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DEFENDANT WAS MISNAMED IN THE COMPLAINT BUT WAS TIMELY SERVED; THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH THE CORRECT NAME, ALTHOUGH SERVED AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY SERVED AND FILED NUNC PRO TUNC (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice complaint should not have been dismissed. The original complaint misnamed defendant Mark Gennaro as Michael Gennaro. The amended complaint with the correct name was served after the statute of limitations had run. Pursuant to CPLR 305(c) the amended complaint should have been deemed timely served and filed nunc pro tunc:

“CPLR 305(c) authorizes the court, in its discretion, to ‘allow any summons or proof of service of a summons to be amended, if a substantial right of a party against whom the summons issued is not prejudiced'” … . “‘Where the motion is to cure a misnomer in the description of a party defendant, it should be granted even after the statute of limitations has run where (1) there is evidence that the correct defendant (misnamed in the original process) has in fact been properly served, and (2) the correct defendant would not be prejudiced by granting the amendment sought'” … . “While CPLR 305(c) may be used to cure a misnomer in the description of a party defendant, it cannot be used after the expiration of the statute of limitations as a device to add or substitute an entirely new defendant who was not properly served” … . “The amendment may be made nunc pro tunc” … .

Here, the evidence established that the defendant, misnamed as Michael Gennaro in the original summons and complaint, was properly served with process within 120 days after the action was timely commenced and, thus, the Supreme Court obtained jurisdiction over the defendant (see CPLR 306-b …). Moreover, there was no evidence that the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the caption to be amended to correct the misnomer … . The defendant’s contention that the plaintiff was improperly attempting to name a new defendant after the expiration of the statute of limitations, instead of merely correcting a misnomer, is without merit … .  Brewster v North Shore/LIJ Huntington Hosp., 2023 NY Slip Op 05584, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: Here the defendant was misnamed in the original complaint and the corrected complaint was not served until after the statute of limitations had run. The amended complaint should have been deemed timely served and filed nunc pro tunc pursuant to CPLR 305(c).

 

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MALPRACTICE TREATING THE INITIAL MEDICAL INJURY AT ANOTHER HOSPITAL IS A FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE INITIAL MEDICAL INJURY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and reinstating the medical malpractice action, noted that malpractice in treating an injury is a foreseeable consequence of the injury. Plaintiff’s decedent was injured during surgery and the injury was subsequently treated at another hospital (The Valley Hospital). Defendants’ expert opined that a delay in treatment at The Valley Hospital was the cause of decedent’s injuries:

Although defendants’ expert opined that the cause of decedent’s injuries was negligent delay by The Valley Hospital, any such delay “does not absolve defendant[s] from liability because there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury” … . Malpractice in treating an injury is a foreseeable consequence of that injury, which does not supersede the causal role of the initial tort … . Therefore, regarding these injuries, defendants’ expert “never actually opined that [decedent’s] claimed injuries were not causally related to defendants’ alleged malpractice” … . Murphy v Chinatown Cardiology, P.C., 2023 NY Slip Op 05321, First Dept 10-19-23

Practice Point: If the initial medical injury leads to subsequent treatment at another hospital, any malpractice in the subsequent treatment is a foreseeable consequence of the initial medical injury.

 

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THE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S ASSERTION THAT THE FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE ATHEROSCLEROTIC CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE PROXIMATELY CAUSED DECEDENT’S PREMATURE DEATH WAS SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ON CAUSATION IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit raised a question of fact whether defendants’ failure to diagnose plaintiff’s decedent’s atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease proximately caused decedent’s premature death:

… Supreme Court properly determined that the affirmation of the defendants’ expert established, prima facie, that the treatment provided by the defendants was not a proximate cause of the decedent’s alleged injuries … . However, … the affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert, wherein the expert opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the defendants’ departures from accepted standards of medical care proximately caused the decedent to die prematurely … , as a result of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, was sufficient to raise an issue of fact with respect to causation … . Persuad v Hassan, 2023 NY Slip Op 05279, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff alleged defendants’ failure to diagnose decedent’s atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease constituted medical malpractice. Plaintiff’s expert raised a question of fact on causation by asserting the failure to diagnose the disease proximately caused decedent’s premature death.

