Negligence Update January – March 2021

(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 2 CLE Credit Hours

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between January 1, 2021 and March 30, 2021 which address issues in “Negligence.” CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from March 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Negligence” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. Links to the written materials for this course (“Negligence Update Pamphlets for January, February and March  2021”) are provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear verification codes. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification codes, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 2 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Negligence Update Pamphlets January, February and March 2021”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Negligence Update Pamphlet January 2021

Negligence Update Pamphlet February 2021

Negligence Update Pamphlet March 2021

Negligence Update January February March 2021 Attorney Affirmation

Negligence Update January February March 2021 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Negligence Update January, February, March 2021” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the Pages in Each of the Three Negligence Update Pamphlets

 

JANUARY 2021 UPDATE PAMPHLET

ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK. 4

PLAINTIFF HIGH SCHOOL BASEBALL PLAYER ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK WITH A BALL DURING A PRACTICE DRILL WHERE MULTIPLE BALLS WERE IN PLAY; TWO DISSENTING MEMORANDA (THIRD DEPT). 4

DENTAL MALPRACTICE. 5

PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT SPECULATIVE OR CONCLUSORY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE AND LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 5

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS. 6

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS MISSED THE DEADLINE AND THEREBY WAIVED THE RIGHT TO MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF PLAINTIFF, THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE NOTE OF ISSUE AND COMPEL AN EXAM SHOUD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 6

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 7

PLAINTIFF’S SIGNING A CONSENT FORM PRIOR TO SURGERY DID NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). 7

SLIP AND FALL (PARKING LOT). 8

RARE CASE WHERE EVIDENCE OF A ROUTINE PROCEDURE FOR KEEPING A PARKING LOT FREE OF ICE AND SNOW, COMBINED WITH PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY, SUPPORTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS’ FAVOR IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT). 8

SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK). 9

ALTHOUGH THE VILLAGE CODE MADE THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE SIDEWALK, THE CODE DID NOT IMPOSE TORT LIABILITY ON THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER; THE PROPERTY OWNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 9

SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK). 10

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE TRIPPED ON A TWIG ON THE SIDEWALK WHICH WAS NOT ADEQUATELY ILLUMINATED; DEFENDANT, IN HER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITIONS OR THAT THE CONDITIONS WERE NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE OPPOSING PAPERS (SECOND DEPT). 10

SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK). 11

PROOF OF A REGULAR SNOW REMOVAL ROUTINE IS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK AT THE TIME OF THE SLIP AND FALL (SECOND DEPT). 11

SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK). 12

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RAISED SIDEWALK FLAG AND WHETHER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT). 12

SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK). 13

THE NYC ADMINSTRATIVE CODE REQUIRES ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS TO REPAIR SIDEWALK FLAGS OVER 1/2 INCH; PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE THE FLAG WAS THREE INCHES; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 13

SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK). 14

THE TREE WELL COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 14

SLIP AND FALL (STAIRWAY). 15

BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROOF WHEN THE STAIRWAY IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS CONSTRUCTED, THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE BUILDING CODE PROVISION; DEFENSE VERDICT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 15

SLIP AND FALL (STAIRWAY). 16

PLAINTIFF’S INCONSISTENT DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN THIS STAIRWAY SLIP AND FALL CASE RAISED A CREDIBILITY QUESTION BUT DID NOT REQUIRE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR; PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY SHE DID NOT USE THE HANDRAILS REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM ALLEGING THE HANDRAILS WERE DEFECTIVE (FIRST DEPT). 16

SLIP AND FALL. 17

THE JURY VERDICT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES WAS NOT INCONSISTENT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). 17

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT. 18

IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE, THE FACT THAT THE INTRUDER KILLED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESIDENT OF DEFENDANT’S APARTMENT BUILDING, IN A PRE-MEDITATED, TARGETED ATTACK DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, INSULATE THE LANDLORD FROM LIABILITY BASED UPON AN ALLEGEDLY BROKEN LOCK ON THE BUILDING’S EXTERIOR DOOR; THE 2ND DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH A LINE OF 1ST DEPARTMENT CASES (SECOND DEPT). 18

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT. 19

THE PROPERTY OWNERS AND THE SECURITY COMPANY WERE PROPERLY FOUND LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SEVERE INJURIES CAUSED BY TWELVE-YEAR-OLD BOYS WHO THREW A SHOPPING CART OVER A FOURTH FLOOR RAILING STRIKING PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND BELOW (FIRST DEPT). 19

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 20

THE SNOWPLOW DRIVER DID NOT VIOLATE THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT). 20

FEBRUARY 2021 UPDATE PAMPHLET

DENTAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE. 5

IN THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, PLAINTIFF RAISED ISSUES OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE, AND THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT (FOURTH DEPT). 5

DENTAL MALPRACTICE, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT. 5

THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMSSED DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SIGNING A CONSENT FORM (SECOND DEPT). 5

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. 6

PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION STEMMING FROM PFOA CONTAMINATION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DID NOT APPLY; QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, PRIVATE NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES (THIRD DEPT). 6

HIGHWAY DESIGN. 7

THE COURT OF CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CLAIM FINDING THAT CLAIMANT’S DECEDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE CAR ACCIDENT EVEN IF THE PROPER W BEAM AS OPPOSED TO THE IMPROPER BOX BEAM HAD BEEN ERECTED AS A BARRIER ACROSS THE CLOSED BRIDGE; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE MAJORITY IMPROPERLY APPLIED A “BUT FOR” STANDARD OF CAUSATION (FOURTH DEPT). 7

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AWARDED ONE DEFENDANT. 9

CVS, A DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT DOCTORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT CVS’S PROVIDING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WITH THE WRONG DOSAGE OF MEDICINE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH (SECOND DEPT). 9

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 10

OVERRULING PRECEDENT, THE FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A CERTIFICATE OF MERIT IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION; IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACTION HAS MERIT OR AN EXCUSE FOR THE FAILURE TO FILE IN SEEKING AN EXTENSION TO FILE THE CERTIFICATE (FIRST DEPT). 10

MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 11

PLAINTIFF NYC SANITATION WORKER STEPPED ON A LIVE POWER LINE AFTER HIS SUPERVISOR ALLEGEDLY TOLD HIM THE POWER WAS OFF; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL DUTY OWED BY THE CITY DEFENDANTS TO THE PLAINTIFF; CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 11

MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 12

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A POLICE OFFICER SUFFERING FROM BIPOLAR DISORDER, COMMITTED SUICIDE; THE ESTATE BROUGHT A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST THE CITY; ALTHOUGH THE FACTS SUPPORTED AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION; THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 12

MUNICIPAL LAW, SLIP AND FALL. 13

IN THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT, UNLIKE IN THE SECOND DEPARTMENT, A MUNICIPALITY MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN A SLIP AND FALL CASE NEED ONLY SHOW IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION EVEN WHERE THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES THE MUNICIPALITY CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; HERE AN ONLINE COMPLAINT DID NOT SATISFY THE WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT; EVIDENCE A MUNICIPAL CONTRACTOR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY (FOURTH DEPT). 13

MUNICIPAL LAW, SLIP AND FALL. 15

PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER A FOOTING FOR A TRAFFIC SIGNAL POLE WHICH HAD BEEN REMOVED; ALTHOUGH THE CITY APPROVED THE REMOVAL OF THE POLE IT PLAYED NO ROLE IN ITS REMOVAL; THEREFORE THE CITY DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION AND THE LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE RELIEVED THE CITY OF LIABILITY (THIRD DEPT). 15

MUNICIPAL LAW. 16

RARE CASE IN WHICH A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE CITY MAY RENDER THE CITY LIABLE FOR A DELAYED RESPONSE TO A 911 CALL; BECAUSE THE DELAY MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A DELIBERATE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY MAY NOT APPLY (FIRST DEPT). 16

MUNICIPAL LAW. 17

THE POLICE REMOVED PLAINTIFF’S BOYFRIEND FROM PLAINTIFF’S PREMISES THREE TIMES TELLING PLAINTIFF HE WOULD NOT COME BACK AND SHE WILL BE OKAY; THEN HER BOYFRIEND THREW HER OUT A THIRD FLOOR WINDOW; THERE WAS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE CITY; THE CITY WAS NOT LIABLE (SECOND DEPT). 17

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION. 18

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LEAVING AN ELEVEN-YEAR-OLD BOY UNSUPERVISED CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE; THE BOY, WHO WAS VISITING HIS 13-YEAR-OLD FRIEND’S HOME, WAS SEVERELY INJURED ATTEMPTING TO DO A FLIP OFF A PICNIC TABLE (THIRD DEPT). 18

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION. 19

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW. PLAINTIFF STUDENT WAS ASSAULTED BY ANOTHER STUDENT AND SUED THE SCHOOL UNDER A NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION THEORY; THE SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 19

SLIP AND FALL. 20

AFTER TWICE ADMITTING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA OF PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THEIR ANSWER TO DENY OWNERSHIP AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN (FIRST DEPT). 20

