Personal Injury Update January – March 2022
(Nontransitional) Prerecorded Audio (On Demand/Recorded-Audio)
Appropriate for Experienced Attorneys
Areas of Professional Practice: 2.5 CLE Credit Hours
Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Including the Summaries in the CLE Written Materials, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” in the “How to Use the New York Appellate Digest” Section on the Home Page.
This course organizes summaries of decisions by the New York State appellate courts (Appellate Division and Court of Appeals) released between January 1, 2022 and March 30, 2022 which address issues in “Personal Injury.”
The “Personal Injury” decision-summaries posted weekly on the New York Appellate Digest website are organized in monthly pamphlets which are accessed in the “Update Service.” The monthly pamphlets comprise the written materials for these monthly CLE courses. Links to the written materials for this course (“Personal Injury Reversal Reports for January, February and March 2022”) are provided below.
As you listen to the course, you will hear verification codes. After finishing the course, print and fill out the attached “Attorney Affirmation,” including the verification codes, your name, your signature, and the date you completed the course. Please also fill out the attached “Evaluation Survey” (the CLE Board requires that I collect and preserve the Evaluation Surveys). Scan the “Attorney Affirmation” and the “Evaluation Survey” and email them as attachments to me, Bruce Freeman, at NewYorkAppellateDigest@gmail.com. I will email to you the completed “New York CLE Certificate of Attendance,” as an attachment, awarding you credit for the 2.5 credit-hour course. Or, if you wish to send and receive hard copies by regular mail, send the “Attorney Affirmation” and “Evaluation Survey” to New York Appellate Digest, LLC, 126 Colonial Village Road, Rochester, New York 14625 and make sure to include your return address.
Click on the links below for the written materials (“Negligence Reversal Reports January, February and March 2022”), the “Attorney Affirmation” (the “verification code” form) and the “Evaluation Survey.”
The media player for this course is at the bottom of the page.
Negligence Reversal Report January 2022
Negligence Reversal Report February 2022
Negligence Reversal Report March 2022
Attorney Affirmation Personal Injury Update January, February, March 2022
Evaluation Survey Personal Injury Update January, February, March 2022
Topics Covered in the “Personal Injury Update January, February, March 2022” Course Are Described Below (the podcast may not address every case in the written materials); Page Numbers Refer to the Written Materials, i.e., the Pages in Each of the Three Negligence Reversal Reports
JANUARY 2022 NEGLIGENCE REVERSAL REPORT
ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLE. 4
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE 14-YEAR-OLD DEFENDANT DRIVER ACKNOWLEDGED HIS NEGLIGENCE ON THE STAND (THIRD DEPT). 4
EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, IMMUNITY. 5
SUNY ALBANY NOT PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY IN THIS CASE BROUGHT BY A STUDENT WHO ALLEGED SHE WAS ASSAULTED IN HER DORM ROOM BY A PERSON NOT AUTHORIZED TO BE IN THE DORM; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF SECURITY AND THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE ASSAULT (THIRD DEPT). 5
ELEVATORS, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CONTRACT LAW. 7
IN THIS ELEVATOR-ACCIDENT CASE, THE BUILDING OWNERS WERE ENTITLED TO A CONDITIONAL JUDGMENT ON CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST THE ELEVATOR-MAINTENANCE COMPANY BEFORE THE PRIMARY ACTION IS DETERMINED (SECOND DEPT). 7
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PASSAGEWAYS. 8
A STAIRWAY CAN BE A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 8
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PASSAGEWAYS. 9
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE OR SNOW IN AN AREA WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARED SUCH THAT IT CONSTITUTED A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE RE: THIS LABOR LAW 241(6) ACTION (FIRST DEPT). 9
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 10
IN THIS SCAFFOLD-FALL CASE, EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF WAS INSTRUCTED TO USE GUARD RAILS ON THE SCAFFOLD BUT DID NOT REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT). 10
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 10
PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH A SKYLIGHT HOLE WHEN ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE PLYWOOD WHICH WAS COVERING THE HOLE; PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT). 10
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 11
PLAINTIFF WAS IN A TRENCH WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY THE BUCKET OF AN EXCAVATOR WHICH WAS ON THE EDGE OF THE TRENCH ABOVE HIM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INJURY WAS THE RESULT OF THE USUAL AND ORDINARY DANGERS OF A CONSTRUCTION SITE AS OPPOSED TO A RISK CONTEMPLATED BY THE LABOR LAW (FOURTH DEPT). 11
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 12
