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Standard of Care Required of Train Operator

n affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the Second Department explained the standard of care applicable to a train operator.  Plaintiff’s decedent was struck by the train:

The complaint in this case alleged that the defendants acted negligently and thereby caused the death of the plaintiff’s decedent, who was struck by a train owned and operated by the defendants. “[A] train operator may be found negligent if he or she sees a person on the tracks from such a distance and under such other circumstances as to permit him [or her], in the exercise of reasonable care, to stop before striking the person” … . In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants submitted evidence, including the deposition testimony of the operator of the train involved in the subject accident, that he was operating the train at a lawful speed and was approximately one car length away when he first observed the decedent, who was intoxicated, trespassing on the tracks. The train operator immediately applied the emergency brakes and sounded the horn, but at that point, it was impossible to avoid the collision. The evidence submitted by the defendants established, prima facie, that they were not negligent in the happening of the accident as a matter of law … .  Neenan v Quinton, 2013 NY Slip Op 06843, 2nd Dept 10-23-13

 

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