Personal Injury Update February March 2023

Personal Injury Update February March 2023

(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released in February and March 2023 which address issues in “Personal Injury.”

The “Personal Injury” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these CLE update courses. Links to the written materials for this course (“Personal Injury Reversal Report February 2023” and “Personal Injury Reversal Report March 2023) are provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Personal Injury Reversal Report February 2023” and “Personal Injury Reversal Report March 2023), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Personal Injury Reversal Report February 2023

Personal Injury Reversal Report March 2023

Attorney Affirmation Personal Injury February March 2023

Evaluation Survey Personal Injury Update February March 2023

Topics Covered in the “Personal Injury Update February March 2023” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the Pages in the “Personal Injury Reversal Report February 2023” and “Personal Injury Reversal Report March 2023”

 

FEBRUARY 2023 PERSONAL INJURY REVERSAL REPORT

ANIMAL LAW. 3

THE MAJORITY IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE DETERMINED DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE THE DOG HAD NEVER EXHIBITED VICIOUS BEHAVIOR BEFORE (FOURTH DEPT). 3

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 5

PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) ACTION WAS STRUCK BY A PIPE WHICH FELL AS IT WAS BEING HOISTED FROM A TRUCK; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD THE VIOLATION OF ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS TO THE BILL OF PARTICULARS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 5

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 6

BECAUSE LOOSE PLANKS ON A SCAFFOLD CONSTITUTED A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S ACTS OR OMISSIONS COULD NOT BE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL AND THE RECALCITRANT WORKER DEFENSE WAS NOT AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT). 6

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 7

PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SOUGHT TO ADD TWO PHYSICIAN’S ASSISTANTS (PA’S) AS DEFENDANTS AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN; PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT DOCTORS WERE THE PA’S EMPLOYERS OR SUPERVISORS; PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PA’S HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTION; THEREFORE THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED (SECOND DEPT). 7

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 8

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS DENIED PROPER MEDICAL CARE IN THE NIAGARA COUNTY JAIL AND SUED THE JAIL DOCTOR, THE COUNTY AND THE SHERIFF; THE CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING THE VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S CIVIL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983 SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS; OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION WERE DEEMED TIME-BARRED; ACTIONS ALLEGING THE COUNTY WAS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF THE SHERIFF WERE DISMISSED; THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE COUNTY AND SHERIFF WERE NOT DEEMED “UNITED IN INTEREST” (FOURTH DEPT). 8

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, INJURED STUDENT, EVIDENCE. 9

HERE THE STUDENT WITH DISABILITIES WAS UNSUPERVISED IN GYM CLASS WHEN SHE WAS INJURED; THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT SUCCESSFULLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT MORE SUPERVISION OF THE STUDENT WAS NEEDED BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE PURPORTEDLY CONFLICTED WITH THE STUDENT’S “AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 504 PLAN” (WHICH DID NOT CALL FOR EXTRA SUPERVISION) AND THEREFORE EXTRA SUPERVISION WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO DISCRIMINATION; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT REJECTED THE ARGUMENT FINDING THAT THE 504 PLAN DID NOT ACT AS A CEILING FOR THE LEVEL OF SUPERVISION TO BE AFFORDED THE STUDENT AND ORDERED A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT). 9

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, INJURED STUDENT. 11

PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S CHEMICAL BURNS WERE CAUSED BY THE INTENTIONALLY WRONGFUL, SPONTANEOUS, UNFORESEEABLE ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES OVER WHOM DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAD NO CONTROL OR AUTHORITY; STUDENTS HAD APPARENLY PUT DRANO IN A WATER BOTTLE WHICH PLAINTIFF KICKED; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE SCHOOL DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF ON ITS LACK OF NOTICE (FIRST DEPT). 11

SEXUAL ABUSE, CHILD VICTIMS ACT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, FAMILY LAW, SOCIAL SERVICES LAW. 12

IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT LAWSUIT ALLEGING PLAINTIFF WAS ABUSED BY A SCHOOL JANITOR, THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW 413 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE JANITOR WAS NOT “A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE” FOR PLAINTIFF’S CARE; THEREFORE THE SCHOOL HAD NO DUTY TO REPORT THE ABUSE PURSUANT TO THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SECOND DEPT). 12

SEXUAL ABUSE, CHILD VICTIMS ACT, COURT OF CLAIMS. 13

IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE, THE ALLEGATION THE ABUSE TOOK PLACE IN 1982 – 1983 WAS SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO MEET THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT (SECOND DEPT). 13

SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, EVIDENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW. 14

PLAINTIFF STEPPED OFF A CURB AND FELL INTO A FOUR-FOOT DEEP STORM DRAIN; THE GRATE WHICH USUALLY COVERED THE DRAIN WAS FOUND AT THE BOTTOM; THE DEFENDANT MUNICIPALITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 14

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, EVIDENCE. 15

THE PLAINTIFF MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT WHEN DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT ALLEGING DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO GO AROUND ANOTHER VEHICLE WAS BASED ON SPECULATION WHICH IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT). 15

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, GRAVES AMENDMENT, EVIDENCE. 16

AFFIDAVITS NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY CERTIFIED BUSINESS RECORDS HAVE NO PROBATIVE VALUE; HERE THE AFFIDAVITS FAILED TO PROVE DEFENDANT WAS IN THE BUSINESS OF RENTING TRUCKS SUCH THAT THE GRAVE’S AMENDMENT APPLIED, AND FAILED TO PROVE THE TRUCK WAS PROPERLY MAINTAINED; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT). 16

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, INSURANCE LAW, ARBITRATION, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 18

THE PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION PENDING A FRAMED ISSUE HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS UNINSURED MOTORIST TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PROCEDURAL CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). 18

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-END COLLISIONS, EVIDENCE. 19

AN AFFIDAVIT FROM A WITNESS TO THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT STATING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS BACKING UP AT THE TIME DEFENDANT’S CAR STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S RAISED ONLY A QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE FAULT WHICH WILL NOT DEFEAT PLANTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 19

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, JUDGES, ATTORNEYS. 20

INSURANCE LAW. SUPREME COURT HAD THE POWER TO APPOINT THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR TO REPRESENT THE ESTATE IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTED THE INSURER, NOT THE DEFENDANT ESTATE (SECOND DEPT). 20

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, POLICE CAR, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW. 21

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A U-TURN TO PURSUE A VEHICLE AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S CAR (SECOND DEPT). 21

 

MARCH 2023 PERSONAL INJURY REVERSAL REPORT

CHILD VICTIMIS ACT, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW. 4

THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) AND NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN (THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE; THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED PLAINTIFF WAS SENT TO A PRIEST NOT EMPLOYED BY THE SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE AND WAS MOLESTED BY THE PRIEST (SECOND DEPT). 4

CHILD VICTIMS ACE, COURT OF CLAIMS, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 5

THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT AGAINST THE STATE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED WHEN THE ABUSE OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT). 5

CHILD VICTIMS ACT, COURT OF CLAIMS. 6

THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT LAWSUIT AGAINST THE STATE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE AT A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED THE TIME PERIOD WHEN THE ABUSE ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE; THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 6

DAMAGES, INQUEST, JUDGES. 7

IN AN INQUEST ON DAMAGES AFTER DEFENDANT DEFAULTED, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED LIABILITY ISSUES (SECOND DEPT). 7

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL), HIPAA PRIVACY RULE. 7

BOTH THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW APPLY TO THE FOIL REQUEST FOR RECORDS DOCUMENTING INJURIES SUFFERED BY ATHLETES USING THE OLYMPIC TRAINING FACILITIES IN THE ADIRONDACK PARK; THE HIPAA DEIDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE REQUESTED RECORDS (THIRD DEPT). 7

INSURANCE LAW, ASSAULT OR ACCIDENT. 9

THE INJURED PARTY WAS STRUCK WITH A BATON IN AN ALTERCATION OUTSIDE A BAR; IT WAS ALLEGED THE INJURY WAS ACCIDENTAL; THE INSURER SOUGHT A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT RE: THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE INCIDENT FELL OUTSIDE THE COVERAGE OF THE POLICY (NO DISCLAIMER REQUIRED) OR WHETHER THE INCIDENT WAS SUBJECT TO A POLICY EXCLUSION (TIMELY DISCLAIMER REQUIRED) (SECOND DEPT). 9

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, AGENCY. 10

PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED ON DEBRIS AND FELL INTO A TWO-TO-THREE-FOOT-DEEP PIT FROM WHICH THE PLYWOOD COVER HAD BEEN REMOVED TRIGGERING POTENTIAL LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6); ONE DEFENDANT MAY BE LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER WITH SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY; TWO DEFENDANTS MAY BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 FOR THE DANGEROUS CONDITIONS; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 10

