Negligence Update May 2019

Course #TRT0856 (Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Hybrid Accreditation for September 2, 2020, through December 31, 2021

This Course Is Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between May 1, 2019 and May 31, 2019 which address issues in “Negligence.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Negligence” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Negligence Update May 2019”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Negligence Update Pamphlet May 2019”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Negligence Pamphlet Update May 2019

Negligence Update May 2019 Attorney Affirmation

Negligence Update May 2019 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Negligence Update May 2019” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Negligence Update Pamphlet May 2019”

ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK.

ALTHOUGH BEING STRUCK BY A MISHIT BALL IS AN INHERENT RISK IN A GOLF GAME WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE, THERE WAS EVIDENCE DEFENDANT DELIBERATELY HIT THE BALL IN A MANNER THAT UNREASONABLY INCREASED THE RISK OF STRIKING PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT). 8

DOG-BITE, LANDLORD-TENANT.

LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF BITTEN BY TENANT’S DOG (FOURTH DEPT). 9

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK.

PLAINTIFF-STUDENT WAS WATCHING FOOTBALL PRACTICE FROM THE SIDELINES WHEN A BLOCKING SLED, PUSHED BY SEVERAL PLAYERS, VEERED OFF TO THE SIDE AND RAN OVER PLAINTIFF’S FOOT, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE APPLIES TO SPECTATORS, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 10

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, BULLYING.

NEW TRIAL ORDERED BECAUSE THE INCONSISTENCY IN THE VERDICT SHEET COULD NOT BE REMEDIED AFTER THE JURY WAS DISCHARGED, THE JURY HAD AWARDED PLAINTIFF-STUDENT $1 MILLION IN A SUIT AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT STEMMING FROM BULLYING BY OTHER STUDENTS (THIRD DEPT). 11

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW.

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S INJURIES, ANOTHER STUDENT, WHO WAS BEING CHASED BY A DOG WHICH HAD BROKEN LOOSE, RAN INTO PLAINTIFF DURING LACROSSE PRACTICE (SECOND DEPT). 12

EMPLOYMENT LAW, ESPINAL, AGENCY.

DEFENDANT RESTAURANT CAN BE LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE VALET PARKING SERVICE WITH WHICH IT CONTRACTED IF THE RESTAURANT HAD THE ABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF THE CONTRACTOR, IF ESPINAL EXCEPTIONS APPLY, AND UNDER AN AGENCY THEORY, THE RESTAURANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT). 12

EMPLOYMENT LAW, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND RETENTION.

IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, HIRING AND RETENTION CASE, THE MEDICAL RECORDS OF A NON-PARTY WITNESS WHO ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT BY DEFENDANT DOCTOR ARE DISCOVERABLE ONLY TO THE EXTENT THEY INCLUDE NON-PRIVILEGED INFORMATION INDICATING DEFENDANT DOCTOR’S EMPLOYER WAS AWARE OF THE ALLEGATIONS, THE NON-PARTY WITNESS DID NOT WAIVE THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE BY DISCUSSING HER MEDICAL HISTORY IN A DEPOSITION (SECOND DEPT). 13

EMPLOYMENT LAW, SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE WAS DRIVING THE EMPLOYER’S TRUCK WITH THE EMPLOYER’S PERMISSION AND WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED (THIRD DEPT). 15

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW.

PLAINTIFF, WHO FELL THROUGH A HOLE IN A HOUSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK COVERED BY LABOR 240 (1) OR 241 (6), PLAINTIFF WAS MEASURING WINDOWS FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION OF WINDOW TREATMENTS (FOURTH DEPT). 16

LANDLORD-TENANT, DANGEROUS CONDITION.

LESSEE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE LAUNDRY ROOM COULD BE LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A DEFECTIVE WASHING MACHINE, LESSEE DID NOT ELIMINATE QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER IT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT, DISSENT (SECOND DEPT). 16

LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BANKRUPTCY.

PLAINTIFF SUED DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS ALLEGING INACCURATE ADVICE CAUSED HER TO FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY, BECAUSE THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ACCRUED WHEN PLAINTIFF FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY, THE LAWSUIT BECAME PART OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE AND PLAINTIFF WAS THEREBY STRIPPED OF THE CAPACITY TO SUE (SECOND DEPT). 17

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING THE CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSE AFTER THE OTHER POTENTIALLY LIABLE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN SEVERED FROM THE ACTION AT THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT’S REQUEST, AND AFTER THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT HAD REPRESENTED TO THE COURT THE OTHER POTENTIALLY LIABLE DEFENDANTS WOULD NOT BE PART OF THE TRIAL, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT, THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR THE ERROR IN JUDGMENT JURY INSTRUCTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT). 18

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT OPINION.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTING MEDICAL EXPERT OPINIONS ABOUT A DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF CARE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). 19

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VS NEGLIGENCE.

ADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF AFTER SURGERY RESULTING IN MEMORY LOSS WAS PART OF PLAINTIFF’S TREATMENT, THEREFORE A CAUSE OF ACTION RESULTING FROM PLAINTIFF’S LEAVING THE HOSPITAL SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, ALTHOUGH PARTIALLY GRANTED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY (SECOND DEPT). 20

MUNICIPAL LAW, THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT.

PETITIONER’S MOTION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE CITY HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING PETITIONER’S INJURIES, THE FACTS SUPPORTING THE CITY’S NEGLIGENCE COULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED DURING THE INVESTIGATION WITH A MODICUM OF EFFORT, CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE RELATING TO THE DELAY, PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO OFFER A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY WAS NOT FATAL (FIRST DEPT). 21

NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT.

PLAINTIFF’S SON WAS INJURED WHEN A UTILITY VEHICLE DRIVEN ON PRIVATE PROPERTY BY DEFENDANTS’ 14-YEAR-OLD SON OVERTURNED, THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS NOT BEING DRIVEN ON A PUBLIC ROAD, HOWEVER THE NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT). 22

OPEN AND OBVIOUS, DANGEROUS CONDITION.

ALLEGEDLY OPERATING A TREE-TRIMMING BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE AND ENTRUSTING THE TREE-TRIMMING TRUCK TO PLAINTIFF’S CO-WORKER, IF NEGLIGENT, WERE NOT PROXIMATE CAUSES OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURY, THE DANGEROUS CONDITION ON THE TRUCK WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S INJURY WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, AND THE ACCIDENT WAS AN ‘EXTRAORDINARY OCCURRENCE,’ SO THERE WAS NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT). 24

SLIP AND FALL, ESPINAL.

ALTHOUGH NO ESPINAL FACTORS WERE ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ORAL CONTRACT WITH THE PROPERTY OWNER TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW ENTIRELY REPLACED THE PROPERTY OWNER’S DUTY, AND WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A RECURRENT ICY CONDITION, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 25

SLIP AND FALL, ESPINAL.

THE ALLEGED FAILURE TO ELIMINATE A TRIPPING HAZARD WAS NOT ACTIONABLE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DEFENDANT’S ACTS OR OMISSIONS DID NOT FIT WITHIN ANY OF THE ESPINAL EXCEPTIONS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT). 26

SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW.

ABUTTING LANDOWNER HAS NO DUTY TO MAINTAIN A TREE WELL IN THE SIDEWALK, LANDOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 27

SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW.

ALTHOUGH THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, IT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ITS SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, THE TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 27

SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW.

CITY DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE PROTRUDING SIGN ANCHOR IN THE SIDEWALK AND PLAINTIFF WAS UNABLE TO SHOW THE CONDITION WAS THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE CITY, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT). 28

SLIP AND FALL, STORM IN PROGRESS. 29
NO EVIDENCE ICE ON WHICH PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WAS FORMED BEFORE THE STORM, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE STORM IN PROGRESS RULE (SECOND DEPT). 29

SLIP AND FALL.

