You are here: / Real Estate
,

ANALYTICAL CRITERIA FOR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, WHERE DEFENDANT SUBMITS EVIDENCE, CLEARLY EXPLAINED; PLAINTIFF IS NOT PENALIZED FOR NOT SUBMITTING EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION; BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS TO PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined the complaint stated a cause of action for specific performance of a real estate contract. The court offered a clear explanation of the analytical criteria to be used when defendant submits evidence in support of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Here, the fact that plaintiff submitted no evidence in opposition was of no consequence. The evidence submitted by defendant was not sufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of law, the complaint did not state a cause of action:

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), “the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus” … .

“A court is . . . permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)” … . However, “on a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the burden never shifts to the nonmoving party to rebut a defense asserted by the moving party” …, and a plaintiff “will not be penalized because he [or she] has not made an evidentiary showing in support of his [or her] complaint” … . When evidentiary material is considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment, “the criterion is whether the [plaintiff] has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the [plaintiff] to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it . . . dismissal should not eventuate” … .

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the complaint adequately alleged a cause of action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property. E & D Group, LLC v Vialet, 2015 NY Slip Op 09400, 2nd Dept 12-23-15

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS TO PLAINTIFF EVEN IF DEFENDANT SUBMITS EVIDENCE)/MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS TO PLAINTIFF EVEN IF DEFENDANT SUBMITS EVIDENCE)

, ,

Fraud Allegations In Connection With a Real Estate Sale Must Be Analyzed within the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ complaint alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment in connection with a real estate purchase should have been dismissed. It was alleged the defendant made misrepresentations re: termite damage and mold. The court explained that allegations of fraud in a real estate transaction must be analyzed within the doctrine of caveat emptor. Here the plaintiffs were aware that the house had been treated for wood destroying insects, an inspection report had been issued, and plaintiffs had conducted their own inspection. The defendant made no representations on which plaintiffs relied and did not actively conceal the condition of the property or thwart plaintiffs’ efforts to discover damage:

“In an action to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff must prove a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury” …  . However, in the context of real estate transactions, a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation must be analyzed within the doctrine of caveat emptor. ” New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no duty on the seller or the seller’s agent to disclose any information concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller or the seller’s agent which constitutes active concealment'” … . “If however, some conduct (i.e., more than mere silence) on the part of the seller rises to the level of active concealment, a seller may have a duty to disclose information concerning the property” … . * * *

” To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for active concealment, the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller’s agents thwarted the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his [or her] responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor'” … . Here, the defendant showed, prima facie, that she did not thwart the plaintiffs’ efforts to discover any termite or mold damage. Indeed, the plaintiffs conducted an inspection of the property for the purpose of determining if there were wood destroying insects, and they themselves saw some evidence that the property had been treated for insect activity during their … visit, but undertook no further investigation … . The mere fact that the defendant undertook previous repair work on the house is not tantamount to concealment of a defective condition.  Hecker v Paschke, 2015 NY Slip Op 08385, 2nd Dept 11-18-15

 

, ,

Question of Fact Whether Real Estate Broker “Launched an Instrument of Harm” In an Apartment Being Shown to Plaintiff; Evidence of Custom Not Enough to Shift the Burden of Proof in Premises Liability Action

The First Department determined defendant real estate broker’s (Prudential/Leonhardt’s) motion for summary judgment in a personal injury case should not have been granted. As an apartment was being shown by the real estate broker, plaintiff tripped and fell when her foot became tangled in a drapery cord which was on the floor. The broker (Leonhardt) submitted evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment stating that she did not remember whether she opened the drapes on the day in question, and further stating that her habit was to hang the cord up when she did open the drapes. The court held the broker’s evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the broker did not “launch an instrument of harm,” i.e., cause the cord to be on the floor. Therefore, the contract between the broker and the owner of the apartment could have given rise to a duty of care owed by the broker to the plaintiff:

We thus turn to the … potential predicate for finding third-party tort liability, which rests on whether Prudential or Leonhardt launched an instrument of harm. Since they were the movants for summary judgment, Prudential and Leonhardt had the prima facie burden of demonstrating that there were no triable issues of fact and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue … . Leonhardt’s deposition testimony, and her affidavit in support of the motion, established that it was possible that she opened the drapes before the accident occurred, although she was not able to state with a reasonable degree of certainty that she did. If indeed she had opened the drapes, Leonhardt surmised, she would have wrapped the cord around the hook, because that is what she always did. However, evidence of a particular custom is insufficient to shift the burden in a premises liability case, because the defendant is required to proffer “specific evidence as to [her] activities on the day of the accident” … . Here, since Leonhardt had no specific recollection concerning the opening of the drapes on the day of the accident, she and Prudential were unable to eliminate the possibility that they were responsible for the hazardous placement of the cord on the floor. Accordingly, they failed to meet their prima facie burden, and the court should have denied their motion for summary judgment. Stimmel v Osherow, 2015 NY Slip Op 08340, 1st Dept 11-17-15

 

, ,

Environmental Clean-Up Indemnification Agreement Between Seller and Buyer of Property Triggered by Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC’s) “Potentially Responsible Party (PRP)” Letter to Buyer

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the environmental clean-up indemnification agreement between the seller (Pyne) and buyer (Remet) of property was triggered by the Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC’s) letter to Remet. Although the letter referred to Remet as a “potentially” responsible party (PRP), the letter required that Remet enter into a consent agreement (re: the clean-up) with the DEC or, if no consent agreement is executed within 30 days, pay for the clean-up done by the DEC:

The plain language of the governing contractual indemnity provision, together with the language of the PRP letter and the surrounding facts and circumstances, demonstrate that Remet was entitled to indemnification because it was “required,” within the meaning of the sales agreement, to act in response to the PRP letter. The PRP letter stated that it pertained to an “Urgent Legal Matter,” indicated that a prompt reply was “necessary,” and set forth the consequences that would flow from Remet’s refusal to act. Regardless of whether Remet was designated a potentially responsible party or a responsible party, the letter demanded either a consent order or payment, and any language indicating that Remet’s response was voluntary must be read in terms of those demands. In other words, the PRP letter — by its terms — effectively marked the beginning of a “legal” process against Remet pursuant to the ECL, in which DEC expressly sought recovery from Remet for any amounts expended in remediating the [the site].

Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the indemnification clause include the parties’ awareness that, because the [site] was listed as an inactive hazardous waste site, the purchaser of the property at issue here risked incurring substantial expenses, and that Pyne accordingly deposited a large sum in escrow to cover at least a portion of those potential expenses. Remet Corp. v Estate of Pyne, 2015 NY Slip Op 07575, CtApp 10-20-15

 

, ,

The Absence of Plaintiff’s (Buyer’s) Attorney’s Explicit Unconditional Approval of the Purchase Contract Invalidated the Contract, Despite Plaintiff’s Desire to Go Through with the Purchase

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that an explicit (not implied) unconditional attorney approval of a real estate contract is a necessary pre-requisite for a valid contract. Here plaintiff’s attorney had approved the contract on the condition that an environmental warranty be provided by the sellers, a condition which was never met or explicitly waived. Despite plaintiff’s desire to go through with the purchase, defendant-sellers’ attorney correctly determined there was no valid contract of sale because plaintiff’s attorney never explicitly unconditionally approved it:

As the Court of Appeals has stated, “[c]larity and predictability are particularly important” in the area of law dealing with attorney approval of real estate contracts … . Here, we conclude that, although plaintiff could have unilaterally waived the environmental conditions that [his attorney] placed on his approval of the contract inasmuch as those conditions benefitted only him …, neither [of plaintiff’s attorneys] clearly and unequivocally did so. Thus, the contract was never unconditionally approved by plaintiff’s attorneys. * * *

