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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFFS COULD HAVE COMMENCED THE LAWSUIT WITHIN THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY FILING BEFORE OR AFTER THE COVID TOLL-PERIOD, THAT IS NOT RELEVANT; THE TOLL EFFECTIVELY ADDED 228 DAYS, THE LENGTH OF THE TOLL-PERIOD, TO THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the COVID tolls of the statute of limitations rendered the plaintiffs action timely:

472 days of the 1,095-day limitation period had elapsed by the time the toll began on March 20, 2020. Upon the expiration of the toll on November 3, 2020, the remaining 623 days of the limitation period began to run again, expiring on July 20, 2022 … . Thus, the action was timely commenced on May 18, 2022 … .

Defendants contend that the toll is inapplicable here because plaintiffs could have timely commenced the action at any point between December 4, 2018 [when the cause action accrued], and March 20, 2020 [when the toll began], or between November 3, 2020 [when the toll expired], and December 4, 2021 [three years from accual]. We reject that contention. “[A] toll operates to compensate a claimant for the shortening of the statutory period in which it must commence . . . an action, irrespective of whether the stay has actually deprived the claimant of any opportunity to do so” …  Thus, plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of tolling for the entire 228-day duration of the COVID-19 Executive Orders. Harden v Weinraub, 2023 NY Slip Op 05822, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Here the plaintiffs’ action accrued before the COVID toll-period which began on March 20, 2020, and there was still time left on the three-year statute of limitations when the toll was lifted on November 3, 2020. The fact that plaintiffs could have commenced the suit within three years of accrual was not relevant. The three-year statute was extended by the the length of the toll-period, 228 days.

 

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PLAINTIFF, A PERMISSIVE DRIVER OF DEFENDANT’S TRUCK, WAS INJURED WHEN HE OPENED THE WATER RESERVOIR FOR THE ENGINE AND IT “EXPLODED,” APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE ENGINE OVERHEATED DUE TO THE POSITION OF THE SNOW PLOW AND THE CONSEQUENT BLOCKING OF AIR FLOW TO THE ENGINE; THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE INCIDENT WAS FORESEEABLE, WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, AND WHETHER DEFENDANT OWED PLAINTIFF A DUTY OF CARE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the incident was foreseeable, whether plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the incident, and whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care. Plaintiff was driving defendant’s truck when everything on the dashboard turned red and plaintiff pulled over to check out the problem. When plaintiff opened the water reservoir cap the reservoir “exploded” injuring him. Plaintiff was told by the police officer who stopped to help that the position of the snow plow on the front of the truck was blocking air flow to the engine (apparently causing the engine to overheat). The Fourth Department determined there were questions of fact whether the incident was foreseeable, whether plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the incident, and whether defendant owed plaintiff, a permissive user of defendant’s truck, a duty of care:

… [T]here are triable issues of fact whether plaintiff’s conduct was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the truck’s mechanical issues … . * * *

… [D]efendant failed to establish as a matter of law that plaintiff’s conduct, in investigating the cause of the malfunction and checking the water level in the reservoir, was of an unreasonable character, was done in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, or was done with conscious indifference to the outcome. * * *

The owner of a vehicle can be liable to permissive guests, users, or occupants if the owner knew or should have known of defects in the vehicle … . Bialecki v HBO Bldrs. W., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 05907, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff, a permissive driver of defendant’s truck, was injured when he checked the engine water reservoir and it “exploded.” Apparently the engine overheated because the snow plow blocked air flow to the engine. There were questions of fact whether the incident was foreseeable, whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the incident, and whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND, THE INSURED, WAS DRIVING WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; PLAINTIFF MAY BE ABLE TO SHOW HER HUSBAND HAD REQUESTED COVERAGE ON HER BEHALF AND, BECAUSE THE INSURER (ALLEGEDLY) NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO PROVIDE THE COVERAGE, THE INSURER IS OBLIGATED TO COVER HER LOSS, DESPITE HER STATUS AS A NONCLIENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the injured plaintiff might be able to show her husband (the insured) requested supplemental spousal liability (SSL) coverage on her behalf and that she was harmed by the insurer’s failure to provide it, despite her status as a nonclient. Plaintiff’s husband was driving and plaintiff was a passenger when she was seriously injured in a traffic accident:

“An insurance agent ordinarily does not owe a duty of care to a nonclient; however, where an agent’s negligence results in an insured being without coverage, the agent may be liable for damages sustained by an injured third party if the third party was the intended beneficiary of the insurance contract and ‘the bond between [the agent and the third party is] so close as to be the functional equivalent of contractual privity’ . . . The functional equivalent of privity may be found . . . where the defendants are aware that their representations are ‘to be used for a particular purpose,’ there was ‘reliance by a known party or parties in furtherance of that purpose’ and there is ‘some conduct by the defendants linking them to the party or parties and evincing [the] defendant[s’] understanding of their reliance’ ” … .

“[A] third party may sue as a beneficiary on a contract made for [its] benefit. However, an intent to benefit the third party must be shown, and, absent such intent, the third party is merely an incidental beneficiary with no right to enforce the particular contracts” … . Thus, “[p]arties asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a contract must establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [their] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [them] is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [them] if the benefit is lost” … . Smith v NGM Ins. Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 05815, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: An insurer may be liable for negligently failing to provide requested coverage for a nonclient. Here, the insured, plaintiff’s husband, allegedly requested supplemental spousal liability (SSL) coverage on behalf of his wife, the injured plaintiff. The insurer, which allegedly failed to provide the requested coverage, may be liable for her loss.

 

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A TEACHER IS NOT A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF A STUDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW; THEREFORE A SCHOOL DISTRICT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO REPORT SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE BY A TEACHER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the teacher (Grunwald) accused of sexual abuse of a student in this Child Victims Act suit was not a person legally responsible for the child’s care within the meaning of the Social Services Law. Therefore the defendant school district did not have a duty to report suspected abuse by the teacher:

… [P]laintiff alleged that Pioneer violated its statutory reporting duties under Social Services Law former § 413 by failing to report the abuse of plaintiff by Grunwald. Social Services Law former § 413, however, applied only where there was “reasonable cause to suspect that a child . . . [was] an abused or maltreated child” … . The Social Services Law incorporated the definition of “abused child” in the Family Court Act … , which in turn defined that term, as relevant here, as a child harmed by a “parent or other person legally responsible for [the child’s] care” … .

Under Family Court Act article 10, however, the definition “should not be construed to include [abuse by] persons who assume fleeting or temporary care of a child such as . . . those persons who provide extended daily care of children in institutional settings, such as teachers” … . Inasmuch as Grunwald, based on the allegations in the complaint, could not be the subject of a report for purposes of Social Services Law former § 413, Pioneer was not required to report any suspected abuse by him … . Solly v Pioneer Cent. Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 05814, Fourth Dept 11-15-23

Practice Point: The Social Services Law obligates a person legally responsible for the care of a child to report suspected child abuse. Because a teacher is not a person legally responsible for the care of a student, the school district is not subject to that reporting requirement.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF CROSSED INTO DEFENDANT’S ONCOMING LANE TO PASS A MAIL TRUCK, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT REACTED REASONABLY TO AN EMERGENCY; TWO OTHER CARS HAD ENTERED DEFENDANT’S LANE TO GO AROUND THE TRUCK JUST BEFORE THE COLLISION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. Plaintiff pulled into defendant’s lane of traffic to go around a mail truck. Just prior to the collision with plaintiff two other cars had passed the mail truck by pulling into defendant’s lane, yet plaintiff had not disengaged the cruise control. There was a question of fact whether defendant responded appropriately to the emergency:

A person facing an emergency is “not automatically absolve[d] . . . from liability” … . In determining whether the actions of a driver are reasonable in light of an emergency situation, the factfinder must consider “both the driver’s awareness of the situation and [the driver’s] actions prior to the occurrence of the emergency” … .