SLIP AND FALL. 21

ALTHOUGH THE SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS SMALL, THE AREA WAS DARKENED BY SCAFFOLDING; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 21

SLIP AND FALL. 22

THE METEOROLOGICAL DATA WAS NOT SWORN TO; DEFENDANTS THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT). 22

SLIP AND FALL, OPEN AND OBVIOUS. 23

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION–A STEEP EMBANKMENT NEXT TO A GRASSY WALKWAY–SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE SAFE BY THE INSTALLATION OF A RAILING OR BARRIER (FIRST DEPT). 23

VERDICT, SET ASIDE. 24

ALLEGED ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT DID NOT WARRANT SETTING ASIDE THE OVER $21 MILLION VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). 24

ZONE OF DANGER. 25

GRANDMOTHER WHO WITNESSED DEBRIS FROM THE FACADE OF A BUILDING INJURE HER TWO-YEAR-OLD GRANDDAUGHTER IS “IMMEDIATE FAMILY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF “ZONE OF DANGER” JURISPRUDENCE; GRANDMOTHER CAN THEREFORE MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (CT APP). 25

MARCH 2021 UPDATE PAMPHLET

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 4

CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT). 4

PRODUCTS LIABILITY. 4

IN THIS DESIGN DEFECT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE, THE LOSS OF THE SPECIFIC PRODUCT WHICH CAUSED THE INJURY DID NOT PREVENT DEFENDANT-MANUFACTURER FROM PRESENTING A DEFENSE; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON SPOLIATION GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT). 4

PRODUCTS LIABILITY. 5

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE REMOTELY OPERATED CRANE COULD FEASIBLY BE MADE SAFER; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (THIRD DEPT). 5

SLIP AND FALL, LANDLORD-TENANT. 6

DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS AN OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD AND DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE DUTY OF CARE AND KNOWLEDGE ELEMENTS OF A SLIP AND FALL CASE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 6

SLIP AND FALL. 7

A WORN MARBLE STEP IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE DEFECT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 7

SLIP AND FALL. 7

ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR TREE WELLS IN CITY SIDEWALKS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 7

SLIP AND FALL. 8

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL WAS LAST INSPECTED OR CLEANED; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 8

SLIP AND FALL. 9

ICE ON SIDEWALK MAY HAVE PRE-EXISTED RECENT SNOW; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE STORM IN PROGRESS RULE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 9

SLIP AND FALL. 9

NON-MANDATORY STANDARDS FOR THE GAP BETWEEN A SUBWAY TRAIN AND THE PLATFORM PROPERLY ADMITTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; HOWEVER THE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR GAP-RELATED ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP). 9

SLIP AND FALL. 10

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE LANDLORD’S FAILURE TO REPAIR SHOWER-CURTAIN BRACKETS CREATED THE DANGEROUS WATER-ON-THE-FLOOR CONDITION WHICH CAUSED THE SLIP AND FALL; AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION CAN STILL BE A DANGEROUS CONDITION; LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 10

SLIP AND FALL. 11

PLAINTIFF APPARENTLY SLIPPED AND FELL BECAUSE OF LEAVES ON THE STAIRWAY; THE CONDITION WAS NOT BOTH “OPEN AND OBVIOUS” AND “NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS” AS A MATTER OF LAW; PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE IN DESCENDING THE STAIRWAY FURNISHED THE OCCASION FOR THE ACCIDENT, BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT). 11

SLIP AND FALL. 12

WATER CAP IN A SIDEWALK WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT, SLIP AND FALL ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 12

SPOLIATION. 12

CITY DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR FAILURE TO PRESERVE PRE-ACCIDENT POLICE COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS POLICE-VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE BECAUSE THE CITY DEFENDANTS WERE AWARE THEY WOULD PROBABLY ASSERT AN EMERGENCY DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT). 12

TOXIC TORTS, LEAD PAINT. 13

DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZARDOUS LEAD PAINT CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT). 13

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 14

$10.5 MILLION VERDICT FOR CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING DEEMED EXCESSIVE IN THIS PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFF ASKED TO STIPULATE TO $3 MILLION (FIRST DEPT). 14

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 14

DRIVER/OWNER OF THE MIDDLE VEHICLE IN THIS CHAIN-REACTION REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE IS NOT LIABLE (SECOND DEPT). 14

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 15

SCHOOL BUS DRIVER ALLEGEDLY GESTURED TO PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A TURN AND PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS THEN STRUCK BY ANOTHER VEHICLE; THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT). 15

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, NEGLIGENCE PER SE. 16

THE BUS DRIVER VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW AND WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW; DEFENSE VERDICT SET ASIDE (THIRD DEPT). 16

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION. 17

PLAINTIFF’S SOLE REMEDY FOR HIS ON THE JOB INJURY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GRAVELY INJURED AND THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT WITH HIS EMPLOYER TO CONTRIBUTE, INDEMNIFY OR INSURE; THE EMPLOYER’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 17

Civil Procedure Update January – March 2021

(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1.5 CLE Credit Hours

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between January 1, 2021 and March 30, 2021 which address issues in “Civil Procedure.” CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from March 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Civil Procedure” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. Links to the written materials for this course (“Civil Procedure Update Pamphlets for January, February and March 2021”) are provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear verification codes. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification codes, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1.5 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Civil Procedure Update Pamphlets for January, February and March 2021”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet January 2021

Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet February 2021

Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet March 2021

Civil Procedure Update January February March 2021 Attorney Affirmation

Civil Procedure Update January February March 2021 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Civil Procedure Update January, February and March 2021” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the Three Update Pamphlets

JANUARY 2021 UPDATE PAMPHLET

APPEALS (APPELLATE RULING IS LAW OF THE CASE ON REMITTAL). 3

THE PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION DIRECTING THE COLLECTION OF MORE EVIDENCE IS THE LAW OF THE CASE; THE DIRECTION WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY SUPREME COURT UPON REMITTAL (SECOND DEPT). 3

BUSINESS RECORDS, CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 4

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ADMITTING LAW-FIRM BUSINESS RECORDS DID NOT INDICATE THE AFFIANT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE LAW FIRM; THEREFORE THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED THE RECORDS IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT). 4

CPLR 205 (a) (MOTIONS). 5

CPLR 205 (A), WHICH ALLOWS AN ACTION TO BE REFILED WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF DISMISSAL, DOES NOT APPLY TO MOTIONS; THE DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY AN ORDER WHICH STAYED THE PROCEEDINGS FOR FURTHER SUBMISSIONS AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL THE ORDER (THIRD DEPT). 5

DEFAULT JUDGMENTS (COUNTERCLAIMS). 6

THE CPLR 3215 REQUIREMENT THAT PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE COMMENCED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DEFAULT APPLIES TO COUNTERCLAIMS; COUNTERCLAIM DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT). 6

DEFAULT JUDGMENTS (ONE-YEAR DEADLINE). 7

THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR TAKING A JUDGMENT RUNS FROM THE DEFAULT AFTER THE FILING AND SERVING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, NOT A SUBSEQUENT AMENDED COMPLAINT (FIRST DEPT). 7

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS FEES. 8

BEFORE PETITIONER INMATE’S ARTICLE 78 PETITION WAS CONSIDERED RESPONDENT VOLUNTARILY REVERSED THE GUILTY FINDINGS ON THE PRISON DISCIPLINARY VIOLATIONS; PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT UNDER THE “CATALYST THEORY” (THIRD DEPT). 8

FORECLOSURE, REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 1501. 9

THE DEBT WAS ACCELERATED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY STAY WAS LIFTED; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED; DISAGREEING WITH THE 2ND DEPARTMENT, THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT NEED TO INTERPOSE A COUNTERCLAIM TO CANCEL THE MORTGAGE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1501 (THIRD DEPT). 9

FORECLOSURE, REFEREE’S REPORT = INQUEST ON DAMAGES. 10

THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED UPON BUSINESS RECORDS WHICH WERE NOT PRODUCED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS DEFAULTED, THE REFEREE’S REPORT FUNCTIONS AS AN INQUEST ON DAMAGES WHICH THE DEFENDANTS CAN CONTEST (SECOND DEPT). 10

JUSTICIABLE CLAIMS. 11

CLAIMS BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS SEEKING TO REQUIRE THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT FOR DEALING WITH VIOLENT PRISONERS WERE NOT JUSTICIABLE (FIRST DEPT). 11

JURISDICTION, INCONVENIENT FORUM. 12

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED JURISDICTION OVER THIS CUSTODY AND NEGLECT PROCEEDING STEMMING FROM AN INCIDENT DURING A BRIEF VISIT TO TENNESSEE (THIRD DEPT). 12

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS, WAIVER. 13

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS MISSED THE DEADLINE AND THEREBY WAIVED THE RIGHT TO MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF PLAINTIFF, THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE NOTE OF ISSUE AND COMPEL AN EXAM SHOUD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 13

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, LATE MOTION, REPLY PAPERS. 14

DEFENDANTS DID NOT SEEK LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE A LATE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OFFERED AN EXPLANATION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN REPLY PAPERS; THE EXPLANATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 14

