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THE JUDGE’S PROVIDING A RACE-NEUTRAL REASON FOR THE PEOPLE’S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO A JUROR, WHILE THE PROSECUTOR REMAINED SILENT, WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the judge’s providing a race-neutral reason for the People’s peremptory challenge of a juror, while the prosecutor remained silent, was reversible error:

Here, it is undisputed that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against K.S., an African-American female, and that the burden then shifted to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral basis for its peremptory strike. The People failed to do so entirely … . Rather, the court stepped in to provide an explanation, speculating that the prosecution had gotten a “bad vibe” from K.S. regarding whether her prior jury service resulted in an acquittal. The prosecution remained silent. The court nevertheless ruled that the prosecution had “given a legitimate race neutral reason” for the strike.

This serious departure from the Batson framework was an error of the highest order. When the court supplied a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike, it failed to hold the prosecution to its burden and instead, effectively became an advocate for the prosecution, thus abandoning its Batson-specific duty to “consider the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations in light of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, and in light of the arguments of the parties” … . It is the nonmovant’s expressed explanation for its peremptory challenge—and whether such explanation is mere pretext for a race-based motive—not simply whether a race-neutral reason could theoretically exist—which is the focus of the Batson framework at steps two and three … . The court’s speculation as to the prosecution’s basis for the strike was irrelevant and deprived defendant of any meaningful way to demonstrate pretext in the face of the prosecution’s silence. People v Estwick, 2024 NY Slip Op 02768, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: It is the prosecutor’s actual reason for a peremptory challenge which is required under Batson, not the theoretical existence of a race-neutral reason. Therefore the Batson procedure is violated where, as here, the judge steps in to provide a reason while the prosecutor remains silent.

 

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HERE THERE WAS NO VALID REASON TO DENY DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s request to represent himself should have been granted:

The court deprived defendant of his constitutional right to self-representation when it denied defendant’s motion to proceed pro se despite defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. A defendant may invoke the right to self-representation where “(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues” … . Here, defendant made a timely and unequivocal request to represent himself, and during an extensive inquiry, at which time the court repeatedly warned defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, defendant affirmed that he understood the risks and insisted on representing himself at trial … . Defendant’s lack of familiarity with the law was not a proper basis for the denial of his motion … . Further, nothing in the record indicates that defendant’s motion was calculated to undermine or delay the progress of the trial— indeed, the court determined that defendant was not malingering—and defendant’s purported “outbursts” during two prior pretrial video conferences did not suggest an intent to disrupt the proceedings … . People v Ivezic, 2024 NY Slip Op 02785, First Dept 5-21-24

Practice Point: A defendant’s lack of knowledge of the law is not a valid reason for denying defendant’s request to represent himself at trial.

 

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THE CHILD’S FOSTER PARENTS WERE PERSONS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD AND WERE ENTITLED TO A HEARING BEFORE THE CHILD WAS REMOVED FROM THEIR CARE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the foster parents, as persons legally responsible for the care of the child, were entitled to a hearing before the child was removed from their care:

Family Court Act § 1028(a) provides that “[u]pon the application of the parent or other person legally responsible for the care of a child temporarily removed under this part . . . , the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the child should be returned,” with two exceptions not relevant here … . Family Court Act § 1028(a) further provides that “[e]xcept for good cause shown, such hearing shall be held within three court days of the application and shall not be adjourned” … .

The phrase “person legally responsible” “includes the child’s custodian, guardian, [or] any other person responsible for the child’s care at the relevant time” … . “The Court of Appeals, in interpreting Family Court Act § 1012(g), has held that ‘the common thread running through the various categories of persons legally responsible for a child’s care is that these persons serve as the functional equivalent of parents'” … . Further, “a person may act as the functional equivalent of a parent even though that person assumes temporary care or custody of a child,” as long as “the care given the child [is] analogous to parenting and occur[s] in a household or ‘family’ setting” … . “Factors to be considered in determining whether an applicant is a person legally responsible for the care of a child include ‘(1) the frequency and nature of the contact, (2) the nature and extent of the control exercised by the [applicant] over the child’s environment, (3) the duration of the [applicant’s] contact with the child, and (4) the [applicant’s] relationship to the child’s parent(s)'” … .

Here, the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a determination that the foster parents were persons legally responsible for the care of the child. The evidence demonstrated that the child, eight years old at the time of the foster parents’ application, had been under the foster parents’ care for most of his life. . Matter of Samson R. (Christopher R.), 2024 NY Slip Op 02710, Second Dept 5-15-24

Practice Point: Here the foster parents had cared for the eight-year-old for most of his life. They were “persons legally responsible for the care of the child” and therefore were entitled to a hearing before removal of the child.

 

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MOTHER’S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND EVASIVE TESTIMONY DID NOT AMOUNT TO “FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT” WARRANTING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AS A SANCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have awarded petitioner attorney’s fees as a sanction against mother based on mother’s testimony in the proceedings: Mother’s conduct was not “frivolous” within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 131-1.1(a):

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a), the court is authorized to award a party in a civil action “reasonable attorney’s fees . . . resulting from frivolous conduct.” Conduct is frivolous if “(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false” … . “A party seeking the imposition of a sanction or an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c) has the burden of demonstrating that the conduct of the opposing party was frivolous within the meaning of the rule” … .

Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the mother engaged in frivolous conduct within the meaning of the rule. Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, the mother’s inconsistent statements and evasive testimony were not frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 … . Matter of Edwin C. v Fenny C., 2024 NY Slip Op 02700,, Second Dept 5-15-24

Practice Point: Here in this Family Court proceeding petitioner was awarded attorney’s fees as a sanction pursuant to 22 NYCRR 131-1.1(a) based on mother’s “inconsistent statements” and “evasive testimony.” Mother’s conduct was not “frivolous” within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 131-1.1(a). The petition should not have been granted.

 

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FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION CHALLENGING A RESTRAINING ORDER RESTRICTING HIS ABILITY TO MAKE STATEMENTS DIRECTED AT POTENTIAL WITNESSES IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL DENIED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined the restraining order restricting former President Donald Trump’s speech during his criminal trial was valid. Trump’s petition for a writ of prohibition was denied:

The Federal Restraining Order is nearly identical to the Restraining Order issued against petitioner in the underlying criminal case … .

Petitioner brings this petition because he disagrees with where the circuit court drew the line in balancing the competing considerations of his First Amendment rights to free expression and the effective functioning of the judicial, prosecutorial and defense processes … . Weighing these concerns, the circuit court ultimately concluded that, given the record, the court had “a duty to act proactively to prevent the creation of an atmosphere of fear or intimidation aimed at preventing trial participants and staff from performing their functions within the trial process” … . This Court adopts the reasoning in the circuit court’s Federal Restraining Order Decision.

The Federal Restraining Order Decision properly found that the order was necessary under the circumstances, holding that “Trump’s documented pattern of speech and its demonstrated real-time, real-world consequences pose a significant and imminent threat to the functioning of the criminal trial process” … . First, the circuit court concluded that petitioner’s directed statements at potential witnesses concerning their participation in the criminal proceeding posed a significant and imminent threat to their willingness to participate fully and candidly, and that courts have a duty to shield witnesses from influences that could affect their testimony and undermine the integrity of the trial process … . Justice Merchan properly determined that petitioner’s public statements posed a significant threat to the integrity of the testimony of witnesses and potential witnesses in this case as well. Matter of Trump v Merchan, 2024 NY Slip Op 02680, First Dept 5-14-24

Practice Point: A court has the power to restrict speech by a defendant in a criminal trial which is directed at potential trial witnesses and which could threaten the witnesses’ willingness to testify.

 

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A DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET SUBMITTED PAST THE 60-DAY DEADLINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the deposition errata sheet should have been struck because it was submitted after the 60-day period expired:

Supreme Court erred in denying their joint motion to the extent that it seeks to strike plaintiff’s errata sheet inasmuch as the errata sheet was untimely (see CPLR 3116 [a]). We therefore modify the order accordingly. CPLR 3116 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o changes to the transcript may be made by the witness more than sixty days after submission to the witness for examination.” It is undisputed that plaintiff did not submit the errata sheet within 60 days of her deposition, and submitted it over a month after the 60-day period expired, in opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s reasons for the lateness under the circumstances did not constitute a good cause for the delay (see CPLR 2004 …). We note that we did not consider the errata sheet when reviewing defendants’ contentions regarding their motions for summary judgment. Pagan v GPK, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02631, Fourth Dept 5-10-24

Practice Point: A motion to strike a deposition errata sheet submitted past the 60-day deadline should be granted.

 

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“GOOD CAUSE” FOR FILING A LATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION MUST BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE INITIAL MOTION PAPERS, NOT IN THE REPLY PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s late summary judgment motion should not have been granted because the initial papers  did not demonstrate “good cause” for the late filing. The “good cause” allegations in defendant’s reply papers should not have been considered:

Defendant’s motion was … untimely … and, thus, defendant was required to demonstrate “good cause” for the untimeliness of the motion in its initial motion papers (CPLR 3212 [a] …). Indeed, “[i]t is well settled that it is improper for a court to consider the ‘good cause’ proffered by a movant if it is presented for the first time in reply papers” … . Inasmuch as it is undisputed here that defendant did not proffer any good cause for the delay in its initial motion papers, the court erred in considering the motion and should have denied it as untimely … . Worden v City of Utica, 2024 NY Slip Op 02628, Fourth Dept 5-10-24

Practice Point: If you make a late summary judgment motion, you must demonstrate “good cause” for being late in the initial motion papers. A “good cause” demonstration in the reply papers should not be considered by the judge.

 

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PROOF OF THE VALUE OF STOLEN PROPERTY WAS INSUFFICIENT; CONVICTION REDUCED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reducing defendant’s possession-of-stolen-property conviction, determined the value of the property was not established:

We agree with defendant that, with respect to his conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree under count 1 of the indictment, there is legally insufficient evidence establishing the value of the items seized from the storage unit. Although defendant did not preserve that issue for our review, we exercise our power to address it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice … . “A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree when [that person] knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit [that person] or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars” … . It is well settled that “a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for [their] statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value” … . “Conclusory statements and rough estimates of value are not sufficient” to establish the value of the property … . Although the People elicited some valuation testimony from the victims at trial, such testimony did not include the basis for the victims’ knowledge of the value of most of the items in the storage unit … . We conclude on this record that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that the value of the property taken exceeded $3,000 … . The evidence is legally sufficient, however, to establish that defendant committed the lesser included offense of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (see § 165.40). People v Hensley, 2024 NY Slip Op 02650, Fourth Dept 5-10-24

Practice Point: The basis for the victim’s knowledge of the value of the stolen property was not demonstrated; possession-of-stolen-property conviction reduced.

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUSPENDED FATHER’S VISITATION WITHOUT MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT, MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have suspended father’s visitation without making findings of fact:

The father … contends that the court failed to make any factual findings whatsoever to support the determination to suspend the father’s visitation with the child, and that the matter should be remitted to allow the court to make such findings. We agree. It is “well established that the court is obligated ‘to set forth those facts essential to its decision’ ” … . Here, the court completely failed to follow that well-established rule when it failed to issue any factual findings to support its determination … , either with respect to whether there had been a change in circumstances … or the relevant factors that it considered in making a best interests of the child determination … . “Effective appellate review, whatever the case but especially in child visitation, custody or neglect proceedings, requires that appropriate factual findings be made by the trial court—the court best able to measure the credibility of the witnesses” … . We therefore reverse the amended order and remit the matter to Family Court to make a determination on the petition including specific findings as to a change in circumstances and the best interests of the child, following an additional hearing if necessary … . Matter of Miller v Boyden, 2024 NY Slip Op 02648, Fourth Dept 5-10-24

Practice Point: Here Family Court should not have suspended father’s visitation without making findings of fact because appellate review is impossible; matter remitted.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS QUANTUM MERUIT CASE. DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE A JURY TRIAL AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL ON DAMAGES; BENCH-TRIAL VERDICT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant never waived a jury trial in this quantum-meruit action. Therefore, although plaintiff was granted summary judgment, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on damages:

… [T]he order awarding damages must be reversed, and the judgment vacated … . Upon granting plaintiff summary judgment for liability on its quantum meruit claim, Supreme Court conducted a hearing on attorneys’ fees. However, claims seeking recovery under the “quasi-contractual theory of quantum meruit” for “only money damages” are considered “actions at law” entitling parties to a trial by jury … . Defendant did not waive a jury trial, but instead filed his jury demand “within fifteen days after service of the note of issue,” and more than a year before the purported attorney fee hearing was held (CPLR 4102[a]). Defendant’s “right to a jury trial [wa]s not lost, when [the] motion [and cross-motion] for summary judgment [were] decided against [him]” … , yet Supreme Court deprived him of this right by conducting a bench trial on damages … . Hilton Wiener LLC v Zenk, 2024 NY Slip Op 02595, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Quantum meruit is an action at law entitling parties to a jury trial.

Practice Point: Here defendant never waived a jury trial and, although summary judgment was awarded to plaintiff, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on damages.

 

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