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE WAS CLEANED OR INSPECTED DURING THE THREE DAYS PRIOR TO THE FALL, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT LACKED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ICY CONDITION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 30

SLIP AND FALL.

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA WAS LAST INSPECTED AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT LACKED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 31

SLIP AND FALL.

DEFENDANT HOUSING AUTHORITY DEMONSTRATED THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL HAD BEEN INSPECTED ON THE MORNING OF THE ACCIDENT AND THERE HAD BEEN NO PRIOR COMPLAINTS ABOUT A WET CONDITION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 32

SLIP AND FALL.

DEFENDANT RESTAURANT DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE GREASY OR SLIPPERY CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 32

SLIP AND FALL.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, HEARSAY IS ADMISSIBLE IN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S FALL (SECOND DEPT). 33

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

VASTLY DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS OF THE INCIDENT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED, EXTENSIVE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). 34

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT.

DEFENDANT DID NOT STRIKE PLAINTIFF AND WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF FROM AN ASSAULT BY OTHERS, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BAR-FIGHT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 35

TOXIC TORTS, REAL ESTATE, CONTRACTS.

DEFENDANT-SELLERS NOT LIABLE FOR MOLD AND MICE IN HOUSE SOLD TO PLAINTIFFS, UNDER THE MERGER DOCTRINE NO PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT SURVIVED THE DELIVERY OF THE DEED, THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIED, NO DUTY OF CARE OWED TO THE PLAINTIFFS OVER AND ABOVE THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS, THE PRIVITY ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WAS ABSENT (SECOND DEPT). 36

TOXIC TORTS.

DEFENDANT’S SUBCONTRACTOR USED A PAINT STRIPPING PRODUCT DURING AN OFFICE BUILDING RENOVATION, PLAINTIFF, AN EVENING OFFICE CLEANER, ALLEGED INJURY FROM BREATHING TOXIC FUMES, THERE IS EVIDENCE DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO WARN, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT). 37

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ATTORNEYS, SUMMATION.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION BASED UPON REMARKS MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL DURING SUMMATION, REMARKS TO WHICH NO OBJECTION HAD BEEN MADE (SECOND DEPT). 38

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, NOSEWORTHY.

PLAINTIFF HAD NO MEMORY OF THE ACCIDENT AND THE JURY WAS GIVEN THE NOSEWORTHY CHARGE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT). 39

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, POLICE REPORT.

DEFENDANT DRIVER ATTEMPTED TO RAISE A FEIGNED FACTUAL ISSUE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY CONTRADICTING A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT IN THE POLICE REPORT, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 40

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-END COLLISIONS.

DEFENDANT ASSERTED SHE THOUGHT PLAINTIFF’S CAR WOULD GO THROUGH THE YELLOW LIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT RAN INTO THE REAR OF PLAINTIFF’S CAR WHEN IT CAME TO A SUDDEN STOP, DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION DID NOT CONSTITUTE A NON-NEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 41

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS.

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT VIOLATED VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1141 BY MAKING A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE, DEFENDANT AVERRED PLAINTIFF WAS DRIVING TOO FAST, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 42

ZONE OF DANGER, IMMEDIATE FAMILY.

GRANDMOTHER WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER WHEN PIECES OF THE FACADE OF A BUILDING FELL AND KILLED HER TWO-YEAR-OLD GRANDCHILD, BECAUSE GRANDMOTHER IS NOT ‘IMMEDIATE FAMILY’ SHE CANNOT RECOVER UNDER A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS THEORY, THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD THAT THEORY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 43

Civil Procedure Update May 2019

Course #MSC1165 (Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Hybrid Accreditation for September 2, 2020, through December 31, 2021

This Course Is Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between May 1, 2019 and May 31, 2010 which address issues in “Civil Procedure.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Civil Procedure” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Civil Procedure Update May 2019”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Civil Procedure Update May 2019”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet May 2019

Civil Procedure Update May 2019 Attorney Affirmation

Civil Procedure Update May 2019 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Civil Procedure Update May 2019” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet May 2019”

ANSWER, MOTION TO EXTEND TIME.

BY JOINING IN A PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT EXTENDED ITS TIME TO ANSWER UNTIL TEN DAYS AFTER NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE ORDER DECIDING THE MOTION TO DISMISS, SINCE DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN DEFAULT, IT COULD APPEAL THE ORDER FINDING IT IN DEFAULT (FIRST DEPT). 7

CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, ERROR IN JUDGMENT JURY INSTRUCTION.

THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING THE CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSE AFTER THE OTHER POTENTIALLY LIABLE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN SEVERED FROM THE ACTION AT THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT’S REQUEST, AND AFTER THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT HAD REPRESENTED TO THE COURT THE OTHER POTENTIALLY LIABLE DEFENDANTS WOULD NOT BE PART OF THE TRIAL, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT, THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR THE ERROR IN JUDGMENT JURY INSTRUCTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT). 8

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, CONTRACTUAL WAIVER.

WAIVER OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ARISING FROM A LEASE WAS NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND WAS ENFORCEABLE, THE COMMERCIAL LEASE WAS NEGOTIATED BY SOPHISTICATED, COUNSELED PARTIES (CT APP). 9

DISCOVERY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EMPLOYMENT LAW, PRIVILEGE.

IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, HIRING AND RETENTION CASE, THE MEDICAL RECORDS OF A NON-PARTY WITNESS WHO ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT BY DEFENDANT DOCTOR ARE DISCOVERABLE ONLY TO THE EXTENT THEY INCLUDE NON-PRIVILEGED INFORMATION INDICATING DEFENDANT DOCTOR’S EMPLOYER WAS AWARE OF THE ALLEGATIONS, THE NON-PARTY WITNESS DID NOT WAIVE THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE BY DISCUSSING HER MEDICAL HISTORY IN A DEPOSITION (SECOND DEPT). 10

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, MOTION TO DISMISS.

PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT WAS NOT ‘DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BASED UPON ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT (THIRD DEPT). 11

ELECTION LAW, DESIGNATING PETITIONS.

DESIGNATING PETITION PROPERLY INVALIDATED AND THE CANDIDATE’S NAME WAS PROPERLY STRUCK FROM THE PRIMARY BALLOT, THE CANDIDATE’S NAME APPEARED ON DESIGNATING PETITIONS FOR TWO DIFFERENT PUBLIC OFFICES WHICH PRESUMPTIVELY MISLED THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT). 12

ELECTION LAW, STANDING, DESIGNATING PETITIONS, VERIFICATION.

PETITIONER DID NOT LIVE IN THE TOWN WHERE THE CHALLENGED CANDIDATE WAS RUNNING FOR OFFICE AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DESIGNATING PETITIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRUCK THE RESPONDENT CANDIDATES’ ANSWER BASED UPON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE VERIFICATION AND DENIALS (FOURTH DEPT). 13

ESPINAL FACTORS.

ALTHOUGH NO ESPINAL FACTORS WERE ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ORAL CONTRACT WITH THE PROPERTY OWNER TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW ENTIRELY REPLACED THE PROPERTY OWNER’S DUTY, AND WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A RECURRENT ICY CONDITION, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 14

EXPERT OPINION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTING MEDICAL EXPERT OPINIONS ABOUT A DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF CARE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). 15

FAMILY LAW, APPEALS.

ORDER ENTERED UPON CONSENT IS NOT APPEALABLE, COERCION ARGUMENT MUST BE RAISED IN A MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER (THIRD DEPT). 16

FAMILY LAW, JURISDICTION.

BECAUSE NO PETITION HAD BEEN FILED IN THIS SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, A DEFECT THAT MAY BE BROUGHT UP AT ANY TIME (THIRD DEPT). 17

FEIGNED QUESTION OF FACT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

DEFENDANT DRIVER ATTEMPTED TO RAISE A FEIGNED FACTUAL ISSUE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY CONTRADICTING A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT IN THE POLICE REPORT, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 18

FORECLOSURE, BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION.

DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED IN REPLY DID NOT SATISFY PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE (SECOND DEPT). 19

FORECLOSURE, CONFIRM REFEREE’S REPORT.

THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A MOTION TO CONFIRM A REFEREE’S REPORT IN A FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING BE MADE BEFORE A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE MAY BE GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 20

FORECLOSURE, MOTION TO DISMISS.

SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 OR CPLR 3215 (SECOND DEPT). 20

LACHES.

PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION SEEKING TO ENJOIN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HOME PLAINTIFFS CONTENDED WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE TOWN CODE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES (SECOND DEPT). 21

LONG-ARM JURISDICTION.

OHIO FIREARMS DEALER DID NOT HAVE MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH NEW YORK SUFFICIENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER HIM, A GUN PURCHASED IN OHIO BY AN OHIO RESIDENT WAS SOLD ON THE BLACK MARKET IN NEW YORK AND WAS USED IN NEW YORK TO SHOOT PLAINTIFF (CT APP). 22

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VS NEGLIGENCE, AMEND COMPLAINT.

ADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF AFTER SURGERY RESULTING IN MEMORY LOSS WAS PART OF PLAINTIFF’S TREATMENT, THEREFORE A CAUSE OF ACTION RESULTING FROM PLAINTIFF’S LEAVING THE HOSPITAL SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, ALTHOUGH PARTIALLY GRANTED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY (SECOND DEPT). 23

PARTIES, CORPORATIONS VS PRINCIPALS.

QUEENS COUNTY ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THE GROUND IT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THE NASSAU COUNTY ACTION, A CORPORATION IS NOT THE SAME PARTY AS A PRINCIPAL OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT A SHOWING THE CORPORATE VEIL SHOULD BE PIERCED (SECOND DEPT). 24

PARTIES, SUBSTITUTION.

SURVIVING PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT TIMELY MOVE TO SUBSTITUTE A REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE DECEDENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 1021, ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 25

PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION, VICTIM WITNESS PROTECTION ACT.

NEITHER THE VICTIM WITNESS PROTECTION ACT NOR THE MANDATORY VICTIM RESTITUTION ACT PROVIDES A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR A JUDGMENT BASED SOLELY UPON RESTITUTION ORDERED IN A CRIMINAL CASE (FIRST DEPT). 26

RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE, MUNICIPAL LAW, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW.

THE CITY AND DEFENDANT CORRECTION OFFICER ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST BECAUSE THE CITY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR ITS EMPLOYEES’ VIOLATION OF 42 USC 1983, THEREFORE THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE CAN NOT BE RELIED UPON TO SUBSTITUTE THE CORRECTION OFFICER FOR “JANE DOE” AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN (FIRST DEPT). 27

RES JUDICATA, CORPORATION LAW, FIDUCIARY DUTY, JUDGES, SUA SPONTE, SEARCH THE RECORD.

RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A SMALL CLAIMS ACTION, NO NEED TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL TO BRING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY ACTION AGAINST A FORMER PARTNER IN A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE SEARCHED THE RECORD AND RENDERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF (SECOND DEPT). 28

SEALING.

MOLINEUX/SANDOVAL HEARING IN THE HARVEY WEINSTEIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT PROSECUTION WAS PROPERLY CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC AND THE RECORD OF THE HEARING WAS PROPERLY SEALED, NEWS-MEDIA COMPANIES’ PETITION TO UNSEAL THE RECORD DENIED (FIRST DEPT). 29

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, WAIVER.

THE PURPORTED WAIVER OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE WAS NOT IN WRITING AS REQUIRED BY GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-103, PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT). 30

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, VACATION OF NOTE OF ISSUE.

ALLEGED ASSAULT BY DOCTOR WAS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE DOCTOR’S EMPLOYMENT BY DEFENDANT HOSPITAL, THE ACTION AGAINST THE HOSPITAL PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, TIME FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION STARTED ANEW AFTER THE NOTE OF ISSUE WAS VACATED, FAILURE TO ATTACH PLEADINGS TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT FATAL (SECOND DEPT). 31

UNJUST ENRICHMENT, CONVERSION.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CONVERSION DOES NOT LIE WHEN PROPERTY INVOLVED IS REAL PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT). 32

VERDICT SHEETS.

NEW TRIAL ORDERED BECAUSE THE INCONSISTENCY IN THE VERDICT SHEET COULD NOT BE REMEDIED AFTER THE JURY WAS DISCHARGED, THE JURY HAD AWARDED PLAINTIFF-STUDENT $1 MILLION IN A SUIT AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT STEMMING FROM BULLYING BY OTHER STUDENTS (THIRD DEPT). 33

VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE, COMMENTS MADE IN SUMMATION.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION BASED UPON REMARKS MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL DURING SUMMATION, REMARKS TO WHICH NO OBJECTION HAD BEEN MADE (SECOND DEPT). 34

VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE, NOWEWORTHY JURY INSTRUCTION.

PLAINTIFF HAD NO MEMORY OF THE ACCIDENT AND THE JURY WAS GIVEN THE NOSEWORTHY CHARGE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT). 35

YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, DNA PROFILE.

PETITIONER, WHO CONSENTED TO PROVIDING A DNA SAMPLE AFTER ARREST, MAY SEEK DISCRETIONARY EXPUNGEMENT OF THE DNA PROFILE AND UNDERLYING DOCUMENTS UPON BEING ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, RESPONDENT JUDGE DIRECTED TO DECIDE WHETHER EXPUNGEMENT IS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE FACTS (FIRST DEPT). 36

ZONE OF DANGER.

GRANDMOTHER WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER WHEN PIECES OF THE FACADE OF A BUILDING FELL AND KILLED HER TWO-YEAR-OLD GRANDCHILD, BECAUSE GRANDMOTHER IS NOT ‘IMMEDIATE FAMILY’ SHE CANNOT RECOVER UNDER A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS THEORY, THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD THAT THEORY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 37

Criminal Law Update June 2019

Course #CRM0354 (Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Hybrid Accreditation for September 2, 2020, through December 31, 2021

This Course Is Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 2 CLE Credit Hours

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between June 1, 2019 and June 30, 2019 which address issues in “Criminal Law.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Criminal Law” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Criminal Law Update Pamphlet June 2019”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 2 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Criminal Law Update Pamphlet June 2019”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Criminal Law Update Pamphlet June 2019

Criminal Law Update June 2019 Attorney Affirmation

Criminal Law Update June 2019 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Criminal Law Update June 2019” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Criminal Law Update Pamphlet June 2019”

APPEALS.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, THREE-JUDGE DISSENT ARGUED THE APPELLATE DIVISION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY AFFIRMING ON A SEARCH-RELATED GROUND THAT WAS NOT RULED ON BY SUPREME COURT (CT APP). 11

APPEALS.

APPEAL OF THE STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE FORECLOSED BY THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE WAIVER OF APPEAL; THE STATEMENT-SUPPRESSION ISSUE FORECLOSED BY THE WAIVER OF APPEAL; THE CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE WAS ABANDONED (FOURTH DEPT). 11

APPEALS, LEGAL SUFFICIENCY, GRAND JURY.

COUNTY COURT’S DETERMINATION THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT IS NOT REVIEWABLE AFTER A CONVICTION BASED UPON LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT). 12

ARREST, BENCH WARRANT, SPEEDY TRIAL.

THE FACT THAT THE BENCH WARRANT WAS BASED UPON A CHARGE FOR WHICH THE STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL PERIOD HAD EXPIRED DID NOT INVALIDATE THE EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT AND THE RESULTING ARREST FOR RESISTING ARREST (FOURTH DEPT). 12

ARTICLE 78, DIRECT APPEAL IS THE REMEDY.

