment to, a tenant may nonetheless impose a mechanic’s lien against the premises where the owner of the premises affirmatively gave consent for the work or equipment directly to the contractor, but not where the owner has merely approved or acquiesced in the undertaking of such work or the provision of such equipment” … . “To sustain the lien, the owner must either be an affirmative factor in procuring the improvement to be made, or having possession and control of the premises assent to the improvement in the expectation that he [or she] will reap the benefit of it'” … .

Here, while Matell presented evidence showing that Fleetwood Park had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the work performed to convert the leased property into a supermarket for the tenant’s use, Matell failed to present any evidence showing that Fleetwood Park conveyed any affirmative consent directly to Matell for the work … . Therefore, Matell failed to make a prima facie showing that Fleetwood Park affirmatively consented to the subject work.  Matell Contr Co v Fleetwood Park Dev LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 07456, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

You might also like
Defendant Entitled to Summary Judgment–Activity (Routine Cleaning) Not Covered by Labor Law 240 (1)—Re: Labor Law 200 and Common Law Negligence: Equipment Provided by Defendant Not Defective; Defendant Did Not Have Authority to Control Plaintiff’s Work
THE PISTOL LICENSING SERVICE’S DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A PISTOL LICENSE HAD A RATIONAL BASIS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANNULLED (SECOND DEPT).
PROCEEDING LEADING TO THE REVOCATION OF APPELLANT’S ADJOURNMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DISMISSAL (ACD) AND ADJUDGING HIM A PERSON IN NEED OF SUPERVISION (PINS) FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS NEVER TOLD OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS NEVER PLACED IN CONTROVERSY AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE WAS NOT WAIVED BY A LETTER TO PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY INDICATING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM DEMENTIA, ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION (SECOND DEPT).
Condition Precedent to Arbitration Re: a Hit-and-Run Accident Involving an Unidentified Vehicle Is Physical Contact with Unidentified Vehicle—Lack of Proof of Physical Contact Justified Permanent Stay of Arbitration
DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY THE SPONTANEOUS ACT OF A BAR PATRON (SECOND DEPT).
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO NAME A NECESSARY PARTY SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTY SUMMONED (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Labor Law 200 and Common Law Negligence Causes of Action Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Test for Sufficiency of Evidence of Accessorial Liability Is Same As Test for... Statutory Requirements for Recovery and Limits Imposed by Subrogation Explained;...