FEBRUARY 2021 UPDATE PAMPHLET

CAPTION, MOTION TO AMEND. 6

MOTION TO AMEND THE CAPTION TO CORRECT THE NAMES OF THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 6

CERTIFICATE OF MERIT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 7

OVERRULING PRECEDENT, THE FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A CERTIFICATE OF MERIT IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION; IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACTION HAS MERIT OR AN EXCUSE FOR THE FAILURE TO FILE IN SEEKING AN EXTENSION TO FILE THE CERTIFICATE (FIRST DEPT). 7

CLASS ACTIONS. 8

CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR PERSONS DENIED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BASED ON THE FAIR MARKET VALUE (FMV) OF THEIR VEHICLES WAS PROPER; THE OPT-IN PROCEDURE SHOULD BE USED TO IDENTIFY CLASS MEMBERS (THIRD DEPT). 8

CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT, PLENARY ACTION. 9

SETTLEMENT CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT WERE VALID AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT). 9

CONTEMPT, JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ORDER. 10

THE CONTEMPT FINDING AND THE $535,000 FINE WERE BASED ON AN ORDER WHICH SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE (FOURTH DEPT). 10

DEATH OF PARTY, DIVORCE. 11

AN AMENDED STIPULATED ORDER CONCERNING THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE HUSBAND’S LIFE INSURANCE AND 401k IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ONGOING DIVORCE ACTION, ISSUED AFTER THE HUSBAND’S DEATH, WAS WITHOUT EFFECT EVEN THOUGH THE ORGINAL STIPULATED ORDER WAS ISSUED ONE DAY BEFORE THE HUSBAND’S DEATH; THE DIVORCE ACTION ABATED UPON THE HUSBAND’S DEATH (FOURTH DEPT). 11

DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION FOR. 12

IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT BEFORE THE OPPONENT HAS PRESENTED EVIDENCE AND CLOSED HIS OR HER CASE (FOURTH DEPT). 12

ESTATE AS PARTY TO DOWNWARD MODIFICATION OF SEPARATION AGREEMENT, FAMILY LAW. 13

THE ESTATE OF A PARTY TO A SEPARATION AGREEMENT MAY SEEK A DOWNWARD MODIFICATION OF THE AGREED MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS; THE DISSENT ARGUED ONLY THE PARTY, NOT THE ESTATE OF THE PARTY, CAN SEEK A DOWNWARD MODIFICATION AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE HANDLED IN PROBATE (FOURTH DEPT). 13

JUDGMENT LIENS, DOCKETING. 14

THE JUDGMENT LIEN WAS NOT DOCKETED UNDER THE SELLER’S SURNAME; THEREFORE THE BUYER’S ACTION FOR A JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 14

JURISDICTION, FAMILY LAW. 15

FAMILY COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE MANDATED BY THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT BEFORE RULING OHIO HAD JURISDICTION IN THE CUSTODY MATTER; MOTHER’S NEW YORK FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE NEW YORK HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER FAMILY OFFENSES OCCURRING IN OHIO (THIRD DEPT). 15

LONG-ARM JURISDICTION. 16

THE DUE PROCESS PRONG OF LONG-ARM JURISDICTION WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED WITH RESPECT THE GERMAN MANUFACTURER; IN ADDITION THE FAILURE TO WARN CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS TO THE FDA REGULATIONS (FOURTH DEPT). 16

NECESSARY PARTIES. 17

RATHER THAN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE NECESSARY PARTIES SUMMONED (SECOND DEPT). 17

SERVICE, NOTICE TO REDEEM, TAX LIEN FORECLOSURE. 18

PLAINTIFF IN THIS TAX LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE NOTICE TO REDEEM; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES FROM THE DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT). 18

PLEADINGS, DENIALS IN ANSWER. 19

ONLY THE HUSBAND TOOK OUT A MORTGAGE AND DEFENDANTS DENIED THE ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THE WIFE’S INTEREST WAS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE; THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE COURT NOTED THAT “NEITHER ADMITTED NOR DENIED” IN AN ANSWER TO A COMPLAINT IS DEEMED AN ADMISSION (SECOND DEPT). 19

PLEADINGS, MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER. 20

AFTER TWICE ADMITTING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA OF PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THEIR ANSWER TO DENY OWNERSHIP AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN (FIRST DEPT). 20

PLEADINGS, STANDING, FORECLOSURE. 21

FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN THE ANSWER IS NO LONGER DEEMED A WAIVER OF THE DEFENSE; DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND HER ANSWER (SECOND DEPT). 21

PLENARY ACTION, SET ASIDE STIPULATION, FAMILY LAW. 22

A PLENARY ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WHICH WAS INCORPORATED BUT NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE (SECOND DEPT). 22

PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE. 22

PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION STEMMING FROM PFOA CONTAMINATION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DID NOT APPLY; QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, PRIVATE NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES (THIRD DEPT). 22

STANDING, GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATION, FORECLOSURE. 23

PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE COMPANY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AND THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH PURSUANT TO CPLR 3408 (f) (SECOND DEPT). 23

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, DENTAL MALPRACTICE. 24

IN THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, PLAINTIFF RAISED ISSUES OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE, AND THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT (FOURTH DEPT). 24

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CPLR 205 (a) TOLLING PROVISION, FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 25

THE JUDGE WHO DISMISSED THE ACTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (a) FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DID NOT PLACE ON THE RECORD THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT CONSTITUTING NEGLECT; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED (FOURTH DEPT). 25

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FRAUD, JUDICIARY LAW 487, PLEADINGS. 26

FRAUD WAS NOT ADEQUATELY PLED, THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT APPLY TO THE FRAUD ALLEGATIONS, THE JUDICIARY LAW 487 CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT ADEQUATELY PLED (FOURTH DEPT). 26

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, MEDICAID, PLENARY ACTION. 27

A CORPORATION OPERATING A SKILLED NURSING FACILITY MAY BRING A PLENARY ACTION BASED UPON THE DENIAL OF MEDICAID BENEFITS FOR ONE OF ITS RESIDENTS; NO NEED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FOURTH DEPT). 27

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE, FORECLOSURE (MAY NO LONGER BE GOOD LAW, SEE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IMMEDIATELY BELOW). 28

THE AFFIRMATIONS OF DISCONTINUANCE AND CANCELLATION WERE SILENT ON THE ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE DEBT AND THEREFORE DID NOT STOP THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FROM RUNNING; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT). 28

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE, FORECLOSURE. 29

A MORTGAGE DEBT CAN BE ACCELERATED ONLY BY AN UNEQUIVOCAL OVERT ACT, I.E., COMMENCING A FORECLOSURE ACTION OR A DOCUMENT MAKING IT CLEAR THE ENTIRE DEBT IS IMMEDIATELY DUE (NOT THAT IT WILL BE DUE IN THE FUTURE); A MORTGAGE DEBT CAN BE DE-ACCELERATED BY A VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE, EVEN IF ITS PURPOSE IS TO STOP THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FROM RUNNING (CT APP). 29

SUBPOENAS, FRAUD. 31

COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR THE ISSUANCE AND QUASHING OF SUBPOENAS IN THIS FRAUD ACTION STEMMING FROM HIGH CREDITWORTHINESS RATINGS GIVEN TO RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FOURTH DEPT). 31

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS THE EQUIVALENT OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL. 32

CVS, A DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT DOCTORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT CVS’S PROVIDING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WITH THE WRONG DOSAGE OF MEDICINE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH (SECOND DEPT). 32

VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE. 33

ALLEGED ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT DID NOT WARRANT SETTING ASIDE THE OVER $21 MILLION VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). 33

MARCH 2021 UPDATE PAMPHLET

90-DAY DEMAND TO FILE NOTE OF ISSUE, FORECLOSURE. 8

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT HAVE A JUSTIFIABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE 90-DAY DEMAND TO FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 8

ANSWER, FAILURE TO REJECT LATE. 9

THE BANK’S FAILURE TO REJECT THE LATE ANSWER WITHIN 15 DAYS WAIVED THE LATE SERVICE AND DEFAULT (SECOND DEPT). 9

ARBITRATION, EMPLOYMENT LAW, SEXUAL HARASSMENT. 9

CPLR 7515, ENACTED IN 2018, DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO PROHIBIT MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS (FIRST DEPT). 9

ARTICLE 78, FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, SUA SPONTE. 10

FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH CAN BE WAIVED; THE JUDGE, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE ARTICLE 78 PETITION ON THAT GROUND; PETITION REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT). 10

ARTICLE 78/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 11

ABSENT A REQUEST FROM A PARTY, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ASPECT OF THIS HYBRID ARTICLE 78/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION (SECOND DEPT). 11

ARTICLE 78/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 12

ALTHOUGH THE ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY TRANSFERRED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION, THE RELATED DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WAS NOT TRANSFERABLE (FOURTH DEPT). 12

ATTACHMENT. 12

THE MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF ATTACHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). 12

BILL OF PARTICULARS, AMENDMENT. 13

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AFTER DISCOVERY WAS CLOSED TO RAISE A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY STEMMING FROM FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY ALLEGED; DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD DEMONSTRATED THE LEASE DID NOT REQUIRE THE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE DOOR WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGED CLOSED ON HER HAND (SECOND DEPT). 13

