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DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR VACATION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER EITHER CPLR 5015 OR 317; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment did not meet the criteria of either CPLR 5015(a)(1) or CPLR 317:

“A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action” … . * * *

Here, the defendant failed to provide a “detailed and credible explanation” for the default … . Rather, the defendant submitted only an affidavit of an employee of its loan servicer averring that the defendant’s agent for process had emailed the summons and complaint to the servicer, and the complaint had been “routed in error to the incorrect email address within” the servicer, which prevented the servicer from “timely notify[ing] its counsel of the [instant] action.” That conclusory and nondetailed allegation does not constitute a reasonable excuse warranting vacatur of the default … . * * *

Although the defendant expressly moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) only, the Supreme Court properly considered whether the defendant set forth grounds to vacate its default pursuant to CPLR 317 … . CPLR 317 provides, in relevant part, that a party served with a summons other than by personal delivery and who does not appear “may be allowed to defend the action within one year after he [or she] obtains knowledge of entry of the judgment . . . upon a finding of the court that he [or she] did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense.” A defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 317 is not required to set forth a reasonable excuse for the delay in answering the complaint … . However, “‘to support a determination granting relief under CPLR 317, a party must still demonstrate, and the Court must find, that the party did not receive actual notice of the summons and complaint in time to defend the action'” … .

… [T]he defendant did not even deny receipt of the summons and complaint. 259 Milford, LLC v FV-1, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 06898, Second Dept 12-7-22

Practice Point: The criteria for vacation of a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 and 317 are different and are explained in this decision. The defendant did not meet the criteria for either statute.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY-RELATED ACTIONS WERE NOT WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS SUCH THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY DELAYS WARRANTED VACATING THE NOTE OF ISSUE AND PAYMENT OF $3000 TO DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this traffic accident case should not have been dismissed as a discovery sanction. But defendant’s motion to vacate the note of issue due to plaintiff’s delay in disclosing prior relevant injuries should have been granted. In addition the appellate court ordered plaintiff’s attorney to pay defendants’ attorney $3000:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to the extent of directing dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126(3). Although the plaintiff initially failed to provide authorizations for the release of medical records relating to pertinent injuries which pre-date the subject accident, the plaintiff did provide date-restricted authorizations for the release of medical records relating to pertinent injuries approximately one week after the defendants requested them. … [D]efendants did not clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff’s discovery-related conduct was willful and contumacious … .

However, in light of the plaintiff’s delay in disclosing information about prior injuries that bear on the controversy and would assist preparation for trial … . the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion to the extent of vacating the note of issue … , directing the plaintiff to provide the defendants with authorizations permitting the release of medical records relating to pertinent injuries which pre-date the subject accident, and directing the plaintiff’s attorney to pay the sum of $3,000 to the defendants’ attorney….. Lopez v Maggies Paratransit Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 06793, Second Dept 11-30-22

Practice Point: Here in this traffic accident case plaintiff’s delays in providing information about prior relevant injuries warranted vacating the note of issue and payment of $3000 by plaintiff’s attorney to defendants’ attorney.

 

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FAMILY COURT’S BEST INTERESTS RULING IN THIS MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY PROCEEDING DID NOT HAVE A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN THE RECORD; THE APPELLATE DIVISION AWARDED PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY TO MOTHER (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s petition for a modification of custody should have been granted:

Having concluded that Family Court’s determination lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record, we are empowered to make our own independent determination of the child’s best interests, and our authority in that regard is as broad as that of Family Court … . In reviewing the record, we note that the mother testified without contradiction that she does not abuse alcohol or drugs, and while she previously struggled with her mental health, the hearing evidence showed that she has overcome that challenge and achieved a stable home life. By contrast, we find problematic the evidence of the father’s regular drinking in the child’s presence and his apparent lack of candor during the DWI assessment, as well as the dirty and unkempt condition of his apartment. We also find significant the strong position of the appellate attorney for the child in support of the mother’s petition … . In light of the foregoing, we hold that the child’s best interests are served by having the parents continue to share joint legal custody but awarding primary physical custody to the mother, with parenting time for the father as the parties shall mutually agree … . Matter of Brittni P. v Michael P., 2022 NY Slip Op 06667, Third Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: The appellate court, reversing Family Court, held the evidence did not support Family Court’s best interests ruling continuing primary physical custody with father. The appellate court undertook its own analysis of the record and awarded primary physical custody to mother.

