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Criteria for a Warrantless Blood Swab

In affirming defendant’s murder conviction, the Fourth Department noted that a swab of a blood stain on defendant’s body was properly taken without a warrant. The DNA in the swab matched the victim’s. The court explained the criteria for a warrantless swab:

Defendant agreed to give his clothing to the police and, when he removed his shirt, an officer noticed a reddish brown stain on defendant’s chest that appeared to be blood. When asked what it was, defendant responded that it was a bruise. The officer swabbed the area, which later tested positive for blood and matched the victim’s DNA. Where, as here, the police did not obtain a warrant for the seizure of the blood evidence, “the police had to satisfy two requirements in order to justify the action taken. First, the police had to have reasonable cause to believe the [blood stain] constituted evidence, or tended to demonstrate that an offense had been committed, or, that a particular person participated in the commission of an offense . . . Second, there had to have been an exigent circumstance of sufficient magnitude to justify immediate seizure without resort to a warrant” … . We agree with the court that the police had reasonable cause to believe that the blood stain on defendant’s chest constituted evidence, and that the seizure was appropriate because it could have been easily destroyed by defendant … . People v Johnson, 2015 NY Slip Op 08540, 4th Dept 11-20-15

 

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Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement Misapplied

The police officers chased defendant when defendant ran and an officer thought he saw a handle of a gun on defendant’s person. The officers entered defendant’s house and found drugs. The Second Department determined the drugs should have been suppressed because there was no emergency justifying the warrantless entry and search of the house:

Under the emergency exception, the police may make a warrantless entry into a protected area if (1) they have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property, (2) the search was not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence, and (3) there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched … . … There was no evidence of any circumstances which would have provided a reasonable basis for the patrol officers to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or property inside the house … .

Furthermore, even where exigent circumstances justify the warrantless entry into a protected area, the scope and duration of the warrantless search must be limited by and reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation … . Here, the subject drugs were not discovered by the ESU officers during their protective sweep. Rather, they were discovered by the patrol officers, who conducted an evidentiary search after the ESU officers had secured the house and removed the defendant, who was the only occupant. At the time of the patrol officers’ search, any purported exigency had abated, the police were in complete control of the house, and there was no danger that the defendant, who was in custody, would dispose of or destroy the weapon. Accordingly, the police were required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting the evidentiary search … . Moreover, contrary to the suppression court’s findings, it is of no avail that the contraband was found in plain view, since the patrol officers’ warrantless entry was illegal … . People v Scott, 2015 NY Slip Op 08445, 2nd Dept 11-18-15

 

Warrantless Entry Into Defendant’s Home Justified by Exigent Circumstances—Juror’s Temporary Absence from the Trial (During Which the Trial Was Adjourned) and the Juror’s Inaccurate Statement He Had Discussed His Absence with the Judge Did Not Warrant a “Buford” Hearing or Disqualification

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Degrasse, affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that the warrantless entry into defendant’s home to arrest him was justified by exigent circumstances and did not, therefore, constitute a “Payton” violation. The First Department further found that a juror’s temporary absence from the trial (during which the trial was adjourned), and the juror’s inaccurate statement he had discussed his absence with the judge, did not reveal juror bias and did not therefore warrant a “Buford” hearing or disqualification of the juror:

…[T]he motion court resolved the Payton issue, finding the detectives’ entry into defendant’s home justified by exigent circumstances.

Factors to be considered in determining whether exigent circumstances are present include “(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause … to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry” … .

