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The Term “Casualty” In Lease Covered Flooding Due to Malfunctioning HVAC System

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was the owner and landlord of a building and defendant was a commercial tenant.  Section 7.04 of the lease stated: “each party releases the other with respect to any claim (including a claim for negligence) which it might otherwise have against the other party for loss, damage or destruction with respect to its property by fire or other casualty . . . occurring during the terms of this Lease” … .  A gauge in the HVAC system burst, causing flooding. Plaintiff sued defendant for the cost of repair, alleging defendant failed to maintain the HVAC system.  The issue was whether the word “casualty” in the lease meant “act of god” only, or included damage from human error.  The First Department (reversing Supreme Court) determined human error was included in the meaning of “casualty:”

[W]here a clause is unambiguous, contract language and terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning…. Here, the lease provides that the parties agreed on mutual releases in case of damage “by fire or other casualty.” In light of this phrasing, in which “other casualty” is placed in the same category as “fire,” it cannot be said that the word “casualty” excludes events resulting from human error. On the contrary, a fire might have myriad causes, many of which do result from human error. However, the parties did not restrict the types of fires that would fall under the release — for example, by stating that only fires caused by severe weather or other natural causes would trigger a release from liability. Accordingly, the phrase “fire or other casualty,” as construed by an ordinary business person, would describe an event, rather than the cause of that event. 45 Broadway Owner LLC v NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 2013 NY Slip Op 04895, 1st Dept 6-27-13

 

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