COUNTY COURT DENIED PETITIONER’S MOTION TO DISMISS AN INDICTMENT ON THE GROUND THE PEOPLE HAD LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE INDICTMENT AT THE TIME HE PLED GUILTY TO A PRIOR INDICTMENT (CPL 40.40); PETITIONER’S REMEDY IS DIRECT APPEAL, NOT THE INSTANT ARTICLE 78 PETITION SEEKING PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS (THIRD DEPT). 13

ATTORNEYS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE REPRESENTED DEFENDANT AND THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT). 14

ATTORNEYS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENT.

DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT TO HIS MOTHER, ON THE PHONE, ABOUT NEEDING THE ASSISTANCE OF AN ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE, ERROR WAS HARMLESS HOWEVER (SECOND DEPT). 14

ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEPORATION.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INFORM DEFENDANT THE AGGRAVATED FELONY TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY SUBJECTED HIM TO MANDATORY DEPORTATION, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT). 15

ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DNA.

THE RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, A POST-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDING MIGHT ANSWER THE QUESTIONS LEFT OPEN BY THE TRIAL RECORD; ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING DNA EVIDENCE WHERE CONSENT, NOT IDENTITY, IS THE ISSUE IS HARMLESS (CT APP). 16

ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

DEFENSE COUNSEL SUCCESSFULLY PURSUED A MISIDENTIFICATION DEFENSE THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL BUT CONCEDED THE ISSUE IN SUMMATION, DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; A WITNESS MAY IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL DESPITE A PROCEDURALLY-DEFECTIVE PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION (SECOND DEPT). 17

ATTORNEYS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

DEFENDANT COMPLAINED THAT HIS ATTORNEY HAD NOT FILED OMNIBUS MOTIONS BUT DEFENSE COUNSEL SAID HE HAD FILED THEM AND THE COURT SAID IT HAD RECEIVED THEM; IN FACT, HOWEVER NO MOTIONS HAD BEEN FILED; DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS ASSIGNED COUNSEL WARRANTED FURTHER INQUIRY BY THE COURT; DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT). 18

ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, JUDGES.

THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO EXPLAIN HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS RECEIVING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS REQUEST FOR NEW COUNSEL, PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT). 19

ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS INFORMED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL OF A PLEA OFFER WHICH WAS MORE LENIENT THAN THE OFFER TO WHICH HE PLED (THIRD DEPT). 20

ATTORNEYS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF THE RISKS OF CONTINUING TO BE REPRESENTED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL IN THE PLEA PROCEEDINGS AFTER THE JUDGE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL WERE INFORMED DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FORMER AND CURRENT CLIENTS WOULD BE WITNESSES AT DEFENDANT’S TRIAL, DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (THIRD DEPT). 21

ATTORNEYS, PRO SE.

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WAS PROPERLY DENIED AND THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST (CT APP). 21

ATTORNEYS, INTEGRITY OF GRAND JURY.

COUNTY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED THE INTEGRITY OF THE GRAND JURY WAS COMPROMISED BY THE PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE POTENTIAL BIAS OF A GRAND JUROR, A TEACHER, WHO HAD TAUGHT THE DEFENDANT TEN YEARS BEFORE, INDICTMENT REINSTATED (THIRD DEPT). 22

ATTORNEYS, JURY NULLIFICATION, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY CONCEDED GUILT AND URGED JURY NULLIFICATION ON THE BURGLARY CHARGE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO BREAK-IN AND THE STOLEN ITEMS WERE NOT WORTH MUCH, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (CT APP). 23

ATTORNEYS , INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, SPEEDY TRIAL.

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, DEFENSE COUNSEL RELIED ON A CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENT WHEN DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT PURSUANT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT). 24

BRADY MATERIAL, SURVEILLANCE VIDEO.

SURVEILLANCE VIDEO CONSTITUTED BRADY MATERIAL WHICH COULD HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL, THE PROSECUTOR HAD SEEN THE VIDEO BUT TOLD THE JURY NO VIDEO EXISTED, CONVICTION REVERSED (CT APP). 25

BRADY MATERIAL.

ANY BRADY VIOLATIONS WERE NOT “MATERIAL” IN THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THE EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE JURY’S VERDICT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP). 26

CHARACTER EVIDENCE, NEGATIVE CHARACTER EVIDENCE.

THE NEGATIVE CHARACTER TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY STRUCK, NOT BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE IS GENERALLY INADMISSIBLE, BUT BECAUSE THE WITNESS WAS ONLY FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFENDANT’S CHARACTER IN THE WORKPLACE, WHICH WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE ALLEGED SEXUAL MISCONDUCT WITH A CHILD (SECOND DEPT). 27

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION, NEW DEFINITION?.

DEFENDANT CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED STOLEN PROPERTY FOUND IN THE BOILER ROOM OF A GARAGE WHERE DEFENDANT AND TWO OTHERS WERE HIDING FROM THE POLICE AFTER A MUGGING; VICTIM WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT IN COURT, DESPITE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION (FIRST DEPT). 28

CORRECTION LAW, INTERNET IDENTIFIER, SEX OFFENDER.

A FACEBOOK ACCOUNT IS NOT AN ‘INTERNET IDENTIFIER’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CORRECTION LAW, THEREFORE DEFENDANT SEX OFFENDER’S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IT TO THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES IS NOT A CRIME (CT APP). 29

DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

BOTH THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE THE SAME BLOCKBURGER TEST FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY (FOURTH DEPT). 29

DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE, APPEALS.

2003 DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED, THE CASE WAS ON APPEAL WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED AN INTENTIONAL MURDER OF A SINGLE VICTIM WITH A WEAPON DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER (FOURTH DEPT). 30

FAMILY OFFENSES, APPEALS.

FAMILY OFFENSE OF HARASSMENT UPHELD, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, ASSAULT SECOND AND CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION OF BREATHING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT). 31

FAMILY OFFENSES, PETITION DEFICIENT.

THE FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION DID NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HARASSMENT SECOND DEGREE AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). 32

GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL, WITNESS CLAIMED LACK OF MEMORY.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ADMIT A WITNESS’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, THE WITNESS’S CLAIM HE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE EVENTS WAS NOT SO DAMAGING TO THE PEOPLE’S CASE AS TO ALLOW THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES (FIRST DEPT). 32

IDENTIFICATION, FAILURE TO IDENTIFY.

DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT HEARSAY EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING ONE OF THE ROBBERY VICTIMS, WHO DID NOT TESTIFY, FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT IN A LINEUP, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT). 33

IDENTIFICATION, TAINTED BY VIDEO SHOWN TO VICTIM.

THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO ARRAY AFTER THE POLICE HAD SHOWN THE ROBBERY VICTIM A CELL PHONE PHOTO DEPICTING THE DEFENDANT USING A TASER ON SOMEONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, THE ROBBER HAD THREATENED THE VICTIM WITH A TASER (SECOND DEPT). 34

JURIES, HESITATION WHEN POLLED.

THE JUDGE PROPERLY HANDLED A JUROR’S HESITATION WHEN THE JURY WAS POLLED, THE JUROR WAS QUESTIONED BY THE JUDGE OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, THE JUDGE DETERMINED THE JUROR WAS NOT UNDER IMPROPER PRESSURE AND SENT THE JURY BACK FOR FURTHER DELIBERATIONS (SECOND DEPT). 35

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.

ANY ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE TOP COUNT AND THE HIGHEST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS AVAILABLE TO THE JURY (CT APP). 36

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.

DENIAL OF THE REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ASSAULT THIRD AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND THE ADMISSION OF THE 911 CALL AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE WERE NOT REVERSIBLE ERRORS (CT APP). 36

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, LESSER INCLULDED OFFENSES.