COMPLAINT, DEFECTIVE. 15

ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT WAS DEFECTIVE, AFFIDAVITS AND OTHER EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATE A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS CLAIM; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 15

COURT OF CLAIMS, CONTRACT LAW. 15

THE COURT OF CLAIMS, NOT SUPREME COURT, IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST THE STATE (FOURTH DEPT). 15

DIRECTED VERDICT, COURT OF CLAIMS, ATTORNEYS. 16

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REMARK ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF A FAIR TRIAL; THE COURT OF CLAIMS HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS SEEKING MONEY DAMAGES FROM THE STATE, RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). 16

FAMILY LAW, DISMISSAL OF PETITION. 18

FATHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT MAKING A DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS, MATTER REMITTED; THE USUAL PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR AWARDING CUSTODY TO A NONPARENT DO NOT APPLY TO A TEMPORARY PLACEMENT WITH A NONPARENT (FOURTH DEPT). 18

FAMILY LAW, FILING OF OBJECTIONS. 19

FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE THE OBJECTIONS TO THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE’S DETERMINATION DID NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF THE OBJECTIONS (FOURTH DEPT). 19

FAMILY LAW, SERVICE OF PETITION. 20

PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NEGLECT PETITION WAS PROPERLY MAILED TO MOTHER AND MOTHER PRESENTED EVIDENCE REBUTTING THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT; A HEARING ON WHETHER MOTHER WAS PROPERLY SERVED IS REQUIRED (FOURTH DEPT). 20

INSTRUMENT FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY. 21

THE COMMERCIAL LEASE GUARANTEE MET THE DEFINITION OF AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY; THE COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS ON ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LEASE GUARANTEES DO NOT APPLY; THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY DEFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT). 21

JUDGMENT ENTERED AFTER PARTY’S DEATH. 22

A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT FOR WHICH A JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AFTER DECEDENT’S DEATH MAY NOT BE ENTERED IN DECEDENT’S NAME PURSUANT TO CPLR 5016 (d); THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRIORITY IN SETTLING THE ESTATE (THIRD DEPT). 22

JURISDICTION, INDIAN LAW. 23

SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNKECHAUG INDIAN NATION TO EXCLUDE A MEMBER OF THE NATION FROM A PARCEL OF NATION LAND (SECOND DEPT). 23

JURORS, REQUEST TO POLL. 24

THE REQUEST TO POLL THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DISCHARGED THE JURY FOREMAN FOR ARGUING WITH ONE OR MORE JURORS WITHOUT INTERVIEWING ALL INVOLVED (FIRST DEPT). 24

MUNCICIPAL LAW, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 25

THE SEVEN-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN NYC’S VICTIMS OF GENDER-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PROTECTION LAW (VGM) IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE ONE-YEAR OR THREE-YEAR CPLR STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT S CORPORATION MAY BE ONE AND THE SAME, THERE WAS ENOUGH EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT FOR THE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION TO SURVIVE THE MOTION TO DISMISS (FIRST DEPT). 25

MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, COUNTY LAW. 26

ALTHOUGH THIS NON-TORT ACTION AGAINST THE NYC DISTRICT ATTORNEY DID NOT TRIGGER THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, IT DID TRIGGER THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT OF THE COUNTY LAW (FIRST DEPT). 26

MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM. 27

THE COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO DEEM A NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY FILED MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION (SLIP AND FALL) ACCRUED, EVEN THOUGH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS SERVED WITHIN THAT TIME PERIOD; A NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED MORE THAN 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT IS A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT). 27

MUNICIPAL LAW. 28

THE NYPD IS A DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY AND CANNOT BE SEPARATELY SUED; THE 42 USC 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT ALLEGATIONS OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CITY CUSTOM OR POLICY; THE OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY FALL BECAUSE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST AND THE FORCE USED BY THE POLICE WAS NOT EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES (SECOND DEPT). 28

NECESSARY PARTIES, FORECLOSURE, DECEASED MORTGAGORS. 29

IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE FIRST DETERMINED WHETHER ANY DISTRIBUTEES OF THE DECEASED MORTGAGORS WERE NECESSARY PARTIES [RPAPL 1311 (1)] AND, IF SO, SUMMON THEM PURSUANT TO CPLR 1001 [b]; THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN NECESSARY PARTIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 29

NECESSARY PARTIES, FORECLOSURE. 31

THE ESTATE OF THE MORTGAGOR WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE PROPERTY WAS CONVEYED BEFORE HER DEATH AND THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 31

ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS. 31

WHERE THERE IS AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN AN ORDER OR A JUDGMENT AND THE DECISION UPON WHICH IT IS BASED, THE DECISION CONTROLS (FIRST DEPT). 31

RECEIVERS. 32

THE CRITERIA FOR APPOINTMENT OF A TEMPORARY RECEIVER IN THIS PARTITION AND SALE ACTION WERE NOT MET (SECOND DEPT). 32

REFEREES, ORDER OF REFERENCE. 33

THE REFEREE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF REFERENCE; SUPREME COURT’S RULINGS BASED UPON THE REFEREE’S ORDER WERE THEREFORE INVALID (SECOND DEPT). 33

SERVICE OF PROCESS, HEARING REQUIRED. 34

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT DID RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ON THE VALIDITY OF THE SERVICE OF PROCESS WHICH REQUIRES A HEARING (FOURTH DEPT). 34

SERVICE, AFFIDAVIT OF, WARRANT OF EVICTION. 35

THERE IS NO NEED TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AFTER SERVICE OF A WARRANT AND NOTICE OF EVICTION; THE MATTER WAS CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT). 35

STANDING. 36

THE BANK’S PROOF OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT), 36

STATUTE OF LIMITATION, FORECLOSURE, ACCELERATION OF THE DEBT. 36

THE DEFAULT LETTER, WHICH INDICATED THE MORTGAGE DEBT WOULD BE ACCELERATED AT A SPECIFIC FUTURE DATE IF THE DEFAULT WERE NOT CURED, DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT START RUNNING AND THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIMELY (THIRD DEPT). 36

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE, ACCELERATION OF THE DEBT. 38

THE DEFAULT NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT BECAUSE IT DID NOT STATE THE DEBT WAS DUE AND PAYABLE IMMEDIATELY; THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PROPER MAILING OF THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE (THIRD DEPT) 38

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, INFANCY TOLL. 39

THE INFANCY TOLL OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CPLR 208 APPLIES TO A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION WHERE THE SOLE DISTUBUTEES ARE INFANTS; THE TOLL, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY TO A RELATED ASSAULT AND BATTERY ACTION WHICH IS PERSONAL TO THE DECEDENT (FRIST DEPT). 39

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SIX-MONTH EXTENSION, CPLR 205 (a). 40

THE ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT INLCUDE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF A PATTERN OF DELAY; THEREFORE THE “FAILURE TO PROSECUTE” EXCEPTION IN CPLR 205 (A) DID NOT APPLY; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION BROUGHT WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT). 40

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SIX-MONTH EXTENSION, CPLR 205 (a). 41

BECAUSE THE ORDER DISMISSING THE INITIAL COMPLAINT DID NOT SPECIFY CONDUCT CONSTITUTING NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE, THE SIX-MONTH TOLL OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (a) APPLIED AND THE ACTION WAS TIMELY; THE DISSENT DISAGREED (SECOND DEPT). 41

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 42

WHERE FRAUD IS THE BASIS OF A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS SIX YEARS (FIRST DEPT). 42

SUA SPONTE. 42

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, AFTER A COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE, ISSUED A PRECLUSION ORDER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MOTION PENDING (FIRST DEPT). 42

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PREMATURE MOTION. 43

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE WAS PREMATURE; PLAINTIFF HAD NOT YET BEEN DEPOSED (FIRST DEPT). 43

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, DEFECTIVE GOODS. 44

EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE ACCEPTED DEFECTIVE GOODS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UCC, THE UCC PROVIDES REMEDIES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BE MADE WHOLE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE ACCEPTANCE; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). 44

VENUE. 45

DEFENDANTS DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE (FIRST DEPT). 45

VERDICT, SET ASIDE. 46

PLAINTIFF, AN EXTERMINATOR, WAS IN THE ATTIC OF DEFENDANT’S HOUSE; THE ATTIC HAD NO FLOOR AND THE PLAINTIFF WALKED ON THE BEAMS OR JOISTS; THE PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED HE STEPPED ON A SMALLER PIECE OF WOOD LYING ACROSS THE BEAMS, IT GAVE WAY AND HIS LEG WENT THROUGH THE CEILING; THE 2ND DEPARTMENT, OVER A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT, DETERMINED THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE SMALLER BOARD WAS A LATENT DEFECT OR THAT DEFENDANT HAD NOTICE OF ANY DEFECT, SET ASIDE THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT AND DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT). 46

