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Allegations In Motion to Suppress Insufficient to Warrant Hearing

In concluding a suppression hearing (re: statements by the defendant) was properly denied, the Fourth Department explained the relevant analytical criteria:

It is well settled that ” [h]earings are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations’ ” … . Here, “[t]he allegations in defendant’s moving papers, when considered in the context of the detailed information provided to defendant, were insufficient to create a factual dispute requiring such a hearing . . . Defendant . . . did not address the specific allegations set forth in the felony complaint” and the other discovery materials provided to him …, which included the relevant grand jury testimony of the witness. Thus, the court properly denied the motion without conducting a hearing based on the insufficiency of the allegations and, under the circumstances of this case … . People v Mitchell, 2015 NY Slip Op 07411, 4th Dept 10-9-15

 

Motion Papers Sufficient to Warrant a Probable Cause Hearing, Criteria Described

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion papers were sufficient to warrant a probable cause hearing. No affidavit from the defendant is required. The Fourth Department explained the analytical criteria:

As the People correctly concede, the court erred in determining that defendant was not entitled to a hearing because his motion papers did not include an affidavit from defendant (see CPL 710.60 [1]…). The court also erred in determining that the factual assertions contained in defendant’s moving papers were insufficient to warrant a hearing.

In determining whether a hearing is required pursuant to CPL 710.60, “the sufficiency of defendant’s factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant’s access to information” … . Here, considering defendant’s limited access to information regarding the basis for the actions of the arresting officers, he “could do little more than dispute the circumstances surrounding his arrest . . . [D]efendant’s lack of access to information precluded more specific factual allegations and created factual disputes, the resolution of which required a hearing” … . People v Jones, 2015 NY Slip Op 07392, 4th Dept 10-9-15

 

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Defendant Entitled to Suppression Hearing Where People Provided No Information About How Defendant Came to the Attention of Law Enforcement Personnel

The First Department determined the defendant’s motion papers, although conclusory, were sufficient to warrant a hearing on whether defendant’s statements should be suppressed.  The People had provided no information about how the defendant came to the attention of law enforcement:

Although the People provided defendant with extensive information about the facts of the crime and the proof to be offered at trial, they provided no information whatsoever, at any stage of the proceedings, about how defendant came to be a suspect, and the basis for her arrest, made hours after the crime at a different location. The People never explained, even by implication, whether defendant met a description, was named by a witness familiar with her, or was connected to the crime in some other way. While the People disclosed defendant’s detailed confession, it did not shed any light on how she came to be arrested … .

Accordingly, given defendant’s complete lack of relevant information, that portion of her motion papers alleging a “lack of probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the unreliability of the information provided to the police and/or the insufficiency of the description,” while conclusory, was sufficient to state a basis for suppression and raise a factual issue requiring a hearing … . People v Wynn, 2014 NY Slip Op 03352, 1st Dept 5-8-14

 

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Defense Counsel’s Absence When Judge Decided to Replace a Sick Juror Not Preserved by Objection/Court Need Not Put on the Record Its Consideration of Alternatives to Courtroom Closure/Factual Allegations Insufficient to Justify a Suppression Hearing

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a dissent, determined defense counsel’s absence from the courtroom when the judge put on the record that he was replacing a sick juror was not a mode of proceedings error and was not preserved by objection. Defense counsel entered the courtroom just as the judge seated the alternate juror and did not object. The Court of Appeals also determined the trial judge was not required to put on the record his consideration of measures other than the closure of the courtroom when undercover officers testified, and sufficient facts were not raised in the defense motion papers to justify a suppression hearing:

Here, although defense counsel was not present in court while the judge was stating on the record that he intended to replace the sick juror and counsel for co-defendant was objecting to that replacement, the record shows that prior to arriving in the courtroom, counsel was aware from his discussion with the court that there was a sick juror and that the court had previously excused an alternate juror for psychological reasons. Most importantly, defense counsel was in the courtroom when the judge told the alternate to take the seat of the sick juror. If counsel had any objection to the replacement of the juror, including a desire to be heard further on the issue, he had the time and the opportunity to make his position known. It was incumbent upon him to raise an objection at that time, before the trial proceeded. Certainly, the better practice would have been for the trial judge to await counsel’s arrival before placing his decision regarding the juror on the record. While, as the dissent notes, defense counsel was absent during the on-the-record discussion about dismissing the juror, nonetheless, counsel was present at the critical time when the sick juror was being replaced by the alternate, and counsel did not raise any objection concerning the right to counsel or otherwise, at a time when the trial court had the opportunity to change course. * * *

… [T]his Court has rejected the argument that United States Supreme Court precedent requires a trial court to explain, on the record, the alternatives to closure that it considered (People v Echevarria, 21 NY3d 1, 18 [2013]; People v Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 504 [1997]). Rather, we have concluded that where the record establishes, as it does here, the need to close a portion of the proceedings, “it can be implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated interest”… . * * *

