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NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY DISMISSED, STUDENT PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD A ONE-ON-ONE AIDE BUT WENT TO THE BATHROOM UNACCOMPANIED, WAS INJURED WHEN SHE CAUGHT HER FINGER IN A BATHROOM DOOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the negligent supervision cause of action against the school district was properly dismissed. Infant plaintiff, a student who had a one-on-one aide, was injured when she went to the bathroom unaccompanied. She caught her finger in a bathroom door:

While a school district is not an insurer of the safety of its students, since it cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all of their movements and activities, it has a duty to adequately supervise the students in its charge and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision … . Where an accident occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, any lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury and summary judgment in favor of the school defendant is warranted … . Here, the District made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that any alleged inadequacy in the level of supervision was not a proximate cause of the accident … . Hinz v Wantagh Union Free Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 07105, Second Dept 10-24-18

NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY DISMISSED, STUDENT PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD A ONE-ON-ONE AIDE BUT WENT TO THE BATHROOM UNACCOMPANIED, WAS INJURED WHEN SHE CAUGHT HER FINGER IN A BATHROOM DOOR (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY DISMISSED, STUDENT PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD A ONE-ON-ONE AIDE BUT WENT TO THE BATHROOM UNACCOMPANIED, WAS INJURED WHEN SHE CAUGHT HER FINGER IN A BATHROOM DOOR (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERLY DISMISSED, STUDENT PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD A ONE-ON-ONE AIDE BUT WENT TO THE BATHROOM UNACCOMPANIED, WAS INJURED WHEN SHE CAUGHT HER FINGER IN A BATHROOM DOOR (SECOND DEPT))

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LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN THE BUILDING, ASSAULT WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the negligence action against the landlord in this third party assault case was properly dismissed. The plaintiff tenant was assaulted in the vestibule of the building. The landlord demonstrated the attack was not foreseeable because there had been no similar assaults in the past:

The plaintiff was assaulted in the vestibule of a residential building in which she lived. The vestibule was accessed through an unlocked front door. A second door leading into the building’s lobby was locked, and there was an intercom buzzer system in the vestibule that permitted residents to control access to the building. The perpetrator of the assault was inside the vestibule when the plaintiff entered the building. …

“Landlords have a common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm, including foreseeable criminal conduct by a third person”… . “To establish foreseeability, there is no requirement that the past experience of criminal activity be of the same type as that to which the plaintiff was subjected” … . However, “the criminal conduct at issue must be shown to be reasonably predictable based on the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location”… .

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it lacked notice of any prior occurrences of the same or similar criminal activity at or near the subject premises … . George v 855 Ocean Ave., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 07100, Second Dept 10-24-18

NEGLIGENCE (LANDLORD-TENANT, THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN THE BUILDING, ASSAULT WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN THE BUILDING, ASSAULT WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))/THIRD PARTY ASSAULT (NEGLIGENCE, LANDLORD-TENANT, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN THE BUILDING, ASSAULT WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))/ ASSAULT, THIRD PARTY (NEGLIGENCE, LANDLORD-TENANT, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN THE BUILDING, ASSAULT WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))

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UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE HOMEOWNER IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, FENCE AND GATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL USE OF THE SIDEWALK BY THE HOMEOWNER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant homeowner was entitled to summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case. Defendant was exempt from liability under the NYC Administrative Code and that defendant’s fence with a gate did not constitute a special use of the sidewalk:

In this trip and fall case involving an uneven sidewalk, defendant Ortiz’s testimony that she lived in a one-family home adjacent to the sidewalk was sufficient competent evidence to make a prima facie showing that she qualified for the exemption provided at Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210(b) … .

In opposition, plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary, and no authority for her proposition that a party seeking to demonstrate that their home is a one-, two- or three-family home exempt from § 7-210 must produce a deed.

Nor is defendant Ortiz liable based on a theory that her fence, containing a gate, constituted a special-use. “The principle of special use, a narrow exception to the general rule, imposes an obligation on the abutting landowner, where he puts part of a public way to a special use for his own benefit and the part used is subject to his control, to maintain the part so used in a reasonably safe condition to avoid injury to others. . . . Special use cases usually involve the installation of some object in the sidewalk or street or some variance in the construction thereof” … . There is no evidence in the record that defendant’s fence is built on or in the sidewalk. That the gate, which defendant testified is “almost never” used, would permit herself and others to enter her property does not constitute a special use, as those using it would merely walk across the sidewalk, a use not “unrelated to the public use” … . Moreover, as the defect in the sidewalk is adjacent to defendant’s gate, not in front of it, it was plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that this alleged “special use” caused or contributed to the defect … . Plaintiff offered no such evidence. Hernandez v Ortiz, 2018 NY Slip Op 07075, First Dept 10-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE HOMEOWNER IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, FENCE AND GATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL USE OF THE SIDEWALK BY THE HOMEOWNER (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL, UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE HOMEOWNER IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, FENCE AND GATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL USE OF THE SIDEWALK BY THE HOMEOWNER (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE HOMEOWNER IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, FENCE AND GATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL USE OF THE SIDEWALK BY THE HOMEOWNER (FIRST DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE HOMEOWNER IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, FENCE AND GATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL USE OF THE SIDEWALK BY THE HOMEOWNER (FIRST DEPT))

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LANDLORD’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE, PLAINTIFF TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN AN ALLEYWAY WHERE TENANTS LEFT THEIR TRASH (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined defendant landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this third party assault case was properly denied. Infant plaintiff was assaulted in an alleyway outside the building where tenants left their trash. There was a question of fact whether the assault was foreseeable. The alternative theory of liability, that defendant failed to maintain safety measures voluntarily undertaken in the alleyway, was rejected because plaintiff did not demonstrate reliance on those measures:

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the alleyway, in which tenants of the building deposited their trash, was not a public area where defendant had no duty to maintain minimal security precautions … . Issues of fact as to the foreseeability of the assault are presented by the record evidence of previous criminal activity in or at the building, including drug dealing, multiple burglaries, including one at gunpoint, and gunshots and the discovery of empty shell casings outside the building . Issues of fact exist as to whether the gate to the alleyway was maintained in a closed and locked condition and whether there was sufficient lighting in the alleyway. Issues of fact also exist as to whether the open gate or any insufficiency in the lighting was a proximate cause of the assault … . Accordingly, considering the neighborhood’s susceptibility to incidents of violent crime, we are unable to hold as a matter of law that defendant upheld its common law duty to maintain the premises in a safe and secure manner.

However, we reject plaintiff’s alternative theory that defendant is liable to the extent that it voluntarily provided a locked gate, lighting, or video monitoring for the alleyway, and then negligently maintained those items. Even were we to conclude that defendant created a duty by introducing such security measures, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was lulled into a false sense of security such that she neglected to take precautions that she would have otherwise taken in the absence of those measure … . Sanchez v Morris Ave. Equities Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 07071, First Dept 10-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (LANDLORD-TENANT, THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, LANDLORD’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE, PLAINTIFF TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN AN ALLEYWAY WHERE TENANTS LEFT THEIR TRASH (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEGLIGENCE, THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, LANDLORD’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE, PLAINTIFF TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN AN ALLEYWAY WHERE TENANTS LEFT THEIR TRASH (FIRST DEPT))/THIRD PARTY ASSAULT (LANDLORD-TENANT, NEGLIGENCE, LANDLORD’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE, PLAINTIFF TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN AN ALLEYWAY WHERE TENANTS LEFT THEIR TRASH (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFFS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiffs (the Rothchilds) were entitled to summary judgment in this rear-end collision case:

The record shows that the accident occurred in heavy, stop-and-go traffic, and DeSouza [defendant] testified to driving three-to-five miles per hour for at least 10 minutes prior to the accident, that he observed cars immediately in front of the Rothchilds’ vehicle, and that he did not place his foot on his brake until his moving vehicle was two feet from the Rothchilds’ back bumper. A driver is supposed to make reasonable use of his or her senses … , and maintain a safe distance from other motor vehicles (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]…), which was not done in this case. Miller v DeSouza, 2018 NY Slip Op 07065, First Dept 10-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PLAINTIFFS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PLAINTIFFS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/REAR END COLLISIONS (PLAINTIFFS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR END COLLISIONS, PLAINTIFFS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))