VERDICT, SET ASIDE. 47

THE DEFENSE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO OFFER A SPECULATIVE CONCLUSION ABOUT HOW PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD; PLANTIFF ALLEGED THE STEP STOOL SHE WAS STANDING ON COLLAPSED; THE DEFENSE EXPERT TESTIFIED SHE COULD HAVE FALLEN ONTO THE STOOL; THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). 47

Criminal Law Update December 2020

(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Appropriate Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between December 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020 which address issues in “Criminal Law.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from March 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Criminal Law” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Criminal Law Update Pamphlet December 2020”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Criminal Law Update Pamphlet December 2020”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Criminal Law Update Pamphlet December 2020

Criminal Law Update December 2020 Attorney Affirmation

Criminal Law Update December 2020 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Criminal Law Update December 2020” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Criminal Law Update Pamphlet December 2020”

710.30 NOTICE. 8

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE THE PEOPLE WERE GOING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SHE TYPED IN THE COMBINATION TO A SAFE IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM A DETECTIVE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 8

ALIBI EVIDENCE. 9

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF ALIBI EVIDENCE, COUNTY COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BY PRECLUDING THE ALIBI EVIDENCE; THE UNPRESERVED ERROR WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT). 9

APPEAL, WAIVER OF, ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 10

THE APPEAL WAIVERS WERE NOT EXECUTED UNTIL SENTENCING AND WERE THEREFORE INVALID; ARGUMENTS ABOUT A LATE FILED OMNIBUS MOTION AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO FILE OMNIBUS MOTIONS DID NOT SURVIVE THE GUILTY PLEAS (FOURTH DEPT). 10

APPEAL, WAIVER OF. 11

A NUMBER OF GUILTY-PLEA CONVICTIONS REVERSED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS WERE TOLD THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO APPEAL (CT APP). 11

APPEALS, JUDGES, SUPPRESSION RULINGS. 12

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED SUPPRESSION ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES; THE APPELLATE COURT IS POWERLESS TO REVIEW THAT ISSUE; THE APPELLATE COURT IS ALSO POWERLESS TO REVIEW THE SECOND GROUND FOR SUPPRESSION ARGUED BY THE PEOPLE ON APPEAL BECAUSE THAT SECOND ISSUE WAS RESOLVED BELOW IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR; MATTER SENT BACK TO SUPREME COURT FOR REVIEW OF THE SECOND ISSUE SHOULD THE PEOPLE BE SO ADVISED (SECOND DEPT). 12

ASSAULT. 13

EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT, ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION VACATED (SECOND DEPT). 13

ATTEMPT, STING. 14

DEFENDANT WAS THE TARGET OF A STING WHERE THE INVESTIGATOR POSED AS THE STEPFATHER OF A 14-YEAR-OLD GIRL WITH WHOM THE DEFENDANT WAS INVITED TO HAVE SEX; WHEN THE INVESTIGATOR SUMMONED THE STEPDAUGHTER TO MEET THE DEFENDANT, HE GOT UP AND WALKED AWAY; THE ATTEMPTED RAPE, CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT). 14

ATTORNEYS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 15

DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE REPRESENTED HIMSELF AT RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT). 15

BEST EVIDENCE RULE, SURVEILLANCE VIDEO. 16

AN EXCEPTION TO THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE APPLIED, ALLOWING TESTIMONY DESCRIBING THE CONTENTS OF DESTROYED VIDEO SURVEILLANCE (FOURTH DEPT). 16

COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, JUDGES. 17

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION’S JOINT REQUEST TO HAVE THE DEFENDANT’S COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATED; ONCE A DEFENDANT IS DEEMED COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, THE DECISION WHETHER TO PRESENT AN INSANITY DEFENSE IS THE DEFENDANT’S, NOT THE COURT’S, TO MAKE (SECOND DEPT). 17

CONTEMPT. 18

DEFENDANT’S CONTEMPT CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING AN ORDER OF PROTECTION STANDS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORDER OF PROTECTION WAS BASED ON AN OFFENSE SINCE FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL (FIRST DEPT). 18

CONTEMPT. 19

STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FIRST DEGREE NOT MET; CONVICTION REDUCED TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT SECOND DEGREE (SECOND DEPT). 19

DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 20

ALTHOUGH THE TWO INDICTMENTS ALLEGED THE SAME MODUS OPERANDI FOR MEDICAID FRAUD, THE CHARGES INVOLVED DIFFERENT PARTIES AND TIME PERIODS; THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION SEEKING TO PRECLUDE PROSECUTION ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS DENIED OVER A DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). 20

EVIDENCE, IRRELEVANT. 20

IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHS OF A BAYONET WHICH WAS NOT THE WEAPON USED IN THE STABBING; THE MAJORITY FOUND THE ERROR HARMLESS, THE DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT). 20

EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION HEARING, LEGALITY OF POLICE CONDUCT. 21

THE POLICE WITNESSES AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING WERE NOT CREDIBLE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND THE INDICTMENT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 21

FORGERY. 22

A DEFENDANT CAN NOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTH FORGERY AND POSSESSION OF A FORGED INSTRUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SAME FORGED INSTRUMENT (SECOND DEPT). 22

GRAND JURIES, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE. 23

THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT STEMMED FROM HIS STRIKING AND SERIOUSLY INJURING AN EIGHT-POUND DOG; THERE WAS NO NEED TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE; INDICTMENT REINSTATED OVER A DISSENT (SECOND DEPT). 23

GUILTY PLEAS, ATTORNEYS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 24

DEFENDANT WAS HOUSED HOURS AWAY FROM HIS BROOKLYN ATTORNEY AND ATTEMPTS TO MOVE DEFENDANT TO NEW YORK CITY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL; UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH HIS ATTORNEY BEFORE ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA; THE MOTION TO VACATE THE PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 24

GUILTY PLEAS, JUDGES. 25

DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE RIGHTS HE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY IMPOSED AN ENHANCED SENTENCE AND CHANGED THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT; GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT). 25

GUILTY PLEAS. 26

DEFENDANT, AT THE PLEA PROCEEDINGS, WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION TO BE IMPOSED OR THE MAXIMUM WHICH COULD BE IMPOSED; GUILTY PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT). 26

IDENTITY. 27

A PHOTOGRAPH OF DEFENDANT WITH A HANDGUN TAKEN SIX WEEKS BEFORE THE SHOOTING WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE AS TENDING TO SHOW HIS IDENTITY AS THE SHOOTER (FIRST DEPT). 27

INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS. 27

ASSAULT THIRD IS AN INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF ASSAULT SECOND (SECOND DEPT). 27

INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS. 28

ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER COUNT MUST BE DISMISSED AS AN INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER (FOURTH DEPT). 28

INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS. 28

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SECOND DEGREE AND CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM ARE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS (SECOND DEPT). 28

INDICTMENT, WAIVER OF. 29

THE OMISSION OF NON-ELEMENTAL FACTUAL INFORMATION, HERE THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, FROM THE WAIVER OF INDICTMENT FORM WAS A DEFECT WAIVED BY THE GUILTY PLEA (CT APP). 29

INDICTMENTS, IDENTITY, MOLINEUX. 29

ALL BUT ONE COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT WAS RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY THE CHILD-VICTIM’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY IN THIS SEXUAL ABUSE CASE; THE SIMILAR UNCHARGED OFFENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED UNDER MOLINEUX AS BACKGROUND EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT). 29

JURIES, DUAL JURIES. 30

THE “DUAL JURY” PROCEDURE USED TO TRY DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CONVICTED, AND THE CO-DEFENDANT, WHO WAS ACQUITTED, ALLOWED THE CO-DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY TO ACT AS A SECOND PROSECUTOR; CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT). 30

JURORS. 31

AFTER THE DISCHARGE OF A JUROR FOR MISCONDUCT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REPLACED THE JUROR WITH AN ALTERNATE WHO HAD BEEN EXCUSED AND SENT HOME; THERE WAS A DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). 31

LESSER INCLUDED COUNTS. 32

SECOND DEGREE MURDER COUNT DISMISSED A LESSER INCLUDED COUNT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER (FOURTH DEPT). 32

MATERIAL STAGES, DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT. 33

DEFENDANT WAS REMOVED FROM THE COURTROOM WHEN HE DISRUPTED THE PROCEEDINGS AS THE GUILTY VERDICT WAS BEING DELIVERED; DEFENDANT SHOULD FIRST HAVE BEEN WARNED THAT HE WOULD BE REMOVED IF HE CONTINUED TO DISRUPT THE PROCEEDINGS; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 33

SENTENCING, JUDGES. 34

DEFENDANT WAS REPEATEDLY WARNED HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO 45 YEARS AFTER TRIAL WHEN, IN FACT, HIS SENTENCE WOULD BE CAPPED AT 20 YEARS; DEFENDANT WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS GROUND FOR AN ATTACK ON HIS SENTENCE AND THEREFORE DID NOT NEED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL BY MOVING TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA; PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT). 34

SENTENCING, JUDGES. 35

SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER THE SECOND TRIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HIGHER THAN THE SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER THE FIRST TRIAL (SECOND DEPT). 35

