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People’s Delay In Providing Bill of Particulars Did Not Require Dismissal Under Speedy Trial Statute

The Fourth Department determined that the People’s delay in providing a bill of particulars did not require dismissal of the indictment pursuant to the speedy trial statute:

…[D]efendant asserted that the People’s bill of particulars was due on January 7, 2009—15 days after defendant’s request (see CPL 200.95 [2])—but that it was not served until August 10, 2009.  According to defendant, the time period from January 7 to August 10, which exceeds six months, constitutes postreadiness delay that should be charged to the People, thus warranting dismissal under CPL 30.30.  We reject that contention. Prior to their failure to serve a timely bill of particulars, the People announced their readiness for trial on the record, and “[f]ailing to serve a bill of particulars is in no way inconsistent with the prosecution’s continued readiness” … .  We addressed a similar contention in People v Runion (107 AD2d 1080), determining that “[t]he court should not have granted the motion made under CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment because of the delays of the prosecutor, after she had announced her readiness for trial, in providing discovery materials and in serving a supplemental bill of particulars.  Defendant’s remedies for such delays do not include dismissal under CPL 30.30” (id. at 1080).  People v Griffin, 1154, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

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