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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / Court, Not Prosecutor, Must Determine Whether Defendant Is Eligible for...
Criminal Law

Court, Not Prosecutor, Must Determine Whether Defendant Is Eligible for Youthful Offender Adjudication

In remitting the matter to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as a youthful offender, the Fourth Department explained that is was unclear whether the court, as opposed to the prosecutor, made the determination not to afford defendant youthful offender status:

“After receipt of a written report of the [preplea or presentence] investigation and at the time of pronouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender” (CPL 720.20 [1]).  In People v Rudolph (___ NY3d ___ [June 27, 2013]), the Court of Appeals held that section 720.20 mandates that, when the sentence is imposed, the sentencing court must determine whether to grant youthful offender status to every defendant who is eligible for it.  The Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he judgment of a court as to which young people have a real likelihood of turning their lives around is just too valuable, both to the offender and to the community, to be sacrificed in plea bargaining” … . People v Brownell, 946, 4th Dept 9-27-13

 

September 27, 2013
Tags: Fourth Department, SENTENCING, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS
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