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LABOR LAW 240(1) LIABILITY IS NONDELEGABLE AND EXTENDS TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. The scaffolding plaintiff was using collapsed and he fell 40 feet. The defendants alleged that the improper assembly of the scaffolding caused the collapse and plaintiff assembled the scaffolding. Therefore the defendants argued plaintiff’s acts constituted the sole proximate cause of his injuries, precluding recovery. However a contract indicated that another party was responsible for supplying safety equipment and meeting OSHA requirements. The court further noted that the general contractor (Varish) could not escape liability on the ground plaintiff was an independent contractor, not an employee:

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We find no merit in Varish’s contention that Labor Law § 240 (1) does not apply in that plaintiff was allegedly an independent contractor, not an employee. The duty to provide a safe working environment is nondelegable, and a contractor or owner and its agents may be liable “even though it exercised no control over, or supervision of, an independent contractor who performed the job” … . Griffin v AVA Realty Ithaca, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03829, 3rd Dept 5-11-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 240(1) LIABILITY IS NONDELEGABLE AND EXTENDS TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS)/INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, LABOR LAW 240(1) LIABILITY IS NONDELEGABLE AND EXTENDS TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS)

HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED, HOMEOWNER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK OR DID NOT CREATE OR WAS NOT AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION.

The Second Department determined defendant homeowner’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 causes of action were properly denied. Defendant did not demonstrate he did not control and supervise plaintiff’s work and he did not demonstrate he did not create or was not aware of the dangerous condition. Therefore the motion was properly denied without reference to plaintiff’s opposing papers:

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“Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 provide an exemption for owners of single and two-family houses such that liability can only be imposed where the homeowner directs or controls the work being performed” … . “In this regard, the phrase direct or control’ is to be strictly construed and, in ascertaining whether a particular homeowner’s actions amount to direction or control of a project, the relevant inquiry is the degree to which the owner supervised the method and manner of the actual work being performed by the injured employee” … . Here, the proof submitted in support of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment raises triable issues of fact as to whether he exercised the requisite degree of direction and control over the injury-[*2]producing method of work so as to impose liability under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) … . * * *

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“[W]hen a worker at a job site is injured as a result of a dangerous or defective premises condition, a property owner’s liability under Labor Law § 200 and for common-law negligence rests upon whether there is evidence that the property owner created the condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable amount of time within which to correct the condition” … . “[W]hen a worker at a job site is injured as a result of dangerous or defective equipment used in the performance of work duties, the property owner’s liability under Labor Law § 200 and for common-law negligence rests upon whether the property owner had the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the work”… . Where, as here, “an accident is alleged to involve defects in both the premises and the equipment used at the work site, the property owner moving for summary judgment with respect to causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards” … . Wadlowski v Cohen, 2017 NY Slip Op 03797, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

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LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED, HOMEOWNER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK OR DID NOT CREATE OR WAS NOT AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION)

DEFECT WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS NOT DESIGNED TO PROTECT AGAINST FALLS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), PLAINTIFF NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION, DEMOLITION OR EXCAVATION, THEREFORE LABOR LAW 241 (6) NOT APPLICABLE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly dismissed because, although he fell when getting out of an aerial bucket, the bucket was not extended and his injury was not related to the failure of a safety device designed to prevent falls. Plaintiff alleged he fell from the bucket because his foot got caught in an electrical device inside the bucket from which the cover was missing. In addition, the Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action was properly dismissed because plaintiff was not involved in construction, demolition or excavation at the time of the injury (he was hired to place an antenna on a utility pole):

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… [T]he bucket truck from which the injured plaintiff fell was not defective or inadequate insofar as it related to providing him with fall protection … . Although the dielectric liner was missing from the bucket, the injured plaintiff’s own deposition testimony was that this device was designed to protect workers from electrical shocks, and not falls. Therefore, its absence did not constitute a failure to protect pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) … . …

