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Whether the “Assault and Battery” Exclusion from Coverage Pertained to an Arson Is a Question of Fact Which Depends Upon the Motives of the Arsonist

A fire in plaintiff’s building left several people dead or injured.  A person was arrested and charged with arson in connection with the fire. The plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the defendant insurance company was required to defend and indemnify plaintiff.  The main issue was whether the policy exclusion of damages caused by assault and battery applied. The First Department affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the insurance company’s affirmative defenses, i.e., the assault and battery exclusion and the lack of bodily injury caused by accident or occurrence.  The First Department wrote:

Civil assault and battery are intentional acts, and the assault offenses with which the accused arsonist is charged do not include the intent to harm a specific individual (compare PJI 2d 3:2 [assault]; 3:3 [battery], with Penal Law 120.10[4] [assault in the first degree]; 120.05[6] [assault in the second degree]). Thus, assuming that the insurance policy exclusion is triggered by civil, rather than criminal, assault or battery, the critical inquiry is whether the accused arsonist, in allegedly causing the fire, intended to harm any occupant of the building. Although the determination of the criminal action is therefore not necessary to a determination of the application of the exclusion, the criminal trial may shed light on the accused arsonist’s motives, including whether he intended to harm anyone inside the building. In any event, the criminal trial may enable defendant to obtain access to evidence and witnesses that will assist in determining whether the exclusion applies. Based on representations made at oral argument, the criminal trial has been concluded and, thus, the stay should be lifted. In light of the foregoing, the motion court correctly denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the affirmative defenses based on the assault and battery exclusion and the lack of bodily injury caused by an accident or occurrence.  20-35 86th St Realty, LLC v Tower Ins Co of NY, 2013 NY Slip Op 03413, 1st Dept, 5-14-13

 

 

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