 

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IN THIS MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY PROCEEDING, MOTHER’S PROOF OF THE CHILD’S INJURIES IN FATHER’S CARE AND HER IMPROVED PARENTING SKILLS AND LIVING CONDITIONS WAS SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS; THE JUDGE APPEARS TO HAVE PREJUDGED THE CASE; MATTER REMITTED TO BE HEARD BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court and remitting the case to a different judge, determined mother’s petition for a modification of custody should not have been dismissed:

“A parent seeking to modify an existing custody order must first show that a change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the existing custody order that then warrants an inquiry into what custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child” … .. “Only after this threshold hurdle has been met will the court conduct a best interests analysis” … . “When, as here, Family Court is tasked with deciding a motion to dismiss at the close of the petitioner’s proof, the court must accept the petitioner’s evidence as true and afford the petitioner every favorable inference that could reasonably be drawn from that evidence, including resolving all credibility questions in the petitioner’s favor” … . * * *

After reviewing the record, we find that the mother’s proof regarding injuries suffered by the child during the father’s parenting time, taken together with the mother’s improved parenting abilities and living conditions, demonstrated a change in circumstances sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss … . * * *

Based on Family Court’s comments regarding its predispositions and its inappropriate comment regarding the mother’s credibility, Family Court appears to have prejudged the case … . Therefore, this matter must be remitted for a new hearing before a different judge. Matter of Nicole B. v Franklin A., 2022 NY Slip Op 06672, Third Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: Here the evidence of the child’s injuries in father’s care and mother’s improved parenting skills and living conditions was sufficient to support her petition for a modification of custody. Father’s motion to dismiss the petition should not have been granted. The judge’s remarks about mother’s credibility and his encouraging father to make a motion to dismiss indicated the judge had prejudged the case. The matter was sent back to be heard by a different judge.

 

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​ THE DISCHARGED LAW FIRM HANDLED THE PERSONAL INJURY CASE FOR TWO YEARS; ALTHOUGH THE FIRM DID NOT SUBMIT ANY TIME RECORDS, SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO AWARD THE DISCHARGED FIRM A PORTION OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE AFTER THE CASE SETTLED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney’s fees to a law firm (Gross) which represented the plaintiff in a personal injury case for two years before being discharged. The case ultimately settled:

After being retained, Gross filed a no-fault benefits application, referred the plaintiff to several doctors, scheduled and rescheduled independent medical examinations, and helped the plaintiff obtain a presettlement loan. The principal of Gross also asserted that the firm investigated the accident scene, obtained and reviewed medical records and other relevant documents, and “spen[t] a great deal . . . of time” on the phone with the plaintiff “answering his many questions about his claim.” The plaintiff ultimately discharged Gross. In May 2018, the plaintiff retained nonparty Gregory Spektor & Associates, P.C. (hereinafter Spektor). In December 2018, Spektor filed a summons and complaint in this action on the plaintiff’s behalf. In July 2020, the plaintiff obtained a $100,000 settlement.* * *

… [I]t cannot be said that the services performed by Gross were of no value … . Although Gross failed to submit time records showing the hours allegedly spent investigating and discussing the claim with the plaintiff, Gross submitted evidence showing that it performed various services in connection with the plaintiff’s case over a period in excess of two years, including, but not limited to, ensuring the plaintiff’s appearances for independent medical examinations to determine the extent of his injuries and the need for additional treatment, and obtaining documentation vital to the plaintiff’s case … . Considering the amount of time spent by Gross working on matters pertaining to the plaintiff’s case, the nature of the work performed, and the relative contributions of counsel, we deem it appropriate to award 10% of the net contingency fee to Gross. Jules v David, 2022 NY Slip Op 06696, Second Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: Supreme Court abused its discretion in refusing to award a discharged law firm a portion of the contingency fee after the case settled. Although the firm did not submit any time records in this personal injury case, it did schedule independent medical exams, review medical records, investigate the accident scene, obtain documents, etc.