… [D]efendant’s simple denial that he was not engaged in any criminal conduct at the time he was stopped did not raise any issue of fact requiring a [suppression] hearing. It was defendant’s role in the conspiracy … and his conduct … at the time of the purchase of the kilogram of cocaine that provided probable cause to arrest him. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent upon defendant to refute the allegations in order to obtain a hearing. People v Garay, 2015 NY Slip Op 02672, CtApp 3-31-15

 

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Bare Allegation in an Attorney Affidavit that, Upon Information and Belief, the Deputies Lacked Probable Cause to Arrest Defendant, Not Enough to Justify a Hearing on a Suppression Motion

In finding defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied without a hearing, the Third Department explained what is required to warrant a hearing:

“A motion seeking suppression of evidence ‘must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact . . . supporting such grounds'” … . A hearing in this regard is neither “automatic [n]or generally available [simply] for the asking” … and, except in circumstances not present here (see CPL 710.60 [3] [b]; 710.20 [3], [6]), the trial court “may summarily deny the motion if the papers do not allege a legal basis for suppression or if the factual allegations do not as a matter of law support any alleged ground” … . Here, in support of her suppression motion, defendant tendered the affidavit of her attorney, who merely asserted — upon information and belief — that the deputies in question lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. This “bare allegation of a lack of probable cause, without any factual support, was insufficient to require a hearing” … . People v Briskin, 2015 NY Slip Op 01493, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

Papers Sufficient to Require Suppression Hearing—No Need to Allege Expectation of Privacy Where Police Act Illegally

In finding defendant’s papers were sufficient to require a suppression hearing (re: the suppression of a gun), the Second Department noted that the defendant was not required to demonstrate he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area the gun was found because the motion alleged the gun was seized as a result of illegal police conduct:

A motion to suppress evidence must state the grounds of the motion and contain sworn allegations of fact supporting such grounds (see CPL 710.60[1]…). “It is fundamental that a motion may be decided without a hearing unless the papers submitted raise a factual dispute on a material point which must be resolved before the court can decide the legal issue” (…see CPL 710.60[3][b],,,). In testing the sufficiency of a defendant’s factual allegations, a court should consider “(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant’s access to information” … .

Here, the allegations in the defendant’s papers, when considered in the context of the information provided by the People, raised a factual dispute requiring a hearing … . Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s motion papers contained the requisite sworn allegations of fact … . Moreover, the defendant was not required to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the gun was found …, since, under both the defendant’s and the People’s versions of events, the dispositive issue was whether the gun was recovered as a direct result of unlawful police action …. In light of the foregoing, the County Court should not have denied suppression without conducting a hearing. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the County Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing and a new determination thereafter of that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to suppress physical evidence.  People v Jennings, 2013 NY Slip Op 06384, 2nd Dept 10-2-13

 

No Requirement that Defendant Submit Affidavit in Support of Suppression Motion; No Requirement Defendant Deny Commission of Charged Offense to Warrant a Hearing on a Suppression Motion

Although the denial of defendant’s suppression motion was affirmed, the Fourth Department noted the trial court erred when it stated the suppression motion must be supported by an affidavit from the defendant and the defendant must deny participation in the alleged crime to warrant a hearing:

We agree with defendant that the court erred in ruling that defendant, in order to be entitled to a suppression hearing, was required to submit an affidavit in support of her motion.  As the Court of Appeals has stated, “suppression motions must be in writing, state the legal ground of the motion and ‘contain sworn allegations of fact,’ made by defendant or ‘another person’ ” … . .  A suppression motion may be based on factual allegations made upon information and belief by defense counsel, provided that, as here, the sources of the attorney’s information and the grounds of his or her belief are identified in the motion papers (see CPL 710.60 [1]).  The court also erred in suggesting that defendant was required to deny participation in the crime.  It is well settled that a defendant must either “deny participating in the transaction or suggest some other grounds for suppression” in order to warrant a suppression hearing… . People v Battle, 926, 4th Dept 9-27-13

 

Defendant’s Papers Deemed Insufficient to Trigger Need for Suppression Hearing

The Third Department determined the defendant’s motion papers did not demonstrate the need for a suppression hearing:

Because defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to justify a hearing, County Court did not err in summarily denying defendant’s motion for a Mapp hearing…. Motion papers seeking suppression of evidence “must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact . . . supporting such grounds” (CPL 710.60 [1]).A hearing is not automatic; a court may summarily deny the motion if the papers do not allege a legal basis for suppression  or if the factual allegations do not as a matter of law support any alleged ground (see CPL 710.60 [3];…) “[F]actual sufficiency should be determined with reference to the face of the pleadings, the context of the motion and [the] defendant’s access to information”….  Here, defendant made his motion after he was supplied with the search warrant application, supporting documents and return, as well as discovery. He had resolved the other criminal charges that precipitated the warrant application, providing him with information related to the situation surrounding the application. In these circumstances, defendant’s bare allegation of a lack of probable cause, without any factual support, was insufficient to require a hearing …   Accordingly, the court properly determined that a hearing was not necessary to decide the motion. People v Vanness, 103553, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

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