AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS – New York Appellate Digest

Pregnant Woman Not Liable Under the Reckless Manslaughter Statute for Death of Baby Injured in Utero But Subsequently Delivered Alive by Cesarean Section

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over an extensive dissent, determined a pregnant women could not be convicted of reckless manslaughter for the death of her baby following a head-on collision. Defendant was in the wrong lane and struck an on-coming car, killing the two occupants. Defendant consented to a cesarean section because the baby was in distress (due to the accident). The baby was born alive but subsequently died. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter for recklessly causing the baby’s death. The Court of Appeals reversed noting that, had the baby died in utero, the baby would not have met the definition of “person” in the manslaughter statute:

Had the legislature intended to include pregnant women in the class of individuals who may be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree for reckless acts committed while pregnant, resulting in the eventual death of their child, it could clearly have done so. Moreover, had defendant’s fetus died in utero, then, plainly, defendant could not have been prosecuted under the manslaughter statute because the fetus would not have fallen under the definition of a “person” (Penal Law § 125.05 [1]; …). * * *

The imposition of criminal liability upon pregnant women for acts committed against a fetus that is later born and subsequently dies as a result of injuries sustained while in utero should be clearly defined by the legislature, not the courts. It should also not be left to the whim of the prosecutor. Conceivably, one could find it “reckless” for a pregnant woman to disregard her obstetrician’s specific orders concerning bed rest; take prescription and/or illicit drugs; shovel a walkway; engage in a contact sport; carry groceries; or disregard dietary restrictions. Such conduct, if it resulted in premature birth and subsequent death of the child, could result in criminal liability for the mother. At present, such conduct, if it caused a stillbirth, would not result in criminal prosecution of the mother if the fetus died in utero. Any change in the law with regard to such matters would be within the province of the legislature. People v Jorgensen, 2015 NY Slip Op 07699, CtApp 10-22-15

October 22, 2015

Criminal Law, Evidence

Proof Presented to Grand Jury Was Sufficient to Support Allegation Defendant “Caused” the Death of a Police Officer Killed by Another Driver While Responding to the Accident In Which Defendant Was Involved

The Second Department determined the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient to support the charge that defendant, who had been involved in a vehicle accident and was allegedly under the influence of alcohol, “caused” the death of a police officer who was struck by a car at the accident scene. The court explained the nature of the proof required to support the charge that the defendant “caused” the death of another:

“Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted—and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence—would warrant conviction'” … . ” Legally sufficient evidence' means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof” (CPL 70.10[1]).

In order to be held criminally liable for a person's death, a defendant must have engaged in conduct that “actually contribute[d]” to that person's death … . The defendant's actions need not be the sole cause of death and, indeed, the defendant need not have committed the fatal act to be liable … . The test is, instead, whether it may be reasonably foreseen that the defendant's actions would result in the victim's death; if so, the defendant's actions may, under the criminal law, constitute a “sufficiently direct cause” of the death to warrant criminal liability for it … .

Here, viewing the evidence before the grand jury in the light most favorable to the prosecution …, we find that there was legally sufficient proof before the grand jury that the defendant's actions “caused” the officer's death. Specifically, it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's conduct would cause collisions and that the police would respond and be required to be in the roadway, where they would be exposed to the potentially lethal danger presented by fast-moving traffic … . People v Ryan, 2015 NY Slip Op 00915, 2nd Dept 2-4-15

February 4, 2015

Criminal Law, Evidence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

Defendant’s Actions In Driving Under the Influence and Causing a Collision Did Not Support Convictions for Offenses Requiring Proof of a Depraved Indifference to Human Life

The Second Department determined that there was insufficient proof of “depraved indifference” to support defendant’s convictions for first degree assault and reckless endangerment stemming from a collision with a vehicle driven by Petrone:

Depraved indifference is ” best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human lifea willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not'” … . It is embodied in conduct that is ” so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes [serious physical injury to] another'” … .

The issue of whether a defendant possessed a state of mind evincing depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis … . Here, the prosecution’s witnesses established that the defendant’s vehicle, without braking, collided into the back of Petrone’s vehicle while both were traveling eastbound in the left lane on Northern Boulevard. The collision was of such force that both vehicles left the roadway and flipped over. Moreover, the testimony of the forensic toxicologist demonstrated that, at the time of the accident, the defendant was significantly impaired due to his ingestion of six different drugs, including methadone. Nevertheless, the evidence of the defendant’s conduct did not support a finding of depraved indifference. The defendant was not driving well in excess of the speed limit, he was not driving the wrong way into oncoming traffic, he had not failed to obey traffic signals, and there was no evidence that he was driving erratically prior to the collision … . Under these factual circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish that the defendant possessed an “utter disregard for the value of human life” or that he “simply [did not] care whether grievous harm result[ed] or not” from his actions … . Consequently, there is simply no “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a rational person to the conclusion” … that the defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life when he caused the injuries to Petrone… . People v Jakobson, 2014 NY Slip Op 05354. 2nd Dept 7-16-14

July 16, 2014

Criminal Law

Grossly Negligent and Reckless Driving Did Not Support Conviction for Depraved Indifference Murder

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissent, determined that the actions of the defendant, who killed a pedestrian during a police chase, did not meet the criteria for depraved indifference murder. Although the defendant drove in a grossly negligent and reckless manner, there was evidence he took measures to avoid injuries to others and therefore was not indifferent to the effects of his actions:

A person is guilty of depraved indifference murder when, “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life [such person] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person” (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]). Depraved indifference is a culpable mental state which “is best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life” … . Thus, “a depraved and utterly indifferent actor is someone who does not care if another is injured or killed” (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Due to the wanton nature of this mens rea, “depraved indifference murder properly applies only to a small, and finite, category of cases where the conduct is at least as morally reprehensible as intentional murder” … .