 

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IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FAMILIARITY WITH THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE, WAS SPECULATIVE AND CONCLUSORY AND DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THE ASSERTIONS MADE BY DEFENDANTS’ EXPERTS; THE DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the affidavit from plaintiff’s expert did not demonstrate familiarity with the applicable standard of care, was speculative and conclusory, and did not address all the allegations raised by defendants’ experts:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact by submitting a redacted physician’s affidavit. “While it is true that a medical expert need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to testify regarding accepted practices in that field, the witness nonetheless should be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge[,] or experience” necessary to establish the reliability of his or her opinion …  Here, the redacted physician’s affidavit failed to lay the requisite foundation for the affiant’s familiarity with the applicable standard of nursing care … . Moreover, the opinions of the plaintiff’s expert that the defendants deviated from the applicable standard of care were speculative, conclusory, and nonresponsive to the specific assertions raised by the defendants’ experts … . Blank v Adiyody, 2023 NY Slip Op 05243, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: In a med mal action, in the context of a summary judgment motion, an expert’s affidavit must demonstrate familiarity with the applicable standard of care, must not be speculative or conclusory, and must address all the assertions made by the opposing party’s expert(s).

 

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IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS ADMITTED WITH COVID, WAS TREATED FOR COVID AND DIED FROM COVID; PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA) THE DEFENDANT WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation was immune from a lawsuit stemming from a COVID-19-related death pursuant to the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (EDTPA):

… [T]he EDTPA initially provided, with certain exceptions, that a health care facility “shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, for any harm or damages alleged to have been sustained as a result of an act or omission in the course of arranging for or providing health care services” as long as three conditions were met: the services were arranged for or provided pursuant to a COVID-19 emergency rule or otherwise in accordance with applicable law; the act or omission was impacted by decisions or activities that were in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak and in support of the State’s directives; and the services were arranged or provided in good faith … . The health care services covered by the immunity provision included those related to the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of COVID-19; the assessment or care of an individual with a confirmed or suspected case of COVID-19; and the care of any other individual who presented at a health care facility or to a health care professional during the period of the COVID-19 emergency declaration … . Mera v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04975, Second Dept 10-4-23

Practice Point: Pursuant to the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (EDTPA), the defendant health care facility was immune from a lawsuit premised upon admission, treatment and death from COVID-19.

 

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THE LABOR LAW CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN JOINED OR CONSOLIDATED WITH THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to join or consolidate the Labor Law construction accident causes of action with the medical malpractice action stemming from the injuries should not have been granted:

Plaintiff commenced suit in Kings County against several construction-related entities alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241, and common-law negligence in connection with a work place accident causing injuries. After the accident plaintiff was taken to a NYCHHC facility for treatment. Plaintiff also commenced this suit in New York County against NYCHHC, alleging medical malpractice in connection with his post-accident treatment. Although the Labor Law action and this medical malpractice action involve common questions of fact, the medical malpractice action involves numerous additional allegations of professional negligence and injuries that are irrelevant to the Labor law action, and there are no common defendants.

The issues and applicable legal principles presented in plaintiff’s Labor Law action and this medical malpractice action arising out of his subsequent treatment, are so dissimilar that joinder or consolidation pursuant to CPLR 602(a) would not be beneficial and would likely result in jury confusion … . Licona-Rubio v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04722, First Dept 9-26-23

Practice Point: Even though the construction-accident injuries were the basis for the medical malpractice action, the Labor Law and medical malpractice actions (against different defendants) should not have been joined or consolidated.

 

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THE EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT HOSPITAL IN THIS MEDICAL MALPPRACTICE ACTION WERE CONCLUSORY AND DID NOT ADDRESS ALL OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS; THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court in this medical malpractice action, determined the expert affidavits were conclusory and did not address all the allegations made by plaintiff. Therefore defendant’s (St. Luke’s) motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

The expert nurse and expert neurologist on whose affidavits St. Luke’s relied merely averred in a conclusory manner that the decedent could not have been monitored in a way to prevent her fall, that St. Luke’s implemented every appropriate fall risk procedure before the decedent’s fall, and that the decedent’s fall and the resulting subdural hematoma were not substantial factors in causing the decedent’s death … . The expert nurse also did not submit the fall risk assessment or hospital fall prevention policy in accordance with which, she claimed, the decedent was monitored … . Because St. Luke’s did not carry its prima facie burden on its motion, Supreme Court should have denied defendant’s motion with respect to those predicates, regardless of the sufficiency of the moving papers … .

As for the remaining predicates for plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claim, St. Luke’s did not address them in its moving papers, nor did its experts address them in their affidavits. Accordingly, St. Luke’s did not establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing them … . Martir v St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 2023 NY Slip Op 04478, First Dept 8-31-23

Practice Point: To warrant summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, the expert affidavits cannot be conclusory and must address all of the relevant allegations.

