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Attorney’s Illness Was Adequate Excuse—Vacation of Preclusion Order Allowed

The Fourth Department affirmed Supreme Court’s allowing plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to respond to discovery demands, after the court had precluded plaintiff for not responding.  Plaintiff’s attorney’s illness provided a reasonable excuse, and the expert’s affirmation (later converted to an affidavit as directed by the court) demonstrated a meritorious action:

“It is well established that the illness of an attorney may constitute a reasonable excuse for a default… . In support of the motion, plaintiff’s counsel averred that, from early 2010 until shortly before his motion to vacate the default order, he was suffering from recurring health issues stemming from two heart attacks, a serious infection requiring hospitalization, and uncontrolled Type II diabetes. According to counsel, those medical issues “affected [his] health in an ongoing manner and prevented [him] from diligently and timely responding to [defendants’] demands in this case.” There is no evidence that counsel’s neglect in this case was “willful, contumacious or manifested bad faith” … . Particularly in light of New York’s “strong public policy . . . [in favor of] disposing of cases on their merits”…, we conclude that “[w]here, as here, there is no evidence of willfulness, deliberate default, or prejudice to the defendants, the interest of justice is best served by permitting the case to be decided on its merits” ….  Loucks v Klimek, 477, 4th Dept 7-5-13

 

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