REQUEST TO SUBMIT CPCS SEVENTH DEGREE TO THE JURY AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CPCS FIFTH DEGREE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED ON THAT COUNT (FOURTH DEPT). 37

JURY NOTES, NO RECORD OF DISCUSSION OF NOTE, ATTORNEY-CLINT PRIVILEGE, SENTENCING.

NO RECORD OF JUDGE’S DISCUSSION OF A JURY NOTE WITH COUNSEL, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED; DEFENDANT AUTHORIZED HIS AGENT TO SHOW HIS LETTER TO HIS ATTORNEY TO A THIRD PARTY, NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; SENTENCES CANNOT BE CONSECUTIVE FOR CRIMES WITH THE SAME ACTUS REUS (THIRD DEPT). 38

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EIDENCE, CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT.

IN AN EXHAUSTIVE DECISION WHICH DISCUSSED ONLY THE CONVOLUTED FACTS OF THIS MURDER CASE, THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION, OVER A DISSENT WHICH CALLED INTO QUESTION THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER (FIRST DEPT). 39

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY, ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT, DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED.

THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THIS COMMON LAW DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE WERE SUFFICIENT TO ALLEGE DEFENDANT WAS THE OPERATOR OF THE VEHICLE, APPELLATE TERM REVERSED (CT APP). 40

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY, SUBSTANCE NOT SHOWN TO BE COCAINE, GRAND JURY.

LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE SUBSTANCE REFERENCED IN THE GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS COCAINE, INDICTMENT PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 40

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY, SECOND INDICTMENT, GRAND JURY.

MATTER SENT BACK FOR A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE PEOPLE PRESENTED NEW EVIDENCE TO THE SECOND GRAND JURY AFTER A ‘NO BILL,’ THE PEOPLE WERE GRANTED PERMISSION TO RE-PRESENT ON THE GROUND THAT NEW EVIDENCE WAS AVAILABLE (FOURTH DEPT). 41

MISSING WITNESS, PEOPLE MUST SHOW TESTIMONY WOULD BE CUMULATIVE.

THE DEFENSE MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THAT THE MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION WAS APPROPRIATE, THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PLACED THE BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THE WITNESS’S TESTIMONY WOULD NOT BE CUMULATIVE ON THE DEFENDANT, THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THE TESTIMONY WOULD BE CUMULATIVE (CT APP). 42

POLICE OFFICERS, ASSAULT OF POLICE OFFICER, LAWFUL DUTY ELEMENT NOT PROVEN.

THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE POLICE OFFICER DEFENDANT PUNCHED WAS ENGAGED IN A LAWFUL DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE ASSAULT, THE PEOPLE ARE HELD TO THE ‘HEAVIER BURDEN’ IN THE DEFINITION OF ‘LAWFUL DUTY’ PROVIDED TO THE JURY WITHOUT OBJECTION, DEFENDANT’S ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT). 43

PAROLE.

PAROLE BOARD MAY CONSIDER SUCH FACTORS AS REMORSE AND INSIGHT INTO THE OFFENSE, EVEN THOUGH THOSE FACTORS ARE NOT LISTED IN THE CONTROLLING STATUTE (THIRD DEPT). 44

PAROLE, INACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT OFFENSES.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR PAROLE WAS TAINTED BY INACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE OFFENSES COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT (THIRD DEPT). 44

PAROLE, BOARD CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT FACTORS.

PETITIONER WAS 14 IN 1990 WHEN HE MURDERED A CLASSMATE AND THE CHILD SHE WAS BABYSITTING, THE PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY DENIED PAROLE FOR THE FIFTH TIME, THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE BOARD CONSIDERED ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS AND DID NOT BASE THEIR DECISION SOLELY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE (SECOND DEPT). 45

PROBATION, NOTIFICATION OF VIOLATIONS INSUFFICIENT, PROOF OF VIOLATION INSUFFICIENT.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF PROBATION AND THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT). 46

PROBATION, ILLEGAL CONDITIONS, APPEALS.

ARGUMENT THAT PROBATION CONDITIONS ARE ILLEGAL SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT). 47

PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE, LATE NOTICE, JUDGES.

COUNTY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT A LATE NOTICE OF HIS INTENT TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). 48

SEARCHES, HANDCUFFS, INCIDENT TO ARREST, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

SEARCH OF A SUITCASE WAS A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN HANDCUFFED AND WAS IN THE PRESENCE OF AS MANY AS EIGHT POLICE OFFICERS (FIRST DEPT). 49

SENTENCING, CONSECUTIVE.

THE FACTS SUPPORTED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON AND MURDER, DEFENDANT WAS SEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON SEVERAL MINUTES BEFORE THE DEFENDANT APPROACHED THE VICTIM (CT APP). 50

SENTENCING, RESTITUTION.

SENTENCING COURT MUST DIRECT THE MANNER IN WHICH RESTITUTION IS TO BE PAID, MATTER REMITTED, ISSUE SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT). 50

SENTENCING, JUVENILE OFFENDERS.

RE: A JUVENILE OFFENDER, THE SURCHARGE AND CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE FEE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ASSESSED, AND THE CONSECUTIVE 2 TO 6 SENTENCES ARE ILLEGAL (FOURTH DEPT). 51

SENTENCING, UNDULY HARSH OR SEVERE.

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR THE SALE OF SMALL AMOUNTS OF COCAINE UNDULY HARSH, CONCURRENT SENTENCES IMPOSED (FOURTH DEPT). 52

SENTENCING, IN ABSENTIA, JUDGES.

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS WARNED HE WOULD BE SENTENCED EVEN IF HE DIDN’T APPEAR AT SENTENCING, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE SENTENCED DEFENDANT IN ABSENTIA WITHOUT FIRST INQUIRING INTO THE REASON AND WHETHER DEFENDANT COULD BE LOCATED (THIRD DEPT). 52

SENTENCING, RESTITUTION, PLEA AGREEMENT, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, GUILTY PLEAS, APPEALS.

RESTITUTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, THE ARGUMENT SURVIVES THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE WAIVER OF APPEAL; DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION HE WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL DID NOT SURVIVE THE WAIVER OF APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT ASSERT THE DEPRIVATION INFECTED THE PLEA AGREEMENT OR THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA (FOURTH DEPT). 53

SENTENCING, ILLEGAL, APPEALS.

IF A DEFENDANT IS NOT SENTENCED AS A PREDICATE FELON THE MINIMUM SENTENCE MUST BE ONE-THIRD OF THE MAXIMUM, NOT ONE-HALF AS IT WAS HERE, AN APPELLATE COURT CAN NOT LET AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE STAND (FOURTH DEPT). 54

SENTENCING, PARKER WARNINGS, ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

THE PARKER WARNINGS DID NOT SPECIFICALLY WARN DEFENDANT HIS SENTENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED IF HE WERE ARRESTED BETWEEN THE PLEA AND SENTENCING, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE ENHANCED SENTENCE ON THAT GROUND, MATTER REMITTED FOR SENTENCING TO THE AGREED TERM OR FOR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA (THIRD DEPT). 54

SENTENCING, JUDGES, GUILTY PLEAS, APPEALS.

DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS AT SENTENCING RAISED THE INTOXICATION DEFENSE REQUIRING FURTHER INQUIRY BY THE COURT, ISSUE CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT, CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA REVERSED (THIRD DEPT). 55

SENTENCING, JUVENILE DELINQUENT.

13-YEAR-OLD WHO, AS A FIRST OFFENSE, PARTICIPATED IN AN ASSAULT (USING A MINI OR SOUVENIR BASEBALL BAT) OF A COUPLE BY HER FATHER AND HER FATHER’S GIRLFRIEND PROPERLY ADJUDICATED A JUVENILE DELINQUENT AND SENTENCED TO A 12-MONTH PERIOD OF PROBATION WITH MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND SCHOOL MONITORING, STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). 56

SENTENCING, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, JUDGES, APPEALS.

COURT MUST CONSIDER WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS, A VALID WAIVER OF APPEAL DOES NOT BAR RAISING THE ISSUE (SECOND DEPT). 57

SENTENCING, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, JUDGES.

THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS; EVEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED AN ARMED FELONY, WHICH CAN DISQUALIFY A DEFENDANT FROM THE STATUS, THE STATUTORY FACTORS WHICH WOULD NONETHELESS ALLOW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT). 58

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), DOWNWARD DEPARTURE, JUDGES.

DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, INSTEAD THE APPLICATION WAS DISMISSED AS ‘PREMATURE,’ MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT). 59

SIDEBAR, RIGHT TO BE PRESENT, THERAPY DOG SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY WITNESS WHEN TESTIFYING.

DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT A SIDEBAR DISCUSSION WITH A PROSPECTIVE JUROR; UPON RETRIAL AN ADULT WITNESS SHOULD NOT TESTIFY WHILE ACCOMPANIED BY A THERAPY DOG (FOURTH DEPT). 60

STATEMENTS IN CONTROLLED PHONE CALL, MIRANDA, CUSTODY.

STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT DURING A CONTROLLED PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE MOTHER OF THE ALLEGED CHILD VICTIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT IN A CLOSED ROOM AT THE SHERIFF’S OFFICE, WHERE DEFENDANT WAS INTERROGATED AND CONFRONTED WITH HIS INCULPATORY STATEMENTS, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS INTERROGATED, HE WAS NOT IN CUSTODY (FOURTH DEPT). 61

STATEMENTS, CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION, ANSWER TO “WHERE DO YOU RESIDE” IS NOT PEDIGREE INFORMATION.

IN THIS CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION CASE, THE INVESTIGATOR’S ASKING DEFENDANT WHERE HE RESIDED WAS DESIGNED TO ELICIT AN INCRIMINATING RESPONSE, THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE WAS NOT PEDIGREE INFORMATION AND A CPL 710.30 NOTICE WAS REQUIRED, ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENT WAS HARMLESS ERROR HOWEVER (FOURTH DEPT). 62

STATEMENTS, HANDCUFFS, MIRANDA, CUSTODY.

ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS HANDCUFFED AND SITTING ON THE BACKSEAT OF A POLICE CAR WHEN HE WAS ASKED QUESTIONS, INCLUDING WHETHER HE HAD BEEN DRINKING, BY THE OFFICER WHO MADE THE TRAFFIC STOP, THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN THE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED (FOURTH DEPT). 63

STATUTES, DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE. VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER.

ATV’S ARE NOT MOTOR VEHICLES WITHIN THE MEANING OF PENAL LAW 125.13 (1) (FIRST DEGREE VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER); CONCURRENT INCLUSORY COUNTS OF PENAL LAW 125.13 (3) DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 64

STREET STOPS, DE BOUR, BLOCKING VEHICLE.

BLOCKING THE CAR IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER WAS A JUSTIFIABLE LEVEL TWO INTRUSION, THE SUBSEQUENT LEVEL THREE INTRUSION WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE INFORMATION KNOWN TO THE POLICE AT THE TIME THE DEFENDANT STARTED TO GET OUT OF THE CAR AS THE POLICE APPROACHED (FOURTH DEPT). 65

STREET STOPS, DE BOUR, SEARCHES, MARIJUANA SMELL.

A FOUNDED SUSPICION OF CRIMINALITY WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR A PAT SEARCH; HOWEVER THE SMELL OF MARIJUANA, ABOUT WHICH THE OFFICER TESTIFIED, WOULD JUSTIFY A SEARCH; BECAUSE THE SUPPRESSION COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE MARIJUANA-SMELL ISSUE, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR A RULING (FOURTH DEPT). 66

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, AGE AND TIME ELEMENTS.

PEOPLE FAILED TO PROVE THE VICTIM-AGE AND TIME-PERIOD ELEMENTS OF PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD, CONVICTION REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT). 67

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, AGE ELEMENT.

THE STATUTE WHICH CRIMINALIZES AN ASSAULT ON A PERSON 65 OR OLDER BY A PERSON MORE THAN TEN YEARS YOUNGER DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF THE ASSAILANT KNEW THE AGE OF THE VICTIM (FOURTH DEPT). 68

SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE.

SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION IS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED (THIRD DEPT). 68

SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE.

THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) DID NOT INCLUDE THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE AND WAS THEREFORE JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE (THIRD DEPT). 69

SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, INCORRECT DOCUMENT, JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE.

A SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE CHARGING DOCUMENT AFTER AN INDICTMENT HAS COME DOWN; IN ADDITION THE SCI HERE WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE ORIGINAL CHARGE OR A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (THIRD DEPT). 70

WITNESS INTIMIDATION, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, HEARSAY ADMISSIBLE.

COUNTY COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT USED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH A WITNESS TO PRESSURE HER NOT TO TESTIFY, THE WITNESS’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT). 71

Negligence Update July 2019

Course #TRT0858 (Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Hybrid Accreditation for September 2, 2020, through December 31, 2021

This Course Is Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 0.5 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between July 1, 2019 and July 31, 2019 which address issues in “Negligence.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Negligence” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Negligence Update July 2019”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 0.5 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Negligence Update Pamphlet July 2019”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Negligence Update Pamphlet July 2019

Negligence Update July 2019 Attorney Affirmation

Negligence Update July 2019 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Negligence Update July 2019” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Negligence Update Pamphlet July 2019”

BANKRUPTCY, SLIP AND FALL.

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION AS AN ASSET IN A BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF THE LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE (SECOND DEPT). 6

COURT OF CLAIMS, SLIP AND FALL.

THE CLAIM DID NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE LOCATION OF CLAIMANT’S SLIP AND FALL AND EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT IN RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED, CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 6

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW.

DAY CARE CENTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT). 7

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW.

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES IN THIS STUDENT-PUSHES-STUDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT). 8

LEGAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO TWO DISTINCT AND SEPARATE ACTIONS, LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT). 8

LEGAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; THE ATTORNEY HAD ATTEMPTED TO REMEDY THE FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS IN AN ESTATE MATTER AFTER THE STATUTE HAD RUN; ABSENCE OF AN EXPERT’S REPORT FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL PRECLUDED A RULING ON THE RELATED ISSUE (FOURTH DEPT). 9

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, ATTORNEYS, EVIDENCE.

ALTHOUGH THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING HIS MOTHER’S ESTATE IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION MAY BE A WITNESS, UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THE CASE, DISQUALIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WAS NOT REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT). 10

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

ALTHOUGH THE TWO THYROID SURGERIES WERE PERFORMED BY THE SAME DOCTOR, THE 2005 SURGERY AND THE 2010 SURGERY WERE DISCRETE EVENTS; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED BY THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT). 11

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EVIDENCE, APPEALS.

THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO LIMIT THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PLAINTIFF COULD OFFER AT TRIAL DID NOT LIMIT THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED; THEREFORE ANY APPEAL MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL; APPEAL DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 12

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRIVILEGE, EVIDENCE.

STATEMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH A HOSPITAL’S QUALITY ASSURANCE INVESTIGATION ARE PRIVILEGED PURSUANT TO THE EDUCATION LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW; THE STATEMENTS ARE NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (FOURTH DEPT). 12

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.

THE SURGICAL PROCEDURE FOR WHICH THERE ALLEGEDLY WAS NO CONSENT WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED TO BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CLAIMED INJURIES, THEREFORE THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). 13

MUNICIPAL LAW, SLIP AND FALL, JUDGES, APPEALS.

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED RELIEF NOT REQUESTED BY A PARTY, HERE THE ABILITY FOR UNLIMITED AMENDMENT OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN FILED; SUA SPONTE ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE; LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED AS AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (SECOND DEPT). 14

MUNICIPAL LAW, SLIP AND FALL.