SENTENCING, JUDGES. 36

THE APPELLATE DIVISION REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE, IN PART BECAUSE THE SENTENCING JUDGE MAY HAVE BEEN REACTING TO CRITICISM OF HOW THE TRIAL WAS HANDLED (SECOND DEPT). 36

SENTENCING, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS. 37

CONSIDERING ALL THE MITIGATING FACTORS, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT). 37

SENTENCING. 38

DESPITE THE HORRIFIC NATURE OF THE CRIME, DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS REDUCED BECAUSE OF HIS MENTAL ILLNESS AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY (FIRST DEPT). 38

SENTENCING. 39

THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE REQUIRED FACTORS WHEN SENTENCING DEFENDANT AFTER DEFENDANT’S VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF INTERIM PROBATION; SENTENCE VACATED (FOURTH DEPT). 39

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA). 40

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM LEVEL TWO TO LEVEL ONE IN THIS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASE (FIRST DEPT). 40

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA). 41

THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS DEEMED NONCONSENSUAL SOLELY BECAUSE THE VICTIM WAS 14; THE DEFENDANT WAS 27; DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE TO RISK LEVEL ONE; THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIVE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). 41

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA). 41

UPWARD DEPARTURE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE DEFENDANT COMMITTED RAPE TO TAKE REVENGE UPON SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE VICTIM; THE FACT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN DEPORTED DID NOT RENDER THE APPEAL MOOT (CT APP). 41

STREET STOPS, APPEAL, WAIVER OF. 42

THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE JUDGE SUGGESTED THE WAIVER WAS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO APPEAL; THE OFFICER WHO APPROACHED DEFENDANT ON THE STREET WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN REACHING FOR AN OBJECT IN DEFENDANT’S SWEATSHIRT POCKET; DEFENDANT’S FLIGHT AND DISCARDING OF THE WEAPON WAS NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE OFFICER’S UNJUSTIFIED ACTIONS; THE GUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT). 42

WARRANTLESS ARREST INSIDE HOME. 43

ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT BEFORE THEY ENTERED THE HOME AND THEREFORE COULD HAVE GOTTEN AN ARREST WARRANT, THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE POLICE ENTERED THE HOME WITH CONSENT; DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED THE POLICE DID NOT GET A WARRANT TO DELAY THE ATTACHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PROCURE STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT). 43

WEAPON, INVOLUTARY POSSESSION OF A. 44

EVEN THOUGH THE DEFENDANT ARGUED HE NEVER HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON FOUND IN ANOTHER’S HOUSE, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE “INVOLUNTARY POSSESSION” JURY INSTRUCTION; POSSESSION, EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, IS NOT VOLUNTARY IF IT IS FOR SO BRIEF A PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT HAVE TERMINATED POSSESSION (CT APP). 44

WEAPON, TEMPORARY INNOCENT POSSESSION OF A. 45

DEFENDANT, WHO ACCEPTED POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON FROM HIS FRIEND, DID SO IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION; DURING THE CONFRONTATION DEFENDANT SHOT TWO PEOPLE; THE ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE DID NOT RENDER DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON TEMPORARY AND LAWFUL (CT APP). 45

WITNESS TAMPERING. 47

WITNESS TAMPERING CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL REVERSED; NO CHARGES WERE PENDING AT THE TIME OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE WITNESS (FOURTH DEPT). 47

Negligence Update November 2020

(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between November 1, 2020 and November 30, 2020 which address issues in “Negligence.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Negligence” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Negligence Update Pamphlet November 2020”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Negligence Update Pamphlet November 2020”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Negligence Update Pamphlet November 2020

Negligence Update November 2020 Attorney Affirmation

Negligence Update November 2020 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Negligence Update November 2020” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Negligence Update Pamphlet November 2020”

COMMON CARRIERS. 8

THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE PROTECTED THE TRANSIT AUTHORITY FROM LIABILITY IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER INJURY CASE; THE DRIVER TESTIFIED HE BRAKED SLIGHTLY WHEN A CAR WAS IN FRONT OF THE BUS MAKING A RIGHT TURN (FIRST DEPT). 8

DRAM SHOP ACT, ALCOHOL POISONING. 9

THE DRAM SHOP ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN FAVOR OF THE INTOXICATED PERSON (SECOND DEPT). 9

FALL FROM TOP BUNK. 10

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT FELL FROM AN UNGUARDED TOP BUNK AT A TEMPORARY SHELTER AND WAS RENDERED A QUADRIPLEGIC; THE SHELTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THERE WAS EVIDENCE THE SHELTER HAD INSTALLED GUARDRAILS ON OTHER TOP BUNKS (FIRST DEPT). 10

INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS. 11

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED A VALID NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT INSURANCE BROKER FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE EXCESS CARRIER OF A CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF; IT WAS ALLEGED THAT PLAINTIFF ROUTINELY NOTIFIED DEFENDANT BROKER OF ANY CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT BROKER ROUTINELY NOTIFIED THE AFFECTED CARRIERS, GIVING RISE TO A DUTY TO DO SO (FIRST DEPT). 11

LANDLORD-TENANT, DANGEROUS CONDITION, CONTRACTORS. 12

THE STATE, AS AN OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD, FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR HIRED TO DO RENOVATIONS DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION WHICH INJURED CLAIMANT; THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 12

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PHYSICAL THERAPY. 13

PLAINTIFF’S KNEE BECAME STIFF AND IMPOSSIBLE TO BEND AFTER SURGERY; PLAINTIFF SUED THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR WHO TREATED HER AT THE POST-SURGERY REHABILITATION CENTER; THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR, WHO DID NOT PERFORM THE SURGERY, HAD CERTIFIED AND RECOMMENDED PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY FOR PLAINTIFF AT THE REHABILITATION CENTER; BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE THERAPY ITSELF, HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 13

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 14

DEFENDANTS’ MEDICAL EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY BASED UPON THE MEDICAL RECORDS AND MATERIAL IN EVIDENCE DESPITE NOT HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURIES; THE EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ABOUT CAUSATION EVEN THOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE EXPERT REPORT (SECOND DEPT). 14

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 15

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 15

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 16

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ AFFIDAVITS WERE CONCLUSORY AND SPECULATIVE WITH RESPECT TO ONE DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; AND A SECOND DEFENDANT’S EXPERTS WERE QUALIFIED TO OFFER OPINIONS IN AREAS OUTSIDE THEIR PARTICULAR FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION (FOURTH DEPT). 16

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 18

STATEMENTS THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT SIGNED AN “AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE” FORM BEFORE REFUSING TREATMENT WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN MEDICAL RECORDS AND IN THE DEPOSITIONS OF THE DOCTORS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS BUSINESS RECORDS, AS ADMISSIONS, AS DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST, OR PURSUANT TO THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE; DEFENSE VERDICT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 18

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 19

THE ALLEGATION THAT DEFENDANT SURGEONS PERFORMED A CHIROPRACTIC PROCEDURE DURING SPINAL FUSION SURGERY SOUNDED IN BATTERY, NOT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, AND WAS TIME-BARRED; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, A CHIROPRACTOR, WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION ABOUT DEFENDANTS’ SURGERY (THIRD DEPT). 19

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 20

THE DEFENDANT SURGEON’S TESTIMONY DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR HABIT EVIDENCE; THEREFORE THE DEFENSE EXPERT, WHO RELIED ON THE INSUFFICIENT HABIT EVIDENCE, DID NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE; EVEN IF SUFFICIENT, HABIT EVIDENCE ONLY RAISES AN INFERENCE FOR THE JURY TO CONSIDER, IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH WHAT PROCEDURE WAS FOLLOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW; NEW EVIDENCE RAISED IN REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT). 20

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 21

THE MAJORITY FOUND PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT, ALLEGING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS GIVEN TOO MUCH MORPHINE, WAS SPECULATIVE AND CONCLUSORY; TWO DISSENTERS DISAGREED; THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 21

MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONDERS. 23

PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD PASSED OUT AT A CONCERT, REFUSED ASSISTANCE IN WALKING TO THE BACK OF THE THEATER SO THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN COULD CHECK HIS BLOOD PRESSURE AND PULSE; WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO WALK TO THE BACK OF THE THEATER HE PASSED OUT AGAIN AND FELL, HIS FACE HITTING THE FLOOR; THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO ASSIST PLAINTIFF AFTER HE REFUSED THEIR HELP AND THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 23

MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY, FIREFIGHTING. 24

MUNICIPALITIES AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN THIS WATER- DAMAGE LAWSUIT STEMMING FROM EXTINGUISHING A FIRE; NUISANCE AND TRESPASS ALSO PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 24

MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY, THIRD-PARTY ASSUALT. 25

THE COUNTY DEMONSTRATED THERE WAS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, THE DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS WERE DISCRETIONARY AND THEREFORE PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, AND THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; PLAINTIFF’S WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION BASED UPON THE DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT FROM ABUSE BY FAMILY MEMBERS DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). 25

