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THE SEARCH OF THE UNCONSCIOUS OR SLEEPING DEFENDANT’S POCKETS WAS NOT A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST OR A SEARCH PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW; THE SEIZED COCAINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea and dismissing the drug-possession indictment, determined the police officer’s search of defendant’s pocket while he was unconscious was not a valid search incident to arrest a was not justified under the Mental Hygiene Law. The police entered the apartment with the tenant’s permission to search for a person for whom they had an arrest warrant. The tenant told the police the defendant had the same first name as the name on the warrant but that defendant was not the person they were looking for. Defendant was sitting at the kitchen table either unconscious or asleep. When the police officer couldn’t wake the defendant up, the officer searched his pockets and found cocaine:

The officers called an ambulance for defendant, but when the ambulance arrived, the medical personnel were able to wake defendant and determined that he did not need medical care. During his testimony at the suppression hearing, the officer asserted that Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 permitted him to search defendant inasmuch as he was planning to call an ambulance to transport defendant. The suppression court determined that the officer’s search of defendant’s person was justified by Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 and that the search was analogous to a search incident to arrest.

… The People correctly concede that the officer did not believe that defendant had committed a crime before he searched defendant’s pockets, and thus the search was not conducted incident to a lawful arrest … . … [W]e cannot conclude that the police officer was acting pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 because, contrary to the People’s assertion, there was insufficient evidence that defendant was in danger of harming himself or others … . People v Ruise, 2025 NY Slip Op 05589, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: For a warrantless search of a person to be justified under the Mental Hygiene Law there must be evidence the defendant is in danger of harming himself or others.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION OF A MENTALLY ILL PATIENT REQUIRES CERTIFICATION BY LICENSED PHYSICIANS, A NURSE PRACTITIONER IS COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE SUBSEQUENT RETENTION HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Love, determined that, at a hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene law sections 9.31 and 9.33 to retain an involuntary patient, the petitioner can rely on the testimony of a nurse practitioner. The controlling statute does not require the testimony of a licensed physician:

Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27 et seq. establishes the procedure for the involuntary admission and retention of patients alleged to be mentally ill in a hospital. Pursuant to that section, a patient may be initially involuntarily admitted to a hospital upon the certification of two examining physicians, which must then be confirmed by a third physician who is a member of the psychiatric staff of that hospital … . A question of first impression before this Court on this appeal is whether, at a hearing held pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.31 and 9.33 to retain an involuntary patient, the petitioner must furnish the testimony of a licensed physician rather than a nurse practitioner. * * *

There is no support in the statute or any related regulations for the proposition that the petitioner must establish its prima facie burden through physician testimony. Moreover, it reasonably can be argued that requiring the testimony of a physician, who may have comparably less knowledge of a specific patient’s mental condition compared to an experienced nurse practitioner who interacts extensively with that patient, would be a disservice to the court and the parties. The court, hearing the testimony and evidence in its totality, is in the best position to determine the value and credibility of a witness in determining these matters. Accordingly, we conclude that a nurse practitioner is competent to testify at a hearing held pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.31(c) and 9.33(c). Matter of Raymond E., 2025 NY Slip Op 04006, Second Dept 7-2-25

Practice Point: A nurse practitioner is competent to testify at a retention hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law section 9.31 and 9.33.

 

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CONFINEMENT IN A RESIDENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT UNIT (RMHU) FOR 17 HOURS A DAY, WITH AT LEAST SEVEN HOURS OF OUT-OF-CELL TIME PER DAY, FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE HUMANE ALTERNATIVES TO LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ACT (HALT ACT) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined the sanctions imposed upon petitioner, an incarcerated person with serious mental illness, did not violate the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (HALT Act) but did violate the Special Housing Unit Exclusion Law (SHU Exclusion Law):

… [P]etitioner remained in the RMHU [residential mental health treatment unit] where he received at least seven hours of out-of-cell time, therefore he was not in segregated confinement, which is defined as “the confinement of an incarcerated individual in any form of cell confinement for more than [17] hours a day” (Correction Law § 2 [23]). * * * Therefore, based on the foregoing, DOCCS [Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] did not violate Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) by placing petitioner in the RMHU longer than three days without the requisite findings under the HALT Act.

However … we do find that the disciplinary sanctions, as written, violated the SHU Exclusion Law as set forth in Correction Law § 401. To that end, Correction Law § 401 provides that “[a]n incarcerated individual . . . shall not be sanctioned with segregated confinement for misconduct [in an RMHTU], or removed from the unit and placed in segregated confinement or a[n RRU (residential rehabilitation unit)], except in exceptional circumstances where such incarcerated individual’s conduct poses a significant and unreasonable risk to . . . safety . . . and . . . has been found to have committed an act or acts defined in [Correction Law § 137 [k] [6] [ii]]” (Correction Law § 401 [5] …). “Because the statute is phrased in the disjunctive” … , DOCCS must find that exceptional circumstances existed and a Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) act occurred if either 1) the incarcerated individual is sanctioned with segregated confinement for misconduct on the unit or 2) the incarcerated individual is removed and placed in segregated confinement or an RRU. Here, the former applies as petitioner was sanctioned, in writing, with segregated confinement in the RMHU but was not found, in a written determination, to have committed an act pursuant to Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii), a fact which is uncontested by either party. Thus, the written disciplinary sanction was in violation of the SHU Exclusion Law. Therefore, the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon petitioner must be annulled. Matter of Walker v Commissioner, N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2025 NY Slip Op 02834, Third Dept 5-8-25

 

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THE “ALLEGEDLY INCAPACITATED PERSON” (AIP) WAS NOT PRESENT FOR THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW GUARDIANSHIP HEARING; THE AIP’S ATTORNEY CANNOT CONSENT TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN IF THE AIP IS NOT PRESENT; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the absence of the allegedly incapacitated person (AIP) from the proceeding to appoint a guardian pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law required remittal:

“Guardianship proceedings, as a drastic intervention in a person’s liberty, must adhere to proper procedural standards” … . Pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.11, where a petition to have a guardian appointed for an AIP has been filed … , “[a] determination that the appointment of a guardian is necessary for a person alleged to be incapacitated shall be made only after a hearing” … . Any party to the proceeding “shall” have the right to present evidence, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses and be represented by counsel … .

Most importantly, “[t]he hearing must be conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be incapacitated, either at the courthouse or where the person alleged to be incapacitated resides” … , unless the person is outside the state or “all the information before the court clearly establishes that (i) the person alleged to be incapacitated is completely unable to participate in the hearing or (ii) no meaningful participation will result from the person’s presence at the hearing” … . “There is an ‘overarching value in a court having the opportunity to observe, firsthand, the allegedly incapacitated person’ ” … .

Here, the court did not conduct a hearing in the presence of the AIP. Although the court evaluator informed the court that “[a]ll of the parties here right now agree that the AIP needs a guardian,” it is unclear whether that statement by the court evaluator constitutes an agreement by the AIP’s attorney to the court’s determination to appoint a guardian for all of the AIP’s person and property. Regardless, even if we were to deem this a situation where the AIP’s attorney agreed that the AIP consented to the appointment, “a court should not accept counsel’s representation that the AIP has consented to the appointment of a guardian where the AIP is not present” … . “[T]he court must first determine whether the AIP has the requisite capacity to consent, and must then make a finding of the AIP’s agreement to the terms of the guardianship, on the record” … . Matter of Chang v Billie J.C.-W., 2025 NY Slip Op 02446, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

Practice Point: A Mental Hygiene Law guardianship hearing must be held in the presence of the allegedly incapacitated person (AIP) absent proof the AIP cannot meaningfully participate. The judge should be able to observe the AIP.

Practice Point: The AIP’s attorney cannot consent to the appointment of a guardian in the AIP’s absence.

 

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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE COURT SHOULD USE ITS AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY WHICH SHOULD BE EMPLOYED SPARINGLY, FACTORS EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a concurring decision and an extensive dissent, determined the juvenile delinquency petition should be dismissed in the interest of justice. The concurrence argued the dismissal should be based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissent argued this difficult situation was properly handled:

Although we are mindful that “[d]ismissal in the furtherance of justice is an extraordinary remedy that must be employed sparingly,” it is our opinion that this is one of “those rare cases where there [are] compelling factor[s] which clearly demonstrate[ ] that prosecution [resulted in an] injustice” .. . … [A]ttempted assault in the third degree, a class B misdemeanor, is not serious … . … [T]he DSS caseworker was not seriously injured. * * * … [A]t the time of the attempted assault, respondent was in DSS’ care and custody because her mother was deceased and her grandmother, who subsequently adopted respondent, ultimately surrendered her rights. Respondent has a reportedly low IQ and a history of mental illness which was so severe that Family Court ordered a capacity evaluation … . Indeed, respondent had been brought to the hospital emergency room based on what was legally designed to be a temporary Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 hold. Respondent remained in what was essentially a lock and key detention in the hospital, mostly in the emergency room, under dubious circumstances for an outrageous period of six months.

… Respondent already had numerous strikes against her, not only her lack of a parent/guardian and her serious mental health challenges, but also a previous juvenile delinquency adjudication. This additional juvenile delinquency finding is a red flag that will undoubtedly hinder opportunities and could cause difficulty for respondent should she seek mental health assistance in the future. Simply put, respondent needs no additional baggage, especially not baggage stemming from a juvenile delinquency petition that was admittedly filed and continued because of the difficulty of placing her in a suitable setting … . Matter of A. WW., 2025 NY Slip Op 02377, Third Dept 4-24-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a detailed analysis of an appellate court’s authority under the Family Court Act to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition “in the interest of justice.”

 

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THE REGULATIONS WHICH PLACE A CAP ON THE NUMBER OF SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL PERSONS WHO CAN BE ADMITTED TO A LONG-TERM CARE FACILITY DO NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined the regulations putting a cap on the number of seriously mentally ill persons who can be accepted by a long-term care facility did not facially discriminate against persons with disabilities:

The State of New York’s Department of Health (DOH) licenses certain facilities known as “adult homes” to provide “long-term care, room, board, housekeeping, personal care and supervision to five or more adults unrelated to the operator” (Dept of Health Regs [18 NYCRR] § 485.2 [b]). Regulations promulgated by DOH provide that an adult home may not admit additional residents with serious mental illness if it has a capacity of 80 or more beds and its resident population is over 25% persons with serious mental illness … . Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc., an adult home subject to this admissions cap, claims that those regulations discriminate against persons with disabilities in violation of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 (FHAA), which extended the protections of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to persons with disabilities (see 42 USC § 3604 [f] [1]-[2]). We conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish that the challenged regulations facially discriminate against persons with disabilities, and therefore affirm. Matter of Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc. v Zucker, 2025 NY Slip Op 00805, CtApp 2-13-25

 

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IN THIS MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10 TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RESPONDENT, WHO HAD SERVED HIS SENTENCE FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES, REQUIRED CIVIL MANAGEMENT, HEARSAY BASED EXPERT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE AND EVIDENCE FROM ONE OF RESPONDENT’S VICTIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the jury’s finding that respondent did not suffer from a mental abnormality requiring civil management, determined that hearsay based expert evidence offered by the state, and evidence of violence and sexual offenses offered by one of respondent’s victims should not have been excluded:

… [T]he State’s expert should have been permitted to give hearsay basis testimony regarding a statement made to her by the respondent’s sexual abuse victim. “In article 10 trials, hearsay basis evidence is admissible if it satisfies two criteria. First, the proponent must demonstrate through evidence that the hearsay is reliable. Second, the court must determine that the probative value in helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect” … . Here, the State established the reliability of this hearsay basis testimony since the respondent was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree with respect to this victim … .. Moreover, the probative value of this hearsay basis testimony in helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion testimony substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect … .

The Supreme Court also erred in precluding a certain witness from testifying at trial regarding violence and sexual offenses that the respondent allegedly committed against her. The witness’s proposed testimony, which was not hearsay … , was relevant to the issue of whether the respondent suffered from a mental abnormality … , and the probative value of such testimony outweighed its prejudicial impact, particularly since the State’s expert expressly considered this proposed testimony in forming her opinion that the respondent suffered from sexual sadism … . Matter of State of New York v Kevin W., 2025 NY Slip Op 00455, Second Dept 1-29-25

Practice Point: Hearsay based expert evidence is admissible in a Mental Hygiene Law Article civil-management 10 trial if it is reliable and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

 

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THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON (AIP) MUST BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT AT GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYIGIENE LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined an alleged incapacitated person (AIP) must be given the opportunity to be present during guardianship proceedings:

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 81 to appoint a guardian of the person and property of her adult daughter Nima B. R., an alleged incapacitated person (hereinafter the AIP). At a hearing on the petition, which was conducted virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the AIP was not present. Although the AIP had indicated to her counsel that she intended to appear, she advised her counsel that she was not feeling well and needed an extra hour to get to the courthouse, and subsequently advised her counsel that she did not feel well and would not be attending. The Supreme Court conducted the hearing in the AIP’s absence, finding that she had “voluntarily absented herself” and noting that she was represented by counsel, had no burden of proof, and was not required to testify. …

Guardianship proceedings, as a drastic intervention in a person’s liberty, must adhere to proper procedural standards … . Mental Hygiene Law § 81.11(c) provides that a hearing to determine whether the appointment of a guardian is necessary for an alleged incapacitated person “must be conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be incapacitated,” including at the alleged incapacitated person’s place of residence if necessary … . “There is an ‘overarching value in a court having the opportunity to observe, firsthand, the allegedly incapacitated person'” … . Accordingly, we remit the matter … for a new hearing at which the AIP shall be afforded an opportunity to be present and a new determination thereafter. Matter of Nima B.R. (Rae-Garwood), 2024 NY Slip Op 06347, Second Dept 12-18-24

Practice Point: An alleged incapacitated person (AIP) has the right to be present at a guardianship proceeding pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law. Here the AIP said she was not feeling well and would not attend. The matter was remitted for a new hearing after affording the AIP the opportunity to attend.

 

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THE 18 USC 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE AND MUNICIPALITY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF REPONDEAT SUPERIOR DOES NOT APPLY AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE POLICE WERE ACTING PURSUANT TO A MUNICIPAL CUSTOM OR POLICY WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY PUSHED PLAINTIFF TO THE GROUND, HANDCUFFED HER AND TASED HER; HOWEVER THE BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the battery cause of action in this Civil Rights Law (18 USC 1983) case should not have been dismissed. The lawsuit stemmed from the police allegedly pushing plaintiff to the ground, striking her, handcuffing her and tasing her. The 18 USC 1983 cause of action was properly dismissed because plaintiff did not prove the police were acting pursuant to a municipal custom or policy. However, the battery cause of action should not have been dismissed:

However … a jury could rationally conclude that the defendants are liable for battery. “‘To recover damages for battery, a plaintiff must prove that there was bodily contact, made with intent, and offensive in nature'” … . “[A]n assault and battery cause of action may be based on contact during an unlawful arrest” … .

At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence from which the jury could rationally conclude that the detention was not privileged under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41, and the trial evidence showed that the officers engaged in contact with the plaintiff during the allegedly unlawful detention. The trial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was sufficient to allow the jury to rationally conclude that the two officers were acting within the scope of their official duties at the relevant time. Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to dismissal of the cause of action alleging battery … . Mac v County of Suffolk, 2024 NY Slip Op 06330, Second Dept 12-18-24

Practice Point: A municipality cannot be held liable pursuant to 18 USC 1983 for the actions of police officers under a respondeat superior theory. The plaintiff must show the police were acting pursuant to a municipal custom or policy.

Practice Point: A municipality may be liable for battery committed by police officers acting within the scope of their employment.

 

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THE JUDGE IN THIS MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD THE HEARING ON WHETHER APPELLANT WAS AN INCAPACITATED PERSON IN HER ABSENCE WITHOUT FIRST FINDING SHE COULD NOT MEANINGFULLY PARTICIPATE; IN ADDITION, COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPOINTED FOR APPELLANT BECAUSE SHE WAS CONTESTING THE GUARDIANSHIP PETITION (THIRD DEPT).

The First Department, vacating the judgment that appellant is an incapacitated person and remanding for a hearing, determined Supreme Court should not have held the Mental Hygiene Law section 81.11 hearing in appellant’s absence without first making the finding she was unable to meaningfully participate in it. In addition, Supreme Court should have appointed counsel for the appellant because she was contesting the guardianship petition:

Under the unique facts of this case [not described in the decision], we are exercising our inherent power to vacate the order and judgment in the interest of substantial justice … . Vacatur is warranted in the interest of justice because the court held a hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.11 in respondent’s absence and without having made a finding regarding her inability to meaningfully participate in the hearing … . In addition, the court failed to appoint counsel to represent respondent even though she was contesting the guardianship petition … . Matter of Jenkins v Gina B., 2024 NY Slip Op 05637, Third Dept 11-14-24

Practice Point: A hearing under the Mental Hygiene Law to determine whether a person is incapacitated should not be held in the person’s absence without a finding he or she could not meaningfully participate in the hearing.

Practice Point: Where a person is contesting a guardianship petition under the Mental Hygiene Law, he or she is entitled to appointed counsel.

 

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