 

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THE JUDGE, PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL AGREED DEFENDANT SHOULD STEP OUT OF THE COURTROOM WHEN HIS JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS DISCUSSED IN A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S AGREEMENT TO HAVE DEFENDANT STEP OUT OF THE COURTROOM WAS NOT A WAIVER OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT; CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should have been present for the sidebar conference about the justification defense in this attempted murder by stabbing case. Defendant claimed he had a heart condition triggered by stress which causes his heart to race until he passes out. Defense counsel argued the condition was relevant to the justification defense because defendant felt he had to stab the victim before he passed out to protect himself. Before the issue was discussed the judge, prosecutor and defense counsel agreed the defendant should step out of the courtroom. The judge ruled the evidence of the heart condition could not come in unless the defendant’s testimony established a connection between the condition and the interaction with the victim:

… [T]he subject of the instant sidebar conference clearly implicated defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge such that his participation might have assisted him in advancing his justification defense to the murder and assault counts. The subject of the conference was whether defendant would be permitted to testify as to a medical (heart) condition with regard to his justification defense. During the sidebar conference the court repeatedly implored defense counsel to explain how defendant’s serious medical condition impacted his assessment of his physical safety. Defendant’s presence at the sidebar conference would have afforded him an opportunity to apprise the court, defense counsel and prosecutor of the exact details of his heart condition in order to demonstrate that it affected his assessment of the circumstances he was confronted with prior to the stabbing incident … . * * *

Although the right to be present at a sidebar conference need not be preserved by an objection … , the right may be waived. Such right may be waived either explicitly or implicitly by defendant … . …

… [D]efendant did not waive the right to be present at the sidebar conference. Contrary to the People’s assertion, defendant did not personally waive his right to be present either explicitly or implicitly. At no time did defendant make an affirmative statement on the record that he did not wish to attend the side bar conference. And no one ever asked him directly. … [H]e was commanded to leave the courtroom so that the sidebar conference could take place in his absence. … [A]t no time was defendant made aware that he had the right to be present at the sidebar conference … . …

… [I]n the absence of any record discussion by the court with counsel and the prosecutor regarding defendant’s right to be present at the sidebar conference, defense counsel’s expression of lack of objection to his client absence from the sidebar conference is not an affirmative statement by counsel confirming that defendant himself was waiving his right to be present at the sidebar conference … . People v Girard, 2022 NY Slip Op 06645, First Dept 11-22-22

Practice Point: Defense counsel agreed to have the defendant step out of the courtroom when the justification defense was discussed in a sidebar conference. Defense counsel’s agreement did not constitute a waiver of defendant’s right to be present. The conviction was reversed.

 

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THE JUDGE IN THIS POST-DIVORCE PROCEEDING ENCOMPASSING FIVE APPEALS, WAS DEEMED TO HAVE MADE MANY RULINGS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, IN PART BECAUSE NECESSARY HEARINGS WERE NOT HELD; THE IMPROPER RULINGS INCLUDED A RESTRICTION OF THE ATTORNEY-FOR-THE-CHILD’S (AFC’S) INTERACTIONS WITH THE CHILDREN (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (and modifying) Supreme Court in this post-divorce proceeding encompassing several appeals, determined many of the court’s rulings were not supported by the record, due in part to the court’s failure to hold hearings. The court had imposed “house rules” for the children, refused to hold a Lincoln hearing, made contempt findings, modified father’s visitation, suspended father’s child support obligations, ordered family unification therapy, limited the attorney-for-the-child’s interactions with the children, and made several other rulings with which the appellate division found fault. The decision is far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

The mother and the AFC contend in appeal Nos. 1, 3, and 5 that the court erred in altering the terms of the parties’ custody and visitation arrangement and in imposing its house rules without conducting a hearing to determine the children’s best interests. We agree. We therefore modify the orders in appeal Nos. 1, 3, and 5 accordingly, and we reinstate the provisions of the agreement and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing, including a Lincoln hearing, to determine whether modification of the parties’ custody and visitation arrangement is the children’s best interests.

Where there is “a dispute between divorced parents, the first concern of the court is and must be the welfare and the interests of the children” … , and “[a]ny court in considering questions of child custody must make every effort to determine what is for the best interest of the child[ren], and what will best promote [their] welfare and happiness” … . Consequently, visitation and “custody determinations should ‘[g]enerally’ be made ‘only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry’ “… , “[u]nless there is sufficient evidence before the court to enable it to undertake a comprehensive independent review of” the children’s best interests … . Burns v Grandjean, 2022 NY Slip Op 06577, Fourth Dept 11-18-22

Practice Point: Here the Fourth Department took issue with many, many rulings made by Supreme Court in this post-divorce proceeding. The decision encompassed five appeals and too many issues to fairly summarize. Many of Supreme Court’s rulings were deemed to have been unsupported by record, in large part because necessary hearings were not held.