This list of factors is illustrative and not exhaustive … . The court’s finding of exigent circumstances is supported by evidence in the record that defendant had been identified by name and from a photograph as the assailant who shot the two men at the bar only hours before. Accordingly, there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest. Moreover, the Nissan Armada was traced to defendant’s nearby address where there was reason to believe he could be found. There was reason to believe defendant was armed inasmuch as he was said to have left the bar with his weapon. The record also supports the court’s conclusion that the circumstances of the Police Department’s entry into the apartment were peaceful. * * *

Defendant next argues that the court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry pursuant to People v Buford (69 NY2d 290 [1987]) with respect to a juror’s absence on a trial day. On February 7, 2012, during the third week of trial, juror number nine failed to appear at court and could not be reached by court personnel. With the consent of counsel, the court adjourned the trial for two days in order to enable a court officer to check on the juror at his home. On the adjourned date, the court officer reported that she met with juror number nine who told her that he wasn’t feeling well and that he had told Justice Webber that he would return to court on February 9, 2012. It was undisputed that no such conversation between the court and the juror occurred. The court decided to continue with the trial and address the juror’s conduct at its conclusion. Defense counsel stated that he was concerned about the juror’s fitness to continue with the trial. The court declined to conduct the requested inquiry and the trial continued to verdict. Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his request for a Buford inquiry. We disagree.

To the extent applicable, CPL 270.35(1) provides that a court must discharge a sworn juror where “the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case or has engaged in misconduct of a substantial nature, but not warranting the declaration of a mistrial . . .” Defendant does not argue on appeal that the juror was grossly unqualified or that his apparent misconduct was substantial. Defendant’s only claim of error stems from the court’s refusal to conduct a Buford inquiry. Viewed in light of the request made before the trial court, defendant’s argument is based on a misconstruction of Buford. As stated by the Court of Appeals, the purpose of Buford was the creation of “a framework by which trial courts could evaluate sworn jurors who, for some reason during the trial, may possess[] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict'” … . A juror with such a state of mind would be “grossly unqualified” … . * * *

… [I]t cannot be seriously argued in this case that juror number nine’s temporary absence from the trial and his inaccurate statement to the court officer indicated bias one way or the other. People v Paulino, 2015 NY Slip Op 05898, 1st Dept 7-7-15

 

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Issuance of a “No Knock” Warrant to Take a DNA Sample Was Not Justified—Sample Should Have Been Suppressed

The Third Department suppressed DNA evidence taken from the defendant pursuant to a “no knock” warrant and reversed defendant’s conviction. No exigent circumstances justified the “no knock” warrant which allowed the police to enter defendant’s home without notice and take the DNA sample:

The search warrant application to obtain DNA from defendant included the unsubstantiated and inaccurate allegations that the “search warrant cannot be executed between the hours of 6:00 A.M. and 9:00 P.M.,” “the property sought will be removed or destroyed if not seized forthwith,” and “[t]he property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of.” There were no factual allegations reflecting exigent circumstances justifying the lack of any notice to defendant of the application to obtain a DNA sample from him. He could not destroy or dispose of his own DNA, and the People’s speculation in their brief that he might have fled was not alleged or supported by facts in the application.

The ensuing search warrant inconsistently stated both that it was to be executed between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. and that it could be executed at any time day or night; and it further authorized police to enter the premises where defendant resided without giving notice of their authority or purpose. Under the authority of the warrant, police arrived unannounced at the place where defendant lived demanding his DNA. The total absence of notice to defendant of the search warrant application, which had obvious defects regarding the manner purportedly necessary to obtain defendant’s DNA, violated his constitutional rights and the DNA obtained in such search must be suppressed and the judgment reversed… . People v Walker, 2014 NY Slip Op 02975, 3rd Dept 5-1-14

 

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Criteria for Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement (Re: Entry of an Apartment) Not Met

The Second Department determined the police should not have entered and apartment without a warrant because the emergency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.  The landlord had simply indicated a woman was in the apartment without any indication the woman was in distress:

Under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, the police may make a warrantless entry into a protected area if (1) they have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; (2) the search was not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence; and (3) there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched … . The United States Supreme Court has determined that the second prong, regarding the subjective intent of the police, is no longer relevant under the Fourth Amendment (see Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 404-405). However, we need not decide whether the second prong of Mitchell is still viable under the New York Constitution because we conclude that the People did not satisfy the first prong of Mitchell … . The mere sound of unspecified banging and a woman’s voice coming from the upstairs apartment was insufficient to show that there was an emergency at hand requiring the immediate assistance of the police in order to protect life or property … . The owner did not say that she heard the woman screaming or crying for help, and the officers did not observe any indicia of an emergency … . People v Hammett, 2015 NY Slip Op 02498, 2nd Dept 3-25-15

 

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Search of Backpack Which Was No Longer In Defendant’s Possession, After Defendant Had Been Handcuffed, Justified by Exigent Circumstances

In finding the suppression motion was properly denied. The Second Department explained the law which justified the pre-arrest detention of the defendant and the search of defendant’s backpack after defendant was handcuffed. The officer received a report of a shooting at a residence. The officer knew the defendant lived at the residence and saw blood on defendant’s clothes.  The defendant was handcuffed and his backpack was placed on a car about three feet away.  After the defendant was handcuffed he told the officer his brother had been shot and the guns were in the backpack.  At that point the officer had probable cause to arrest for criminal possession of a weapon and could search the backpack incident to arrest due to exigent circumstances:

Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence recovered incident to his arrest. “On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance” … . “Under the State Constitution, an individual’s right of privacy in his or her effects dictates that a warrantless search incident to arrest be deemed unreasonable unless justified by the presence of exigent circumstances” … . For “compelling reasons,” including the safety of the officers or the public, “a search not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest’ may be conducted even though the arrested person has been subdued and his closed container is within the exclusive control of the police” … . People v Alvarado, 2015 NY Slip Op 01955, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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Criteria for a Valid Warrantless Search of a Home Pursuant to the Emergency Exception Described—The Court Noted that One of the Criteria, i.e., that the Police Not Be Primarily Motivated by Intent to Arrest and Seize Evidence, No Longer Applies to Claims Under the US Constitution and May Only Apply to Claims Under the New York Constitution

In affirming County Court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion, the Second Department explained the application of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.  The court noted that there is now a question whether one of the criteria for a valid warrantless search pursuant to the emergency exception, i.e., that the police are not primarily motivated by the intent to arrest and seize evidence, no longer applies under the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, and may only apply to claims under the New York Constitution:

“[Al]though warrantless entries into a home are presumptively unreasonable'” …, a warrantless search and seizure in a protected area may be lawful, under some circumstances, pursuant to the emergency doctrine (see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-178…). The exception applies where the police (1) have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property,” (2) are “not . . . primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence,” and (3) have a “reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched” (People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d at 177-178…).

The United States Supreme Court has held that the subjective intent of the police is not relevant in determining the reasonableness of police conduct under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (see Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403). Consequently, the second prong of Mitchell is now relevant, if at all, only to claims raised under the New York Constitution (see NY Const, art I, § 12). We need not determine in this case whether the second prong of Mitchell is still viable under the New York Constitution … , because we conclude that the actions of the police officers were permissible under both Brigham City and Mitchell … . People v Loucks, 2015 NY Slip Op 01471, 2nd Dept 2-18-15

 

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Warrantless Search of Defendant’s Jacket Not Justified–Defendant Was Handcuffed Inside a Police Car and Jacket Was Outside the Car

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, over a dissent, determined that the warrantless search of defendant's jacket could not be justified.  The defendant was handcuffed and sitting in the back of a police car when the jacket, which was on the trunk of the police car, was searched:

“[A]ll warrantless searches presumptively are unreasonable per se,” and, “[w]here a warrant has not been obtained, it is the People who have the burden of overcoming” this presumption of unreasonableness … . As the Court of Appeals recently reiterated in Jimenez (22 NY3d at 717), the People must satisfy two separate requirements to justify a warrantless search of a container incident to arrest. “The first imposes spatial and temporal limitations to ensure that the search is not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest” (Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 721 [internal quotation marks omitted]…). The second requires the People to demonstrate the presence of exigent circumstances (Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722). The Court of Appeals has recognized two interests underlying the exigency requirement: the safety of the public and the arresting officer, and the protection of evidence from destruction or concealment … .  * * *

Here, the jacket was unquestionably outside defendant's grabbable area at the time of the search, which even the dissent acknowledges. Defendant was sitting handcuffed inside a police car, the jacket was outside lying on the vehicle's trunk, and numerous officers were on the scene. Thus, the jacket had been reduced to the exclusive control of the police and there was no reasonable possibility that defendant could have reached it… .