THE DUCT ON THE FLOOR WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE LABOR LAW 241 (6) DID NOT APPLY; THE DEFENDANT DID NOT SUPERVISE OR CONTROL PLAINTIFF’S WORK, THEREFORE LABOR LAW 200 DID NOT APPLY (FIRST DEPT). 12
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 13
THE SCAFFOLD BRACING BAR OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS; LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 13
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, JUDGES. 14
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S TESTIMONY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ON THE GROUND THE TESTIMONY EXCEEDED THE CPLR 3101 (D) DISCLOSURE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 14
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW. 15
IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION AGAINST A NURSING HOME, DEFENDANTS’ EXPERTS’ OPINIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBMISSION OF DECEDENT’S MEDICAL RECORDS, RENDERING THE OPINIONS SPECULATIVE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 15
NOTICE OF CLAIM, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 16
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PORT AUTHORITY, WHICH IS A BISTATE ENTITY (NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY) CREATED BY COMPACT (FIRST DEPT). 16
PRODUCTS LIABILITY. 16
DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER AND RETAILER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DESIGN DEFECT, FAILURE TO WARN AND IMPLIED WARRANTY CAUSES OF ACTION; PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED USING A “HOVERBOARD” (SECOND DEPT). 16
PROTRUDING SCREW (DANGEROUS CONDITION), HOMEOWNER LIABILITY, EMPLOYMENT LAW. 18
PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE CONTRACTOR DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER HIRED TO BUILD A NEW STAIRCASE; PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY A PROTRUDING SCREW ON THE NEW STAIRCASE; DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE; THE HOMEOWNER DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION, DID NOT SUPERVISE THE CONTRACTOR’S WORK, AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION (FIRST DEPT). 18
ROADWAY DEFECT, MUNICIPAL LAW, SPECIAL USE. 19
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER AN ALLEGED DEFECT IN THE ROAD WAS CAUSED BY DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL USE OF THE ROAD; TWO DISSENTERS DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT). 19
SLIP AND FALL, CONTRACT LAW. 20
PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL ON AN UNEVEN MAT WHEN SHE STEPPED OFF THE DEFENDANT’S SKATING RINK; THE ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY WHICH SOLD AND INSTALLED THE MAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OWNER OF THE SKATING RINK AND THE SELLER/INSTALLER OF THE MAT AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE SELLER/INSTALLER OF THE MAT LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM (FIRST DEPT). 20
SUBWAYS, MUNICIPAL LAW, IMMUNITY. 21
PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS SUBWAY ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A TRAIN AND ALLEGED THE ALLOWED SPEED FOR ENTERING A STATION WAS TOO HIGH; DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT SPEED STUDIES HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT). 21
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, CIVIL PROCEDURE, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW. 22
EVEN THOUGH PARTY DEPOSITIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PREMATURE AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION PAPERS DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT BECAUSE NO EXPLANATION OF THE ACCIDENT WAS OFFERED; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT’S BUS CROSSED A DOUBLE YELLOW LINE AND STRUCK HIS TAXI CAB (SECOND DEPT). 22
TREADMILL. 23
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS INJURED WHEN DEFENDANT’S TREADMILL SUDDENLY ACCELERATED; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE TREADMILL-ACCELERATION DAYS BEFORE SHE WAS INJURED, RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT DEFENDANT’S ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE DEFECT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 23
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 24
DEFENDANTS ARGUED PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE IN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROCEEDING; HERE THE DEFENDANTS ARGUED PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE AND HIS REMEDY WAS LIMITED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION; THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN THIS ACTION (THIRD DEPT). 24
FEBRUARY 2022 NEGLIGENCE REVERSAL REPORT
EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW, CHILD VICTIM’S ACT. 5
PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY REQUESTS IN THIS CHILD VICTIM’S ACT ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A CATHOLIC SCHOOL GYM TEACHER WERE PALPABLY IMPROPER (SECOND DEPT). 5
EMPLOYMENT LAW, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION. 6
ALTHOUGH THE DOCTOR WAS AT WORK AT THE HOSPITAL WHEN HE WAS SHOT DURING A MASS SHOOTING, HIS INJURY WAS NOT WORK-RELATED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (THIRD DEPT). 6
