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Damage to Building Caused By Excavation Next Door Constituted “Vandalism”

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, over a partial dissent, the Court of Appeals answered two certified questions from the Second Circuit.  The case involved damage to a building caused by the excavation of a parking garage next door. The question was whether the damage could fall within the meaning of “vandalism” in the building owner’s insurance policy, even though the alleged acts were not directed at the damaged building.  The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative:

It is true that, in some cases of alleged vandalism not directed at particular property, the term does not intuitively seem to fit.  … The word vandalism, which derives from the sack of Rome by the original Vandals in 455 AD (see IV, Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire at 246-248 [Folio Society 1986]), more readily brings to mind people who smash and loot than business owners who seek their own profit in disregard of the injury they do to the property of others.  We conclude, however, that there is no principled distinction between the two.  An excavator who is paid to dig a hole, and does so in conscious disregard of likely damage to the building next door, is, for these purposes, not essentially different from an irresponsible youth who might dig a hole on the same property, with the same effect, whether in search of buried treasure or just for fun. …

In common speech, and by the express terms of the policy in suit, vandalism is “malicious” damage to property.  The Second Circuit’s second question asks, in essence, what state of mind amounts to “malice” for these purposes.  We answer by adopting, insofar as it relates to property damage, the formulation we have used in reviewing awards of punitive damages. Conduct is “malicious” for these purposes when it reflects “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that [it] may be called willful or wanton”… .  Georgitsi Realty LLC v Penn-Starr Insurance Co, 156, CtApp 10-17-13

 

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