Further, the People failed to establish the requisite exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of the jacket. Although defendant had previously struggled with police, five to six additional officers had arrived on the scene and defendant was subdued and placed in the police car. Thus, the scene at the time of the search was police-controlled … . People v Morales, 2015 NY Slip Op 01190, 1st Dept 2-10-15

 

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Warrantless Search of Backpack After Juvenile Was Handcuffed and Placed in a Police Car Justified by “Close Spatial and Temporal Proximity” and “Exigent Circumstances”

The First Department affirmed a juvenile delinquency adjudication based upon the juvenile’s possession of an air pistol, which was discovered in a warrantless search of the juvenile’s backpack after the juvenile was handcuffed.  In explaining why the suppression motion was properly denied, the court wrote:

The police lawfully detained appellant as a suspected truant … . In the course of this detention, the police lawfully patted down appellant’s book bag, particularly since as appellant approached the police car, the bag hit the car, making a distinctive metallic sound that the officer recognized as the sound of a firearm. In patting down the bag, an officer felt the distinctive shape of a pistol, including its grip and trigger guard. The warrantless search of the bag, after appellant had been handcuffed and placed in the police car, was justified by close spatial and temporal proximity, as well as by exigent circumstances … . These circumstances included the fact that defendant resisted arrest, the officers’ knowledge that appellant was on probation in connection with a past robbery and that he had resisted arrest before, the officers’ high level of certainty that the bag actually contained a weapon, and the danger of appellant reaching the bag, despite being handcuffed, while seated in the police car next to the officer who had the bag. Matter of Kenneth S, 2014 NY Slip Op 07299, 1st Dept 10-28-14

 

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Search of Home for Weapon Not Justified by Exigent Circumstances

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, reversed the appellate division, finding that exigent circumstances did not justify the search for and seizure of weapon after the suspects and all members of the household were in one room of the home under police supervision.  The police responded to gunfire, saw one of the suspects with a firearm, and used force to gain entry to the apartment into which the suspects fled:

“[S]ubject only to carefully drawn and narrow exceptions, a warrantless search of an individual's home is per se unreasonable and hence unconstitutional” … . One exception, commonly referred to as the “exigent circumstances” exception, dictates that police may act without a warrant where they possess probable cause to search but “urgent events make it impossible to obtain a warrant in sufficient time to preserve evidence or contraband threatened with removal or destruction” … . Even in such cases, however, “the scope of the conduct thus sanctioned is strictly limited by the necessities of the circumstances in which it arises” … . The People have the burden of establishing that the exigencies of the situation justified the warrantless search … .

In this instance, the People failed to meet that burden. There is no record support for the Appellate Division's conclusion that exigent circumstances justified the search of the closed box. The search was unreasonable as a matter of law because, by the time Officer Brennan opened the box, any urgency justifying the warrantless search had abated. The officers had handcuffed the men and removed them to the living room where they (and the two women) remained under police supervision. At the time Officer Brennan searched the box and discovered the gun, the police “were in complete control of the house” and “[a]ll occupants were out of commission” … . At that point, contrary to the People's contention, there was no danger that defendant would dispose of or destroy the weapon …nor was there any danger to the public or the police … .  Absent the presence of any other exception to the warrant requirement, such as a search incident to arrest or the gun being in plain view … the police were required to obtain a warrant prior to searching the box. People v Jenkins, 2014 NY Slip Op 07007, CtApp 10-16-14

 

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