You are here: / CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Tag Archive for: CONFLICT OF INTEREST

,

Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Disqualified Defense Counsel Over Defendant’s Objection on Conflict of Interest Grounds—The Fact that a Co-Defendant Had Been Represented by Another Attorney from the New York County Defender Services (NYCDS) Did Not Create a Conflict for Defendant’s NYCDS Attorney—Defendant’s Attorney Did Not Have Access to Any Information Provided by the Co-Defendant (Who Had Already Pled Out)—Client Confidences Are Not Generally Shared by Attorneys Within a Large Institution Like the NYCDS, As They Might Be Within a Private Law Firm

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, over a dissent, determined that the fact that a co-defendant (Stephens) had been represented by a New York County Defender Services (NYCDS) attorney did not create a conflict requiring the disqualification of defendant's trial attorney (Fisher), who also worked for the NYCDS.  The court noted that Fisher was not privy to any confidences of Stephens (who had pled out shortly after arraignment) and there was little danger attorneys within a large institution like the NYCDS would share their clients' confidential information.  Therefore Fisher could effectively cross-examine Stephens should he be called to testify (the People did not intend to call Stephens). The defendant did not want Fisher disqualified and was willing to waive any conflict:

As both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have explained, the Sixth Amendment encompasses a right to select and be represented by one's preferred counsel. However, that right is not absolute …, and it must be balanced with the right to effective assistance of counsel … . Thus, trial courts are given “substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interests not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses” … . …

Here … defendant not only challenges the trial court's refusal to accept his waiver of the potential conflict of interest, but also questions whether there was even a potential conflict of interest, in the first instance, where Fisher, who is a staff attorney at an institutional defense organization, never personally represented Stephens. It is crucial to recognize that here, unlike in other right to counsel cases, the proper initial inquiry is not whether defendant's waiver should have been accepted, but whether there was even a conflict or potential conflict of interest to waive in the first place. The court need only reach the issue of whether the waiver was properly accepted or denied after it has been established that there was a conflict or potential conflict of interest to waive. I find that on this record, no conflict or potential conflict of interest existed. * * *

Here, defendant and Stephens were arrested in connection with the same incident, but Stephens's case was already concluded by the time of Fisher's disqualification and, again, there was no evidence or suggestion that information concerning Stephens was ever shared with Fisher. Indeed, Fisher acknowledged that he would be barred from viewing his office's file on Stephens or using the address on file to try to locate Stephens; similarly no other attorney would have had access to NYCDS's file either. Thus … it cannot be said that the prior representation of Stephens by the same public defense organization created a potential conflict of interest. Although this Court is aware that the trial court's “discretion is especially broad” when balancing the right to counsel of a criminal defendant's choosing and the right to effective assistance of counsel free of conflicts … , under the specific circumstances here, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying defendant's counsel. People v Watson, 2014 NY Slip Op 08383, 1st Dept 12-2-14


 

,

Fact that Prosecutor Had Represented the Defendant in the Past Did Not Require Disqualification—No Substantial Risk of an Abuse of Confidence

The Third Department determined that the fact that the District Attorney had represented the defendant 16 years before did not require disqualification:

Ordinarily, “[a] public prosecutor should be removed only to protect a defendant from actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence” … . Here, the fact that the District Attorney may have previously represented defendant in prior, unrelated criminal matters, without more, does not require his disqualification … . Further, although the District Attorney sought to impeach defendant using prior contempt convictions arising from marital problems that defendant alleges he had discussed with the District Attorney, County Court’s refusal to allow any inquiry into the underlying facts of these convictions eliminated any possible avenue by which the District Attorney might have utilized any confidential information that he may have acquired … . As 16 years had passed since any such alleged confidences had been shared, the passage of time had also diminished the risk of prejudice … . As defendant did not demonstrate a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence or any actual prejudice, we find no error in County Court’s determination … . People v Giroux, 2014 NY Slip Op 08060, 3rd Dept 11-20-14

 

, ,

Assignment of New Counsel and Adjournment of Trial Over Defendant’s Objection Was Proper—Defense Counsel Had Represented the Confidential Informant in the Past—District Attorney Objected to Preclusion of Confidential Informant’s Testimony as a Solution

The Third Department determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered, over defendant’s objection, the assignment of new counsel because of a conflict of interest.  Assigned counsel had represented the confidential informant (CI).  The court was faced with either assigning new counsel or ruling that the CI could not testify:

County Court did not abuse its discretion in substituting assigned counsel against defendant’s wishes … . A criminal defendant’s right to counsel of his or her choice is not absolute and may properly be circumscribed where defense counsel’s continued representation of the defendant would present a conflict of interest … . Here, upon learning of the CI’s identity,[FN2] defendant’s original assigned attorney informed the court that he possessed confidential information from his prior representation of the CI that would affect his ability to cross-examine that witness, thereby establishing the existence of an actual conflict of interest … . Faced with “the dilemma of having to choose between undesirable alternatives” in addressing the conflict …, County Court’s decision to assign new counsel and adjourn the trial rather than preclude the testimony of the CI altogether constituted a proper exercise of its broad discretion under the circumstances presented … . People v Robinson, 2014 NY Slip Op 07018, 3rd Dept 10-16-14

 

,

Attorney Conflict Waiver Criteria Discussed/Whether Molineux Analysis Should Be Applied to “Prior Bad Thoughts” in Journal Entries Discussed

In two concurring opinions, one by Judge Lippman and the other by Judge Abdus-Salaam, the Court of Appeals determined defendant did not raise an error warranting reversal.

The defendant contended (1) his attorney had personal interests which conflicted with her professional obligations to him, and (2) journal entries which were unrelated to the murder with which defendant was charged should not have been admitted in evidence.

One of defendant’s attorneys was under indictment by the same district attorney’s office for allegedly smuggling drugs to a client in jail. The defendant waived the conflict. The two judges disagreed about what such a conflict waiver should include and agreed the defendant’s conflict waiver was inadequate, but determined reversal was not required because there was an insufficient showing the conflict operated on the defense.

The journal entries were essentially “bad thoughts” about women other than the victim.  Judge Lippman determined that the “prior bad thoughts” should have been analyzed under the Molineux criteria for the admission of evidence of prior crimes and bad acts.  Judge Abdus-Salaam determined that Molineux should not be extended to such “prior bad thoughts,” which should simply be scrutinized under relevancy criteria. Both judges determined the erroneous admission of the “bad thoughts” evidence was harmless error.  People v Cortez, 225, CtApp 1-21-14

 

,

Hearing Required to Determine If Criminal Investigation of Defense Counsel Affected the Conduct of the Defense (Re: CPL 440.10 Motion to Vacate the Conviction)

The Court of Appeals determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to vacate his conviction.  Defendant’s attorney was the subject of a criminal investigation by the district attorney’s office during defendant’s trial.  The investigation of the attorney was not related to the charges against the defendant.  Therefore an automatic reversal was not required.  A hearing was necessary to determine if the conduct of the defense was affected by a conflict of interest (the district attorney’s investigation of defendant’s lawyer):

We reject defendant’s request to require automatic reversal anytime the defense attorney is under investigation or being prosecuted by the same district attorney’s office that is trying his client.  Indeed, in People v Konstantinides (14 NY3d 1, 13 [2009]), we declined to adopt such a per se rule in a case where a defense attorney was accused of criminal misconduct (witness tampering, bribery and suborning perjury) in relation to a witness in his client’s case.  An actual conflict would exist where a defense attorney was implicated in the crimes for which his client stood trial, but that was not the situation in Konstantinides and is certainly not the case here.  Accordingly, to obtain relief, defendant must demonstrate at a hearing on his 440.10 application that “the conduct of his defense was in fact affected by the operation of the conflict of interest, or that the conflict operated on the representation” … .  People v Payton, 232, CtApp 12-12-13

 

, ,

Judge Who Had Represented Defendant Not Required to Recuse Himself

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott (over a substantial partial dissent which dealt with defense counsel’s antagonistic behavior toward the judge and degrading comments about the defendant), the Court of Appeals determined the trial judge, who had represented the defendant in the past on an unrelated matter (about which the judge had no specific memory), properly denied defendant’s recusal request which alleged bias on the judge’s part:

Unless disqualification is required under Judiciary Law § 14, a judge’s decision on a recusal motion is one of discretion … .  “This discretionary decision is within the personal conscience of the court when the alleged appearance of impropriety arises from inappropriate awareness of nonjuridical data” … .  We have held that for any alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying it “must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case” … .  People v Glynn, 155, CtApp 10-17-13

 

