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A NOTICE OF VIOLATION FROM THE CITY TO THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER REGARDING THE DETERIORATED CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CITY HAD WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT (A PROTRUDING METAL BAR) WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether the city had notice of the condition of the sidewalk which allegedly caused her slip and fall; Plaintiff demonstrated a notice of violation had been issued to the abutting property owner concerning the deterioration of the sidewalk. Plaintiff had alleged she tripped over a metal bar protruding from the sidewalk. The notice of violation raised a question of fact whether that specific defect was encompassed by the notice:

The plaintiff submitted … a Notice of Violation from the Department of Public Works, Office of the Commissioner, to the purported owner of the property abutting the sidewalk on which the plaintiff fell. The Notice of Violation was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works, the very individual who was statutorily designated to receive written notice of sidewalk defects. The Notice of Violation stated that an inspection, which … found … that “deteriorated and hazardous conditions” existed on the abutting sidewalk. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the City did, in fact, have prior written notice of the alleged defect … . Whether the Notice of Violation “encompassed the particular condition which allegedly caused the subject accident is an issue of fact which should await resolution at trial” … . Douglas v City of Mount Vernon, N.Y., 2024 NY Slip Op 02173, Second Dept 4-24-24

Practice Point: Here a notice of violation issued by the city to the abutting property owner concerning the deteriorated condition of the sidewalk raised a question of fact whether the city had prior written notice of the specific defect, a protruding metal bar, which caused plaintiff’s fall.

 

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PLAINTIFF IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE ALLEGED DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS DEFENDANT COMPANY’S EMPLOYEE AND WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT COMPANY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE DRIVER WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE; THE FACT THAT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT USES THE TERM “INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR” IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant employer in this traffic accident case did not demonstrate the defendant driver was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee acting within the scope of employment:

… [Plaintiff] allegedly was injured when a vehicle he was operating collided with a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant Luis F. Leal. * * * The plaintiffs alleged … that Leal was [defendant] Publishers’ employee, and that Leal was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. …

“The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment. Conversely, the general rule is that an employer who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligent acts” … . “[T]he critical inquiry in determining whether an employment relationship exists pertains to the degree of control exercised by the purported employer over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results” … . “Factors relevant to assessing control include whether the worker (1) worked at his [or her] own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer’s payroll and (5) was on a fixed schedule” … . “The fact that a contract exists designating a person as an independent contractor is to be considered, but is not dispositive” … . Whether an actor is an independent contractor or an employee is usually a factual issue for a jury … . Brielmeier v Leal, 2024 NY Slip Op 02163, Second Dept 4-24-24

Practice Point: An employer may be responsible for the negligence of an employee, but is not responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor. The fact that the employment contract uses the term “independent contractor” is not dispositive. The relevant criteria are explained.

 

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CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS IN THE EDUCATION LAW AND GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW; PLAINTIFF-STUDENT, WHO HAD BEEN BULLIED AND WAS PUSHED TO THE FLOOR BY ANOTHER STUDENT, RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT SUPPORTING THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Iannacci, determined (1) charter schools are not subject to the notice of claim requirements of the Education Law and the General Municipal Law, and (2) plaintiff student, who allegedly had been bullied and was pushed to the floor by another student when the hallway was unsupervised, raised questions of fact supporting the negligent supervision cause of action:

Since charter schools are independent from school districts with respect to civil liability, financial obligations, and liability insurance coverage, it stands to reason that the extraordinary safeguards of prelitigation notification of claims applicable to school districts, municipalities and other wholly public entities would not apply to charter schools. * * *

The evidence presented triable issues of fact as to whether there were monitors present in the hallway at the time of the incident as required by the School’s policies and procedures and whether the presence of such monitors could have prevented the alleged pushing incident … . A. P. v John W. Lavelle Preparatory Charter Sch., 2024 NY Slip Op 02205, Second Dept 4-24-24

Practice Point: Charter schools are not subject to the notice-of-claim requirement in the Education Law and General Municipal Law; i.e., a plaintiff suing a charter school for negligence need not file or serve a notice of claim as a condition precedent.

 

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RE: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: RETRIEVING AND FERTILIZING THE EGGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE MEDICAL-MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; STORING AND MAINTAINING THE FROZEN EGGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS ARE UNTIMELY; THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS ARE TIMELY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Shulman, determined plaintiffs’ causes of action alleging defendants did not properly freeze, store and maintain embryos for future implantation sounded in negligence, not medical malpractice, and were therefore timely:

The underlying parts of the IVF [in vitro fertilization] process implicate both medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. Retrieving the eggs from the ovaries, fertilizing the egg with a donated sperm, grading the quality of the embryos, and preparing them for cryopreservation are clear acts of medical science or art requiring a specialized skillset appropriately characterized as medical in nature. However, all of these acts concluded on August 11, 2008, when the embryos were cryopreserved, rendering the causes of action based on such treatment untimely (see CPLR 214-a). Further, because those processes firmly ended on that date, the continuous treatment doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations … . As plaintiffs’ causes of action for medical malpractice based upon these allegations are untimely, we need not address their merits.

On the other hand, once cryopreservation has commenced, the mere maintenance of the storage tanks containing the frozen embryos does not comprise acts of “medical science or art requiring special skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons” … . Where an act is more “‘administrative’ than medical in nature,” conduct is “measured by ordinary negligence standards” … . While the cryopreservation storage tanks … were checked at least twice weekly for leaks and the levels of liquid nitrogen, such acts are more administrative than medical in nature. Thus, once the embryos entered cryopreservation, [defendants] merely owed a duty to plaintiffs to maintain the successful operability of the storage tanks.

The alleged failure in “fulfilling [this] different duty” “sounds in negligence,” rather than medical malpractice … . Bledsoe v Center for Human Reproduction, 2024 NY Slip Op 02088, First Dept 4-18-24

Practice Point: The opinion in this “in vitro fertilization” case clearly demonstrates the distinction between medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. The retrieving, fertilizing and grading of the embryos involve specialized medical skills and implicate the medical-malpractice criteria. The storage and maintenance of the frozen embryos, on the other hand, implicate ordinary negligence criteria. Here the medical malpractice causes of action were untimely. But the ordinary negligence causes of action were timely.

 

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REVERSING THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT WITHOUT OPINION OR MEMORANDUM DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS’ FAVOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Fourth Department without an opinion or memorandum decision, determined questions of fact precluded summary judgment in defendants’ favor in this medical malpractice case. ​Amber R. v Pediatric & Adolescent Urgent Care of W. N.Y., PLLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02085, CtApp 4-18-24

From the dissent in Amber R. v Pediatric & Adolescent Urgent Care of W. N.Y., PLLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 04063 [218 AD3d 1344], Fourth Dept 7-28-23:

The medical records proferred by defendants established that, after a failed first intubation attempt with a 3.5 mm ET by defendant Katelyn Johnson-Clark, D.O., a physician with little training in the intubation process, Johnson-Clark attempted intubation using a smaller 3.0 mm ET. It is undisputed that there was no verification of the proper placement of that ET by way of an end-tidal CO2 detector. The medical records further establish that one minute after the placement of the ET, the infant’s heart rate quickly dropped and one minute thereafter, the infant’s belly was distended. Another physician testified at her deposition that both of those signs indicate that there was a potential issue with the intubation. When the specialized transport team arrived, it was determined by way of a CO2 detector that the ET was not in the proper place. Thus, we conclude that defendants’ own submissions raise questions of fact whether Johnson-Clark acted negligently in the intubation of the infant and the motion was properly denied in part without regard to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition papers … . We would therefore affirm that part of the order denying defendants’ motion insofar as it seeks summary judgment dismissing the claim of malpractice related to the intubation of the infant.

 

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BECAUSE A CONTEMPORARY REPORT PROVIDED THE CITY WITH NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE SLIP AND FALL, THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE THE LACK OF A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILING TO TIMELY FILE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim in this slip and fall case should have been granted. The line-of-duty report provided the city with timely knowledge of the nature of the claim and demonstrate the city would not be prejudiced by the delay in filing the notice. Where a defendant has timely knowledge of the incident, the lack of a reasonable explanation for failing to timely file is often overlooked:

The line-of-duty injury report’s specificity regarding the location and circumstances of the incident, permitted the City to readily infer that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed … .

Further, as the petitioner has shown the City’s actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim, the petitioner’s failure to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the notice of claim was not fatal to her claim … .

… [A]s the City acquired timely knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, the petitioner met her initial burden of showing that the City would not be prejudiced by the late notice of claim … . In response …, the City has failed to provide particularized evidence establishing that the late notice substantially prejudiced its ability to defend the claim on the merits … . Matter of Steward v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02058, Second Dept 4-17-24

Practice Point: If the municipal defendant has timely notice of the nature of the incident (here by virtue of a contemporary report) and the city cannot demonstrate prejudice, a petition for leave to file a late notice of claim should be granted, even in the absence of a reasonable excuse for failing to timely file.

 

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THE SECOND DEPARTMENT JOINED THE FIRST AND THIRD DEPARTMENTS IN HOLDING THAT THE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT APPLIES TO A NEW YORK RESIDENT WHO WAS ABUSED OUT-OF-STATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, joining the First and Third Departments, determined an action brought under the Child Victims Act by a person who was a resident of New York at the time the cause of action accrued can take advantage of the extended statute of limitations (CPLR 214-g) even where the wrongful conduct occurred out-of-state:

The plaintiff alleges that, when he was a resident of New York, he was the victim of childhood sexual abuse committed against him by Philip Foglietta, a football coach, while attending summer football camp in Vermont in 1972 and in Massachusetts in 1973 and 1975. * * *

… [W]e agree with the Appellate Division, First and Third Departments, that a plaintiff’s residence in New York at the time his or her claims or causes of action accrued is sufficient to bring those claims or causes of action within the purview of CPLR 214-g, even where, as here, the wrongful conduct underlying the New York resident’s causes of action occurred out-of-state … . * * *

The appellants’ focus on the location of the alleged wrongdoing is misplaced in this context, because the subject of CPLR 214-g is not the wrongful conduct itself, but rather the statute of limitations or notice of claim requirements that barred some New Yorkers from recovering damages for the underlying wrongdoing. CPLR 214-g did not criminalize or penalize behavior that was previously lawful, nor did it create a new private right of action. Rather, the statute revived prior claims or causes of action that already existed but were barred either because of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations or the plaintiff’s failure to file a timely notice of claim (see id. § 214-g). Smith v Pro Camps, Ltd., 2024 NY Slip Op 02074, Second Dept 4-17-24

Practice Point: The Child Victims Act extends the statute of limitations for a plaintiff who was a New York resident at the time the cause of action accrued, even if the abuse took place in another state.

 

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THE THIRD DEPARTMENT JOINS THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS IN HOLDING THAT A PLAINTIFF NEED NOT MAKE A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT TO PRESERVE AN “AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE” ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, affirming the defense verdict in this medical malpractice case, joined the other appellate division departments in finding that a plaintiff may make a “verdict is against the weight of the evidence” argument on appeal without moving to set aside the verdict on that ground:

… [We now join our colleagues in our sister Departments in concluding that plaintiffs were not required to preserve their weight of the evidence contention by moving to set aside the verdict upon that basis … . A trial court has the authority to order a new trial “on its own initiative” when the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence (CPLR 4404 [a]), and this Court’s power “is as broad as that of the trial court” … . Although we believe it remains best practice for a party to challenge a verdict upon this basis before the trial court, in light of its superior opportunity to evaluate the proof and credibility of witnesses … , we nonetheless agree that this Court is fully empowered to “order a new trial where the appellant made no motion for that relief in the trial court” … . To the extent that our prior decisions have suggested otherwise, they should no longer be followed … . Fitzpatrick v Tvetenstrand, 2024 NY Slip Op 01956, Third Dept 4-10-24

Practice Point: In this decision, the Third Department joined the other departments in holding that a plaintiff need not make a motion to set aside the verdict to preserve an “against the weight of the evidence” argument on appeal.

 

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A MANAGING AGENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON THE MANAGED PROPERTY UNLESS THE MANAGING AGENT EXERCISES COMPLETE AND EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION OF THE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the property managing agent did not exercise complete and exclusive control of the operation of the property and therefore could not be held liable for plaintiff’s trip and fall over a stub-up pipe protruding from a step:

Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against CBRE [the managing agent] on the ground that CBRE does not own, operate, or control the premises. “Where, as here, a managing agent is accused of nonfeasance which causes injury to a third party, it is subject to liability only where it has complete and exclusive control of the management and operation of the property in question” … . “A managing agent is not in complete and exclusive control of the premises where the owner has reserved to itself a certain amount of control in the written agreement” … .

Here, CBRE established, prima facie, that it was a managing agent of the premises and that the management agreement was not so comprehensive and exclusive as to displace the duty of the owner of the premises to maintain the premises safely … . Quezada v CBRE, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 01829, Second Dept 4-3-24

Practice Point: A managing agent is not liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition on the managed property unless the agent exercises complete and exclusive control over the operation of the property.

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT HIS OWN LIABILTY; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end collision case, determined that although defendant raised a question of fact about whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent, defendant did not raise a question of fact about the defendant-driver’s liability. In addition, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been deemed premature:

… [T]he defendants submitted an affidavit from the defendant driver, in which he stated that he was “not fully responsible” for the accident. The defendant driver also averred that the traffic light had turned green and that the plaintiff had moved forward and then suddenly stopped, causing the defendant driver to strike the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle despite his efforts to stop his vehicle. This evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident, thereby supporting the denial of that branch of her motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence … . However, since the defendants’ evidence related only to the plaintiff’s comparative fault, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging negligent operation of a motor vehicle … .

Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the plaintiff’s motion was premature. “[W]hile a party is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery in advance of a summary judgment determination, [a] party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” … . Here, the defendants had personal knowledge of the relevant facts, and their mere hope or speculation that evidence might be uncovered during discovery was an insufficient basis for denying the plaintiff’s motion …. Martin v Copado-Esquivel, 2024 NY Slip Op 01804, Second Dept 4-3-24

Practice Point: In a rear-end collision case, the fact that defendant raises a question of fact about plaintiff’s contributory negligence does not preclude granting plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s liability.

Practice Point: Here, where the facts of the rear-end collision were within defendant’s personal knowledge, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been dismissed as premature.

 

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