“[C]onsiderations of clarity, predictability, and professional responsibility weigh against reading an implied limitation into the attorney approval contingency” … . If [plaintiff’s attorney] intended to waive the conditions placed … on … approval of the contract, he should have done so expressly and not left anything for inference, or he should have stated that he, as plaintiff’s counsel, unconditionally approved the contract as proposed by defendants. Because he failed to do so, we conclude that there was not a valid contract between the parties and that the court erred in directing defendants to sell the property to plaintiffs. Pohlman v Madia, 2015 NY Slip Op 07379, 4th Dept 10-9-15

 

,

The Purchasers’ Purported Retraction of an Earlier Repudiation of the Purchase Contract Was Not “Bona Fide” Because It Imposed a Condition for the Retraction Which Was Not Contemplated by the Purchase Contract—Sellers Entitled to Keep $365,000 Downpayment Based Upon Purchasers’ Failure to Close

The First Department, over an extensive dissent by Justice Saxe, determined that the defendants, who had entered an agreement to purchase plaintiffs’ condominium, were not justified in repudiating the agreement based upon on-going “firestopping” work in the condominium-building, and, even if the agreement had been effectively repudiated, the purported retraction of the repudiation was not “bona fide.”  Therefore, the plaintiffs-sellers were entitled to keep the purchasers’ $365,000 downpayment based upon purchasers’ failure to close. The issue on appeal came down to whether the plaintiffs-sellers breached a paragraph of the agreement which required them to clear the unit of any code violations of which the plaintiffs had been notified in writing by the condominium board of managers. The majority determined no such notice had been given to the plaintiffs-sellers. The majority further determined the defendants’ purported retraction of the repudiation was not “bona fide” because it was conditioned on proof of the completion of the firestopping work, thereby imposing a condition not contemplated by the contract:

… [D]efendants point to no provision in the contract that justifies their initial purported reason for canceling the contract, which was that it threatened the safety of themselves and their children. Nor do they claim that plaintiffs somehow prevented them from learning of the firestopping issue. To the contrary, the contract itself referred expressly to a … notice from the board of managers that discussed the status of the then ongoing firestopping project. This was sufficient to place defendants on notice of a potential issue that might have given them pause to execute an agreement in which they acknowledged they were accepting the unit as is.

Because defendants had no right to insist that the firestopping issue be resolved as a condition to closing, their “retraction” of the purported repudiation was ineffective. In order to be effective, a retraction of a contract repudiation must be bona fide … . Defendants’ acceptance of plaintiffs’ offer to schedule a closing was not bona fide, because it was conditioned on plaintiffs’ provision of documents and information establishing to defendants’ satisfaction that the firestopping had been completed. We disagree with the dissent that the letter from defendants’ counsel conditionally retracting the repudiation creates an issue of fact as to whether it was bona fide. That letter unquestionably adhered to defendants’ position, which had supported the initial repudiation, that plaintiffs had a contractual obligation to ensure proper firestopping in the apartment before delivering the deed. The clear implication of the letter was that, if plaintiffs could not establish to defendants’ complete satisfaction that the firestopping work had been performed, defendants would once again refuse to close. As stated above, this position was untenable, and clearly, contrary to the dissent’s view, sought to insert an additional material term or condition into the contract. Again, nothing in the contract required plaintiffs to perform any firestopping, and plaintiffs were entitled to view defendants’ continued insistence on proof that they had done so as an justified refusal to perform under the agreement. Beinstein v Navani, 2015 NY Slip Op 06403, 1st Dept 8-4-15

 

,

Purchase Contract Properly Converted to a “Time Is of the Essence” Contract

In affirming the judgment awarded plaintiff in this breach of contract action, the Third Department noted that a “non time of the essence” real estate purchase contract can be converted to a “time of the essence” contract by giving the buyer clear, unequivocal notice and a reasonable time to perform, as was done by the seller here. 12 Baker Hill Rd., Inc. v Miranti, 2015 NY Slip Op 06400, 3rd Dept 7-30-15