Defendant admitted that, after she noticed the mail truck, she observed two motor vehicles pass it by pulling out from behind the truck, crossing completely into the westbound lane, and returning to the eastbound lane of travel, but she nevertheless continued in the westbound lane without deactivating her cruise control. She then saw plaintiff’s vehicle cross over into her lane “possibly to see if there was oncoming traffic” before it reentered the eastbound lane. It was not until that point that plaintiff deactivated her cruise control, which had been set to 45 miles per hour. We conclude that issues of fact exist whether, given her observations, defendant responded reasonably under the circumstances … . Carollo v Solotes, 2023 NY Slip Op 05803, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff entered defendant’s oncoming law to pass a mail truck and collided with defendant. Usually an emergency will absolve a driver of liability. But there was evidence two other cars had pulled into defendant’s lane to pass the mail truck and defendant did not disengage the cruise control. Therefore there was a question of fact whether defendant responded reasonably to the emergency.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY HAD REPRESENTED THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE IN A MATTER INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY AND THE ATTORNEY’S SMALL LAW FIRM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s attorney, Laraby, and Laraby’s law firm, must be disqualified in this medical malpractice action. Laraby had represented the defendant in this case in a matter involving substantially similar allegations of malpractice:

The plaintiff in the prior representation, whose baby had suffered from essentially the same injuries as plaintiff’s son here, made many of the same allegations of negligence and malpractice against defendant as plaintiff does in this case. Both cases involved whether defendant properly monitored the patients and the babies and made proper decisions regarding oxytocin administration, and whether defendant made the proper decision to continue with vaginal delivery instead of proceeding with a cesarean section. Alternatively, defendant established that Laraby received specific, confidential information in the prior litigation that is substantially related to the present litigation … . In particular, Laraby had access to the litigation strategy to defend defendant against the allegations of malpractice, including speaking with and receiving reports of expert witnesses. Brandice M.C. v Wilder, 2023 NY Slip Op 05871, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff’s attorney had represented the defendant in this medical malpractice action in a case where the issues were substantially the same. The motion to disqualify the attorney and the attorney’s small law firm should have been granted.

 

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THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE ICE WAS PREEXISTING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined there was a question of fact whether the storm-in-progress doctrine applied in this slip and fall case. 

… [I]n this case a trier of fact should be charged with determining whether there was a lull or ongoing storm in progress that supports the continued delay of defendants’ obligation to remedy their premises from hazardous conditions … .

Inasmuch as defendants did not establish that there was a storm in progress, plaintiffs did not need to demonstrate that the ice was preexisting … . To that end, defendants also failed to establish as a matter of law the absence of a hazardous icy condition or whether they had notice and a reasonable period of time to correct such condition. We reach this conclusion particularly in light of the reply affidavit from Altschule [defendants’ meteorologist], who “generally agree[d]” with plaintiffs’ opposing meteorologist that ice may have formed as early as approximately 14 hours prior to the incident — therefore both acknowledging the presence of ice and confirming the maximum duration that it may have existed … . Gagne v MJ Props. Realty, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05769, Third Dept 11-16-23

Practice Point: The jury must decide whether the storm-in-progress doctrine applied in this sidewalk slip and fall. Because the defendants did not demonstrate the doctrine applied, plaintiffs did not need to demonstrate the ice was preexisting.

 

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THE MOTIONS BEFORE THE COURT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE DID NOT ADDRESS WHETHER THE EMPLOYER OF THE DRIVER WHO REAR-ENDED PLAINTIFF WAS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF; THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED PLAINTIFF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE EMPLOYER OF THE DRIVER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court in this traffic-accident case, determined Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, searched the record to award plaintiff summary judgment. The motion before the court was brought by the owner of the car which rear-ended plaintiff, Piard, against the employer of the driver of Piard’s car, Y & H. Piard alleged she did not give Y & H permission to drive the car outside of Y & H’s garage and sought summary judgment on that ground. The court improperly searched the record and awarded plaintiff summary judgment against Y & H:

… [T]he motion court erred in searching the record and granting summary judgment to plaintiff on plaintiff’s claim against Y&H. A motion for summary judgment on one claim or defense does not provide a basis for searching the record and granting summary judgment on an unrelated claim or defense … . Here, the only issues raised with respect to defendant Piard’s motion and plaintiff’s cross-motion were defendant Piard’s liability and plaintiff’s comparative fault. The court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff based on co-defendant’s Y&H’s liability. Christopher v Piard, 2023 NY Slip Op 05787, First Dept 11-16-23

Practice Point: There are limits on a court’s power to search the record and, sua sponte, award summary judgment. Here the motions before the court did not address whether the employer of the driver of the car which rear-ended plaintiff was liable to plaintiff. Rather the motions addressed whether the owner of the car had given permission to the employer of the driver to use her car. The motion court should not have searched the record and awarded summary judgment to plaintiff against the employer of the driver of the car.

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT, A DOCTOR, USED A PORTION OF THE TWO-FAMILY HOUSE AS A STUDY OR HOME OFFICE, THE EXCLUSION OF OWNER-OCCUPIED TWO-FAMILY RESIDENCES FROM LIABILITY FOR SIDEWALK DEFECTS APPLIED; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this sidewalk slip and fall case was entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the exclusion of one, two, and three- family residences from liability for sidewalk defects. Although defendant was a doctor and used space in the basement as a study, the residential character of the building was controlling:

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210, which became effective September 14, 2003, shifted tort liability for injuries arising from a defective sidewalk from the City to the abutting property owner … . “However, this liability-shifting provision does not apply to ‘one-, two- or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part, owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes'” … . …

… [T]he defendant established … that the premises abutting the public sidewalk was a two-family, owner-occupied residence, and thus, that she is entitled to the exemption from liability for owner-occupied residential property. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant’s partial use of the basement as an office space was merely incidental to her residential use of the property … . While the defendant testified at her deposition that she was a doctor and used a portion of the basement apartment as a study or home office and that it held office equipment, no evidence indicated that she used the space with regularity or that she claimed the premises as her business address or as a tax deduction. McCalla v Piris-Fraser, 2023 NY Slip Op 05722, Second Dept 11-15-23

Practice Point: Here the owner of the two-family residence abutting the sidewalk where plaintiff slipped and fell was a doctor who had a study or home office in the basement. The home office or study did not transform the property to a business and the doctor was entitled to the “owner-occupied, two-family-residence” exclusion from liability in the NYC Administrative Code re: sidewalk defects.

 

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PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S FINGER WAS CAUGHT IN A DOOR SHUT BY ANOTHER STUDENT ACTING AS A LUNCH MONITOR; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE SCHOOL PROVIDED ADEQUATE SUPERVISION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-student’s negligent supervision action against the Department of Education (DOE) should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s finger was caught in a door as the door was shut by another student who was acting as a lunch monitor. Plaintiff and other students banged on the door to get someone to open it, but its wasn’t opened for three minutes. The tip of plaintiff’s finger was severed:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the DOE adequately supervised the infant plaintiff … , or that its alleged lack of adequate supervision was not a proximate cause of the accident … . Significantly, the defendants’ submissions demonstrated that there was no adult monitoring the area where the accident took place and that, at the time of the accident, an assistant principal in the cafeteria was in the midst of calling for more assistance. Among the triable issues of fact presented by the defendants’ submissions were whether there was an appropriate level of supervision for the seventh-grade students under the circumstances … , and whether the school played a role in empowering or training the student lunch monitor with respect to closing the door to the kitchen.

Although there are certain accidents that occur in such a short span of time “that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented [them and] any lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury” … , this is not one of those cases, especially in light of the fact that the infant plaintiff’s finger remained pinched by the closed door for approximately three minutes while he and his fellow students banged on the door. Fleming v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 05714, Second Dept 11-15-23

Practice Point: The accident–plaintiff-student’s finger was caught (for three minutes) in a door shut by another student who was acting as a lunch monitor–raised a question whether the level of supervision by the school was adequate.

 

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