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE LOOKED BEYOND THE PLEADINGS IN CONSIDERING THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT; THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court abused its discretion by denying the motion to amend the complaint:

“Leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit” ( … see CPLR 3025 [b]). “A court should not examine the merits or legal sufficiency of the proposed amendment unless the proposed pleading is clearly and patently insufficient on its face” … . Here, we conclude that the court erred in denying the motion inasmuch as there was no showing of prejudice arising from the proposed amendments … and the proposed amended complaint adequately asserts causes of action for slander of title … and removal of a cloud on title by reformation or cancellation of a deed … . In making its determination that the proposed causes of action were palpably insufficient, the court improperly looked beyond the face of the proposed pleading to the documents establishing the chain of title to plaintiffs’ properties and a 2011 deed from the Trustees of Grenell Island Chapel to defendant. DiGiacco v Grenell Is. Chapel, 2022 NY Slip Op 06576, Fourth Dept 11-18-22

Practice Point: Here Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint. The judge should not have looked beyond the pleading in deciding the motion to amend.

 

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BOTH PARTIES MOVED TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE FOR FILING A NOTE OF ISSUE BECAUSE DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE; DENYING THE MOTION MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CASE TO PROGRESS; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to extend the deadline for filing the note of issue should not have been denied because discovery was incomplete:

The motion court improvidently denied the motions of both parties to extend the deadline to file the note of issue and to complete discovery since discovery was not complete. Under the circumstances, the court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion left the parties in limbo where they could neither move forward to trial nor complete the discovery necessary to move forward to trial, thereby frustrating the strong public policy favoring open disclosure to allow the parties to adequately prepare (CPLR 3101[a] …). Additionally, as defendant demonstrated a need for additional discovery and to depose plaintiff’s expert, who was hired to calculate damages in this commercial case, its motion should have been granted (see 22 NYCRR 202.70, Rule 13[c] …). 361 Broadway Assoc. Holdings, LLC v Foundations Group I, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 06571, First Dept 11-17-22

Practice Point: if the judge makes it impossible for the case to progress, here by denying both parties’ motions to extend the deadline for filing the note of issue to complete discovery, the appellate court will reverse.

 

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HERE THE FAILURE TO OPPOSE THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS DUE TO NEGLECT WHICH DOES NOT WARRANT VACATUR; THE MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER ENTERED ON PLAINTIFF’S DEFAULT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order entered upon plaintiff’s default should not have been granted:

Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), “[t]he court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person . . . upon the ground of . . . excusable default.” “A party seeking to vacate an order entered upon his or her default in opposing a motion must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion” . “Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party’s default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible” and detailed explanation of the default … . The determination as to what constitutes a reasonable excuse is a matter of the court’s discretion, but mere neglect will not suffice … .

… [A] managing attorney at the law firm representing the plaintiff was notified of the February 28, 2018 adjourned deadline to submit opposition papers to the defendants’ motion, and a member of the firm entered a “follow up docket date” for February 7, 2018, “to ensure that the opposition was being handled” … . However, instead of “follow[ing] up with the managing attorney to make sure the opposition was assigned,” the member of the law firm returned the file to the file room. As the member of the law firm affirmed, “[i]t simply was not addressed properly.” … [T]he plaintiff did not move to vacate the order dated August 29, 2018, for approximately eight months, or 253 days, after being served with the order and notice of entry … .

… [T]he plaintiff’s failure to oppose the defendants’ motion was the equivalent of mere neglect and was therefore insufficient to warrant vacatur … . Sauteanu v BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 06509, Second Dept 11-16-22

Practice Point: A motion to vacate an order entered upon a party’s default may be granted on law-office-failure grounds but not if the matter was simply neglected. Here the plaintiff did not move to vacate the order for 253 days after service of the order and notice of entry. The court found the plaintiff’s failure to oppose the summary judgment was due to neglect and the motion to vacate the order should not have been granted.

 

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