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Motion for Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint Should Have Been Denied—Question of Fact Re: Whether Spanish Document Was a Judgment

The First Department determined that a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 3213 to enforce a Spanish court’s award of damages against the defendant should not have been granted.  Experts disagreed about whether the Spanish document was an enforceable judgment.  The First Department explained the criteria for recognizing foreign decrees (CPLR 5302) and for determining a motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint (CPLR 3213):

A motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint (CPLR 3213) is based on an “instrument for the payment of money only or upon any judgment.” The statute allows a plaintiff an expedited procedure for entry of a judgment by filing and service of a summons and a set of motion papers that contain sufficient evidentiary detail for the plaintiff to establish entitlement to summary judgment (see David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3213:8).

CPLR 5302 provides that New York will recognize foreign decrees that are “final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending.” Here, the parties’ Spanish law experts disagree as to whether the document here, denominated a “ruling” (“auto” in Spanish), is enforceable as a judgment. *  *  *

The conflicting evidence as to whether the ruling is final, conclusive and enforceable in Spain precludes plaintiff from obtaining an accelerated judgment pursuant to CPLR 3213.  Sea Trade Mar Corp v Coutsodontis, 2013 NY Slip Op 05599, 1st Dept 8-13-13

 

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