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Tag Archive for: second

Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges, Mental Hygiene Law

IN THIS MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RESPONDENT, WHO HAD SERVED HIS SENTENCE FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES, REQUIRED CIVIL MANAGEMENT, HEARSAY BASED EXPERT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE AND EVIDENCE FROM ONE OF RESPONDENT’S VICTIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the jury’s finding that respondent did not suffer from a mental abnormality requiring civil management, determined that hearsay based expert evidence offered by the state, and evidence of violence and sexual offenses offered by one of respondent’s victims should not have been excluded:

… [T]he State’s expert should have been permitted to give hearsay basis testimony regarding a statement made to her by the respondent’s sexual abuse victim. “In article 10 trials, hearsay basis evidence is admissible if it satisfies two criteria. First, the proponent must demonstrate through evidence that the hearsay is reliable. Second, the court must determine that the probative value in helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect” … . Here, the State established the reliability of this hearsay basis testimony since the respondent was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree with respect to this victim … .. Moreover, the probative value of this hearsay basis testimony in helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion testimony substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect … .

The Supreme Court also erred in precluding a certain witness from testifying at trial regarding violence and sexual offenses that the respondent allegedly committed against her. The witness’s proposed testimony, which was not hearsay … , was relevant to the issue of whether the respondent suffered from a mental abnormality … , and the probative value of such testimony outweighed its prejudicial impact, particularly since the State’s expert expressly considered this proposed testimony in forming her opinion that the respondent suffered from sexual sadism … . Matter of State of New York v Kevin W., 2025 NY Slip Op 00455, Second Dept 1-29-25

Practice Point: Hearsay based expert evidence is admissible in a Mental Hygiene Law Article civil-management 10 trial if it is reliable and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

 

January 29, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-01-29 09:15:012025-02-02 09:52:17IN THIS MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RESPONDENT, WHO HAD SERVED HIS SENTENCE FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES, REQUIRED CIVIL MANAGEMENT, HEARSAY BASED EXPERT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE AND EVIDENCE FROM ONE OF RESPONDENT’S VICTIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ASSERT THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAIINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING WITH ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should have been allowed to amend the answer to assert the lack-of-standing defense and plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing with admissible evidence:

“In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, applications to amend or supplement a pleading are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” ( …see CPLR 3025[b]). The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion … . “‘Mere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine'”… . Here, BAC Home failed to show that any surprise or prejudice would result from the proposed amendments and did not demonstrate that the proposed amendments were palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit … .

The defendant did not waive the defense of lack of standing by failing to interpose the defense in his original answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see RPAPL 1302-a).

Here, in order to establish its standing, BAC Home [plaintiff’s predecessor] submitted affidavits from two document execution representatives of Ditech [plaintiff], each of whom stated that review of Ditech’s business records relating to the subject mortgage loan had confirmed that BAC Home was in possession of the note at the time the action was commenced. However, neither affiant identified any particular document reviewed, nor did they attach to their respective affidavits any admissible document to show that BAC Home possessed the note prior to the commencement of this action. The affidavits also failed to show that either affiant possessed personal knowledge of whether BAC Home possessed the note prior to the commencement of the action. Under these circumstances, the affidavits constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked any probative value (see CPLR 4518[a] …). Ditech Fin., LLC v Khan, 2020 NY Slip Op 07865, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

December 23, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-12-23 13:55:292020-12-26 13:57:33THE MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ASSERT THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAIINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING WITH ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

RISK ASSESSMENT REDUCED FROM TWO TO ONE; DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF STATUTORY RAPE WHEN HE WAS 22; THE VICTIMS, WHO WERE 15 AND 16, INITIATED THE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing defendant’s risk assessment to level one, determined the Louisiana statutory rape conviction did not warrant a 25 point assessment. The defendant was 22 at the time and the victims, who initiated the consensual encounter, were 15 and 16:

“In cases of statutory rape, the Board has long recognized that strict application of the Guidelines may in some instances result in overassessment of the offender’s risk to public safety. The Guidelines provide that ‘[t]he Board or a court may choose to depart downward in an appropriate case and in those instances where (i) the victim’s lack of consent is due only to inability to consent by virtue of age and (ii) scoring 25 points in this category [risk factor 2, for sexual contact with the victim] results in an over-assessment of the offender’s risk to public safety'” … .

Considering all of the circumstances present here, including that this offense is the only sex-related crime in the defendant’s history, the defendant accepted responsibility for his crimes and was sentenced minimally in Louisiana, the assessment of 25 points under risk factor 2 results in an overassessment of the defendant’s risk to public safety … . People v Brocato, 2020 NY Slip Op 06295, Second Dept 11-4-20

 

November 4, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-11-04 13:58:452020-11-07 14:11:07RISK ASSESSMENT REDUCED FROM TWO TO ONE; DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF STATUTORY RAPE WHEN HE WAS 22; THE VICTIMS, WHO WERE 15 AND 16, INITIATED THE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER (SECOND DEPT).
Negligence

DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE KEPT A PROPER LOOKOUT IN THIS VEHICLE-BICYCLE COLLISION CASE; THE PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST STRUCK THE REAR DRIVER’S SIDE DOOR WHEN DEFENDANT TURNED LEFT INTO A CAR WASH; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this vehicle-bicycle collision case should not have been granted:

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when, while riding a bicycle, he came into contact with the rear driver’s side of a motor vehicle that was operated by the defendant, as it was turning left into a car wash. …

An operator of a motor vehicle traveling with the right-of-way has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles … . Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant moving for summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from fault … .

Here, when questioned at his deposition, the defendant admitted that in the short period leading up to the accident, he could not recall where he was looking. The defendant further admitted that he did not see the plaintiff prior to impact and only realized there was an accident when he heard the impact to the rear driver’s side of his vehicle. Accordingly, the defendant failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that he kept a proper lookout and that his alleged negligence did not contribute to the happening of the accident … . Carias v Grove, 2020 NY Slip Op 05029, Second Dept 9-23-20

 

September 23, 2020
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-09-23 16:05:202020-09-25 16:17:47DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE KEPT A PROPER LOOKOUT IN THIS VEHICLE-BICYCLE COLLISION CASE; THE PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST STRUCK THE REAR DRIVER’S SIDE DOOR WHEN DEFENDANT TURNED LEFT INTO A CAR WASH; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

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