Jurisdiction Was Gained Over Out-of State Manufacturer Under Two Provisions of CPLR 302
Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a tree stand made by an out-of-state manufacturer and distributed in New York through Dick’s Sporting Goods. In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Fourth Department outlined the statutory and due process requirements for good service upon a foreign corporation under CPLR 302. The court wrote:
Here, defendant had an exclusive distributorship agreement with Dick’s, and maintained a website that provided information relating to its products, directed consumers to retail locations where they could purchase the products, and allowed for the direct purchase of the products through a credit card. Therefore, defendant was transacting business in New York through the use of its website, and the court properly concluded that there is long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).
… [D]efendant is subject to long- arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii). Under that provision, courts “may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who . . . commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person . . . within the state . . . if he .expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” “The conferral of jurisdiction under [that] provision rests on five elements: First, that defendant committed a tortious act outside the State; second, that the cause of action arises from that act; third, that the act caused injury to a person or property within the State; fourth, that defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the State; and fifth, that defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce” …. Halas v Dick’s Sporting Goods…Big Dog Treestands, Inc, CA 12-01868, 336, 4th Dept, 4-26-13