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 11

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT WEARING A HARD HAT AND WAS STRUCK IN THE HEAD BY DEBRIS DURING DEMOLITION WORK; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE HEAD PROTECTION VIOLATED THE INDUSTRIAL CODE GIVING RISE TO A LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE JOB WAS NOT A HARD HAT JOB; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 11

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 12

A VIDEO CAMERA HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN A GRAPEFRUIT-SIZED HOLE BEHIND A TOILET IN A WOMEN’S RESTROOM AND VIDEO HAD BEEN RECOVERED; OVERRULING PRECEDENT, THE FIRST DEPARTMENT HELD THAT “EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT” IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND THAT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS REINSTATED (FIRST DEPT). 12

SLIP AND FALL, LANDLORD-TENANT, CONTRACT LAW, INSURANCE LAW. 13

IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE MASTER LEASE VIOLATED GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 5-321 WHICH PROHIBITS A LEASE AGREEMENT FROM PROVIDING THE LANDLORD BE INDEMNIFIED FOR LIABILITY FOR THE LANDLORD’S OWN NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT). 13

SLIP AND FALL, LANDLORD-TENANT. 15

DEFENDANTS IN THIS ICY-STEP SLIP AND FALL CASE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORDS WHO WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ICE AND SNOW REMOVAL; DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBMIT THE LEASE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 15

SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW. 16

DEFENDANT NYC HOUSING AUTHORITY (NYCHA) UNILATERALLY ADJOURNED THE 5O-H HEARING IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE AND ALLEGEDLY SENT A FOLLOW-UP LETTER TO PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF DENIED RECEIPT OF THE LETTER AND DEFENDANT IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE IN REPLY; THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT CONSIDERED; IN ADDITION, THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT PROVE THE LETTER WAS MAILED TO PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT). 16

SLIP AND FALL. 17

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE OF THE WEATHER AT THE TIME OF THE ICE SLIP AND FALL PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS RULE; IN ADDITION, THERE WAS EVIDENCE THE ICE WAS THERE FOR SOME TIME BEFORE THE FALL AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY LACKED ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF IT; DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 17

SLIP AND FALL. 18

CONFLICTING EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT ICE ON THE PARKING LOT BEFORE THE SNOW STORM BEGAN PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL ACTION (THIRD DEPT). 18

SLIP AND FALL. 18

THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF TWO PROXIMATE CAUSES OF PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL: (1) HER KNEE BUCKLED; AND (2) WHEN SHE TRIED TO STOP HER FALL BY GRABBING THE VANITY, THE VANITY MOVED FIVE INCHES AWAY FROM THE WALL (SECOND DEPT). 18

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, EMERGENCY DOCTRINE. 20

PLAINTIFF CHANGED LANES, CUT OFF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AND CRASHED INTO THE REAR OF THE CAR IN FRONT; DEFENDANTS MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE; SUPREME COURT DENIED THE MOTION DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO OPPOSE IT; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT AWARDED DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT). 20

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, INSURANCE LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 21

IN THIS NO-FAULT INSURANCE CASE, THE INSURER REQUESTED AN EXAMINATION UNDER OATH (EUO) WITHOUT AFFORDING THE MEDICAL PROVIDER SPECIFIC, OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REQUEST; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO THE INSURER (FIRST DEPT). 21

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 22

INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS; HERE A NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS COLLIDED WITH A CAR DRIVEN BY A NEW YORK RESIDENT IN THE LINCOLN TUNNEL AND THE TRIAL WAS HELD IN NEW YORK; ALTHOUGH THE INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE WAS VALIDATED BY THE US SUPREME COURT IN 2019, THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT (CT APP). 22

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW. 23

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN WAS STRUCK CROSSING THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER FAILED TO SEE WHAT SHE SHOULD HAVE SEEN (SECOND DEPT). 23

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 24

DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS STRUCK BY AN ONCOMING CAR WHICH CROSSED A DOUBLE YELLOW LINE; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT). 24

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 25

IN A REAR-END COLLISION, THE ALLEGATION THE CAR IN FRONT STOPPED SHORT DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT). 25

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 26

PLAINTIFF WAS INVOLVED IN A COLLISION WHICH PUSHED HIS CAR INTO DEFENDANT’S CAR WHICH WAS PARKED ALONG THE CURB IN VIOLATION OF PARKING REGULATIONS; THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 26

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. 26

THE ALLEGATION THE CAR IN FRONT MADE A SUDDEN STOP DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN A REAR-END COLLISION (SECOND DEPT). 26