EXERCISE EQUIMENT. 7
PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN THE ARM AND FOOT PEDAL OF AN ELLIPTICAL MACHINE AT DEFENDANT’S GYM BROKE OFF; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT OR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT). 7
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 8
DEFENDANT WAS A PRIME, NOT A GENERAL, CONTRACTOR AND DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISION OR CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6); HOWEVER, DEFENDANT DID EXERCISE SOME CONTROL OVER WORK-SITE SAFETY AND THEREFORE MAY BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FOURTH DEPT). 8
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 9
DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED (1) THE PROTRUDING PIPE OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS, (2) THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK, AND (3) THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION PROHIBITING THE ACCUMULATION OF DEBRIS DID NOT APPLY; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 9
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 10
NEITHER THE BUILDING OWNER NOR THE PROSPECTIVE BUILDING OWNER HAD SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE PREMISES OR THE WORK, INCLUDING THE WORK OF PLAINTIFF AND HIS CO-WORKER WHO APPARENTLY MOPPED THE FLOOR WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE OWNER AND PROSPECTIVE OWNER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 10
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW. 11
THE TENANT WHICH SUPPLIED THE ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE LADDER TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). 11
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE. 12
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’ DECEDENT COULD NOT COMMENCE A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WHILE THE DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS STILL REPRESENTED HIM, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ACTION WAS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT). 12
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, NEGLIGENCE, TRUSTS AND ESTATES. 13
IT WAS ALLEGED DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS DID NOT INSTRUCT THE DECEDENT TO REVOKE THE TOTTEN TRUSTS SO THE FUNDS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER WISHES AS SET OUT IN THE WILL AND TRUST DRAFTED BY DEFENDANTS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 13
MEDICAL (DENTAL) MALPRACTICE, CONTRACT LAW. 14
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY; PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED ON THE PROMISED OUTCOME OF THE DENTAL WORK (SECOND DEPT). 14
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CERTIFICATE OF MERIT. 15
THE FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE THE CERTIFICATE OF MERIT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DIMSISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT (THIRD DEPT). 15
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCOVERY, CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES RECORDS. 16
CERTAIN CHILD CUSTODY RECORDS AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES RECORDS (WHICH DO NOT RELATE TO AN INVESTIGATION) MAY BE DISCOVERABLE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION BROUGH ON BEHALF OF AN INFANT (THIRD DEPT). 16
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DELAYED DIAGNOSIS. 17
PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A DELAY IN DIAGNOSIS AFFECTED THE PROGNOSIS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 17
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT AFFIDAVITS. 18
IN THIS MEDIDCAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, THE HOSPITAL-DEFENDANTS’ EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT ADDRESS ALL OF THE MALPRACTICE ALLEGATIONS AND OFFERED CONSLUSORY ASSERTIONS; THEREFORE THE HOSPITAL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 18
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, BAILMENT. 19
DEFENDANT, BASED ON ITS STATUS AS BAILOR OF THE MACHINE WHICH ALLEGEDLY INJURED PLAINTIFF, MAY BE LIABLE UNDER BREACH OF WARRANTY AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION (THIRD DEPT). 19
SLIP AND FALL, FEIGNED ISSUE OF FACT. 20
PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED SHE DID NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED HER SLIP AND FALL BUT STATED IN HER AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHE SLIPPED ON ICE; THE AFFIDAVIT CREATED A FEIGNED ISSUE OF FACT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). 20
SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, PRE-JOINDER DISCOVERY, PRESERVATION OF THE SCENE. 21
PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF CLAIM DEMONSTRATED HE HAD SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO FORMULATE A COMPLAINT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; HIS REQUEST FOR PRE-JOINDER DISCOVERY AND PRESERVATION OF THE ACCIDENT SCENE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 21
SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, SPECIAL USE. 22
PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE STEPS ON WHICH SHE SLIPPED AND FELL, ALTHOUGH ON A PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY, WERE SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL USE BY THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER (POTENTIALLY RENDERING THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER LIABLE) (THIRD DEPT). 22
SLIP AND FALL, OPEN AND OBVIOUS, CREDIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF. 23
PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED OVER AN ELECTRICAL BOX AS SHE STEPPED OFF A TREADMILL; DEFENDANTS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE CONDITION WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF AND HER WITNESSES, INCLUDING HER EXPERT (SECOND DEPT). 23
SLIP AND FALL, OPEN AND OBVIOUS. 24
THE ROLLED UP MAT WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP AND FALL WAS KNOWN TO THE PLAINTIFF AND WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 24
SLIP AND FALL. 25
THERE REMAINED QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS CREATED THE ICY CONDITION AND WHETHER THEY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 25
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CONTRACT LAW. 26
LESSOR OF THE VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE REAR-END COLLISION WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE GRAVES AMENDMENT; SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO SEARCH THE RECORD AND GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVEN THOUGH NO MOTION HAD BEEN MADE (FIRST DEPT). 26
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MUNICIPAL LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW. 27
WILLIAMS, THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN SLOWING DOWN FOR A WORK CREW AHEAD; THE WILLIAMS CAR WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND BY A POLICE CAR PURSUING ANOTHER VEHICLE; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT). 27
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-END COLLISIONS. 28
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT BUS DRIVER SAW WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AND WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE; THE BUS WAS BEHIND PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AND BOTH THE BUS AND THE SCOOTER APPARENTLY CHANGED LANES AT THE SAME TIME (SECOND DEPT). 28
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM. 29
CLAIMANTS’ APPLICATION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). 29
WRONGFUL DEATH, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW. 30
THE WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT NURSING HOME SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT). 30
MARCH 2022 NEGLIGENCE REVERSAL REPORT
BUS PASSENGERS, MUNICIPAL LAW. 4
THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND PLAINTIFF BUS PASSENGER’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE NORMAL JERKS AND JOLTS OF BUS TRAVEL AND NOT BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON DEFENDANTS’ PART; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 4
BUS PASSENGERS. 5
THERE WAS NO OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THAT THE CITY BUS STOPPED “VIOLENTLY,” CAUSING HER TO FALL; THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVICENCE (SECOND DEPT). 5
DUTY TO WARN. 6
PLAINTIFF, WHILE ATTENDING A BEACH-FRONT PARTY, SUFFERED SEVERE INJURY WHEN HE DOVE OFF A BULKHEAD INTO SHALLOW WATER; HIS ACTION AGAINST THE PROPERTY OWNER FOR FAILURE TO WARN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE PROPERTY OWNER’S INDEMNIFICATION ACTION AGAINST THE PERSON WHO RENTED THE AREA FOR THE PARTY WAS DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). 6
LANDLORD-TENANT, OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD. 7
DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD WAS NOT OBLIGATED BY THE LEASE OR ANY STATUTE TO REPAIR THE FLOOR OF A WALK-IN FREEZER IN THE LEASED PREMISES; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DENTS IN THE METAL FLOOR CAUSED HIS LADDER TO FALL OVER; THE LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 7
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, REAL ESTATE. 8
PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS’ 2010 BREACH OF A CONDOMINIUM-SALE CONTRACT ACTION WAS DISMISSED ON STATUTE OF FRAUDS GROUNDS; WHEN A WRITTEN CONTRACT SUBSEQUENTLY SURFACED, DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS DID NOT MOVE TO RENEW, VACATE OR APPEAL THE ORDER (FIRST DEPT). 8
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 9
PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A RETAINER AGREEMENT TO DEMONSTRATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANTS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT). 9
LOSS OF SERVICES. 10
PLAINTIFFS-PARENTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF THEIR INJURED DAUGHTER’S SERVICES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE PARENTS DEMONSTRATED ONLY THAT THEIR DAUGHTER PERFORMED SERVICES IN HER EMPLOYMENT AT THE COMPANIES OWNED BY THE PARENTS (FIRST DEPT). 10
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, AMEND ANSWERS, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, PLAINTIFF’S WIEGHT AND SMOKING. 11
CODEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO AMEND THEIR ANSWERS IN THIS MED MAL CASE TO ALLEGE PLAINTIFF’S CULPABLE CONDUCT AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (RE: HER WEIGHT AND SMOKING) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE DELAY IN MAKING THE MOTION CAUSED NO PREJUDICE; GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DELAY NEED NOT BE SHOWN; FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE AMENDED PLEADINGS WITH THE MOTION PAPERS AND DEFECTS IN VERIFICATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED (FIRST DEPT). 11
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CATARACT SURGERY. 12
THE DEFENDANT OPHTHALMOLOGICAL SURGEON’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED; PLAINTIFF LOST SIGHT IN HER RIGHT EYE AFTER CATARACT-REMOVAL SURGERY (FIRST DEPT). 12
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, EXPERT AFFIDAVITS. 13
THE EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THE ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 13
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE CANCER, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 14
PLANTIFF ALLEGED FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE CANCER IN 2014 IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; DESPITE THE ENACTMENT OF LAVERN’S LAW (CPLR 214-A) IN 2018, WHICH EXTENDED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE CANCER BY VIRTUE OF ITS RETROACTIVE-APPLICATION AND REVIVAL PROVISIONS, THE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT). 14
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, VICARIOUS LIABILITY. 15
THE COMPANY WHICH STAFFED THE HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, AS OPPOSED TO EMPLOYEES FOR WHOM THE COMPANY WOULD BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE (SECOND DEPT). 15
MUNICIPAL LAW, NO-KNOCK WARRANTS. 16
THE TARGETS OF A NO-KNOCK WARRANT ARE OWED A “SPECIAL DUTY” SUCH THAT A MUNICIPALITY MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE POLICE OFFICERS EXECUTING THE WARRANT (CT APP). 16
PRIVILEGE, PHYSICIAN-PATIENT, BREACH IS A TORT. 18
PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE, A TORT (THIRD DEPT). 18
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, ESCALATORS. 19
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS INJURED WHILE REPAIRING AN ESCALATOR, COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE ESCALATOR’S SUDDEN START-UP, THE MOTION TO COMPEL HIM TO SUPPLEMENT HIS ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WAS PROPERLY DENIED; PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS CAN BE PROVEN BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; AT THIS STAGE PLAINTIFF CAN TESTIFY UNDER OATH THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW THE CAUSE OF THE UNEXPECTED START-UP (FIRST DEPT). 19
SLIP AND FALL, CAUSE OF FALL. 20
ALTHOUGH THE INFANT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HER SLIP AND FALL; MOTHER, FATHER AND THE DEFENDANTS PROVIDED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE FALL WAS CAUSED BY AN IDENTIFIED DEFECT IN THE SIDEWALK, RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT). 20
SLIP AND FALL, CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. 21
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ABOUT THE ABILITY TO SEE ICE ON THE PARKING LOT RAISED A TRIABLE QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL (THIRD DEPT). 21
SLIP AND FALL, MEDICAL RECORDS. 22
AN ENTRY IN A HOSPITAL RECORD INDICATING PLAINTIFF FELL DOWN A FEW STAIRS WAS NOT GERMANE TO TREATMENT OR DIAGNOSIS AND WAS NOT AN ADMISSION BECAUSE THE SOURCE OF THE ENTRY WAS UNKNOWN; NEW TRIAL ORDERED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT). 22
SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW. 23
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE, PURSUANT TO THE TOWN CODE, FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE AREA OF THE SIDEWALK WHERE PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER A PROTRUDING BOLT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 23
SLIP AND FALL, STORM IN PROGRESS. 24
THE METEOROLOGIST’S AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED TO SHOW THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS WHEN PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE RECORDS RELIED UPON BY THE AFFIANT; THE AFFIDAVIT THEREFORE HAD NO PROBATIVE VALUE (SECOND DEPT). 24
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MUNCIPAL LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, POLICE VEHICLE. 25
IN THIS POLICE-CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, THE MUNICIPALITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE POLICE OFFICER’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT WAS EXEMPT FROM THE ORDINARY RULES OF THE ROAD PURSUANT TO VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104, AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE OFFICER WAS NOT LIABLE UNDER THE ORDINARY RULES OF NEGLIGENCE; THE MUNICIPALITY’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). 25
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PEDESTRIANS, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, SUN GLARE. 26
SUN GLARE DID NOT CREATE AN EMERGENCY FOR THE BUS DRIVER WHO STRUCK PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN (SECOND DEPT). 26