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Failure to Get Court’s Permission to Represent to a Grand Jury Required Dismissal of Indictment​

The First Department determined that the prosecutor’s failure to get court permission to represent a case to a grand jury need not be preserved by objection and required dismissal of the indictment:

The failure to obtain court authorization to re-present the charges to a second grand jury implicates the power to prosecute…; thus, defendant was not required to alert the court to the authorization requirement of CPL 190.75(3), or otherwise object, in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. Where, as here, the prosecutor presented charges and the grand jury failed to vote to either dismiss them or indict the defendant, a situation arose “in which the court, and not the prosecutor, should have decided whether re-presentation to a second grand jury was appropriate”…. In the absence of court authorization, dismissal of the indictment is required …. People v Miller, 2013 NY Slip Op 03928, 1st Dept, 5-30-13

 

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