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Firefighter Rule Prohibiting Negligence Suit by Injured Police Officer Applied/Action Under Municipal Law 205-e Allowed

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, the Second Department determined a police officer who was injured when she fell off the back of a flat bed truck while loading police barricades could not sue in negligence (based on the firefighter rule) but could sue under General Municipal Law 205-e based on an alleged violation of Labor Law 27-a (which imposes a general duty to provide a safe work environment):

Re: the applicability of the firefighter rule:

…[T]he firefighter rule provides that “[p]olice and firefighters may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment” …. The rule bars a police officer’s or a firefighter’s recovery ” when the performance of his or her duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury'” … * * *

While loading a flatbed truck may not be a task that is typically associated with police work, the alleged accident occurred while the plaintiff was on a police vehicle, loading police barriers, and while she was assigned to the barrier truck detail, a location and job detail to which she was exposed solely as a result of her duties as a police officer… .  * * *

Re: the viability of the General Municipal Law 205-e cause of action:

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the Legislature has, on several occasions, “sought to ameliorate the harsh effects of the [firefighter] rule” …. To that end, in 1935, the Legislature first enacted General Municipal Law § 205-a, which created a cause of action for firefighters who, while in the line of duty, are injured as a result of violations of statutes or regulations (see General Municipal Law § 205-a; L 1935, ch 800, § 2; L 1936, ch 251, § 1). In 1989, the Legislature enacted General Municipal Law § 205-e in direct response to Santangelo v State of New York (71 NY2d 393), which ,,,had extended the firefighter rule to police officers… .  * * *

…[T]he plaintiff has alleged that the defendants’ Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1) violation is a predicate for her General Municipal Law § 205-e cause of action. Section 205-e does not stand alone and must be predicated on a violation of a separate legal requirement. …[T]he Court of Appeals, in addressing the various amendments to General Municipal Law § 205-e, has stated “that we should apply this provision expansively’ so as to favor recovery by police officers whenever possible”… .

Since section 27-a provides an objective standard by which the actions or omissions of a public employer, such as the City, can be measured for purposes of liability, Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1) can serve as a predicate for a section 205-e claim… .  Gammons v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 05298, Second Dept 7-17-13

 

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