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You are here: Home1 / DISORDERLY CONDUCT

Tag Archive for: DISORDERLY CONDUCT

Criminal Law, Evidence

Gun Found Wedged Under a Rock After an Illegal Police Pursuit Was Not “Abandoned,” Suppression of Gun Was Proper

The Fourth Department determined that all the fruits of an illegal pursuit and arrest of the defendant were properly suppressed. Defendant crossed a street, causing a car to stop abruptly to avoid hitting him. The police pursued defendant, intending to arrest him for disorderly conduct. The police noticed defendant was carrying a bulky object held in his shirt. After capturing the defendant, the police found a gun wedged under a rock. The People conceded that the pursuit of defendant was unlawful because his crossing the street did not constitute disorderly conduct. The only question on appeal was whether the gun was abandoned, and therefore not subject to suppression. The court explained the relevant test for abandoned property in this context:

It is well established that property seized as a result of an unlawful pursuit must be suppressed, unless that property was abandoned … . “Property which has in fact been abandoned is outside the protection of the constitutional provisions . . . There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights . . . [and, thus,] [t]he proof supporting abandonment should reasonably beget the exclusive inference of . . . throwing away’ ” … . “The test to be applied is whether defendant’s action . . . was spontaneous and precipitated by the illegality or whether it was a calculated act not provoked by the unlawful police activity and was thus attenuated from it” … . Here, the court properly concluded that defendant’s action was spontaneous and precipitated by the unlawful pursuit by the police … . The court thus properly determined that the People failed to establish that defendant had abandoned the gun and, consequently, properly suppressed the gun. People v Mueses, 2015 NY Slip Op 07088, 4th Dept 10-2-15

 

October 2, 2015
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Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

Where Arrest Was Not Authorized, Conviction for Resisting Arrest Was Against the Weight of the Evidence

The People conceded defendant’s actions (apparently simply standing with a group) did not constitute disorderly conduct. Therefore, the Fourth Department determined, defendant’s arrest for disorderly conduct was unauthorized and his conviction of resisting arrest was against the weight of the evidence:

As the People correctly concede, the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrest of defendant for disorderly conduct was authorized. The Court of Appeals has “made clear that evidence of actual or threatened public harm (inconvenience, annoyance or alarm’) is a necessary element of a valid disorderly conduct charge” …, and there is no evidence of such actual or threatened harm here. Inasmuch as it “is not disorderly conduct . . . for a small group of people, even people of bad reputation, to stand peaceably on a street corner” …, the arrest of defendant for engaging in that conduct was not authorized. “There being no probable cause that authorized defendant’s arrest, [he] cannot be guilty of resisting arrest” … . Thus, we conclude that the jury “failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded” … . People v Howard, 2015 NY Slip Op 07100, 4th Dept 10-2-15

 

October 2, 2015
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Criminal Law, Family Law

Gun Found In Juvenile’s Shoe (After Juvenile Was Told to Remove His Shoes) Should Have Been Suppressed—Juvenile Could Not Be Arrested and Detained for a Violation (Disorderly Conduct Is Not a Crime) and Nothing More than a Frisk Is Justified During a Temporary Detention Pending the Arrival of a Juvenile’s Parents

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the search of the 15-year-old appellant (Jamal) was illegal and the gun found in appellant's shoe should have been suppressed.  The appellant, who had already been searched twice, was being wrongfully detained on a disorderly conduct charge (a violation, not a crime) at the time he was told to take off his shoes:

CPL 140.10 permits a police officer to arrest a person for any “offense” that is committed in the officer's presence. The term “offense” is broadly defined to include conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or a fine is provided by state or local law (see Penal Law § 10.00 [1]). Family Court Act § 305.2(2), however, provides that “[a]n officer may take a child under the age of sixteen into custody without a warrant in cases in which he [or she] may arrest a person for a crime . . . .” The term “crime” includes only misdemeanors and felonies, not violations (see Penal Law § 10.00[6]). Accordingly, a search may be conducted where a juvenile is taken into custody for conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime … . As disorderly conduct is not a crime, Family Court Act § 305.2(2) prohibited Jamal's warrantless arrest for that offense … . Based on this record, it is clear that upon learning that Jamal was a juvenile the police nonetheless kept him under arrest with no statutory authority for doing so. * * *

…[W]hen Jamal was being held pending his parents' arrival, he was under temporary detention as opposed to arrest. “A temporary detention justifies only a frisk, not a full-fledged search” … . The removal of Jamal's shoes was far more intrusive than a frisk or a patdown … . We find no merit to the presentment agency's argument that safety required the removal of Jamal's shoes. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . .” … . Considerations of safety provide no justification in this case where Jamal was continuously in police custody and had been searched twice before being directed to remove his shoes. It is of no moment that Jamal was directed to remove his shoes pursuant to an alleged standard procedure. “[A]n unreasonable search is not somehow rendered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible, by the mere fact that a departmental procedure was followed” … . The standard of reasonableness still applies … . We recognize that in appropriate cases law enforcement officers are authorized to employ reasonable measures to guard against detainees' self-infliction of harm. Such reasonable measures may include the removal of belts and shoelaces … . Nonetheless, the removal of Jamal's shoes cannot be justified as a protective measure where, as noted above, he had been twice searched by police officers who had no reason to expect that he had “anything on him” or otherwise posed a danger. Matter of Jamal S, 2014 NY Slip Op 08470, 1st Dept 12-4-14

 

December 4, 2014
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Criminal Law, Evidence