 

Broker Entitled to a Commission Despite Purchaser’s Wish Not to Work with the Broker Any Further

The Second Department determined a broker who had negotiated extensively on behalf of the purchaser, but was not named as a broker entitled to a commission in the operative contract (because the purchaser did not want to work with that broker any further), was entitled to a commission. The court explained the relevant law:

In order to recover a real estate brokerage commission, a broker must establish: (1) that it is duly licensed, (2) that it had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission, and (3) that it was the procuring cause of the transaction . “To establish that a broker was the procuring cause of a transaction, the broker must establish that there was a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote, between the bare introduction and the consummation” … . Sholom & Zuckerbrot Realty, LLC v Gallant, 2015 NY Slip Op 06231, 2nd Dept 7-22-15

 

, ,

Property Was Not Transferred Until Escrow Conditions Were Met—Appellant Did Not Own the Building Where Plaintiff Slipped and Fell Because the Escrow Conditions Were Not Met and the Deed Was Not Released from Escrow Until the Day After the Slip and Fall

Reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department determined appellant did not own the property on the day plaintiff slipped and fell. The “preclosing” on the sale of the property to appellant took place on the day of the accident. But the deed was held in escrow until the escrow conditions were met on the day following the accident. Therefore the property was not transferred to the appellant until the day after the accident:

“When a deed is delivered to be held in escrow, the actual transfer of the property does not occur until the condition of the escrow is satisfied and the deed is subsequently delivered to the grantee by the escrow agent”… . Here, the appellant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting proof that the actual transfer of the property to the appellant did not occur until the conditions of the escrow were satisfied and the deed was thereafter released by the escrow agent on [the day after the accident]. As a result, the appellant demonstrated that it did not own or otherwise control the subject property on the date of the plaintiff’s alleged accident … . Camac v 550 Realty Hgts., LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 05631, 2nd Dept 7-1-15

 

,

Purchasers Entitled to Return of Downpayment Under Terms of the Purchase Contract and Pursuant to General Obligations Law 5-1311—Home Damaged by Hurricane Sandy Before Appraisal by Lender

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have granted the purchasers’ motion for summary judgment on the complaint seeking return of the downpayment.  The contract for sale of real property was contingent upon purchasers receiving a commitment for a loan.  The commitments received by the purchasers were contingent upon a property appraisal.  The house was damaged in Hurricane Sandy and the lender, based upon the post-Sandy appraisal, would not issue the loan. The Second Department determined the purchasers were entitled to a return of their downpayment under the terms of the contract and pursuant to General Obligations Law 5-1311:

“For more than a century it has been well settled in this State that a vendee who defaults on a real estate contract without lawful excuse, cannot recover the down payment” … . Where, however, the obligations of a purchaser under a contract of sale are contingent upon the issuance of a firm financing commitment by a lender, a purchaser may be entitled to recover the down payment if he or she was unable to secure a firm commitment in accordance with the terms of the contract … .

Here, the contract of sale was conditioned upon the issuance of a written commitment from an institutional lender. The contract of sale expressly provided that “a commitment conditioned on the Institutional Lender’s approval of an appraisal shall not be deemed a Commitment’ hereunder until an appraisal is approved.” Accordingly, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they were unable to secure a firm commitment in accordance with the contract of sale, and that they were entitled to the return of their down payment pursuant to the terms of the contract … . In addition, the plaintiffs demonstrated, prima facie, that they were entitled to a return of their down payment by virtue of General Obligations Law § 5-1311, since a “material part” of the property was destroyed by Hurricane Sandy before legal title or possession of the property could be transferred (General Obligations Law § 5-1311[1][a][1]). Walsh v Catalano, 2015 NY Slip Op 05468, 2nd Dept 6-24-15

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy