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PLAINTIFF’S SOLE REMEDY FOR HIS ON THE JOB INJURY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GRAVELY INJURED AND THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT WITH HIS EMPLOYER TO CONTRIBUTE, INDEMNIFY OR INSURE; THE EMPLOYER’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured while acting within the scope of his employment. Workers’ Compensation, therefore, was his exclusive remedy unless he was gravely injured or there was agreement with the employer:

Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 prohibits third-party claims for contribution or indemnification against an employer unless the employee has sustained a “grave injury” or there is a written contract entered into prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had expressly agreed to contribution to or indemnification of the third-party claimant … .

Here, in support of its motion, A.B.C. Tank established, prima facie, that there was no written agreement between the parties that required it to contribute, indemnify, or procure insurance … . Further, A.B.C. Tank established, prima facie, that the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment and that the plaintiff’s injuries did not constitute a “grave injury” within the meaning of Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 … . McIntosh v Ronit Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01485, Second Dept 3-4-20

 

CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO SIMULTANEOUSLY RECEIVE AN AWARD FOR A SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE AND A PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant was entitled to simultaneously receive an award for a schedule loss of use (SLU) and a permanent partial disability classification:

… Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) permits a simultaneous SLU award and nonschedule classification for impairments that arise out of the same work-related accident where the claimant has returned to work at preinjury wages. * * *

… [W]hen a claimant who has sustained a permanent impairment to a member has returned to work at preinjury wages, it is mere speculation that an award will ever be made for nonschedule injuries arising from the same accident. Although the Board may be appropriately concerned about the possibility of double payment or recovery if and when a claimant experiences actual lost wages, this circumstance was provided for within Matter of Taher v Yiota Taxi, Inc. (162 AD3d at 1290 n 2). Additionally, the withholding of an SLU award in favor of the “virtual banking” of nonschedule cap weeks adds unnecessary complexity in the event that a claimant suffers a death that is unrelated to the established sites of injury … .  We further note that the Board’s position strongly incentivizes injured claimants with schedule and nonschedule permanent impairments arising from the same work-related accident who are capable of returning to work at preinjury wages not to do so in order to collect a nonschedule award. Matter of Arias v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01429, Third Dept 2-27-20

 

THE PERIODS OF TIME WHEN CLAIMANT WAS DEEMED TEMPORARILY PERMANENTLY DISABLED AFTER SURGERY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COUNTED AGAINST THE 300-WEEK CAP FOR HIS PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, reversing the Worker’s Compensation Board, determined the periods of time when claimant was deemed temporarily totally disabled following surgery should not have been counted against the 300-week cap for his permanent partial disability payments. The Third Department also held that a claimant need not seek reclassification before the exhaustion of the permanent partial disability award, as the Board had ruled:

We note that the WCLJs [Workers’ Compensation Law Judges] classified claimant as temporarily totally disabled following his two surgeries, which findings were supported by medical proof. Therefore, the Board did not comply with the statute when it counted the weeks during which claimant was classified as temporarily totally disabled against the cap for his nonschedule award for a permanent partial disability. Instead, the duration of his permanent partial disability nonschedule award (the running of the 300 weeks) should have been tolled while claimant was classified with a temporary total disability.  …

… [T]he durational benefit caps for nonschedule awards under Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w) apply to “all compensation payable under this paragraph” … . However, benefits paid during a period of temporary total disability are payable under a separate paragraph, section 15 (2) … . * * * Accordingly, temporary total disability benefits do not count towards the benefit caps for nonschedule awards under Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w). Matter of Sanchez v Jacobi Med. Ctr., 2020 NY Slip Op 01235, Third Dept 2-20-20

 

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CORRECTION OFFICER NOT ENTITLED TO TWO-YEAR LEAVE OF ABSENCE; THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE FINDING PETITIONER’S PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION WITH AN INMATE WAS NOT AN ASSAULT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined petitioner correction officer was not entitled to a two-year workers’ compensation leave of absence because there was support in the record for the finding petitioner was not assaulted. Petitioner was injured trying to prevent an inmate from swallowing contraband:

… [R]espondent advised petitioner that, pursuant to Civil Service Law § 71, his employment would be terminated … because his absence from employment … exceeded one cumulative year. Petitioner asserted through counsel that he was entitled to a two-year leave of absence under Civil Service Law § 71 because his injuries resulted from an assault sustained during the performance of his duties. * * *

Pursuant to Civil Service Law § 71, an employee who “has been separated from [his or her] service by reason of a disability resulting from occupational injury” is “entitled to a leave of absence for at least one year.” If, however, “an employee has been separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from an assault sustained in the course of his or her employment, he or she shall be entitled to a leave of absence for at least two years” … . * * *

Although the record demonstrates that the parolee was combative and refused orders to stop resisting and to surrender the contraband, there is no indication that the parolee directed any intentional physical act of violence toward petitioner before, during or after petitioner’s application of the body hold. Given the absence of such record evidence, respondent’s determination that petitioner’s injuries were not the result of an assault sustained during the course of employment had a sound basis in reason and, thus, was rational … . Matter of Froehlich v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2020 NY Slip Op 00652, Third Dept 1-30-20

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THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO AND DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS; THEREFORE THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD’S FINDING THAT THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT WAS PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER WAS NOT BINDING ON THE THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that third-party defendant I & G Group was plaintiff’s employer was not binding on the third-party plaintiffs because the third-party plaintiffs did not participate in the Workers’ Compensation proceedings. Therefore the matter has to be litigated and I & G Group’s motion for summary judgment should should not have been granted:

The Court of Appeals has … recognized that a decision by the worker’s compensation board may not be binding on parties who do not participate in its hearings. * * * “[U]nless the Legislature expands the definition of parties in interest, the unfortunate result will be that a duplicative proceeding must be held and the issue of compensability adjudicated anew because defendants never had a full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the question” … .

Here, because it is undisputed that appellants [third-party plaintiffs] were not given notice of the worker’s compensation hearing, and were not afforded the opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses, their third-party claims, in which they challenge the identity of plaintiff’s employer, should not have been dismissed as precluded by the board’s prior determination of that issue … . Martinez v 250 W. 43 Owner, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 00058, First Dept 1-7-20

 

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CLAIMANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AN UNLIMITED MEDICAL RELEASE AS OPPOSED TO A LIMITED RELEASE CONCERNING ONLY THOSE AREAS OF HIS BODY AT ISSUE IN THE CLAIM FOR BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant was not required to provide an unlimited medical release. Claimant should have been required to provide a release limited to those areas of his body which were at issue in the claim for benefits:

The Board’s regulations provide that a limited release is a “limited authorization to obtain relevant medical records regarding the prior medical history of the body part or illness at issue” (12 NYCRR 300.37 [b] [1] [iii]). It is applicable “if the claimant files a completed employee claim form and indicates on the form that he or she had a prior injury to the same body part or similar illness to the one(s) listed on the form” (12 NYCRR 300.37 [b] [1] [iii]). There is no question that, prior to filing his claim, claimant received medical treatment from various physicians for the same sites of injury dating back to at least 2011. It is evident from the record and the briefs that both parties agree that the employer is entitled to claimant’s past medical records for the claimed sites. That said, claimant maintains that the Board erred in requiring him to sign an open-ended HIPAA release, without limiting that release to treatment records pertaining to the claimed sites. Although the employer would certainly be entitled to the medical records of all providers, once identified, who treated the claimed sites, the fact remains that claimant was only obligated to provide a limited release for those providers. As such, we agree with claimant that the Board erred in directing him to provide an unlimited medical release. Matter of Trusewicz v Delta Envtl., 2019 NY Slip Op 09336, Third Dept 12-26-19

 

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PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DRIVER OF THE TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH STRUCK HIM WHEN HE WAS STANDING IN THE ROADWAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT NO LONGER NEED BE SHOWN; OTHER ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION INCLUDE THE EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY, THE TRUCK RENTAL COMPANIES’ LIABILITY, THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff police officer was entitled to summary judgment against the driver of the tractor trailer which struck the officer who was standing in the roadway both under a common law negligence theory and under General Municipal Law 205-e. The court dealt with several other issues including: (1) whether a second police officer was engaged in an emergency operation, giving rise to the reckless disregard standard, when he stopped to assist the plaintiff who had made a traffic stop (the answer is no); (2) whether the second officer was liable based upon the position of his car (the answer is no, the car furnished a condition for the accident but was not the cause); (3) whether the injured officer’s recovery was confined to Workers’ Compensation (there is a question of fact whether the injury was “grave”); (4) whether the Graves Amendment protected the truck rental companies (the answer is yes); (5) whether vicarious liability applies to the truck driver’s employer (there is a question of fact on that issue). With respect to the common law negligence and the General Municipal Law 205-e causes of action, the court wrote:

… [T]he plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate that the injured plaintiff was free from comparative negligence in order to obtain summary judgment on the issue of Burke’s [the truck driver’s] liability on the first cause of action [negligence]. * * *

When the light changed, Burke began his left turn onto northbound Midland Avenue. Prior to beginning his turn, Burke was aware that there was a police officer conducting a traffic stop on foot and a police car parked on the northbound side of Midland Avenue. Although Burke believed he could make the turn safely, the rear of the trailer hit the injured plaintiff. * * *

The plaintiffs also established … Burke’s liability as to … a violation of General Municipal Law § 205-e. … [T]hat statute permits a police officer to bring a tort claim for injuries sustained “while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by . . . superior officer[s]” where such injuries occur “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” … . In order to recover under the statute, “a police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties” … .

