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MANUFACTURER AND SELLER OF THE PRODUCT WHICH ALLEGEDLY INJURED INFANT PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE THE PARENTS FOR CONTRIBUTION ON A THEORY OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INFANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the third-party complaint brought by the defendant manufacturer and seller of a humidifier against the parents of the injured child, alleging negligent supervision of the child, should have been dismissed:

In March 2014, the then-10-month-old infant plaintiff allegedly was injured when she knocked over a humidifier and hot water spilled onto her foot. The infant’s father had placed the humidifier on the living room floor before leaving the apartment with the infant’s five-year-old sibling. The infant’s mother was in the living room when the accident occurred. In August 2014, this action to recover damages for the infant’s injuries was commenced against the defendants, which allegedly manufactured and sold the humidifier. In December 2015, the defendants commenced a third-party action against the parents for contribution. …

There is no legally cognizable cause of action to recover damages for injuries suffered by a minor child against his or her parent for negligent supervision … . Additionally, where a secondary right of contribution is dependent upon “the parent’s alleged failure to perform a duty owing to the plaintiff child, the absence of the primary cause of action defeats the . . . third-party complaint” … . Although there is an exception when the parent’s conduct implicates a duty owed to the public at large … , the acts complained of in the third-party complaint were encompassed within the intrafamily immunity for negligent supervision … . Martinez v Kaz USA, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 02776, Second Dept 5-13-20

 

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THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS COMPREHENSIVE ASBESTOS-MESOTHELIOMA OPINION INCLUDE: GENERAL CAUSATION; SPECIFIC CAUSATION; WHETHER THE CLOSING PREJUDICED THE JURY; AND THE APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Gische, over a dissent, determined there was sufficient evidence of causation to raise a jury question in this asbestos-mesothelioma action. The issues addressed included: (1) general causation; (2) specific causation; (3) whether plaintiff’s counsel’s closing required a new trial; and (4) the apportionment of damages. The opinion is far too detailed and comprehensive to fairly summarize here:

The Court of Appeals recognized that precise information and exact details are not always available in toxic tort cases and they may not be necessary so long as there is “evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude” that the defendant’s offending substance “has probably caused” the kind of harm of which the plaintiff complains … . * * *

After each sides’ attorney highlighted the weaknesses in the other sides’ expert’s scientific evidence and authorities, it then became the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and decide which opinion was more credible … . There is no legal basis to disturb the jury’s findings and verdict in favor of plaintiff … . * * *

There is no basis, in this record, for a finding that the weight of the evidence presented at trial preponderated in favor of finding no specific causation. * * *

Plaintiff’s counsel’s summation comments were isolated remarks during a very lengthy summation. They were not pervasive, egregious or an obdurate pattern of remarks that inflamed the jury into believing that the focus of plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos contaminated talc was other than airborne particulants that she had breathed in for many years … . * * *

Issues raised by plaintiff on its cross appeal regarding the court’s calculation of offsets for payments made by the settling defendants … do have merit. General Obligations Law § 15-108 requires that a judgment be adjusted by subtracting the greater of other tortfeasors’ equitable share of the damages or the amount actually paid by them. Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am., 2020 NY Slip Op 02261, First Dept 4-9-20

 

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IN THIS DESIGN DEFECT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE, THE LOSS OF THE SPECIFIC PRODUCT WHICH CAUSED THE INJURY DID NOT PREVENT DEFENDANT-MANUFACTURER FROM PRESENTING A DEFENSE; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON SPOLIATION GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant-manufacturer (Doka) of an allegedly defective ratchet was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff could not produce the ratchet (spoliation). The ratchet was used to move heavy concrete forms into place along a track. Allegedly the ratchets broke when extra pressure was placed on them when the forms became “bound” on the track. Plaintiff alleged he was injured when he used his foot to increase the pressure on the ratchet when the form became bound. Because this was a design-defect case, and because the ratchets allegedly had broken before under similar circumstance, the defendant-manufacturer could present a defense and, therefore, the loss of the ratchet did not warrant dismissal of the complaint:

In cases like this, where the claim is based on a design defect (as opposed to a manufacturing defect), the absence of the product is not necessarily fatal to the defendant. As this Court has observed, a product’s design “possibly might be evaluated and the defect proved circumstantially” … . Circumstantial evidence could, one would imagine, be the testimony of someone involved in the design process, and plans or photographs of the product before it entered the stream of commerce. It could also, assuming that the missing product was one of multiple units manufactured using the same design, be another one of those units. * * *

Doka does not, in any meaningful way, argue why its inability to inspect the exact ratchet that plaintiff was using would prevent it from defending against the products liability claim. Rossi v Doka USA, Ltd., 2020 NY Slip Op 02098, First Dept 3-26-20

 

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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE REMOTELY OPERATED CRANE COULD FEASIBLY BE MADE SAFER; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s expert did not raise a question of fact in this products liability case. Plaintiff’s decedent was killed by a crane operated remotely by plaintiff’s decedent. Defendants’ experts attributed the accident to plaintiff’s decedent’s acts of leaning into the path of the crane and bending over with the remote attached to his hip, causing the crane to be activated inadvertently. Both leaning into the path of the crane and bending over with the remote attached were known to be dangerous and plaintiff’s decedent had trained others accordingly. Although plaintiff’s expert averred that a dead man’s switch would have prevented the accident, he did not present any supporting evidence:

“An expert’s [Darby’s] affidavit — offered as the only evidence to defeat summary judgment — must contain sufficient allegations to demonstrate that the conclusions it contains are more than mere speculation, and would, if offered alone at trial, support a verdict in the proponent’s favor” … . Initially, although Derby alleged that he inspected the remote, his affidavit was not supported by facts of his own independent testing of the device; rather, he relied on deposition testimony of other witnesses to explain the functions of the remote … . Furthermore, although Derby averred that the remote could be made safer by adding a dead man’s switch or by implementing joysticks, he offered no proposed designs that could feasibly be installed … , and, moreover, he pointed to no industry standards or data to support his conclusion that the absence of a dead man’s switch rendered the remote unsafe … . After all, “[a] factual issue regarding design defect is not established merely by pointing to efforts within the industry to make a safer product, without providing some detail as to how the current product is not reasonably safe and how a feasible alternative would be safer” … . Given Derby’s failure to elaborate, and mindful of the testimony of multiple witnesses for defendants who averred that they were not aware of any remote controls in the industry that use a dead man’s switch for crane operations, plaintiff’s proof was insufficient to raise a triable issue regarding design defect … . Darrow v Hetronic Deutschland GMBH, 2020 NY Slip Op 01543, Third Dept 3-5-20

 

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS GROUNDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ONLY TWO OF THE 19 PLAINTIFFS RESIDED IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds should not have been granted. Nineteen plaintiffs brought this production liability action alleging damage caused by defendants’ “Just For Men” dyes and products. Only two plaintiffs resided in New York and defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted on that ground, without any further proof:

“The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dismiss an action when, although it may have jurisdiction over a claim, the court determines that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum'” (… CPLR 327[a]). The burden was on the defendants to show that “considerations relevant to private or public interest militate against accepting or retaining the litigation” … . Factors to consider are the residency of the parties, potential inconvenience to proposed witnesses, especially nonparty witnesses, availability of an alternative forum, the situs of the actionable events, the location of the evidence, and the burden that retaining the case would have on New York courts … .

Here, the defendants asserted no facts other than that the nonresident plaintiffs were out-of-state residents. The defendants did not meet their burden of proof on the issue of convenience of the witnesses, since, among other things, there was no statement as to whom the witnesses are and where they reside. Moreover, Just For Men’s design, manufacturing, labeling, advertising, and executive decision-making all allegedly occurred in White Plains, where Combe Incorporated has a principal place of business. Further, there is no per se rule stating that out-of-state plaintiffs cannot, on the ground of forum non conveniens, sue in New York based upon products liability … , despite the fact that evidence of damages would most often be found where the plaintiff resides. Albright v Combe Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 00837, Second Dept 2-5-20

 

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DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER DID NOT ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SNOW THROWER WAS DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED AND WHETHER WARNINGS WERE ADEQUATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant snow-thrower manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment in this products liability case should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged he turned off the snow thrower before placing his hand inside the mechanism in an attempt to clean out a blockage. The impeller was allegedly still spinning at that point and two of plaintiff’s fingers were amputated. Plaintiffs’ expert opined that a $20 clean-out tool should have been provided. The defendant failed to eliminate questions of fact about whether the snow thrower was defective and whether the warnings were adequate:

According to the plaintiffs’ expert, a clean-out tool “would have been technologically and economically feasible to include with the snow [thrower] in 1983” since the defendant manufactured a clean-out tool costing approximately $20 that was sold in Germany in 1983 as part of a “safety kit.” Based on the foregoing, the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action sounding in negligence and strict products liability based on design defect.

… [A]lthough the defendant submitted evidence that certain warnings were placed on the snow thrower and in the owner’s manual, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it adequately warned users that the impeller may continue to rotate after the engine is turned off … . The defendant also failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was aware of the danger of putting his hand inside the discharge chute after turning off the engine, or that he would not have heeded more prominent or express warnings on the snow thrower … . Samyn v Ariens Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 08435 [177 AD3d 917], Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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FRENCH COMPANY WHICH MANUFACTURED ELEVATOR BRAKES FOR SALE TO OTHER MANUFACTURERS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONTACTS WITH NEW YORK TO CONFER JURISDICTION IN THIS ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have jurisdiction over a French company (Warner Europe) which manufactured elevator brakes in this elevator-malfunction case. The French company sold the brakes to other companies which incorporated the brakes into their elevator A.C. drives:

Warner Europe established that it does not sell the elevator brakes it manufactures in France to any customers in New York or contract with any other company to distribute its elevator brakes to customers in New York. Instead, it sells its elevator brakes as component parts to other manufacturers which incorporate them into A.C. drives, which are then sold to other manufacturers that incorporate the A.C. drives containing the elevator brakes into elevator systems. Warner Europe also established that it has no knowledge of the end users of the elevator brakes, and that it does not sell replacement elevator brakes or component parts to the end-user customers who purchased the elevators into which they were incorporated. Warner Europe also established that its products were neither sold nor advertised online. Finally, Warner Europe showed that it has no real or personal property in New York, no registered agent or telephone number in New York, and no bank or investment account in New York, and that it does not advertise in New York. Thus, the record does not support a finding that Warner Europe knew or reasonably should have known that its manufacture and sale of elevator brakes would have a direct consequence in New York… such that long-arm jurisdiction could be exercised.

Moreover, the plaintiffs and the defendants that opposed Warner Europe’s motion to dismiss did not make a showing of a “sufficient start” to warrant the denial of the motion … . There is no basis to allow discovery to be conducted on the issue of personal jurisdiction since the opposing parties did not allege any facts which, if proven, would establish that Warner Europe may be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York … . Grandelli v Hope St. Holdings, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 07386, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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GOODYEAR DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT AFFILIATIONS WITH NEW YORK TO CONFER JURISDICTION IN THIS TIRE-MALFUNCTION OUT-OF-STATE ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that Goodyear’s motion to dismiss the products liability complaint for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted. Plaintiff, a New York resident, was injured when a tire manufactured by Goodyear allegedly malfunctioned causing the car to overturn in Virginia. The Second Department held that plaintiff did not rebut Goodyear’s argument that it did not have significant affiliations with New York and noted that a corporation’s registration with the New York State Department of State does not confer jurisdiction on New York:

“While the ultimate burden of proof rests with the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiffs, in opposition to a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), need only make a prima facie showing that the defendant was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” … . “General jurisdiction in New York is provided for in CPLR 301, which allows a court to exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore'”… . A court may exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corporations “when their affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State” … .

Here, in opposition to Goodyear’s motion, the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over Goodyear existed under CPLR 301. The plaintiff did not rebut the evidence submitted by Goodyear showing that Goodyear’s affiliations with New York are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home here … . Furthermore, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, “a corporate defendant’s registration to do business in New York and designation of the Secretary of State to accept service of process in New York does not constitute consent by the corporation to submit to the general jurisdiction of New York for causes of action that are unrelated to the corporation’s affiliations with New York” … . Aybar v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 06584, Second Dept 9-18-19

 

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY CONTRADICTED THE CONCLUSIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over two dissents, determined summary judgment should not have been granted to defendants in this personal injury case stemming from a potholder catching fire. The Appellate Division had reversed because plaintiff’s deposition testimony conflicted with the conclusions of plaintiff’s expert. The facts were not discussed:

The courts below erred in granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motions. Although the plaintiff’s deposition testimony partially contradicted the factual conclusions reached by her expert witnesses, the expert opinions were based upon other record evidence and were neither speculative nor conclusory. Insofar as plaintiff raised genuine issues of fact on the element of causation, summary judgment should not have been granted on that ground … . We remit for Supreme Court to consider the alternative grounds for summary judgment defendants raised in their motions and neither Supreme Court nor the Appellate Division reached.

… Judges ]Rivera, Stein, Fahey and Wilson concur. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Garcia and Feinman dissent and vote to affirm for reasons stated in the Appellate Division memorandum decision (Salinas v World Houseware Producing Co., Ltd., 166 AD3d 493 [1st Dept 2018]). Salinas v World Houseware Producing Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 06537, CtApp 9-12-19

 

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PLAINTIFF BUS DRIVER WAS SPRAYED WITH DIESEL FUEL AS SHE ATTEMPTED TO FILL THE TANK OF THE BUS SHE WAS DRIVING; THE MANUFACTURER OF THE GAS PUMP NOZZLE AND THE GAS STATION DEMONSTRATED THE NOZZLE AND THE GAS PUMP WERE WORKING PROPERLY; THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF A RELEVANT DESIGN FLAW IN THE FUEL SYSTEM OF THE BUS; THE NOZZLE MANUFACTURER’S AND THE GAS STATION’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined that the products liability cause of action against the manufacturer of a gas pump fuel nozzle (Husky), and the premises liability cause of action against the gas station (Kwik Fill) should have been dismissed. The plaintiff was sprayed with diesel fuel as she attempted to fill the tank in the bus (manufactured by Coach) she was driving. There was evidence that the design of the fuel system of the bus may have been the cause:

In opposition to Husky’s motion, the Coach defendants submitted the affidavit of an expert and the deposition testimony of the vice president of engineering of defendant Motor Coach Industries, Ltd. The expert opined that the accident was caused by a nozzle malfunction. He did not, however, identify any particular defect in the nozzle, which he did not inspect. We thus conclude that the expert’s opinion is based on mere speculation and is insufficient to raise an issue of fact … . …

It is undisputed that the Kwik Fill defendants hired an outside vendor that regularly inspected and serviced their fuel pumps, and, in support of their motion, the Kwik Fill defendants submitted evidence establishing that the vendor determined that the fuel pumps were working properly before and after the accident, thus establishing that the Kwik Fill defendants maintained their property in a reasonably safe condition … . Menear v Kwik Fill, 2019 NY Slip Op 05845, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

 

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