MOTION TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NOTICE ADDED A NEW THEORY OF CAUSATION (SECOND DEPT). 15

MUNICIPAL LAW.

NEGLIGENCE, BREACH OF CONTRACT AND DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BROUGHT BY A DISABLED FORMER POLICE OFFICER CONCERNING GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). 16

MUNICIPAL LAW.

THE NOTICES OF CLAIM NOTIFIED THE MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS ONLY OF THE DAMAGES RELATING TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTHER’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD HER DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 17

NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT.

PLAINTIFF’S ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR LETTING PLAINTIFF USE A SCISSORS LIFT SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT NEGLIGENTLY ENTRUSTED THE LIFT TO HIM, KNOWING HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO OPERATE IT; PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN THE LIFT TIPPED OVER AND PLAINTIFF FELL 25 FEET (THIRD DEPT). 18

PRODUCTS LIABILITY.

PLAINTIFF BUS DRIVER WAS SPRAYED WITH DIESEL FUEL AS SHE ATTEMPTED TO FILL THE TANK OF THE BUS SHE WAS DRIVING; THE MANUFACTURER OF THE GAS PUMP NOZZLE AND THE GAS STATION DEMONSTRATED THE NOZZLE AND THE GAS PUMP WERE WORKING PROPERLY; THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF A RELEVANT DESIGN FLAW IN THE FUEL SYSTEM OF THE BUS; THE NOZZLE MANUFACTURER’S AND THE GAS STATION’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 19

SLIP AND FALL.

DEFENDANT GYM DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AN ACCUMULATION OF DUST ON THE BASKETBALL COURT FLOOR WAS INHERENT IN THE SPORT OR OPEN AND OBVIOUS, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 20

SLIP AND FALL.

ONE INCH DEEP DEPRESSION IN THE ROADWAY WHICH WAS SURROUNDED BY ORANGE MARKINGS WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED TO BE TRIVIAL OR BOTH ‘OPEN AND OBVIOUS’ AND ‘NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS’ AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 20

SLIP AND FALL.

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE FELL OVER A WORKER WHEN SHE ATTEMPTED TO STEP OFF AN ELLIPTICAL MACHINE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 21

SLIP AND FALL.

PLAINTIFF FELL IN A POTHOLE IN THE PATH FROM THE BUS TO THE CURB, TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT). 22

THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT.

HOTEL WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS STABBED TO DEATH AT A PARTY AT THE HOTEL, THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AT THE HOTEL AND THERE WAS NO SECURITY ON THE NIGHT OF THE STABBING (SECOND DEPT). 22

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, COMMON CARRIER.

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE BUS STOPPED IN AN UNUSUAL AND VIOLENT WAY IN THIS COMMON CARRIER INJURY CASE (SECOND DEPT). 23

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, EVIDENCE.

EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE APPEARED TO BE INTOXICATED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, THE EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT’S RELIABILITY AS A WITNESS AND COULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN REBUTTAL TO DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 24

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, EVIDENCE.

PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY ABOUT HOW THE TRAFFIC ACCIENT HAPPENED FOUND INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, DISSENT ARGUED THE TESTIMONY RAISED CLASSIC QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DETERMINE (FIRST DEPT). 25

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SPOLIATION.

RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF PREJUDICE CAUSED BY PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE PHONE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAPTURED IMAGES OF THE INCIDENT AT THE HEART OF THE LAWSUIT, DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT REVERSED AND MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY (THIRD DEPT). 26

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SPOLIATION.

SPOLIATION WARRANTED STRIKING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT). 27

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS.

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; DEFENDANT SAW THE VEHICLE WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY RAN THE STOP SIGN AND THOUGHT IT WAS GOING TOO FAST TO STOP; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION (FOURTH DEPT). 27

Civil Procedure Update July 2019

Course #MSC1167 (Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)

Hybrid Accreditation for September 2, 2020, through December 31, 2021

This Course Is Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys

Areas of Professional Practice: 1 CLE Credit Hour

Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.

This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between July 1, 2019 and July 31, 2010 which address issues in “Civil Procedure.” Similar 1/2-to 1-hour CLE courses are continuously being submitted for approval to the NYS CLE Board for each month from January 2019 to the present, to provide readers with CLE credit simply for keeping up to date with the latest appellate decisions.

The “Civil Procedure” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. A link to the written materials for this course (“Civil Procedure Update July 2019”) is provided below.

As you listen to the course, you will hear a verification code. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification code, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 1 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.

Click on the links below for the written materials (“Civil Procedure Update July 2019”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”

The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.

Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet July 2019

Civil Procedure Update July 2019 Attorney Affirmation

Civil Procedure Update July 2019 Evaluation Survey

Topics Covered in the “Civil Procedure Update July 2019” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the “Civil Procedure Update Pamphlet July 2019”

APPEALS, MOTIONS IN LIMINE.

THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO LIMIT THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PLAINTIFF COULD OFFER AT TRIAL DID NOT LIMIT THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED; THEREFORE ANY APPEAL MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL; APPEAL DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 8

ARTICLE 78, VERIFICATION, RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.

ALTHOUGH THE ARTICLE 78 PETITION WAS VERIFIED BY AN ATTORNEY, THE VERIFICATION WAS VALID BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY HAD FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS; IN ADDITION, ANY DEFECTS IN THE VERIFICATION WERE WAIVED BY RESPONDENTS; PRIOR ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO THE PETITION ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF THE EDUCATION LAW CONCERNING THE SUSPENSION OF A SCHOOL PRINCIPAL (FOURTH DEPT). 9

ARTICLE 78, JUDGES, CRIMINAL LAW.

ARTICLE 78 ACTION SEEKING TO PROHIBIT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE FROM EXCLUDING TESTIMONY AS PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DISMISSED AS INAPPROPRIATE; MATTER CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT). 10

ARTICLE 78, SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.

THE APPELLATE DIVISION DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING HAD BEEN DENIED, THE ARTICLE 78 PETITION, SEEKING REVIEW OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A BID ON A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, WAS THEREFORE DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 11

ATTORNEYS, VIRTUAL LAW OFFICE.

USING A NEW YORK VIRTUAL LAW OFFICE PROGRAM (VLOP) ONLY AS A MAILING ADDRESS AND AS AN AGENT TO ACCEPT SERVICE DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ATTORNEY PRACTICING IN NEW YORK HAVE A PHYSICAL OFFICE IN NEW YORK, HOWEVER THE ACTION BROUGHT BY THE VLOP ATTORNEY IS NOT A NULLITY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 12

BANKRUPTCY.

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION AS AN ASSET IN A BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF THE LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE (SECOND DEPT). 13

CLASS ACTIONS.

COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF APPEALS COULD NOT PURSUE STATE WAGE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF CLAIMANTS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN WHICH THE STATE WAGE CLAIMS WERE RELEASED (FIRST DEPT). 13

COMPLAINT, SPOLIATION.

SPOLIATION WARRANTED STRIKING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT). 14

COMPLAINT, SPOLIATION.

RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF PREJUDICE CAUSED BY PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE PHONE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAPTURED IMAGES OF THE INCIDENT AT THE HEART OF THE LAWSUIT, DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT REVERSED AND MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY (THIRD DEPT). 15

COMPLAINT, CONSOLIDATION.

PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL FILED A SECOND COMPLAINT ARISING OUT OF THE SAME FACTS AS THE FIRST COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE CERTAIN INTENTIONAL TORTS BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RAN OUT, DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND COMPLAINT WAS NOT REQUIRED, CONSOLIDATION OF THE TWO COMPLAINTS WAS ORDERED (THIRD DEPT). 16

CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE.

