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INSURER’S ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN AN UNDERLYING ACTION (WHICH ALLEGED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT PROTECT AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer’s action against the defendant school district, seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurer is not obligated to indemnify the defendants for a settlement reached in mediation, should not have been dismissed. The underlying action alleged the school district did not protect the plaintiffs from anti-Semitic harassment and discrimination. The insurer defended the action but reserved the right to disclaim coverage. A $3,000,000 (plus $1,480,000 attorney’s fees) settlement was reached. The Second Department determined the documentary evidence submitted by the school district, i.e., the insurance policies, did not conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law. Therefore the motion to dismiss the insurer’s declaratory judgment action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) should not have been granted:

The plaintiffs in the underlying action … alleged that repeated and frequent incidents of anti-Semitic harassment and discrimination against them by other students, which were reported to school officials on numerous occasions and directly observed on other occasions by school personnel, gave rise to an inference that the defendants “intended for the harassment to occur” based upon the defendants’ practices, policies, and customs in dealing with reports and observations of anti-Semitic harassment and discrimination, that the defendants “intentionally discriminated” against the plaintiffs, that the defendants’ conduct “aided and incited” unlawful discrimination, and that the defendants’ acts and omissions were “undertaken recklessly and with the intent to engage in wrongful conduct.”

While “it is not legally impossible to find accidental results flowing from intentional causes, i.e., that the resulting damage was unintended although the original act or acts leading to the damage were intentional”… , the insurance policies do not conclusively establish that the plaintiff is obligated to indemnify the defendants in the underlying action, and the other evidence submitted by the defendants did not utterly refute the factual allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint. Whether the incidents set forth in the amended complaint in the underlying action were accidents present questions of fact which cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) … . Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 01565, Second Dept 3-7-18

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER’S ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN AN UNDERLYING ACTION (WHICH ALLEGED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT PROTECT AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, INSURANCE LAW, (INSURER’S ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN AN UNDERLYING ACTION (WHICH ALLEGED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT PROTECT AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3211 (MOTION TO DISMISS ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, INSURANCE LAW, (INSURER’S ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN AN UNDERLYING ACTION (WHICH ALLEGED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT PROTECT AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (INSURANCE LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE, INSURER’S ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN AN UNDERLYING ACTION (WHICH ALLEGED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT PROTECT AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

THE LAWSUIT ALLEGED ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS, WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE, THE PASSING REFERENCES TO PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT, WHICH WOULD BE COVERED, DID NOT TRIGGER THE DUTY TO DEFEND (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department upheld the declaratory judgment finding that defendant insurer does not have a duty to defend based upon the exclusion of coverage for antitrust violations. Despite the allegations in the complaint which colored the action as one for product disparagement, which would be covered, the complaint alleged antitrust violations:

The underlying lawsuit alleges, broadly, that plaintiff acquired and maintained its 90% market share of VHR (vehicle history report) sales by engaging in an anticompetitive scheme. Plaintiff contends that defendant owes it a defense in the suit because the suit alleges disparagement. It relies on the following allegations: “By contractually committing these two websites to include hyperlinks to Carfax VHRs and to exclude VHRs of any other provider, Carfax has stigmatized any listing without such a link in the eyes of consumers who infer that the absence means that the car has a blemished history.” “Carfax also utilizes its inflated revenues to disparage and falsely malign dealers in order to mislead consumers into believing its VHRs are necessary and accurate.”

These passing references to disparagement do not allege a “Wrongful Act” [within the meaning of the policy language].” They were made “only in the context of the anti-trust claims, i.e. , as legal jargon pertinent to anti-trust and not as a means of even arguably alleging a separate claim for libel, slander or product disparagement” … . Carfax, Inc. v Illinois Natl. Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 01409, First Dept 3-1-18

INSURANCE LAW (THE LAWSUIT ALLEGED ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS, WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE, THE PASSING REFERENCES TO PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT, WHICH WOULD BE COVERED, DID NOT TRIGGER THE DUTY TO DEFEND (FIRST DEPARTMENT))/DUTY TO DEFEND (INSURANCE LAW, THE LAWSUIT ALLEGED ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS, WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE, THE PASSING REFERENCES TO PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT, WHICH WOULD BE COVERED, DID NOT TRIGGER THE DUTY TO DEFEND (FIRST DEPARTMENT))/ANTITRUST ((INSURANCE LAW, THE LAWSUIT ALLEGED ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS, WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE, THE PASSING REFERENCES TO PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT, WHICH WOULD BE COVERED, DID NOT TRIGGER THE DUTY TO DEFEND (FIRST DEPARTMENT))

SUIT SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FOR A SETTLEMENT PAID TO DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RELEVANT LAW EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the suit by a general contractor (Aragon) and property lessee seeking indemnification for a settlement paid to defendant subcontractor’s (Port Richmond’s) injured employee (Brown), as well as the suit alleging the failure to procure insurance, should not have been dismissed. The court explained the relevant indemnification law:

It is well settled that “where an indemnitor does not receive notice of an action settled by the indemnitee, in order to recover reimbursement [for the settlement], [the indemnitee] must establish that [it] would have been liable and that there was no good defense to the liability”… . Conversely, “[w]here the indemnitor does receive notice of the claim against the indemnitee, . . . the general rule is that the indemnitor will be bound by any reasonable good faith settlement the indemnitee might thereafter make”… . As to notice, ” [i]t is sufficient that the party against whom ultimate liability is claimed is fully and fairly informed of the claim and that the action is pending with full opportunity to defend or to participate in the defense'” … . …

Applying these principles, we find that the motion court improperly dismissed the indemnification claim. The subcontract plainly requires indemnification for claims arising out of Port Richmond’s work on the construction project. On appeal, Port Richmond does not argue that Brown’s injuries did not arise from its work. Instead, Port Richmond contends that because the underlying action was dismissed against Aragon, plaintiffs cannot establish Aragon’s liability for those injuries. However, where notice is given, the indemnitee need not establish its own liability for the underlying claim … . There is no dispute that Port Richmond had notice of the underlying action as well as the settlement negotiations in this Court.  Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v Tower Natl. Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 01401, Second Dept 3-1-18

INSURANCE LAW (SUIT SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FOR A SETTLEMENT PAID TO DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RELEVANT LAW EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/INDEMNIFICATION (INSURANCE LAW, SUIT SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FOR A SETTLEMENT PAID TO DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RELEVANT LAW EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/SETTLEMENTS (INSURANCE LAW, INDEMNIFICATION, (SUIT SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FOR A SETTLEMENT PAID TO DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RELEVANT LAW EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))

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ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a decision dealing with several substantive insurance and employment issues not summarized here, determined that plaintiff, as the beneficiary of her husband’s life insurance policy, had sufficiently alleged she was in a relationship close to privity such that the insurance agent (Pontillo) and his employers owed her a duty of care. Plaintiff’s suit stemmed from the insurers’ denial of coverage based upon material misrepresentations in the decedent’s application (not mentioning substance abuse):

Plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of the ReliaStar policy from the moment when decedent applied for the policy. She further alleged that she was linked to Pontillo by his status as a family member and trusted financial advisor and that Pontillo knew not only that the policy was intended to ensure plaintiff’s financial well-being in the event of decedent’s death, but that she would rely upon his expertise in preparing a valid application for it. Accepting these allegations as true, they show “an affirmative assumption of a duty of care to a specific party, [plaintiff,] for a specific purpose, regardless of whether there was a contractual relationship” … . As Supreme Court correctly determined, this alleged “reliance by . . . plaintiff that was ‘the end and aim of the transaction'” … constituted “a relationship so close as to approach that of privity” and created a duty of care toward her that permitted a negligence claim against Pontillo and his purported employers … . Vestal v Pontillo, 2018 NY Slip Op 01236, Third Dept 2-22-18

INSURANCE LAW (ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (INSURANCE LAW, ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT))/PRIVITY (INSURANCE LAW, NEGLIGENCE, (ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT))

RESPONDENT FELL USING A WALKER TO GET OFF A BUS, HER INJURY RESULTED FROM USE OR OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROPERLY AWARDED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined no-fault benefits were properly awarded to respondent, who fell using a walker to exit a bus. Although the lift device was used when respondent got on the bus, the driver refused to activate the lift device when respondent got off. Respondent’s injury was deemed to stem form the use or operation of a motor vehicle:

Here, the bus driver activated the lift device of the bus to assist Valerie Mathis when she boarded the bus. Subsequently, when she was exiting the bus, the bus driver refused to activate the lift device or to lower the bus. As a result, she was forced to place her walker out in the street, and then fell over while attempting to exit the bus.

