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ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR SITE PLAN APPROVAL ANNULLED, BOARD’S DETERMINATION BASED SOLELY ON GENERALIZED COMMUNITY OPPOSITION.

The Second Department, reversing the zoning board, determined that the denial of petitioner’s application for site plan approval was improperly based solely on generalized community opposition. The village consultants and the negative State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) declaration did not support the board’s determination:

“Although scientific or other expert testimony is not required in every case to support a zoning board’s determination, the board may not base its decision on generalized community objections” … . In contrast, a zoning board’s reliance upon specific, detailed testimony of neighbors based on personal knowledge does not render a variance determination the product of generalized and conclusory community opposition … .

Here, we agree with the petitioner that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the rationality of the Board’s determinations denying the petitioner’s application for site plan approval … . The only evidence in the record concerning the traffic and safety issues cited by the Board in the determinations was the conclusory opposition of neighboring residents, which was not supported by any of the Village’s consultants and was contradicted by the negative SEQRA declaration adopted by the Board … . Under the circumstances, the Board’s determinations were improperly based on generalized community opposition and should have been annulled … . Matter of Ramapo Pinnacle Props., LLC v Village of Airmont Planning Bd., 2016 NY Slip Op 08238, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

ZONING (ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR SITE PLAN APPROVAL ANNULLED, BOARD’S DETERMINATION BASED SOLELY ON GENERALIZED COMMUNITY OPPOSITION)

ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS’ RULING THAT A NONCONFORMING USE HAD NOT BEEN DISCONTINUED OR ABANDONED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVERSED.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board of appeals’ (ZBA’s) ruling that a nonconforming use had not been discontinured or abandoned should be affirmed. The court explained the role of the reviewing court when the controversy is fact-based and does not involve the interpretation of a statute or ordinance:

It is well settled that unless the issue presented is one of pure legal interpretation, “[a] zoning board’s interpretation of a local zoning ordinance is afforded deference and will only be disturbed if irrational or unreasonable” … . Here, the issue of whether the preexisting nonconforming use was discontinued is largely a fact-based inquiry, rather than a purely legal interpretation of the zoning law. As such, the ZBA’s determination is entitled to deference … . Matter of Lumberjack Pass Amusements, LLC v Town of Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2016 NY Slip Op 08142, 3rd Dept 12-1-16

 

ZONING (ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS’ RULING THAT A NONCONFORMING USE HAD NOT BEEN DISCONTINUED OR ABANDONED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVERSED)/NONCONFORMING USE (ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS’ RULING THAT A NONCONFORMING USE HAD NOT BEEN DISCONTINUED OR ABANDONED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVERSED)

NO VARIANCE REQUIRED TO ALLOW CHURCH PROPERTY TO BE USED TO HOUSE HOMELESS PERSONS.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the proposed use of church property to house homeless persons did not require a variance:

Strictly religious uses and activities are more than prayer and sacrifice and all churches recognize that the area of their responsibility is broader than leading the congregation in prayer. . . . To limit a church to being merely a house of prayer and sacrifice would, in a large degree, be depriving the church of the opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and strengthening itself and the congregation” … . To that end, “[s]ervices to the homeless have been judicially recognized as religious conduct” … . Matter of Sullivan v Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Albany, 2016 NY Slip Op 07911, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

ZONING (NO VARIANCE REQUIRED TO ALLOW CHURCH PROPERTY TO BE USED TO HOUSE HOMELESS PERSONS)/CHURCH PROPERTY (ZONING, NO VARIANCE REQUIRED TO ALLOW CHURCH PROPERTY TO BE USED TO HOUSE HOMELESS PERSONS)/HOMELESS (ZONING, NO VARIANCE REQUIRED TO ALLOW CHURCH PROPERTY TO BE USED TO HOUSE HOMELESS PERSONS)

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ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

The Third Department determined all “rezoned” property-owners, deemed “necessary parties” by Supreme Court in this action to annul a local law rezoning property for industrial use. were, in fact, not “necessary parties.” The petition, which had been dismissed for failure to timely serve the newly-added “necessary parties,” was reinstated. The local law, which would allow a recycling center in a previously residential-agricultural zone, was challenged based upon an alleged failure to comply with the State Environment Quality Review Act:

The newly-added respondents were not necessary parties merely because the ordinance at issue affected their property rights. “‘[T]he absence of a necessary party may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, by any party or by the court on its own motion'” (Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Sulyman, 130 AD3d 1197, 1198 [2015], quoting Matter of Estate of Prospect v New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 13 AD3d 699, 700 [2004]). Given a court’s power to raise the issue, it is notable that the Court of Appeals and this state’s appellate courts, including this Court, have long entertained challenges to municipalities’ legislative actions in regard to zoning ordinances without requiring the joinder of every property owner whose rights are affected by the ordinance at issue … . ]). This has been true even when the ordinance at issue is one that, on its face, is likely to dramatically affect the property rights held by real property owners (see e.g. Matter of Wallach v Town of Dryden, 23 NY3d 728, 740 [2014]). Although this Court has, in limited cases, found property owners to be necessary parties in regard to legal challenges to municipal ordinances that affect the property owners’ rights, it has only done so in cases where the owners had obtained an actual approval pursuant to the challenged zoning ordinance that would be adversely impacted by a judgment annulling that ordinance … . Matter of Hudson Riv. Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v Town Bd. of The Town of Coeymans, 2016 NY Slip Op 07358, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/ZONING (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)

ZONING BOARD PROPERLY REJECTED APPLICATION TO EXTEND THE ONE-YEAR DEADLINE FOR A REBUILD OF A FIRE-DAMAGED, NON-CONFORMING HOME.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined the zoning board (ZBA) properly rejected petitioner’s application to rebuild a fire-damaged, non-conforming home after the statutory one-year period for a rebuild had passed. The unambiguous language of the town code provision supported the board’s action (therefore the action was not arbitrary and/or capricious):

The ZBA’s affirmance of the … denial of the complete application for a building permit was based on its interpretation of Town Code § 77-48(A) as then in effect. Since the interpretation of the terms of that section involves a pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, we do not defer to the ZBA’s interpretation, but instead make an independent review of the law … . We conclude that the ZBA correctly interpreted the then-current version of Town Code § 77-48(A). Indeed, the provision “could not be clearer” … ; it enunciated a strict one-year limit for completion of the rebuilding of a destroyed nonconforming residence. Thus, the ZBA’s affirmance of the denial of the … permit application was a correct interpretation of the law. The ZBA correctly concluded that it was not authorized to disregard that clear language. Matter of Warner v Town of Kent Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2016 NY Slip Op 07332, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

ZONING (ZONING BOARD PROPERLY REJECTED APPLICATION TO EXTEND THE ONE-YEAR DEADLINE FOR A REBUILD OF A FIRE-DAMAGED, NON-CONFORMING HOME)

ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE.

The Second Department determined petitioners, who own property adjacent to the property for which the contested variance was granted, did not have standing to challenge the variance. The challenge was deemed not to be within the “zone of interest” encompassed by the relevant statute. Any increase in parking related to the variance affected only the subject property, and not parking on the street:

… [A] petitioner whose property is adjacent to the property that is the subject of the administrative action may rely on a presumption of direct injury for purposes of standing … . Nevertheless, even a petitioner whose property is adjacent to the subject property must demonstrate that its alleged injury is within the “zone of interest” of the statute … . “Simply stated, a party must show that the in-fact injury of which it complains (its aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon it) falls within the zone of interests,’ or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted” … .

Here, we agree with the Supreme Court that the petitioners/plaintiffs did not allege any legally cognizable injury with respect to parking or traffic. Simply put, the only effect that the petitioners/plaintiffs allege the area variances will have with respect to parking is limited to parking actually on the subject property. There is no allegation of impact as to on-street parking … . Matter of Panevan Corp. v Town of Greenburgh, 2016 NY Slip Op 07327, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

ZONING (ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)/VARIANCE (ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)/STANDING (ZONING, ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTERESTS OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)/ZONE OF INTERESTS (ZONING, (ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)

ZONING BOARD DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE DURATIONAL LIMIT ON PERMIT FOR A NONCONFORMING USE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board did not have statutory authority to impose a durational limit on a permit allowing property in a residential zone to be used as a parking lot for the adjacent restaurant:

The Board did not have the authority to impose a durational limit on a permit granted pursuant to Town Code § 70-225(E). “Judicial review of a determination by a zoning board is generally limited to determining whether the action taken by the zoning board was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion” … . “[W]here the issue involves pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, deference [to the board] is not required” … .

“[C]onditions imposed by a Board of Zoning Appeals must be authorized by the zoning ordinance” … . “[I]f a zoning board imposes unreasonable or improper conditions, those conditions may be annulled although the variance is upheld” … .

Here, Town Code § 70-225(E) does not explicitly provide the Board with the authority to impose durational limits upon permits granted pursuant to that section. Thus, it was improper for the Board to include a five-year durational limit on a permit granted pursuant to that provision, and the durational limit must be annulled … . Matter of Citrin v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 2016 NY Slip Op 06827, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

ZONING (ZONING BOARD DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE DURATIONAL LIMIT ON PERMIT FOR A NONCONFORMING USE)

ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied petitioner’s application to renew a variance previously granted by the board. The Second Department held the board had adequately explained the reasons for the denial:

Where “a zoning board is [considering] an application that is substantially similar to a prior application that had been previously determined, the zoning board is required to provide a rational explanation for reaching a different result” … . “Where, however, a zoning board provides a rational explanation for reaching a different result on similar facts, the determination will not be viewed as either arbitrary or capricious” … . The zoning board “may refuse to duplicate previous error; it may change its views as to what is for the best interests of the [Town]; [or] it may give weight to slight differences which are not easily discernable” … .

The ZBA’s determination denying the petitioner’s applications to renew the use variance previously issued in 2007, and for a new use variance, was not illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion. With respect to renewal of the 2007 variance, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the ZBA’s findings of fact dated December 4, 2013, provided a rational basis for denying the petitioner’s application. The ZBA found, among other things, that the petitioner failed to demonstrate “unnecessary hardship” in accordance with Town Law § 267-b(2)(b). The fact that the ZBA previously temporarily approved the same application in 2007 did not relieve the petitioner of its evidentiary burdens in demonstrating “unnecessary hardship” for purposes of renewal of the use variance, or for purposes of seeking an additional use variance. As the ZBA determined, the petitioner failed to show, based on competent financial evidence, i.e., by dollars and cents proof, that it cannot yield a reasonable rate of return absent the requested use variances … . Matter of Monte Carlo 1, LLC v Weiss, 2016 NY Slip Op 06217, 2nd Dept 9-28-16

ZONING (ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS)/VARIANCE (ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS)

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USE OF SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCE FOR WEDDINGS, RECEPTIONS AND OTHER EVENTS VIOLATED THE ZONING ORDINANCE WHICH ALLOWED “ACCESSORY USE.”

The Third Department determined the use of a single family residence (called Highland Castle) for weddings, receptions and other events constituted a violation of the zoning ordinance, which allowed “accessory use” of residential property:

The ZBA [zoning board of appeals] found that, given the manner in which petitioner utilized and marketed Highlands Castle as a venue for weddings and other large social gatherings, the challenged use was neither subordinate nor customarily incidental to the primary single-family residential use of the property. On this record, we cannot say that such determination is either irrational or unreasonable. Petitioner insists that Highlands Castle is held out merely for residential rental use, yet the record belies such a claim. In offering Highlands Castle for rent, petitioner emphasized its availability for weddings, large parties and other social receptions. Notably, the property was marketed as available on a daily or even a “half-day” basis and was advertised upon a pricing structure specific to the type of event that may be of interest to the consumer and, in some instances, to the number of individuals that will be attending. The marketing of Highlands Castle thus evinces a clear intent to target a rental audience that sought more than just residential use of the property and, indeed, no evidence was presented that Highlands Castle had ever been rented out for use as a single-family residence. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Highlands Castle was rented eight times over the course of a roughly two-year period for large-scale events — including three weddings and an American Bar Association function. Further, given that the property is advertised for rent on a year-round basis without restriction as to availability, nothing prevents its regular use as an event venue on a more frequent basis than that which has previously occurred. Matter of Lavender v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of The Town of Bolton, 2016 NY Slip Op 05599, 3rd Dept 7-21-16

ZONING (USE OF SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCE FOR WEDDINGS, RECEPTIONS AND OTHER EVENTS VIOLATED THE ZONING ORDINANCE WHICH ALLOWED “ACCESSORY USE”)

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PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, CLOSE PROXIMITY IS NOT ENOUGH.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly found the petitioners did not have standing to challenge the approval of construction project by the zoning board. Although petitioners' property is in close proximity to the proposed project, the petitioners did not demonstrate any harm peculiar to them, as opposed to the community at large:

An allegation of close proximity may give rise to an inference of damage or injury that enables a nearby property owner to challenge a land use decision without proof of actual injury. However, this does not entitle the property owner to judicial review in every instance … . Rather, in addition to establishing that the effect of the proposed change is different from that suffered by the public generally, the petitioner must establish that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interests the statute protects … . Thus, “even where petitioner's premises are physically close to the subject property, an ad hoc determination may be required as to whether a particular petitioner itself has a legally protectable interest so as to confer standing” … . * * *

The Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioners failed to establish standing on the basis of alleged traffic impacts, impacts arising from issues of compliance, or community character impacts, as the petitioners failed to establish any harm distinct from that of the community at large … . Matter of CPD NY Energy Corp. v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 2016 NY Slip Op 03877, 2nd Dept 5-18-16

ZONING (PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, CLOSE PROXIMITY IS NOT ENOUGH)/LAND-USE (PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, CLOSE PROXIMITY IS NOT ENOUGH)/STANDING (ZONING, PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, CLOSE PROXIMITY IS NOT ENOUGH)/LAND-USE (PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, CLOSE PROXIMITY IS NOT ENOUGH)

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