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) requires a driver to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any . . . pedestrian.” Here, the unrebutted evidence established a prima facie violation of § 1146(a), as it demonstrated that Burke failed to exercise due care to avoid hitting the injured plaintiff. Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 09251, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

REGULATION LIMITING BRIEFS TO EIGHT PAGES IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND THE LONGER BRIEF WAS NOT AN ADEQUATE GROUND FOR REJECTING THE EMPLOYER’S APPLICATION AND APPEAL (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department determined the regulation limiting the length of briefs to eight pages was arbitrary and capricious. The employer’s application had been rejected solely because the brief was longer than eight pages:

The difficulty here is that there is no defined standard as to what explanation the Board would consider adequate. Worse yet, the regulation, by its express terms, does not authorize the Board to dismiss an application for Board review where a brief longer than eight pages is submitted without an adequate explanation. In such an instance, the regulation simply specifies that the brief “will not be considered” (12 NYCRR 300.13 [b] [1] [i]). Although the regulation also provides that an application may be denied “when the applicant . . . does not comply with prescribed formatting. . . requirements” (12 NYCRR 300.13 [b] [4] [i]), the filing of a brief is discretionary, not mandatory. As such, we find that the Board acted arbitrarily in dismissing the employer’s application for Board review. We further conclude that it would not be reasonable in the first instance for the Board to reject an oversized brief outright for to do so would undermine the role of counsel. We find this aspect of the regulation flawed for there is simply no safety valve that would allow an applicant to seek permission to file a lengthier brief without jeopardizing the ability to submit a legal analysis supportive of the application for Board review … . As such, we find that the regulation is unreasonable with respect to the oversized brief exception and must be rejected as arbitrary and capricious. The matter must be remitted to the Board for further proceedings. Matter of Daniels v City of Rochester, 2019 NY Slip Op 08902, Second Dept 12-12-19

 

ABSENT A FINDING OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY, CLAIMANT NEED NOT SHOW ATTACHMENT TO THE LABOR MARKET AND IS ENTITLED TO RELY ON HER CHIROPRACTOR’S OPINION SHE IS TEMPORARILY TOTALLY DISABLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant was not required to show attachment to the labor market because there had not been a finding of permanent partial disability:

Claimant sought review by the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that she was not required to demonstrate attachment to the labor market because, absent a finding that she had sustained a permanent partial disability, she was entitled to rely upon her chiropractor’s opinion that she was temporarily totally disabled. …

Claimant’s obligation to demonstrate attachment to the labor market is predicated — in the first instance — upon a finding of a permanent partial disability … . Matter of Bowers v New York City Tr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 08748, Second Dept 12-5-19

 

DISMISSAL OF A CLAIM BASED UPON THE PRECLUSION OF AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION (IME) REPORT DID NOT CONSTITUTE LITIGATION OF THE CLAIM; CLAIMANT WAS ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE CLAIM BASED UPON A NEW IME REPORT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined that the dismissal of the claim based upon the preclusion of the 2015 Independent Medical Examination (IME) report was not a litigation on the merits and claimant was not precluded from further consideration of the claim based upon a new 2017 IME report:

Claimant contends that the Board erred in denying his request for further action without considering … 2017 IME report on the ground that the claim had already been litigated and disallowed. We agree. By disallowing the claim in its prior decision based upon the record as it existed after the preclusion of … 2015 IME report, and declaring that no further direction was planned at the time, the Board did not deny the claim outright … . As such, the Board’s prior decision did not preclude claimant from submitting further medical evidence of causally-related consequential injuries (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 123 … ). Accordingly, the Board’s decision that the claim for causally-related consequential injuries was already litigated and that claimant could not submit further medical evidence in support thereof was in error, as was its decision denying reconsideration, and they must be reversed. Matter of Galatro v Slomins, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 53955, Third Dept 11-27-19

 

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