A defendant who knowingly pursues risky behavior that endangers others does not necessarily evince depraved indifference by engaging in that conduct. As we have explained, “[a] person who is depravedly indifferent is not just willing to take a grossly unreasonable risk to human life that person does not care how the risk turns out” … . “The element of depraved indifference to human life comprises both depravity and indifference, and has meaning independent of recklessness and the gravity of the risk created” … . In short, the mens rea of depraved indifference will rarely be established by risky behavior alone. People v Maldonado, 2014 NY Slip Op 04878, CtApp 7-1-14

July 1, 2014

Criminal Law

Depraved Indifference Murder Convictions Stemming from Outrageously Reckless Driving While Intoxicated Upheld

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman, the Court of Appeals determined that the unusually egregious circumstances of the three cases before them, all resulting in convictions for depraved indifference murder stemming from outrageously reckless driving while intoxicated, supported the depraved-indifference-murder verdicts. Because of the fact-specific nature of the analysis, the relevant facts of one of the three cases are provided here:

When viewed in the light most favorable to the People, there was legally sufficient evidence to support Heidgen’s convictions for depraved indifference murder. The jury could have determined that defendant was unhappy and self-destructive. Defendant’s friends who observed him at the party thought that he was intoxicated but not so intoxicated that he was incoherent, unsteady on his feet or slurring his speech. Heidgen drove the wrong way on the highway for over two miles without reacting to other drivers coming at him, car horns, or wrong way signage. Perhaps most significantly, more than one witness testified that defendant appeared to follow, or track, the headlights of oncoming vehicles. In addition, the toxicologist testified that defendant’s blood alcohol level would have caused delayed reaction time, but that it would not have rendered him incapable of reacting at all. Based on this evidence, the jury could have found that, despite defendant’s intoxication, he perceived his surroundings. The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant drove, knowing that he was on the wrong side of the road and with an appreciation of the grave risks involved in that behavior. One who engages in what amounts to a high speed game of chicken, with complete disregard for the value of the lives that are thereby endangered, is undoubtedly an individual whose culpability is the equivalent of an intentional murderer. People v Heidgen…, 174, 175, 176, CtApp 11-21-13

November 21, 2013

Criminal Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

Recklessness Demonstrated In Operation of Vehicle

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions for reckless manslaughter and reckless assault after defendant’s car struck another car head on. There was evidence defendant was deliberately speeding (134 mph) in an area he knew to include a sharp turn. The court explained the difference between recklessness and criminal negligence in this context:

The mental states of recklessness and criminal negligence share many similarities. Both require that there be a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” that death or injury will occur; that the defendant engage in some blameworthy conduct contributing to that risk; and that the defendant’s conduct amount to a “gross deviation” from how a reasonable person would act (compare Penal Law § 15.05 [3] [Recklessly] with Penal Law § 15.05 [4] [Criminal Negligence]). The only distinction between the two mental states is that recklessness requires that the defendant be “aware of” and “consciously disregard” the risk while criminal negligence is met when the defendant negligently fails to perceive the risk … .

In the context of automobile accidents involving speeding, we have held that the culpable risk-creating conduct necessary to support a finding of recklessness or criminal negligence generally requires “some additional affirmative act” aside from “driving faster than the posted speed limit” … . Here, there was ample proof that defendant did more than merely drive faster than the legal limit — indeed, there was eyewitness testimony that he was traveling at more than double the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Moreover, before the collision, defendant stopped his vehicle in the middle of the unlit road and revved the engine. He then hit the gas pedal and accelerated to an extremely high rate of speed before crossing the double line into oncoming traffic. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence showed that defendant used a public road as his personal drag strip to showcase the capabilities of his modified sports car. Although the jury acquitted defendant of driving while ability impaired (by alcohol), there was evidence that he had been drinking and smoking marijuana that evening … . The evidence therefore demonstrated that defendant engaged in conduct exhibiting “the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong” … .

Furthermore, the proof was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant acted recklessly — by consciously disregarding the risk he created — as opposed to negligently failing to perceive that risk. Defendant was familiar with the curve in the road …, having driven by there on a number of prior occasions, and he had been warned twice about speeding into that very section of the road. People v Asaro, 158, CtApp 10-22-13

October 22, 2013

Criminal Law, Evidence

Relationship Between Defendant’s Act and Fatal Car Accident Too Attenuated to Support Criminally Negligent Homicide

The Third Department determined that the relationship between the defendant’s act and a fatal car accident was too attenuated to support a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. The defendant, a passenger, jerked the steering wheel, apparently in an attempt to intimidate or strike a car that was along side of the car defendant was in. The car defendant was in struck a guard rail and caused the blockage of one lane of traffic. The one car accident caused traffic to back up. 30 minutes later the fatal accident occurred. The Third Department wrote:

“[A]n act ‘qualifies as a sufficiently direct cause when the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen'”… . A connection between the conduct and the death that is obscure or “merely probable” will not suffice …. On the other hand, we note that the mere lapse of time will not necessarily serve to break the chain of causation … . Nor does a defendant’s conduct need to be the sole cause of death in order for criminal responsibility to attach …. * * *

Here, the People failed to present evidence directly linking defendant’s act to the victims’ deaths …. Although the accident reconstructionist called as a witness by the People provided an opinion as to the sequence of the five-car collision, he could not estimate the speed of the vehicles involved, he did not attempt to reconstruct the initial accident and he offered no opinion to support the conclusion that the third and fatal accident was a foreseeable result of the initial accident … . People v Ballenger, 104664, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

May 30, 2013

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