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Use of Church Property Sufficient to Maintain Tax-Exempt Status

The Third Department determined the City (respondents) did not demonstrate church-owned property was no longer used for religious purposes.  Therefore the City could not revoke the tax-exempt status of the property:

Although the burden of proof in tax exemption matters ordinarily lies with the party seeking an exemption, a municipality seeking to withdraw an existing exemption bears the burden of proving that the real property in question has become subject to taxation … . Here, although it is undisputed that petitioners continue to be organized exclusively for tax-exempt religious purposes, respondents contend that their properties are not entitled to tax exemptions because they are no longer “used primarily for the furtherance of [religious] purposes” … . To meet their burden in this regard, respondents contend that statements made by the Diocese establish that the properties no longer function as churches, that regular worship services and religious activities that were formerly conducted on the properties now take place elsewhere, and that the parcels are now investment properties being marketed for sale for the non-exempt purpose of generating income.

… Petitioners … submitted affidavits from church officials stating that both properties continue to be used for religious services conducted to serve the spiritual needs of the parish faithful, in the form of monthly morning prayers on one of the properties and periodic prayer services that include scripture readings and communion services on the other.  Contrary to respondents’ contention that such occasional or periodic use cannot be deemed to be primary,”[i]t is the actual or physical use of the property” that determines whether it is exempt from real property taxation … . Here, the record reveals that petitioners’ only actual or physical use of their properties is for religious purposes. Absent any showing by respondents that the properties are used for anything other than the religious purposes for which petitioners were organized, the mere fact that this use is now less frequent does not alter the properties’ tax-exempt status … . The record also includes a letter from a Diocese official to the Assessor averring that the properties are used to store religious artifacts and fixtures. Matter of St Williams Church of Troy…, v Dimitriadis…, 516532, 3rd Dept 3-6-14

 

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Application to Vacate Default Judgment in Tax Foreclosure Proceeding Governed by Two-Year Statute of Limitations (Under the Facts, the One-Month Statute Did Not Apply)/Deed Purporting to Transfer Property from Religious Organization Invalid for Failure to Comply with the Religious Corporation Law/Notice of Tax Foreclosure Sufficient Even Though Actual Owner Not Notified

The Third Department determined petitioner’s application to set aside a tax foreclosure judgment was timely, but determined the application was properly denied because the notice of the foreclosure proceeding was adequate, even though petitioner, the actual owner of the property, was not notified. Petitioner, a religious organization, had transferred the property by deed to Forbes, a minister, in 1985. Forbes paid property taxes for several years, but when the payments ceased the county moved to foreclose, naming Forbes as the owner. It turned out that the deed to Forbes was invalid because the transfer did not comply with the Religious Corporation Law. The actual owner, petitioner, was not notified of the foreclosure proceedings. In affirming the judgment of foreclosure, the court discussed the appropriate statute of limitations under the facts, the property-transfer requirements of the Religious Corporation Law, and the tax-foreclosure notice requirements:

Initially, Supreme Court erred in determining that petitioner’s application was untimely. Unlike a motion to vacate a default judgment in a tax foreclosure proceeding, which “may not be brought later than one month after entry of the judgment” (RPTL 1131…), a person or entity challenging the validity of a deed transferred in connection with a tax foreclosure proceeding faces a two-year statute of limitations (see RPTL 1137…). As petitioner was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding and now seeks to set aside the judgment on the basis that respondent failed to provide notice to the rightful owner, the application was timely (see RPTL 1137).The 1985 deed to Forbes was invalid. A religious corporation shall not sell “any of its real property without applying for and obtaining leave of the court” pursuant to N-PCL 511 (Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1]…). Under N-PCL 511 (b), the Attorney General must be notified before any sale may be finalized. Petitioner did not seek court approval in 1985 or thereafter (see Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1], [9]), nor was the Attorney General notified of the transfer of the property. Where court approval is not obtained for the transfer of real property from a religious corporation, the conveyance is invalid … . Accordingly, the 1985 deed was invalid and Forbes should not have had any legal right to the property. * * *When determining the reasonableness of the taxing authority’s attempts to provide notice to interested parties, the court may take into account the conduct of such parties … Here, petitioner indicated that it intended to convey the property to Forbes – its then-minister – in 1985 and was only unsuccessful due to their lack of legal knowledge. Additionally, petitioner did not take any action against Forbes to regain title, despite the deed having been filed for nearly 27 years at the time the foreclosure proceeding was commenced. Under the circumstances, including respondent’s provision of proper statutory notice to the owner of record, respondent complied with due process and satisfied its obligation of searching for interested parties, and petitioner has not demonstrated that any additional steps or more exhaustive search was required here… . Matter of City of Hudson…, 516690, 3rd Dept 2-27-14

