You are here: / / Orange County Executive Did Not Have Authority to Terminate County Employees...
,

Orange County Executive Did Not Have Authority to Terminate County Employees Before County Legislature Eliminated Positions

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court and determined the Orange County Executive did not have the authority to terminate county employees before the legislature acted to removed funding for the positions:

The doctrine of “[l]egislative equivalency requires that a position created by a legislative act can only be abolished by correlative legislative act”…. Pursuant to section 2.02(1) of the Orange County Charter and Orange County Administrative Code, the Orange County Legislature possesses sole authority to “establish or abolish positions of employment and titles thereof.” Here, the County Legislature had not taken any action to abolish the subject positions at the time the County Executive terminated the subject employees’ employment. While the Orange County Charter and Orange County Administrative Code give the County Executive the authority to “supervise, direct and control and administer all departments” (Orange County Charter § 3.02[e]; Administrative Code § 3.02[e]), they do not give the County Executive the authority to terminate the employment of civil service employees without a proper abolition of the positions by the County Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of legislative equivalency…. Further, County Charter § 4.10(a) does not authorize the County Executive to undertake any “remedial action” constituting, inter alia, unilateral modification to the budget and/or abolition of legislatively created positions…. Therefore, under these circumstances, the County Executive did not have the authority to terminate the subject employees’ employment for economic reasons, effective October 29, 2010.   Matter of Civil Serv Empls Assn Inc v County of Orange, 2013 NY Slip Op 04798, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF IS THE SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE PLAINTIFF IN A PRIOR IDENTICAL ACTION WHICH WAS DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND ORDERS; THE INSTANT ACTION IS PRECLUDED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA (FIRST DEPT).
NO EVIDENCE ICE ON WHICH PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WAS FORMED BEFORE THE STORM, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE STORM IN PROGRESS RULE (SECOND DEPT).
THE INDICTMENT CHARGED DEFENDANT WITH POSSESSION OF A WEAPON OUTSIDE HIS HOME OR BUSINESS; THE JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY THEY NEED ONLY FIND DEFENDANT POSSESSED A LOADED FIREARM; THE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON CONVICTION WAS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH HARMLESS, IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS WITHOUT AUTHENTICATING THE ACCOUNTS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT).
COUNTY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE THREATENED DEFENDANT WITH THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE SHOULD SHE GO TO TRIAL, PLEA VACATED, APPELLATE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE ISSUE ON APPEAL, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ANY GROUND FOR A DISCLAIMER NOT MENTIONED IN THE DISCLAIMER LETTER IS WAIVED.
IN THIS BATSON CHALLENGE CASE, THE MAJORITY HELD THE DEFENSE’S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE PROSECUTOR’S STATED REASON FOR EXCLUDING A PROSPECTIVE JUROR, I.E. THAT THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR WAS NOT AFRICAN-AMERICAN, PRECLUDED APPEAL ON THAT ISSUE; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE THREE-STEP BATSON PROCEDURE WAS NOT FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO THAT JUROR, REQUIRING REVERSAL (SECOND DEPT).
BANK’S EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Hospital Can Be Vicariously Liable for Actions of Non-employee Physician Under... Resentencing (Re: Postrelease Supervision) of Defendants Who Have Completed...