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Gaps in Treatment Precluded “Continuous Treatment Doctrine” in Medical Malpractice Suit—Action Time-Barred

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court and granted summary judgment to the defendant in a medical malpractice action finding the action was time-barred because the continuous treatment doctrine did not apply:

Although the plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine, they failed to raise a triable issue of fact in that regard … . The plaintiffs’ decedent received treatment from the defendant over a 17-year period for recurrent bladder tumors. After his initial diagnosis, in 1991, the decedent typically returned for treatment only when he was symptomatic, experiencing hematuria. Thus, between December 1999 and April 2003, and again, from December 2004 until October 2007, the decedent did not visit with the defendant. As a result of these temporal gaps, because the decedent did not continue to seek a course of treatment, any continuity in treatment that had existed was severed … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss, as time-barred, so much of the complaint as was based upon alleged acts of medical malpractice and lack of informed consent committed prior to December 22, 2006… . Peykarian v Yin Chu Chien, 2013 NY slip Op 05809, 2nd Dept 9-11-13

 

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