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Further, the … defendants established, prima facie, that the work the injured plaintiff was performing at the time of the accident did not involve construction, demolition, or excavation and, accordingly, that Labor Law § 241(6) does not apply … . Robinson v National Grid Energy Mgt., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03787, 2nd  Dept 5-10-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFECT WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS NOT DESIGNED TO PROTECT AGAINST FALLS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), PLAINTIFF NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION, DEMOLITION OR EXCAVATION, THEREFORE LABOR LAW 241 (6) NOT APPLICABLE)

THE LADDER PLAINTIFF WAS USING WOBBLED, SPUN AND FELL OVER, PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff alleged the ladder on which he was standing wobbled causing him to fall. The court distinguished a recent Court of Appeals case which found a question of fact precluded summary judgment where plaintiff fell on wet temporary exterior stairs. The First Department noted there is a presumption that a ladder or scaffold which fails did not provide adequate protection:

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As the Court of Appeals recently reiterated in O’Brien v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (_ NY3d _, 2017 NY Slip Op 02466 … , ‘The fact that a worker falls at a construction site, in itself, does not establish a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).” “Rather, liability is contingent upon the existence of a hazard contemplated in section 240(1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein” … . However, “[i]n cases involving ladders or scaffolds that collapse or malfunction for no apparent reason,” the Court of Appeals has applied “a presumption that the ladder or scaffolding device was not good enough to afford proper protection” …  — a presumption that the O’Brien Court recognized but found inapplicable to the facts before it, which involved a fall from an exterior stairway.

Here, plaintiff established prima facie that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated through his testimony that the ladder from which he fell wobbled during its use … , that two of the ladder’s rubber feet were missing …, and that the ladder spun and fell over … . Kebe v Greenpoint-Goldman Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 03712, 1st Dept 5-9-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (THE LADDER PLAINTIFF WAS USING WOBBLED, SPUN AND FELL OVER, PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, THE LADDER PLAINTIFF WAS USING WOBBLED, SPUN AND FELL OVER, PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION)

LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING STILTS, FELL WHEN A STILT CONTACTED AN OBJECT ON THE FLOOR.

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor law 240 (1) action should not have been granted. Plaintiff was using stilts to work on a ceiling when a stilt contacted a conduit on the floor, causing him to fall:

Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant established its entitlement to judgment on the theory that plaintiff’s fall was caused solely by stepping on the conduit, i.e., a “separate hazard wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first place” … , we nevertheless conclude that plaintiff raised an issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion … In his affidavit submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff clarified his deposition testimony with respect to why and how he fell … . Plaintiff was installing the last of eight ceiling tiles in a room. He explained in his deposition and in his affidavit that his work was obstructed by electrical wiring and conduit in the ceiling that had not been properly secured, thereby leaving limited space in which to install the tile, which measured two feet by four feet. With his arms fully extended overhead while attempting to move and secure the electrical wiring and conduit, he lost his balance and was forced to step backwards, at which point his right stilt came into contact with the conduit and he fell. Thus, plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether his “injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant height differential” while he was attempting to secure the electrical wiring and conduit in the ceiling in order to install the ceiling tile … , and were not solely caused by the presence of the conduit on the floor … . Piche v Synergy Tooling Sys., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03673, 4th Dept 5-5-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING STILTS, FELL WHEN A STILT CONTACTED AN OBJECT ON THE FLOOR)/STILTS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING STILTS, FELL WHEN A STILT CONTACTED AN OBJECT ON THE FLOOR)

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ELECTRICIAN SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE IN DRIVEWAY OF DEFENDANTS’ HOME, DEFENDANTS, WHO WERE OUT-OF-STATE, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE DRIVEWAY WAS LAST INSPECTED OR WHAT THE CONDITION OF THE DRIVEWAY WAS ON THE DAY OF THE SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the homeowners, who were living out-of-state while their home was being renovated, did not meet their burden of proof for summary judgment in this slip and fall case brought under Labor Law 200. Plaintiff, an electrician, alleged he slipped and fell on ice in the defendants’ driveway. The defendants didn’t demonstrate when the driveway was last inspected or what the condition of the driveway was when plaintiff fell, so the motion was denied without reference to plaintiff’s responding papers:

The Supreme Court properly determined that the homeowners had a duty to keep their property in a reasonably safe condition and provide workers with a safe place to work, even though they were residing out of state at the time of the accident … . In addition, contrary to the homeowners’ contention, the plaintiff’s alleged injuries stem from a dangerous condition on the premises … , and not from the manner in which work was performed … . Further, the court properly concluded that the homeowners failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the alleged icy condition in the driveway … . The evidence submitted in support of the homeowners’ motion, which included transcripts of the plaintiff’s and their own deposition testimony, failed to establish when they or the company they contracted with to provide snow removal on the driveway last inspected the driveway, or what the driveway looked like on the day of the accident … . DeFelice v Seakco Constr. Co., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03481, 2nd Dept 5-3-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ELECTRICIAN SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE IN DRIVEWAY OF DEFENDANTS’ HOME, DEFENDANTS, WHO WERE OUT-OF-STATE, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE DRIVEWAY WAS LAST INSPECTED OR WHAT THE CONDITION OF THE DRIVEWAY WAS ON THE DAY OF THE SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED)/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW 200, ELECTRICIAN SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE IN DRIVEWAY OF DEFENDANTS’ HOME, DEFENDANTS, WHO WERE OUT-OF-STATE, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE DRIVEWAY WAS LAST INSPECTED OR WHAT THE CONDITION OF THE DRIVEWAY WAS ON THE DAY OF THE SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED)/SLIP AND FALL (LABOR LAW 200, ELECTRICIAN SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE IN DRIVEWAY OF DEFENDANTS’ HOME, DEFENDANTS, WHO WERE OUT-OF-STATE, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE DRIVEWAY WAS LAST INSPECTED OR WHAT THE CONDITION OF THE DRIVEWAY WAS ON THE DAY OF THE SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should not have been granted. There was a question of fact whether the scaffold was an adequate safety device because defendant alleged he was ordered to work on the scaffold when it was not high enough to reach his work area:

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Inasmuch as a modification to the scaffold was required and could have taken hours to be performed, we conclude that there are triable issues of fact whether an adequate safety device was “readily available” for plaintiff’s use … . Moreover, based on plaintiff’s testimony describing the third supervisor’s instructions, we conclude that there are triable issues of fact whether plaintiff chose “for no good reason” not to wait for the scaffold to be modified … . Although the third supervisor denied making such a comment, that denial merely establishes that neither party is entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. Videan v NRG Energy, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03315, 4th Dept 4-28-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

ELEVATOR REPAIR COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), STATIONARY LADDER WAS A SAFETY DEVICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE LADDER AFFORDED ADEQUATE PROTECTION.

The Second Department determined neither defendant nor plaintiff’s decedent was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff’s decedent had to climb up a stationary ladder to access an elevator motor for repair. He slipped off the ladder while descending. The ladder was deemed a safety device covered by Labor Law 240(1) but there was question of fact whether the ladder offered adequate protection:

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The defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s decedent was not engaged in a covered activity at the time of the injury. To the contrary, the record evidence supports the plaintiff’s contention that the decedent was repairing a malfunctioning elevator car when the accident occurred … .

Moreover, under the circumstances presented, the permanently affixed ladder, which provided the only means of access to the elevated motor room, functioned as a “safety device” within the meaning of the statute … . ,,,

Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, as the evidence submitted on the plaintiff’s motion raised triable issues of fact as to whether the ladder afforded the decedent adequate protection for entering and exiting the motor room … . Esquivel v 2707 Creston Realty, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03155, 2nd Dept 4-26-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ELEVATOR REPAIR COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), STATIONARY LADDER WAS A SAFETY DEVICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE LADDER AFFORDED ADEQUATE PROTECTION)/ELEVATORS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ELEVATOR REPAIR COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), STATIONARY LADDER WAS A SAFETY DEVICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE LADDER AFFORDED ADEQUATE PROTECTION)

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DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED.