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE (ATV) ACCIDENT. 26

INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER ON DEFENDANTS’ ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE (ATV), DRIVEN BY DEFENDANTS’ DECEDENT, WHO WAS INTOXICATED, WHEN THE ATV CRASHED INTO A TREE; THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE IS NO COMMON LAW “NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF ALCOHOL TO A MINOR” CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST ADDRESSED IN PLAINITIFFS’ REPLY PAPERS PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 26

SLIP AND FALL, COURT OF CLAIMS. 27

THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE A CLAIM DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY THE LOCATION OF THE SLIP AND FALL, RENDERING THE FILING OF THE CLAIM UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT). 27

SLIP AND FALL, INSTRUMENT OF HARM. 28

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BUILDING MANAGEMENT COMPANY WAS LIABLE, PURSUANT TO ESPINAL FACTORS, FOR INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL INTO THE ELEVATOR SHAFT (FIRST DEPT). 28

SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM. 30

THE REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE EXCUSE WAS INADEQUATE BUT THE CITY HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT). 30

SLIP AND FALL, TRIVIAL DEFECT. 31

THE CRACK OVER WHICH INFANT PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED WAS DEEMED TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT). 31

SLIP AND FALL. 32

50% FAULT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPORTIONED TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS WET-FLOOR SLIP AND FALL CASE; THE WATER ON THE FLOOR WAS NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THE WARNING SIGN WAS NOT VISIBLE (FOURTH DEPT). 32

SLIP AND FALL. 33

DEFENDANT GROCERY STORE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; DEFENDANT POINTED TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFF’S PROOF INSTEAD OF AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWING IT DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION (WATER ON THE FLOOR IN FRONT OF A VEGETABLE DISPLAY WITH MELTING ICE) (SECOND DEPT). 33

SLIP AND FALL. 34

DEFENDANT TRIPPED OVER A PIECE OF PIPE STICKING OUT OF THE FLOOR AND FELL INTO THE UNGUARDED ELEVATOR MECHANISM; THE DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 34

SLIP AND FALL. 35

IN A COMPREHENSIVE DECISION ANALYZING THE ELEMENTS OF PROOF IN A SLIP AND FALL CASE, INCLUDING EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE, THE 1ST DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE DEFENDANT STORE DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE OR ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF A PUDDLE OF WATER IN FRONT OF AN ICE MACHINE (FIRST DEPT). 35

SLIP AND FALL. 36

THE DRY BUT ALLEGEDLY SLIPPERY FLOOR WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT). 36

SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS. 37

SOCIAL SERVICES LAW ARTICLE 11 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR THE INAPPROPRIATE USE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS (SECOND DEPT). 37

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT, LANDLORD LIABILITY FOR ROBBERY. 38

THE LANDLORD DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF ANY PRIOR ROBBERIES OCCURRING IN THE BUILDING, THEREFORE THE TENANT-ROBBERY-VICTIM’S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 38

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT, NURSING HOME RESIDENT. 39

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND AGENCY ALLEGATIONS SUFFICIENTLY PLED VICARIOUS LIABILTY FOR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE NURSING HOME DEFENDANTS FOR AN ASSAULT BY A RESIDENT ON PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT; THE COMPLAINT ALSO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED PUBLIC HEALTH LAW VIOLATIONS; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 39

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT. 41

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO THE CLUB AND THE SECURITY COMPANY IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE CLUB COULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE CLUB, WHETHER THE CLUB WAS THE SPECIAL EMPLOYER OF THE BOUNCERS AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO VICARIOUS LIABILITY, AND WHETHER THERE WAS DRAM SHOP ACT LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT). 41

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT. 42

DEFENDANT HOTEL PROPERLY FOUND NEGLIGENT FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE; HOWEVER THE HOTEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPORTIONED 100% OF THE FAULT (SECOND DEPT). 42

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 43

THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYEE WAS ON HIS WAY HOME FROM A CORPORATE MEETING HELD BY HIS EMPLOYER WHEN THE CAR ACCIDENT HAPPENED; THE EMPLOYER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 43

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, LACHES. 44

THE 2019 MOTION TO RESTORE THE ACTION TO ACTIVE STATUS AFTER THE NOTE OF ISSUE WAS VACATED IN 2012 SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; LACHES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THERE HAS BEEN NO SERVICE OF A 90-DAY DEMAND PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT). 44

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PEDESTRIANS, CONTRACTORS. 45

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTRACTOR HIRED TO WORK ON A SIDEWALK WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE PEDESTRIANS HAD A SAFE PASSAGEWAY; PLAINTIFFS WERE STRUCK BY A CAR WHEN THEY WALKED IN THE PUBLIC STREET BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK WAS BLOCKED; THE THEORY OF LIABILITY APPEARS TO STEM FROM THE CONTRACTOR’S ALLEGED CREATION OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION UPON A PUBLIC STREET OR SIDEWALK (SECOND DEPT). 45

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS. 46

SUBPOENA SEEKING 1009 FORMS SHOWING THE INSURER’S PAYMENTS TO TWO DOCTORS WHO PERFORM MEDICAL EXAMS FOR THE INSURER IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED; WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBPOENA FOR THE MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXAMS, THAT ISSUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED BY SUPREME COURT AND CAN NOT, THEREFORE, BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL (THIRD DEPT). 46

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-END COLLISIONS. 47

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFFS’ CAR STOPPED SUDDENLY DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT). 47

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW. 48

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 388 (1), WHICH IMPOSES VICARIOUS LIABILITY ON THE OWNER OF A VEHICLE, DOES NOT PERMIT A NEGLIGENT DRIVER TO SUE THE VEHICLE OWNER FOR THE DRIVER’S OWN NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT). 48

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 49

DEFENDANT CLAIMED IN HIS DEPOSITION HE COULDN’T STOP AT THE RED LIGHT BECAUSE THE FLOOR MAT HAD ROLLED UP UNDER THE BRAKE PEDAL; PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED THE DEPOSITION AS PART OF PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE MAJORITY HELD THE DEPOSITION WAS HEARSAY AND THEREFORE COULD NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE USUAL HEARSAY RULES DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE DEPOSITION WAS SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT). 49

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PEDESTRIANS, ZONE OF DANGER, EMOTIONAL TRAUMA. 51

INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER AND WITNESSED A TRUCK STRIKE AND KILL HER BROTHER; SHE ALLEGED SEVERE EMOTIONAL TRAUMA; DEFENDANT’S DISCLOSURE DEMANDS FOR PLAINTIFF’S FACEBOOK, SNAPCHAT AND INSTRAGRAM ACCOUNTS, AS WELL AS THE PHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES, OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FRIENDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 51

Civil Procedure Update November 2020

(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between November 1, 2020 and November 30, 2020 which address issues in “Civil Procedure.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Civil Procedure” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet November 2020”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet November 2020”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet November 2020

Civil Procedure Update November 2020 Attorney Affirmation

Civil Procedure Update November 2020 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Civil Procedure Update November 2020” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet November 2020”

ARTICLE 78, DISCOVERY, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW. 8

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY IN THE ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CONTESTING SUNY ALBANY’S FINDING PETITIONER VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT BY HAVING NONCONSENSUAL SEX; THE ALLEGED VICTIM HAS NO MEMORY OF THE INCIDENT; PETITIONER ALLEGED BIAS ON THE PART OF THE SCHOOL’S TITLE IX INVESTIGATOR (THIRD DEPT). 8

BUSINESS RECORDS, CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. 9

A CRUCIAL DOCUMENT SUBMITTED TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF A MEDICAID LIEN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS A BUSINESS RECORD; THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY AN EMPLOYEE FAMILIAR WITH THE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE ENTITY WHICH PROVIDED THE DATA COLLECTED IN THE DOCUMENT (FOURTH DEPT). 9

BUSINESS RECORDS, MEDICAL RECORDS, HEARSAY. 10

STATEMENTS THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT SIGNED AN “AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE” FORM BEFORE REFUSING TREATMENT WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN MEDICAL RECORDS AND IN THE DEPOSITIONS OF THE DOCTORS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS BUSINESS RECORDS, AS ADMISSIONS, AS DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST, OR PURSUANT TO THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE; DEFENSE VERDICT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 10

CIVIL FORFEITURE. 12

NONPARTY BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED POSSESSION OF A CAR SUBJECT TO CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. (SECOND DEPT). 12

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 13

PLAINTIFFS FOUND OUT WELL INTO THE CONTRACT FOR GAS-MAIN WORK THAT THE REQUESTED INSURANCE COVERAGE HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED; THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DEPENDED ON A CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAY NOT OCCUR; THE NEGLIGENT PROCUREMENT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR LACK OF DAMAGES; THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS SUPPORTED BY NOMINAL DAMAGES; THE FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CAUSES OF ACTION WERE SUPPORTED BY A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INSURANCE BROKER AND DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE (SECOND DEPT). 13

DEFAULT JUDGMENT, MOTION TO VACATE. 14

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION GRANTED IN THE INTERESTS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE; THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTED DEFENDANT WAS THE VICTIM OF A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD; SUPREME COURT, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT). 15

DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 16

PLAINTIFF BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR; DESPITE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MOTION, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, SUA SPONTE, PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (SECOND DEPT). 16