No Probable Cause for Disorderly Conduct Arrest/Defendant Was Standing in Front of a Store with Three Others All of Whom Refused Police Officer’s Request to Move

The Court of Appeals determined the presence of three reputed gang members in front of a store, one of whom was partially blocking the door, was not enough to support a disorderly conduct charge.  Evidence seized as a result of arrest should therefore have been suppressed:

The applicable statute is Penal Law § 240.20 (6), which says:”A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:. . . .”6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse;”

We have made clear that evidence of actual or threatened public harm (“inconvenience, annoyance or alarm”) is a necessary element of a valid disorderly conduct charge … . Here, the evidence was insufficient to provide the arresting officer with probable cause to believe that defendant either intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or was reckless in creating a risk of those consequences. According to the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing, defendant stood with three other young men, reputed to be gang members, on a street corner, and the four refused to move when asked to do so by the police. The only evidence of any possible impact on the public resulting from their presence was the officer’s testimony that one of defendant’s companions “was partially blocking” the entrance to a store by standing in front of it.  Defendant and the other two men were close to the door, but not in front of it. There is no evidence that anyone trying to enter or leave the store was actually obstructed. This was not sufficient to satisfy the public harm element of the statute.  People v Johnson, 2014 NY Slip Op 02217, CtApp 4-1-14

 

April 1, 2014
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Criminal Law, Family Law

Family Offense of Disorderly Conduct Established

The Second Department determined the family offense of disorderly conduct had been established by a fair preponderance of the evidence:

…[T]he petitioner established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence …, that the appellant, who …made verbal threats to the petitioner in the hallway of the Family Court building and physically blocked the petitioner’s car from exiting the parking lot of the Family Court, engaged in threatening behavior that recklessly created a risk of causing public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm (see Penal Law § 240.20…… . Matter of Banks v Opoku, 2013 NY slip Op 05568, 2nd Dept 8-7-13

 

August 7, 2013
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Criminal Law, Family Law

Family Offense of Disorderly Conduct Not Proven—No Proof of Public Inconvenience, Annoyance, or Alarm

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Skelos, the Second Department determined the wife’s allegations against her husband did not demonstrate the family offense of disorderly conduct.  The wife alleged the husband tried to push her down stairs, twisted her arm and pushed her against a wall. Under the Penal Law, disorderly conduct requires an intent to cause or the reckless creation of a risk of causing public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.  However, Family Court Act section 812 provides: “For purposes of this article, disorderly conduct included disorderly conduct not in a public place.”  The Second Department determined that, even in the context of a family offense proceeding, the “public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm” element must be proven:

We … hold that, even where the conduct at issue is alleged to have occurred in a private residence, in order for a petitioner to meet his or her burden of establishing the family offense of disorderly conduct, there must be a prima facie showing that the conduct was either intended to cause, or recklessly created a risk of causing, public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. The intent to cause, or recklessness in causing, public harm, is the mens rea of the offense of disorderly conduct … . The plain language of the subject provision of Family Court Act § 812, in contrast, provides only that the conduct need not occur in a public place (see Family Ct Act § 812). The plain language of Family Court Act § 812 therefore pertains only to the actus reus of the offense—specifically, the place where it is committed—and does not speak to the mens rea of the offense. Indeed, since Family Court Act § 812 does not specify an alternative culpable mental state, if the mens rea provided for in the Penal Law were not applicable in family offense proceedings, it is unclear what the mens rea of this family offense would be. * * *

One can certainly contemplate conduct occurring in a private residence that is intended to cause, or evinces a reckless disregard of causing, public harm. Such conduct might include, for example, a loud fight, or a loud argument with disturbing content, occurring in an apartment building late at night, or under other circumstances where the public may reasonably be expected to hear or see the altercation. As the Court of Appeals has observed, “the risk of public disorder does not have to be realized,” in order to infer that an individual intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded the risk of causing, such a threat… . Matter of  Cassie v Cassie, 2013 NY Slip Op 05446, 2nd Dept 7-24-13

 

July 24, 2013
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Criminal Law, Family Law

Disorderly Conduct as a Family Offense Needn’t Occur in a Public Place

The Fourth Department determined that “disorderly conduct” as a family offense does not require the conduct to take place in public:

Contrary to respondent’s contention, petitioner met her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed the family offense of disorderly conduct … . Although respondent’s conduct did not take place in public, section 812 (1) specifically states that, “[f]or purposes of this article, ‘disorderly conduct’ includes disorderly conduct not in a public place.” In addition, disorderly conduct may be committed when a person “recklessly creat[es] a risk” of annoyance or alarm through violent or threatening behavior. We thus reject respondent’s contention that the statute “requires more than a ‘risk.’ ”  Matter of McLaughlin v McLaughlin, 330, CAF 12-01556, 4th Dept. 3-22-13

 

 

March 22, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Defendant’s Behavior Did Not Justify Arrest for Disorderly Conduct

The defendant’s arrest for “disorderly conduct” was not supported by probable cause.  Specifically, the proof was insufficient to support the “public harm” element of the offense.  “During daylight hours on a public street, defendant made two abusive statements claiming harassment to a police officer who was seated in a patrol car. …[T]he public outburst was extremely brief, lasting about 15 seconds. The statements were not accompanied by menacing conduct … . And there is no basis to infer that [the officer] felt threatened by the statements.”  The “risk to public order” was not sufficient to justify the arrest.  People vs. Baker, No. 16, CtApp 2-7-13

 

February 7, 2013
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