The First Department, over a dissent, determined the $900,000 default judgment in this Labor Law action should not have been vacated. The court noted that it had the power to overrule Supreme Court, even in the absence of an abuse of discretion. It has been held that a defendant’s reliance on an insurance broker to handle a lawsuit, as argued here, is a valid excuse for a default. However defendant’s principal, Mr. Gjonaj, received, over the course of years, papers sent by plaintiff’s attorney which should have alerted him to fact that the lawsuit was progressing in defendant’s absence. The court further determined plaintiff’s installation of video cameras was a covered activity under the Labor Law and his falling from a ladder was therefore actionable:

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… [Mr.  Gjonaj’s.] assertion in this case that he believed his broker was forwarding the paperwork to the appropriate insurance carrier was unreasonable in light of his conceded receipt of the summons and complaint, two motions for a default judgment, a letter from the court and a court decision reflecting a $900,000 judgment against him. Surely Mr. Gjonaj knew that if his insurance company had retained a lawyer to appear for defendants, he and his corporations would not have continued to receive legal documents directly from plaintiff’s attorney and the court for over three years. The fact that [the broker] kept assuring Mr. Gjonaj “that everything in this matter was under control and that the claim was being handled by the proper insurance company,” does not help to establish reasonableness, objective or otherwise, on the part of Mr. Gjonaj, who should have known that everything was not under control after years of receiving so many legal documents from plaintiff’s counsel relating to the same lawsuit. Gecaj v Gjonaj Realty & Mgt. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 03109, 1st Dept 4-25-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED)/LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED. FALLING FROM A LADDER WHILE INSTALLING VIDEO CAMERAS WAS A COVERED ACTIVITY)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED. FALLING FROM A LADDER WHILE INSTALLING VIDEO CAMERAS WAS A COVERED ACTIVITY)/VIDEO CAMERAS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED. FALLING FROM A LADDER WHILE INSTALLING VIDEO CAMERAS WAS A COVERED ACTIVITY)/INSURANCE LAW (DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED)/DEFAULT JUDGMENTS (DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON ITS INSURANCE BROKER TO HANDLE A LABOR LAW PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT, UNDER THE FACTS, A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED)

BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s riding in the back of a pick-up truck was not an Industrial Code violation. Plaintiff was injured when the truck came to an abrupt stop. He was instructed to ride in the back of the truck a short distance while moving debris to a dumpster. The Second Department held that the bed of the truck was a proper “platform” within the meaning of the Industrial Code and, therefore, plaintiff’s injury was not caused by an Industrial Code violation:

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… [T]he plaintiff asserted a cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) predicated on an alleged violation of section 23-9.7(e) of the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR 23-9.7[e]), which reads as follows: “Riding. No person shall be suffered or permitted to ride on running boards, fenders or elsewhere on a truck or similar vehicle except where a properly constructed and installed seat or platform is provided.” The defendants separately moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them, arguing that the platform of a pickup truck is a “properly constructed and installed . . . platform” within the meaning of section 23-9.7(e). The Supreme Court denied those branches of the motions.

“The interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation presents a question of law for the court” … . Moreover, in interpreting a regulation, this Court must assume that the promulgating agency ” did not deliberately place a phrase in the [regulation] which was intended to serve no purpose . . . and each word must be read and given a distinct and consistent meaning'” … .

Guided by the above principles, the word “platform” as used in subdivision (e) of section 23-9.7 must reasonably be read to include the platform of a pickup truck. While such a platform is normally intended for transporting cargo, the Vehicle and Traffic Law contemplates that it may also be used, without restriction, to carry people over distances of less than five miles (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1222). Thus, it is reasonable to interpret section 23-9.7(e) as excluding from its scope an activity that is not prohibited by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1222.

Therefore, under the facts presented, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff could not establish a violation of section 23-9.7(e) of the Industrial Code. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Pruszko v Pine Hollow Country Club, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03025, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)/PLATFORM (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, INDUSTRIAL CODE, BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)/TRUCKS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)

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