DEPOSITIONS, CROSS-EXAMINATION. 17

THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENSE EXPERT USING DECEDENT’S HUSBAND’S DEPOSITION IN THIS NEGLIGENCE AND PUBLIC-HEALTH-LAW VIOLATION CASE; THE DECEDENT’S HUSBAND, A NONPARTY, WAS AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY; THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (FOURTH DEPT). 17

DEPOSITIONS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, HEARSAY. 18

DEFENDANT CLAIMED IN HIS DEPOSITION HE COULDN’T STOP AT THE RED LIGHT BECAUSE THE FLOOR MAT HAD ROLLED UP UNDER THE BRAKE PEDAL; PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED THE DEPOSITION AS PART OF PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE MAJORITY HELD THE DEPOSITION WAS HEARSAY AND THEREFORE COULD NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE USUAL HEARSAY RULES DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE DEPOSITION WAS SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT). 18

DISCOVERY, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 19

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS FIRED AFTER REJECTING THE SEXUAL ADVANCES OF HER MANAGER IN THIS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DISCLOSURE OF THE RECORDS OF OTHER EMPLOYEES WHO ENGAGED IN THE CONDUCT FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS OSTENSIBLY FIRED (TARDINESS) (SECOND DEPT). 19

DISCOVERY. 21

INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER AND WITNESSED A TRUCK STRIKE AND KILL HER BROTHER; SHE ALLEGED SEVERE EMOTIONAL TRAUMA; DEFENDANT’S DISCLOSURE DEMANDS FOR THE FACEBOOK, SNAPCHAT AND INSTRAGRAM ACCOUNTS, AS WELL AS THE PHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES, OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FRIENDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 21

DISCOVERY. 22

SUBPOENA SEEKING 1009 FORMS SHOWING THE INSURER’S PAYMENTS TO TWO DOCTORS WHO PERFORM MEDICAL EXAMS FOR THE INSURER IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED; WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBPOENA FOR THE MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXAMS, THAT ISSUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED BY SUPREME COURT AND CAN NOT, THEREFORE, BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL (THIRD DEPT). 22

EXPERT OPINION. 23

DEFENDANTS’ MEDICAL EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY BASED UPON THE MEDICAL RECORDS AND MATERIAL IN EVIDENCE DESPITE NOT HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURIES; THE EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ABOUT CAUSATION EVEN THOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE EXPERT REPORT (SECOND DEPT). 23

EXPERT OPINION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 24

THE DEFENDANT SURGEON’S TESTIMONY DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR HABIT EVIDENCE; THEREFORE THE DEFENSE EXPERT, WHO RELIED ON THE INSUFFICIENT HABIT EVIDENCE, DID NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE; EVEN IF SUFFICIENT, HABIT EVIDENCE ONLY RAISES AN INFERENCE FOR THE JURY TO CONSIDER, IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH WHAT PROCEDURE WAS FOLLOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW; NEW EVIDENCE RAISED IN REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT). 24

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 26

THE ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DID NOT DESCRIBE THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT CONSTITUTING NEGLECT BY THE PLAINTIFF AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3216; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 26

FRAMED ISSUE HEARING, ARBITRATION, INSURANCE LAW. 27

THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE VEHICLE WHICH STRUCK PETITIONER WAS THE VEHICLE INSURED BY GEICO; ARBITRATION OF PETITIONER’S DEMAND FOR UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS FROM ALLSTATE, HER INSURER, SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED AND A FRAMED ISSUE HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 27

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, SET ASIDE VERDICT. 28

IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 TRIAL, THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE BETTER PRACTICE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESERVE ON THE MOTION AND LET THE MATTER GO TO THE JURY; AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE LABOR LAW 200 VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS INCONSISTENT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). 28

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE CLAIM, COURT OF CLAIMS. 29

THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE A CLAIM DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY THE LOCATION OF THE SLIP AND FALL, RENDERING THE FILING OF THE CLAIM UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT). 29

PLEADINGS, EXTEND TIME TO SERVE, ORDERS VERSUS JUDGMENTS. 31

ALTHOUGH AN ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN ISSUED, NO JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WAS ENTERED; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS STILL VIABLE AND PLAINTIFFS COULD MOVE TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE; THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). 31

PLEADINGS, EXTEND TIME TO SERVE. 32

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO CPLR 306-B SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; IF A PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTEND TIME FOR GOOD CAUSE, THE COURT SHOULD GO ON TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). 32

PLEADINGS, EXTEND TIME TO SERVE. 33

SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT). 33

PLEADINGS, HOME IMPROVEMENT LICENSE. 34
PLAINTIFF HOME IMPROVEMENT CONTRACTOR DID NOT ALLEGE HE WAS LICENSED IN ROCKLAND COUNTY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CAUSES OF ACTION TO FORECLOSE ON A MECHANIC’S LIEN AND BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 34

PLEADINGS, MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. 36

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTOR DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE OR CONTROL THE WORK THAT CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S INJURY; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AND THE COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). 36

PLEADINGS, MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. 37

FEDERAL TAX RETURNS AND EMAILS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211 (A)(1); THE MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 37

PLEADINGS, RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE. 38

PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY ADDING A PARTY AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN; TWO OF THE THREE PRONGS OF THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED (THIRD DEPT). 38

PLEADINGS, STANDING, FORECLOSURE. 39

THE FAILURE TO RAISE THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION CAN BE REMEDIED BY A MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER AND BY RAISING THE DEFENSE IN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 39

PLEADINGS. 40

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND AGENCY ALLEGATIONS SUFFICIENTLY PLED VICARIOUS LIABILTY FOR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE NURSING HOME DEFENDANTS FOR AN ASSAULT BY A RESIDENT ON PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT; THE COMPLAINT ALSO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED PUBLIC HEALTH LAW VIOLATIONS; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 40

REPLY PAPERS. 42

INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER ON DEFENDANTS’ ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE (ATV), DRIVEN BY DEFENDANTS’ DECEDENT, WHO WAS INTOXICATED, WHEN THE ATV CRASHED INTO A TREE; THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE IS NO COMMON LAW “NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF ALCOHOL TO A MINOR” CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST ADDRESSED IN PLAINITIFFS’ REPLY PAPERS PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 42

RESETTLE ORDER. 43

THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO RESETTLE WHICH IMPROPERLY SOUGHT THE MODIFICATION OF A SUBSTANTIVE PART OF AN ORDER, AS OPPOSED TO MERELY THE CORRECTION OF A MISTAKE, IS NOT APPEALABLE (THIRD DEPT). 43

RESTORE, MOTION TO, LACHES. 44

THE 2019 MOTION TO RESTORE THE ACTION TO ACTIVE STATUS AFTER THE NOTE OF ISSUE WAS VACATED IN 2012 SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; LACHES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THERE HAS BEEN NO SERVICE OF A 90-DAY DEMAND PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT). 44

STANDING, FAMILY COURT, VISITATION. 45

THE MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER HAD STANDING TO PETITION FOR VISITATION AFTER MOTHER’S DEATH; FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED THE PETITION WITHOUT HOLDING A “BEST INTERESTS” HEARING (SECOND DEPT). 45

STANDING, FORECLOSURE. 45

THE BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORDS ALLEGEDLY REVIEWED BY THE AFFIANT; THEREFORE THE EVIDENCE WAS HEARSAY AND THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 45

STANDING, FORECLOSURE. 46

THE BANK’S PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 WAS SUFFICIENT, BUT THE BANK’S PROOF OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 46

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BATTERY, EXPERT OPINION. 47

THE ALLEGATION THAT DEFENDANT SURGEONS PERFORMED A CHIROPRACTIC PROCEDURE DURING SPINAL FUSION SURGERY SOUNDED IN BATTERY, NOT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, AND WAS TIME-BARRED; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, A CHIROPRACTOR, WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION ABOUT DEFENDANTS’ SURGERY (THIRD DEPT). 47

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE, DISCONTINUANCE. 48

THE DISCONTINUANCE OF THE 2008 FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DE-ACCELERATE THE DEBT SO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS KEPT RUNNING, RENDERING THE INSTANT ACTION UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT). 48

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FIDUCIARY DUTY. 49

THE TRUSTEES DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR LACHES DEFENSES TO THE ACTION SEEKING AN ESTATE ACCOUNTING; THE TRUSTEES DID NOT OPENLY REPUDIATE THEIR FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE TIME DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN FOR EITHER DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT). 49

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, FAMILY COURT. 50

AS NO PETITION WAS BEFORE THE COURT, FAMILY COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER A FORENSIC EVALUATION (THIRD DEPT). 50

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FAMILY COURT. 51

FATHER AND MOTHER SUBMITTED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ON THE ISSUE WHETHER THE CHILDREN WERE CONSTRUCTIVELY EMANCIPATED; FATHER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS PETITION TO TERMINATE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED BUT MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING FATHER’S PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 51

VERDICT, SET ASIDE. 52

WHERE A LADDER SHIFTS OR SLIDES FOR NO APPARENT REASON A VIOLATION OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) IS ESTABLISHED; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 52