 

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County Could Not Shift Obligation to Pay Property Tax Refunds to Taxing Districts

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, which includes extensive historical, theoretical, constitutional and statutory discussions of the issues involved, the Court of Appeals determined Nassau County could not shift its obligation to pay real property tax refunds from the county to its individual taxing districts. The county’s attempt to supersede a special state tax law exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority:

As limited by the State and Federal Constitutions' protection of individual rights and restriction of State power, the State Constitution establishes the State government as the preeminent sovereign of New York, and the three coordinate branches of the State government may exercise the entire legislative, executive and judicial power of the State, as entrusted to them by the people … .Given that the authority of political subdivisions flows from the State government and is, in a sense, an exception to the State government's otherwise plenary power, the lawmaking power of a county or other political subdivision “can be exercised only to the extent it has been delegated by the State”… .. Furthermore, because the Constitution expressly imbues the State government, rather than any locality, with “[t]he power of taxation” (NY Const art XVI, § 1), State law governs the tax field unless the State Legislature or the Constitution unambiguously delegates certain taxation authority to a political subdivision… . Matter of Baldwin Union Free School District v County of Nassau, 9, CtApp 2-18-14

 

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Tax Lien Foreclosure Upheld Despite Alleged Lack of Notice

The Third Department determined a motion to vacate a tax lien foreclosure was properly denied in the face of claimed lack of notice, finding the motion untimely and finding the statutory notice requirements had been met and the owner had been afforded due process:

Respondent’s motion to vacate was untimely as it was brought more than one month after entry of the judgment of foreclosure (see RPTL 1131…).  Notably, “the statute of limitations set forth in RPTL 1131 applies even where, as here, the property owner asserts that he or she was not notified of the foreclosure proceeding”… . …

“[N]otice shall be deemed received unless both the certified mailing and the ordinary first class mailing are returned by the United States postal service within [45] days after being mailed,” and the foreclosing agent is required to seek an alternative mailing address for the property owner only when both such notices are returned (RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i] …).  Accordingly, inasmuch as the notice sent by first class mail to respondent at the 8th Avenue address was not returned, such notice was deemed received …, and “petitioner was not obligated to take additional steps to notify respondent of the foreclosure proceeding”… .

…”[D]ue process does not require actual notice by the property owner, only reasonable efforts to provide notice under the circumstances” …, and petitioner discharged its obligations in this regard by fulfilling the requirements of RPTL 1125 … .  Finally, we note that”[o]wnership carries responsibilities” …, which includes an obligation to apprise the tax enforcing officer of a change in address (see RPTL 1125 [1] [d]…).  There is nothing in the record to suggest that respondent fulfilled that obligation here.  Simply put, “respondent was responsible for protecting his ownership interests and chargeable with notice that failure to pay his taxes could result in foreclosure” … . Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Sullivan…, 516658, 3rd Dept 11-27-13

 

Tax Exempt Status of Non-Profit Public Parking Lots Should Not Have Been Revoked

The Second Department ruled the tax exempt status of non-profit public parking lots should not have been revoked:

“The crucial issue in determining whether property is tax exempt pursuant to [RPTL 420-a] is whether the primary or principal use of the property is a tax-exempt purpose of its owner” … . The general rule is that the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that a property is tax exempt … . However, where, as here, a municipality seeks ” to withdraw a previously granted tax exemption, the municipality bears the burden of proving that the real property is subject to taxation'” … . * * *

Here, the respondents failed to meet their burden of proof for revocation of the tax exemption on the grounds that the petitioners’ activity did not conform to a charitable purpose within the meaning of RPTL 420-a. Absent a precise statutory definition of “charitable purpose,” courts have interpreted this category to include relief of poverty, advancement of governmental and municipal purposes, and other objectives that are beneficial to the community… . Matter of Greater Jamaica Dev Corp v NYC Tax Comm, 2013 NY Slip Op 07972, 2nd Dept 11-27-13

 

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Property Owned by Religious Group Entitled to Real Property Tax Exemption

The Third Department reversed Supreme Court and determined a religious group (Cybeline Revival) had demonstrated its property was used primarily for religious and charitable purposes, and, therefore, the group was entitled to a real property tax exemption:

…[P]etitioner met its burden to demonstrate that it uses the property primarily for its religious and charitable purposes … .  In accord with Supreme Court’s determination, respondents contend that the property was used primarily to provide cooperative housing because, in essence, the few adherents of the Cybeline Revival have in effect just continued the property’s former residential use… .  However, these arguments contend that there is some threshold amount of activity and public benefit that must be demonstrated, which confuses the standard that is simply whether the property was used primarily for religious and charitable purposes … .  The testimony established that the Cybeline Revival stresses communal living among its adherents, as well as providing hospitality and charity to those in need, and the members consider this property the home of their faith … .  They also conduct religious and charitable activities throughout the property on a regular basis.  Accordingly, petitioner has satisfied the legal requirements in order to receive a real property tax exemption for 2009, 2010 and 2011 … .  Matter of Maetreum of Cybele, Magna Mater Inc v McCoy…, 515598, 3rd Dept 11-21-13

 

“Assessor’s Formula” for Determining Property Tax Assessment for Golf Course Approved

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, the Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s approach to the determination of real property tax assessments for a private, not-for-profit golf course.  The country club challenged the tax assessment imposed by the respondents (the board of assessors, et al). After a trial, Supreme Court adopted the assessment method used by the country club’s expert, called the “assessor’s formula,” rather than the respondents’ “triple net lease” method (which had previously been approved by the Second Department).  The opinion has an extensive description and discussion of the valuation techniques used by both experts and ultimately determined there is no reason to rigidly mandate that a particular valuation technique be used in all cases:

Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, we conclude that there is no basis to categorically preclude the application of this approach [the “assessor’s method] to the valuation of golf courses. Further, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the methodology employed by the Country Club yielded a fair market value, and we discern no reason to disturb the Supreme Court’s determination on appeal. Matter of Hempstead Country Club v Board of Assessors, 2013 NY Slip Op 07178, 2nd Dept 11-6-13

 

Failure to Serve Superintendent of Schools in Accordance with RPTL Required Dismissal of Property Tax Certiorari Proceeding

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly vacated an order which directed the school district to repay back taxes for 2006 through 2010 on the ground that the superintendent of schools was not properly served in the tax certiorari proceeding:

It is undisputed that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of RPTL 708(3) which provide, in pertinent part, that in a tax certiorari proceeding, within 10 days after service upon the Assessor, “one copy of the petition and notice shall be mailed . . . to the superintendent of schools of any school district within which any of part of the real property on which the assessment to be reviewed is located.” RPTL 708(3) further provides that “[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of this section shall result in the dismissal of the petition, unless excused for good cause shown.” RPTL 708(3) requires a petitioner to show good cause to excuse its failure to notify the appropriate school district, and not merely to demonstrate the absence of prejudice to that school district … . Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, it failed to establish good cause for its failure to serve the petitions on the School District … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioner’s cross motion [for leave to make late service] (see CPLR 2004, 2005; RPTL 708[3]…). Matter of Cornwall Yacht Club, Inc. v Assessor, 2013 NY Slip Op 07039 [110 AD3d 1070], 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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Violation of Zoning Ordinance Precludes Property Tax Exemption

The Fourth Department affirmed the determination the petitioner (a hospital) was not entitled to a property tax exemption because the use of the property was in violation of a zoning law.  After noting that a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7, and not an Article 78 proceeding, is the proper vehicle for challenging a tax assessment, the Fourth Department wrote:

The fact that petitioner used the subject property for “hospital purposes” as that term is used in the RPTL is not contested (RPTL 420-a [5]). Nevertheless, a property owner who uses its property for exempt purposes in violation of an applicable zoning law is prohibited from receiving a tax exemption pursuant to RPTL 420-a… . Matter of Geneva General Hospital v Assessor of Town of Geneva…,559, 4th Dept 7-5-13

 

Petitioner Did Not Demonstrate Diminution in Value Related to Presence of Lead Paint Re: Tax Assessments

In affirming the tax assessment of residential properties in Syracuse, the Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined that the petitioner did not make a sufficient showing of the diminution of property values by the presence of lead paint:

In this Real Property Tax Law article 7 proceeding challenging the tax assessments of certain residential properties located in Syracuse, New York, petitioner contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the impact of contamination — specifically, lead paint — upon the market value of the properties. We hold that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity that attaches to the tax assessments of the properties by the City of Syracuse. That is, petitioner failed to proffer substantial evidence demonstrating a diminution in market value to his properties caused by the mere presence of lead paint. * * *

Where the trial court declined to credit petitioner’s appraisal reports, and the record does not demonstrate a diminution in market value caused by environmental contamination or hazards, petitioner failed to meet his burden and there is no basis to disturb the presumption of validity in the City’s favor. Matter of Roth v City of Syracuse, No 110, CtApp, 6-11-13

 

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