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Defendant’s 440.46 Motion for Resentencing Should Not Have Been Denied

In finding defendant’s motion for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.46 should have been granted, the Second Department explained the relevant criteria:

Although resentencing is not mandatory, there is a statutory presumption in favor of resentencing (see L 2004, ch 738, § 23; CPL 440.46[3]…). Under the circumstances of this case, the factors relied upon by the Supreme Court in denying the motion–the defendant’s criminal history and parole violations–are insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption. The instant offense and many of the defendant’s prior offenses consisted of low-level drug crimes, and none of the defendant’s recent convictions involved violence or weapons …. The defendant had no disciplinary infractions in prison, and had several positive accomplishments … . While the defendant’s parole violations were a relevant consideration …, they were only one factor to consider, and did not mandate denial of the defendant’s motion …. Under all of the circumstances presented here, “the presumption that the defendant is entitled to benefit from the reforms enacted by the Legislature based upon its judgment that the prior sentencing scheme for drug offenses like that committed by the defendant was excessively harsh, has not been rebutted” … . People v Green, 2013 NY Slip Op 06588, 2nd Dept 10-9-13

 

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