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NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the negligence and trespass action against the town in this lawsuit stemming from a landslide should have been dismissed. The town had issued a permit for the placement of fill. Plaintiff’s alleged the landslide blocked a stream and flooded plaintiff’s land:

… [T]o hold a municipality liable for negligence in the exercise of a governmental function, a plaintiff must show that the municipality owed it a special duty beyond that owed to the public at large … . As a basis for the Town’s negligence, the complaint in this action alleges … that plaintiff owned land near the … property that was affected by the landslide and resulting flooding. However, the complaint does not allege that the Town had assumed any duty to act on plaintiff’s behalf or that the Town made any representations upon which plaintiff justifiably relied. …

… “[A] trespass claim represents an injury to the right of possession, and the elements of a trespass cause of action are an intentional entry onto the land of another without permission. Regarding intent, the defendant ‘must intend the act which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion, and the intrusion must at least be the immediate or inevitable consequence of what he or she willfully does, or which he or she does so negligently as to amount to willfulness'” … .

Plaintiff alleged that the Town issued the permit for the performance of work, including grading and other land disturbance activities and placement of fill, notwithstanding its knowledge that significant slope failures resulting in landslides had previously occurred in the immediate vicinity, which the complaint alleges constituted a “dangerous recurring condition.” Plaintiff further alleged that the Town failed to properly supervise the work that was conducted pursuant to the permit; however, it did not allege that the Town directly participated in placement of the fill that caused the landslide. City of Albany v Normanskill Cr., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 07020, Third Dept 10-18-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/TRESPASS (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/LANDSLIDE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/FLOODING (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF OFFERED DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COURT HELD PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, REQUIRING DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s action in this slip and fall case was properly dismissed. Plaintiff had offered several different allegations about the cause of his fall. The court held plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of his fall:

The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, through the submission, inter alia, of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and amended bill of particulars, that the plaintiff could not identify the cause of his fall without engaging in speculation … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff’s sworn statement, submitted in opposition to the defendant’s motion, that he expected the floor of the diner to be “level with the landing,” presented what appears to be a feigned issue of fact designed to avoid the consequences of his prior deposition testimony … . Pasqualoni v Jacklou Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 06928, Second Dept 10-17-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF OFFERED DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COURT HELD PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, REQUIRING DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (PLAINTIFF OFFERED DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COURT HELD PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, REQUIRING DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT)

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INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the MetLife was not vicariously liable for an alleged civil assault and battery by a private investigator, who was deemed to be a subcontractor, not an employee of MetLife:

” The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment. Conversely, the general rule is that an employer who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligent acts'” … . ” The determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists turns on whether the alleged employer exercises control over the results produced, or the means used to achieve the results. Control over the means is the more important consideration'” … . However, “[i]ncidental control over the results produced without further indicia of control over the means employed to achieve the results will not constitute substantial evidence of an employer-employee relationship” … .

Here, the contract between MetLife and Scope provided that Scope’s “affiliates and agents” were “solely personnel of [Scope] and not MetLife,” and that Scope would have “full responsibility for the actions and omissions of all personnel employed by [Scope] or any agents who are involved in performing the Services and for any losses arising therefrom.” The contract likewise contained a clause in which Scope agreed to indemnify MetLife for, inter alia, losses resulting from “negligent or wrongful acts.” Although, as the plaintiffs point out, a rider to the contract sets forth “Minimum Standards” for private investigators employed by Scope, “[t]he requirement that the work be done properly is a condition just as readily required of an independent contractor as of an employee and not conclusive as to either” … . McHale v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 06895, Second Dept 10-17-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (EMPLOYMENT LAW, INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/SUBCONTRACTORS (VICARIOUS LIABILITY, (INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/VICARIOUS LIABILITY (EMPLOYMENT LAW, NEGLIGENCE, INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))THIRD PARTY ASSAULT  (INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/BATTERY (EMPLOYMENT LAW, INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))

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SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendants demonstrated the storm in progress rule insulated them from liability in this snow and ice sidewalk slip and fall case because the slip and fall occurred less than four hours after the precipitation stopped. The motion to renew was properly denied because the newly submitted evidence did not call into question the applicability of the four-hour rule:

… [T]he defendants demonstrated that, pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 16-123(a), which requires building owners to clear ice and snow from an abutting sidewalk within four hours after the snow ceases to fall, excluding the hours between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., they had no duty to clear the sidewalk until 10:20 a.m., which was several hours after the plaintiff’s accident. The plaintiff moved, in effect, for leave to renew and reargue her opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In support of that branch of her motion which was for leave to renew, the plaintiff submitted the deposition testimony of a former employee of the defendants who witnessed the accident. The plaintiff argued that she was unable to present this evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment because the defendants deliberately delayed disclosing the identity of the witness until just before they made that motion. …

A motion for leave to renew “shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination” (CPLR 2221[e][2]) and “shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion”… . Here, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to renew her opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The newly submitted evidence would not have changed the prior determination … . The new facts relied on, consisting of the deposition testimony of the defendants’ former employee, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had a duty to clear the sidewalk prior to the plaintiff’s accident or whether they created or exacerbated a dangerous condition by engaging in negligent snow removal efforts. Ghoneim v Vision Enters. Mgt., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06884. Second Dept 10-17-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))/STORM IN PROGRESS RULE  (SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO RENEW, SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))/RENEW, MOTION TO (SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2221 (MOTION TO RENEW, SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF THE END OF PRECIPITATION, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE, NEWLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO RENEW DID NOT AFFECT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR HOUR RULE (SECOND DEPT))

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MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, AMENDED NOTICE PURPORTED TO ADD NEW THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND A TIME-BARRED DERIVATIVE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the motion to serve an amended notice of claim as a late notice of claim in this pedestrian accident case was properly denied. The original notice of claim alleged inadequate street lighting prevented the defendant driver from seeing the infant plaintiff. The amended notice of claim purported to add theories of liability and purported to add mother’s derivative claim. Mother’s claim could not be added because the infancy toll of the statute of limitations did not apply to her:

… [T]he plaintiffs failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a notice of claim that described the infant plaintiff’s injuries as arising from any negligence on the part of the Town other than that related to the nonfunctioning street lights, as described in the original notice of claim … . The plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate a causal nexus between the infancy of one of the plaintiffs and the delay … . Moreover, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that, within 90 days after the accident or a reasonable time thereafter, the Town acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim that it was negligent with respect to anything other than the street lights… . The plaintiffs also failed to establish that the Town would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay … .

The proposed amended notice of claim with respect to the mother’s derivative claim is time-barred because the statute of limitations expired before the plaintiffs moved to serve a late notice of claim, and the toll for infancy pursuant to CPLR 208 does not apply to a parent’s derivative cause of action … .

We also agree with the Supreme Court’s determination denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for leave to serve an amended notice of claim. A notice of claim may be amended only to correct good faith and nonprejudicial technical mistakes, omissions, or defects, not to substantively change the nature of the claim or the theory of liability … . The proposed amendments to the notice of claim added new theories of liability related to the Town’s ownership, operation, control, design, planning, study, retention, supervision, maintenance, repair, inspection, and management of the street and sidewalks on Swalm Street. Such amendments are not technical in nature and are not permitted as late-filed amendments to a notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e(6) … . Palacios v Town of N. Hempstead, 2018 NY Slip Op 06927, Second Dept 10-17-18

NEGLIGENCE (MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, AMENDED NOTICE PURPORTED TO ADD NEW THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND A TIME-BARRED DERIVATIVE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, AMENDED NOTICE PURPORTED TO ADD NEW THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND A TIME-BARRED DERIVATIVE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM  (MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, AMENDED NOTICE PURPORTED TO ADD NEW THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND A TIME-BARRED DERIVATIVE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, AMENDED NOTICE PURPORTED TO ADD NEW THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND A TIME-BARRED DERIVATIVE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 208 (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED, AMENDED NOTICE PURPORTED TO ADD NEW THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND A TIME-BARRED DERIVATIVE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))

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