You are here: / / No Action Where Plaintiff Struck by Small Piece of Sheetrock Dropped from...

No Action Where Plaintiff Struck by Small Piece of Sheetrock Dropped from Third Floor

Plaintiff was struck by a small piece of sheetrock a worker dropped from the third floor.  In affirming the dismissal of the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, the Second Department wrote:

As the Court of Appeals has observed, not every injury caused by a falling object at a construction site is covered by the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1)…. Rather, in a “falling object” case under Labor Law § 240(1)…, a plaintiff must show that, at the time the object fell, it was “being hoisted or secured” … or “required securing for the purposes of the undertaking”…. The plaintiff also must show that the object fell “because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute”…. The statute does not apply in situations in which a hoisting or securing device of the type enumerated in the statute would not be necessary or expected…. Moncayo v Curtis Partition Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03644, 2nd Dept, 5-22-13

 

You might also like
A FORECLOSURE ACTION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING DOES NOT ACCELERATE THE MORTGAGE DEBT AND DOES NOT TRIGGER THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT).
WHEN A PARTY BRINGS A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE IN THE COUNTY TO WHICH THE PARTY WANTS VENUE CHANGED, AS OPPOSED TO THE COUNTY WHERE THE ACTION WAS STARTED, THE PARTY MUST USE THE SPECIAL PROCEDURE IN CPLR 511 (A) AND (B), WHICH REQUIRES MAKING A DEMAND ON THE OTHER PARTY BEFORE BRINGING A MOTION; HERE THE SPECIAL PROCEDURE WAS NOT USED, THE MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE WAS MADE IN THE “WRONG COUNTY” AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Presumption Vehicle Was Being Driven with the Owner’s Consent (Vehicle & Traffic Law 388) Was Not Overcome by Testimony of Vehicle Owner and Her Daughter—Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Awarded on that Ground
DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL DID NOT REMAIN VALID AFTER DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO A DIFFERENT CRIME WHEN THE INITIAL SENTENCE PROMISE COULD NOT BE FULFILLED (SECOND DEPT).
BARKING AND STRAINING AT THE LEASH CONSTITUTE NORMAL CANINE BEHAVIOR AND DID NOT SERVE TO MAKE DEFENDANTS AWARE OF THE DOG’S ALLEGED VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE CONDITION OF SIDEWALKS BUT NOT CITY OWNED TREE WELLS, UNLESS THEY AFFIRMATIVELY CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, NEGLIGENTLY REPAIR THE AREA, OR CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION BY A SPECIAL USE; HERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL BECAUSE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE WELL, NOT THE SIDEWALK, AND NONE OF THE OTHER LIABILITY THEORIES APPLIED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE MORTGAGE IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING, THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Fall from Unfolded Step Ladder Stated Claim​ Single-Family House Exemption to Labor Law Action Applied