The Fourth Department determined the defendant’s wearing of a “stun belt” during his trial (unbeknownst to the judge and to which no objection was made) did not constitute a mode of proceedings error. The dissent argued to the contrary, characterizing the sheriff’s use of the stun belt without the court’s involvement as a usurpation of the power of the court:
County Court could not have granted defendant’s motion under CPL 440.10 (1) (f) unless the unauthorized use of the stun belt at trial constitutes a mode of proceedings error, in which case reversal would have been required on direct appeal if the use of the stun belt had been disclosed on the record … .
We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that the improper use of the stun belt, i.e., at the direction of the Sheriff rather than the court, constitutes a mode of proceedings error.
Indeed, we note that a mode of proceedings error occurs “[w]here the procedure adopted by the court . . . is at a basic variance with the mandate of law” …, and that is not the case here. We further note that in Buchanan the court deferred to the Sheriff, indeed delegated to the Sheriff, the determination whether defendant should wear the stun belt after the court acknowledged that defendant had done nothing to merit it (see Buchanan, 13 NY3d at 3), but the Court of Appeals did not find the error to be a mode of proceedings error. Instead, the Court of Appeals simply ruled that the court failed to exercise its discretion… . People v Schrock, 800, 4th Dept 7-19-13