 

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IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, DEFENDANTS’ EXPERTS DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE BILLS OF PARTICULARS AND RELIED ON A DISPUTED FACT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice actions should not have been granted. It was alleged that plaintiff’s decedent was not properly treated for a stroke. The defendants’ experts did not address all the allegations in the bills of particulars and relied on a disputed fact:

… [T]he expert physician for the defendants …, failed to address all of the specific allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s bill of particulars … . Because [the] affirmation relied upon a disputed fact, specifically that the decedent’s condition was improving … , it was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that.[defendants] did not deviate or depart from accepted medical practice or that such deviation or departure was not a proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries … . Hiegel v Orange Regional Med. Ctr., 2023 NY Slip Op 04434, Second Dept 8-30-23

Practice Point: In a medical malpractice action, at the summary judgment stage, the defense experts must address all the allegations in the bill of particulars and may not rely on facts which are disputed.

 

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THE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS THE ABILITY TO ASSERT CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSES IS APPEALABLE; DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING THE CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSES ATTRIBUTING LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TO NON-PARTIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendants in this medical malpractice action should not have been precluded from asserting the negligence of non-parties (CPLR article 16 defenses) as an affirmative defenses. The court noted that, although the a ruling on a motion in limine is generally not appealable, a ruling on a motion which seeks to limit the legal theories which can be asserted is appealable:

“Generally, an order ruling [on a motion in limine], even when made in advance of trial on motion papers constitutes, at best, an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission” … . There is, however, “a distinction between an order that ‘limits the admissibility of evidence,’ which is not appealable . . . , and one that ‘limits the legal theories of liability to be tried’ or the scope of the issues at trial, which is appealable” … . * * *

… [D]efendants are entitled to assert their CPLR article 16 defenses regarding the nonparty providers. “As provided in CPLR 1601 (1), a defendant may raise the CPLR article 16 defense regarding a nonparty tortfeasor, provided that the plaintiff could obtain jurisdiction over that party” … . Here, defendants are entitled to raise their pleaded affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR article 16 … because plaintiff could have sought to maintain an action against the nonparty providers in Supreme Court … .

The crux of the issue on appeal is whether defendants were required, in response to plaintiff’s demands for bills of particulars, to particularize the pleaded CPLR article 16 defense, and thus whether the court properly precluded them from asserting that defense at trial when they did not timely particularize that defense. We conclude that no such particularization was required under the circumstances of this case, and thus that the court erred in precluding defendants from asserting the CPLR article 16 defense at trial. Harris v Rome Mem. Hosp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04273, Fourth Dept 8-11-23

Practice Point: Motions in limine generally are not appealable. But motions seeking to preclude legal theories of liability are appealable.

Practice Point: Under the unique circumstances of this case, defendants in this medical malpractice action should not have been precluded from presenting CPLR article 16 affirmative defenses on the ground the defenses were not particularized in the bill of particulars. It was not clear the demands related to the CPLR article 16 affirmative defenses.

 

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DEFENDANTS’ EXPERTS’ CLAIMS THAT DEFENDANTS PROVIDED PROPER CARE AND ADVICE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE BELIED BY THE MEDICAL RECORDS AS EXPLAINED BY PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s experts in this medical malpractice action raised questions of fact about the negligence of each defendant. The decision is fact-specific and far too detailed to fairly summarize, but it provides insight into when expert affidavits are deemed sufficiently substantive to raise questions of fact:

… [W]hen viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that the record raises several questions of fact as to whether each defendant satisfied the standard of care applicable to him or it … . Despite that each defendant and their respective experts opined that decedent was not presenting with the signs or symptoms of a stroke, this is belied by the medical record, which establishes that decedent was experiencing a stroke and/or vertebral artery dissection during the relevant time period that they treated decedent and presented with the “classic” symptoms associated with a stroke. At a minimum, these differing opinions create a question of fact, which plaintiff’s experts highlighted in so far that each defendant deviated from the standard of care by failing to refer decedent to a specialist or neurologist … . McCarthy v Town of Massena, N.Y. (Massena Mem. Hosp.)2023 NY Slip Op 03959, Third Dept 7-27-23

Practice Point: Here the medical records as explained by plaintiff’s experts raised questions of fact about whether plaintiff’s decedent was exhibiting symptoms of a stroke at the time defendants treated him, a diagnosis defendants allegedly failed to make.

 

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