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Defendant May Be Liable for Obstruction in Municipal Right of Way

The Second Department determined the defendant’s (Argyros’s) motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case should have been denied.  Plaintiff tripped on a piece of wood that was anchored into the ground.  Argyros owned the land and the piece of wood was in the town’s municipal right of way over the land.  There was evidence most property owners cared for the areas in the right of way:

” The law imposes a duty to maintain property free and clear of dangerous or defective conditions only upon those who own, occupy, or control property, or who put the property to a special use or derive a special benefit from it'” … . Here, while Argyros owned the real property on which the accident occurred and the Town possessed a right of way over the portion of it where the plaintiff fell, title to the land under the right of way is not determinative in assessing the issue of duty, as issues of control and maintenance of the property must also be considered … . * * *

The Supreme Court should have denied Argyros’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, as the evidence submitted in support of the motion failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether he controlled or maintained the area of the property where the plaintiff fell … . Riccardi v County of Suffolk, 2013 NY Slip Op 06673, 2nd Dept 10-16-13

 

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