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Child Should Not Have Been Removed from Foster Parents in Favor of Maternal Uncle

In reversing Family Court’s determination the child should move to the home of her maternal uncle rather than remain with her foster parents for adoption, the Second Department wrote:

Once parental rights have been terminated, there is no presumption favoring the child’s biological family … . Moreover, while the law expresses a preference for keeping siblings together, the rule is not absolute and may be overcome where the best interests of each child lie in residing apart … . Here, as the children never shared a household, the Family Court erred in concluding that this consideration outweighed the benefit to Orianne of remaining in her foster home, where she has resided since infancy … . The record clearly reflects that Orianne has bonded with her foster family, and is healthy, happy, and well provided for … . Accordingly, the Family Court erred in determining that it was in Oriane’s best interests to move to the home of her maternal uncle rather than remain with her foster parents for the purpose of adoption, which, the record indicates, is the foster parents’ intent… . Matter of Ender MZ-P…, 2013 NY Slip Op 05829, 2nd Dept 9-11-13

 

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