IN THIS EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER DISPUTE ABOUT A HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CONTRIBUTION, THE CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, EACH PAYCHECK WITH THE PREMIUM DEDUCTION WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT WRONG (SECOND DEPT). 17

CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE, LEGAL MALPRACTICE.

CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO TWO DISTINCT AND SEPARATE ACTIONS, LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT). 18

CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE, LEGAL MALPRACTICE.

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; THE ATTORNEY HAD ATTEMPTED TO REMEDY THE FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS IN AN ESTATE MATTER AFTER THE STATUTE HAD RUN; ABSENCE OF AN EXPERT’S REPORT FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL PRECLUDED A RULING ON THE RELATED ISSUE (FOURTH DEPT). 19

CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.

ALTHOUGH THE TWO THYROID SURGERIES WERE PERFORMED BY THE SAME DOCTOR, THE 2005 SURGERY AND THE 2010 SURGERY WERE DISCRETE EVENTS; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED BY THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT). 20

COURT OF CLAIMS, DAMAGES.

THE CLAIM WAS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE LOST WAGES AS PART OF THE DAMAGES IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY ACTION, THE DISSENT DISAGREED AND WOULD HAVE VACATED THE AWARD FOR LOST WAGES (FOURTH DEPT). 21

COURT OF CLAIMS.

THE CLAIM DID NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE LOCATION OF CLAIMANT’S SLIP AND FALL AND EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT IN RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED, CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). 22

DEFAULT, MOTION TO VACATE.

LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE, MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 23

DEFAULT, MOTION TO VACATE.

MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EXCUSE OFFERED (SECOND DEPT). 24

FORECLOSURE, ABANDONMENT.

FORECLOSURE ACTION ABANDONED, BANK FAILED TO INITIATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS WITHIN ONE YEAR (SECOND DEPT). 24

FORECLOSURE, CONFERENCE.

THE BANK’S MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE OF THE BANK’S UNEXCUSED FAILURE TO APPEAR AT A SCHEDULED CONFERENCE IN VIOLATION OF 22 NYCRR 202.27(c) (SECOND DEPT). 25

FORECLOSURE, NOTICE.

PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 AND DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF STANDING PURSUANT TO A MERGER, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 26

FORECLOSURE, NOTICE/MAILING.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE/MAILING REQUIREMENTS AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS, THE REFEREE’S REPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED (SECOND DEPT). 27

FRAUD, CIVIL CONSPIRACY.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN NEW YORK, THE ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY, INCLUDING OVERT ACTS, WERE PROPERLY PLED AS PART OF THE FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT). 28

FRAUD, CONTRACT LAW.

FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION, AS ALLEGED, IS NOT DUPLICATIVE OF THE ACTION FOR BREACH OF A LOAN GUARANTEE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THAT GROUND (FIRST DEPT). 29

FRAUD, CONTRACT LAW.

IN THE INDUCEMENT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT DUPLICATIVE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION; MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 30

JUDGES, ORDERS.

FAMILY COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A RESETTLED ORDER WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THE ORIGINAL ORDER AND WHICH WAS ISSUED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF TESTIMONY CONCERNING MOTHER’S SERIOUS MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEMS (THIRD DEPT). 31

JUDGES, SUA SPONTE, FORECLOSURE.

DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT ASSERT THE BANK LACKED STANDING IN HIS ANSWER AND DID NOT OPPOSE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STANDING ISSUE AND DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT). 32

JUDGES, SUA SPONTE, MUNICIPAL LAW.

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED RELIEF NOT REQUESTED BY A PARTY, HERE THE ABILITY FOR UNLIMITED AMENDMENT OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN FILED; SUA SPONTE ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE; LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED AS AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (SECOND DEPT). 33

JURISDICTION.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ONLY CONNECTION TO THE CORPORATION WHICH HAD CONTACTS WITH NEW YORK WAS HIS SALARY; THEREFORE THE CORPORATION’S NEW YORK CONTACTS COULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT). 34

LAW OF THE CASE.

DEED MADE UNDER FALSE PRETENSES IS VOID AB INITIO RENDERING THE RELATED MORTGAGE INVALID; THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE DOES NOT PRECLUDE RECONSIDERING A MATTER WHERE THERE IS NEW EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT). 35

MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY.

STATEMENTS POSTED ON AN ELECTION-RELATED FACEBOOK PAGE ABOUT THE OPPOSING CANDIDATE ARE NOT SHIELDED BY IMMUNITY AND ARE ACTIONABLE IN THIS DEFAMATION CASE; TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF A COMPLAINT A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE MADE (THIRD DEPT). 35

MUNICIPAL LAW, RECORDING MORTGAGE, ATTORNEY AFFIDAVITS.

PLAINTIFF BANK WAS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REQUIRING THE COUNTY COURT TO RECORD A MORTGAGE, THE ORIGINAL OF WHICH HAD ALLEGEDLY BEEN LOST; AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT IS AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR THE SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS IN ADMISSIBLE FORM (SECOND DEPT). 36

MUNICIPAL LAW.

THE NOTICES OF CLAIM NOTIFIED THE MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS ONLY OF THE DAMAGES RELATING TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTHER’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD HER DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 37

NEGLECT, FAMILY LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BASED IN PART ON THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF RESPONDENT’S CONVICTION FOR ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD, PROPERLY GRANTED (THIRD DEPT). 38

PRIVILEGE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.

STATEMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH A HOSPITAL’S QUALITY ASSURANCE INVESTIGATION ARE PRIVILEGED PURSUANT TO THE EDUCATION LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW; THE STATEMENTS ARE NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (FOURTH DEPT). 39

PRIVILEGE.

EMAILS INADVERTENTLY PROVIDED TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER (SECOND DEPT). 40

RELIGION, JURISDICTION.

PLAINTIFF CHURCH’S OBJECTION TO THE SYNOD’S TAKING CONTROL OF A SCHOOL OPERATED BY PLAINTIFF CHURCH IS A RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY WHICH IS NOT JUSTICIABLE IN STATE COURTS (SECOND DEPT). 40

RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, ARBITRATION.

THE DOCTRINES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA APPLY TO THE ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER DID NOT ABUSE A MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES RECIPIENT, THE CONTRARY SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT). 41

SANCTIONS, WAIVER.

PLAINTIFF LOAN SERVICING COMPANY WAIVED THE TIME OF THE ESSENCE PROVISION BY ITS RELENTLESS EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE FORECLOSURE SALE TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER (TO EXACT A HIGHER PRICE); THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON PLAINTIFF WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY A WRITTEN DECISION AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTROLLING REGULATION; SANCTIONS ASPECT REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT). 42

SERVICE, EXTENSION OF TIME.

PLAINTIFF BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO EFFECT SERVICE FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). 43

SERVICE, ORDERS.

AN ORDER REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY DEMANDS WHICH WAS NOT SERVED ON THE DEFENDANT BY THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENFORCEABLE (SECOND DEPT). 44

SUBPOENAS.

NONPARTY SUBPOENA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED IN THIS OUT-OF-STATE ASBESTOS-RELATED INSURANCE ACTION, THE NONPARTY HAD BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE INSURER AND MAY POSSESS RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW THE INSURANCE POLICIES WERE INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED (FOURTH DEPT). 44

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A COURT MAY CONVERT A MOTION TO DISMISS TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE WHERE A PURE QUESTION OF LAW IS INVOLVED; THE STRICTER STANDARDS FOR NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT DO NOT APPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SALE OF A BUSINESS (FOURTH DEPT). 45

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY ABOUT HOW THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT HAPPENED FOUND INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, DISSENT ARGUED THE TESTIMONY RAISED CLASSIC QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DETERMINE (FIRST DEPT). 46

VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE.

EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE APPEARED TO BE INTOXICATED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, THE EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT’S RELIABILITY AS A WITNESS AND COULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN REBUTTAL TO DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 47