,

Court’s Failure to Inquire About Potential Conflict of Interest and Failure to Follow Statutory Procedure for Jury Note Did Not Require Reversal

The Third Department determined the trial court’s failure to directly inquire into defendant’s awareness of the risks associated with his attorney’s potential conflict of interest and the trial court’s failure to follow the statutory procedure with respect to a note from the jury during deliberations did not require reversal:

Early in these proceedings, defendant’s trial counsel informed County Court of a potential conflict of interest based upon the prior representation of a prosecution witness by another attorney in counsel’s law firm. Although counsel informed the court that defendant had no objection, County Court erred by failing to directly inquire into defendant’s awareness of the potential risks and  his willingness to waive any  potential conflict … . * * *

While the better practice would  have  been  for County  Court to read the note on the record prior to responding to it and we do not condone the court’s curtailment of counsel’s argument, the record reflects that counsel was aware  of the specific content of the note and  we  are satisfied that counsel had  a full opportunity to explain his position as to the meaning  of “duly served.”  Under  these circumstances, defense counsel can be  said to have meaningfully participated in the response to the note… .  People v Cooper, 104749, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

 

,

Potential Versus Actual Conflict of Interest

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction, rejecting the defendant’s argument he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because of defense counsel’s conflict of interest.  The Court of Appeals described the difference between an actual conflict of interest (which mandates reversal if not waived) and a potential conflict of interest (at issue in this case):

The defendant bears the burden of establishing a denial of meaningful representation …. When such a claim is premised on a perceived conflict of interest, our precedent differentiates between actual and potential conflicts …. An actual conflict exists if an attorney simultaneously represents clients whose interests are opposed …and, in such situations, reversal is required if the defendant does not waive the actual conflict ….

In contrast, a potential conflict that is not waived by the accused requires reversal only if it “operates” on or “affects” the defense … — i.e., the nature of the attorney-client relationship or underlying circumstances bear a “‘substantial relation to the conduct of the defense'” …. The “requirement that a potential conflict have affected, or operated on, or borne a substantial relation to the conduct of the defense — three formulations of the same principle — is not a requirement that [the] defendant show specific prejudice” …. Nevertheless, it is the defendant’s “heavy burden” … to show that a potential conflict actually operated on the defense ….  People v Sanchez, No 107, CtApp, 6-4-13

 

,

Defense Attorney’s Conflict of Interest Amounted to Ineffective Assistance

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted defendant’s writ of coram nobis finding a conflict of interest on the part of defendant’s counsel, of which defendant was never made aware, amounted ineffective assistance.  Defendant’s appellate counsel had represented a co-defendant, Martin, who testified against the defendant at his trial.  During sentencing of Martin, counsel argued for leniency based upon his testifying against the defendant.  In appealing defendant’s conviction, counsel argued Martin was a liar and his testimony should be ignored.  The Court of Appeals wrote:

It is undisputed that appellate counsel represented defendant and his codefendant simultaneously, that appellate counsel argued at Martin’s sentencing hearing for leniency based on Martin’s trial testimony adverse to the defendant, and that defendant neither knew nor had the opportunity to waive any conflict arising from appellate counsel’s representation of defendant and Martin. Under these circumstances, an actual unwaived conflict existed.

An attorney may not simultaneously represent a criminal defendant and a codefendant or prosecution witness whose interests actually conflict unless the conflict is validly waived …. Simultaneous representation of two clients with conflicting interests means the lawyer “cannot give either client undivided loyalty” …. Counsel has the duty to inform the client and the court so that the court may ascertain the nature of the conflict and give the client an opportunity to waive it ….  People v Prescott, No 80, CtApp, 5-7-13

 

,

Representation of Co-defendants by Attorneys In Same Firm Constituted Ineffective Assistance

Defendant brought a motion pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 440 to vacate his conviction on the ground that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.  Defendant’s attorney was “of counsel” to the law firm of the attorney who represented a co-defendant.  The co-defendant agreed to testify against the defendant in return for a lesser sentence.  Ultimately the defendant pled guilty.  In reversing the judgment of conviction, the Third Department, in a decision by Justice Stein, wrote:

When a single attorney or multiple attorneys associated with the same firm simultaneously represent clients in a criminal matter, “if the clients’ interests actually conflict, and if the defendant has not waived the conflict, the defendant is deprived of the effective assistance of counsel”… People v Lynch, 104852, 104945, 3rd Dept 3-26-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy