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Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Apply When Biological Mother Opposes Paternity Petition

In affirming Family Court’s dismissal of a paternity petition, the Fourth Department explained that the doctrine of equitable estoppel, urged to bar the mother from denying petitioner is the father of the child, did not apply:

“[T]he Court of Appeals has recently reiterated that a nonbiological, nonadoptive parent does not have standing to seek visitation when a biological parent who is fit opposes it, and that equitable estoppel does not apply in such situations even where the nonparent has enjoyed a close relationship with the child and exercised some control over the child with the parent’s consent” … .  It is well settled “that parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption” …, and that “Alison D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in [custody situations] otherwise fraught with the risk of ‘disruptive . . . battles’ . . . over parentage as a prelude to further potential combat over custody and visitation” … .  As the Court of Appeals has stated, “any change in the meaning of ‘parent’ under our law should come by way of legislative enactment rather than judicial revamping of precedent” … .  Matter of White v Wilcox, 903, 4th Dept 9-27-13

 

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