The Court of Appeals held that the admission at trial of statements made by the defendant indicating he had committed murders other than the murder with which he was charged “did not rise to the level of constitutional injury such as ineffectiveness of counsel or juror partiality.” Therefore, the harmless error doctrine applied and, in light of the evidence against the defendant, the conviction was affirmed. People v Byer, No 84, CtApp, 4-25-13
In this sexual-crimes case, the Third Department discussed (among other issues): (1) the application of speedy trial rules when an initial indictment is dismissed and then charges stemming from the same incident are brought more than six months later in a second indictment; (2) the sufficiency of proof of the victim’s helplessness (intoxication); and (3) the inadmissibility of an experiment (opening a door with a credit card to demonstrate how defendant could have entered the house) which had nothing to do with the trial evidence. All but two of the convictions were affirmed. In reversing the two convictions which were based entirely on the defendant’s confession, the Third Department wrote:
We find that defendant’s convictions of criminal sexual act in the first degree must be reversed. “A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him [or her] without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed” (CPL 60.50). While this additional proof “need not corroborate every detail of the confession” …, both of defendant’s criminal sexual act convictions were based solely upon his uncorroborated admissions that he performed oral sex on the victim. Defendant’s presence at the scene did not provide the necessary corroboration because the issue is not his identity or connection to the crime but, instead, whether the crimes occurred at all. As there was no corroborating proof “of whatever weight,” these charges must be dismissed… . People v Bjork, 104014, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13
In this case the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of a three-year-old child. In his statement to the police, the defendant said the child fell while she was in the shower. At trial the defendant testified the child also fell on the stairs. The trial court gave an “inconsistent statements” charge to the jury, finding it would have been reasonable and logical for the defendant to have mentioned the fall on the stairs in his statement to police. In upholding the trial court, the Third Department wrote:
In its general instructions to the jury, County Court included a charge regarding a witness testifying to a fact that the witness omitted at a prior time when it would have been reasonable and logical to have stated the fact (see CJI2d[NY] Credibility of Witnesses [Inconsistent Statements]).Defendant contends that this constituted error. Defendant had given a detailed voluntary statement to police regarding the pertinent events surrounding the victim’s death. He did not include in that statement an account of the victim purportedly falling on the stairs while coming to eat lunch, but he testified regarding such event at trial. Since it would be reasonable to expect defendant to mention all potential injuries sustained by the victim while in his care that day, including this charge did not constitute reversible error.
In addition, the Third Department found no error in the trial court’s allowing evidence of prior injuries revealed by the autopsy and two injuries incurred by the child when she was in defendant’s care. This evidence of “similar uncharged crimes” was deemed admissible under Molineux to demonstrate “the absence of an accident” as the cause of the child’s injuries. People v Tinkler, 103766, 3rd Dept 4-11-13
In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, the First Department upheld the denial of defendant’s suppression motions. After hearing gun shots police officers approached the defendant. After defendant answered a couple of questions he “began to place his hand in his back pocket.” At that point, the officer grabbed defendant’s arm and told defendant he wanted to frisk the defendant before allowing him to reach in his pockets. As the officer began to frisk the defendant, the defendant ran and was brought the ground. A firearm, still warm, was taken from the defendant’s back pocket. Written statements subsequently given by the defendant were suppressed by the trial court because of a Miranda violation. A videotaped statement, made seven hours after the tainted written statements, was deemed admissible:
Prior to pleading guilty, defendant moved to suppress a gun, recovered from his pocket, and videotaped statements he made to the prosecution as fruits of an unlawful seizure. He also moved to suppress the statements as obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We conclude that the facts disclosed in the record were such as to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that defendant was reaching for a weapon when the arresting officer grabbed his arm. We also find that defendant’s videotaped statements were not suppressible, notwithstanding the suppression of prior written statements made more than seven hours earlier to police officers, because the videotaped statements were attenuated by a “definite, pronounced break in the interrogation” … . People v Davis, 2012 NY Slip Op 02337, 6129, 9270, 1st Dept 4-4-13
In an opinion by Judge Graffeo, in addressing the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the strategic reasons for not requesting that the jury be charged with lesser included offenses and for not requesting a severance when culpability is arguably unequal were discussed. In addition, the Court of Appeals addressed the level of corroborative evidence needed to allow into evidence an admission/confession made by the defendant (Criminal Procedure Law 60.50). The judgment of conviction was affirmed People v McGee, No. 30, CtApp 3-21-13
A 19-year preindictment delay did not violate defendant’s speedy trial and due process rights. The charge was murder. The defendant was at liberty until indicted. The People established good cause for the delay in that the case was not ready to bring to a grand jury until the statements of three witnesses and DNA test results were obtained. The Fourth Department held that there was no need for a Singer hearing to determine the reason for the delay because there was no issue of fact with respect to the cause of the delay and the record provided County Court with a sufficient basis to determine whether the delay was justified. The admission of prior incidents of domestic violence against the victim (defendant’s wife) was proper because the evidence was probative of defendant’s motive, intent and identity. The defendant was not entitled to a circumstantial evidence charge because the admissions he made about killing his wife constituted direct evidence. People v Rogers, 1425, KA 11-00012 4th Dept. 2-1-13
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