Thus, the arbitrator and master arbitrator rationally found that the bus was a “proximate cause” of the injury and that the accident involved the “use or operation” of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5104(a). Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Physical Medicine & Rehab of NY PC, 2018 NY Slip Op 01260, First Dept 2-22-18

INSURANCE LAW (NO-FAULT, RESPONDENT FELL USING A WALKER TO GET OFF A BUS, HER INJURY RESULTED FROM USE OR OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROPERLY AWARDED (FIRST DEPT))/NO-FAULT BENEFITS (INSURANCE LAW,  RESPONDENT FELL USING A WALKER TO GET OFF A BUS, HER INJURY RESULTED FROM USE OR OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROPERLY AWARDED (FIRST DEPT))/BUSES (INSURANCE LAW, NO-FAULT, RESPONDENT FELL USING A WALKER TO GET OFF A BUS, HER INJURY RESULTED FROM USE OR OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROPERLY AWARDED (FIRST DEPT))

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ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined an all-risk artwork insurance policy did not cover contractual liability to purchasers of stolen art which was returned to the owner. In addition, the court determined the allegations in the complaint against the insurance brokers were insufficient to allege a fiduciary relationship:

“[D]efective title is clearly not a physical loss or damage . . . from any external cause” … . Despite the fact that the phrase “loss or damage” in the policy was not qualified by terms such as “direct” or “physical,” “[w]e may not, under the guise of strict construction, rewrite a policy to bind the insurer to a risk that it did not contemplate and for which it has not been paid” … . “Title insurance has been regarded as a separate type of contract not falling within any of the three basic classes of insurance. . . . It is not reasonable to interpret a policy so broadly that it becomes another type of policy altogether” … . …

The … causes of action, against the insurance broker defendants, were properly dismissed, with leave to replead  … for a “special relationship” with the broker defendants … . “Although the parties’ relationship lasted a considerable period of time and defendant [broker] assured plaintiff that his insurance needs were being met, these circumstances are not so exceptional as to support imposition of a fiduciary duty upon defendant”… . A longstanding relationship alone is insufficient to establish a special relationship between plaintiff and the broker defendants. Dae Assoc., LLC v AXA Art Ins. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 01026, First Dept 2-13-18

INSURANCE LAW (ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/ARTWORK, STOLEN (INSURANCE LAW, STOLEN ARTWORK, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/BROKERS (INSURANCE LAW, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY (INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/TITLE (INSURANCE LAW, STOLEN ARTWORK, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))

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VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county was obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage to respondent, who was injured by an uninsured driver while driving a county car. The county argued it was exempt from providing uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law 370:

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“[T]he Legislature has specifically declared its grave concern that motorists who use the public highways be financially responsible to ensure that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents be recompensed for their injuries and losses'” … . Thus, although the Legislature authorized municipalities to be self-insured pursuant to the exception in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370(1), it did not exculpate them from the responsibility of providing uninsured motorist protection … . Matter of County of Suffolk v Johnson, 2018 NY Slip Op 00552, Second Dept 1-31-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (INSURANCE LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))/INSURANCE LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))/UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (MUNICIPAL LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, INSURANCE LAW,  VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))

INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer of a Peter Pan bus was obligated to defend and indemnify the bus company in an action brought by a passenger who fell attempting to pick up her luggage outside the bus:

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The insurance policy issued by defendant to Peter Pan provides coverage for damages owed because of, inter alia, ” bodily injury’ … caused by an accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto.'” Regardless of whether the plaintiff in the underlying action, having arrived at her destination on a Peter Pan bus and seen the driver unloading the passengers’ luggage, tripped over a suitcase while approaching her own suitcase or tripped on the curb while looking for her suitcase, her accident resulted from Peter Pan’s use of the bus, a covered auto, and defendant is obligated to defend and indemnify Peter Pan in the underlying action … . Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v Hanover Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 00467, First Dept 1-25-18

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT))/BUSES (INSURANCE LAW, INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (BUSES, INSURANCE LAW, INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT))

INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer of a Peter Pan bus was obligated to defend and indemnify the bus company in an action brought by a passenger who fell attempting to pick up her luggage outside the bus:

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The insurance policy issued by defendant to Peter Pan provides coverage for damages owed because of, inter alia, ” bodily injury’ … caused by an accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto.'” Regardless of whether the plaintiff in the underlying action, having arrived at her destination on a Peter Pan bus and seen the driver unloading the passengers’ luggage, tripped over a suitcase while approaching her own suitcase or tripped on the curb while looking for her suitcase, her accident resulted from Peter Pan’s use of the bus, a covered auto, and defendant is obligated to defend and indemnify Peter Pan in the underlying action … . Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v Hanover Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 00467, First Dept 1-25-18

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT))/BUSES (INSURANCE LAW, INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (BUSES, INSURANCE LAW, INSURER OF A BUS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE BUS COMPANY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY A PASSENGER WHO FELL ATTEMPTING TO PICK UP HER LUGGAGE OUTSIDE THE BUS (FIRST DEPT))

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INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the defendant insurance broker’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged, under a negligence theory, that the broker failed to procure sufficient uninsured motorist coverage. The papers submitted by the broker failed to demonstrate the amount of coverage requested was procured. Therefore the motion should have been denied without consideration of the opposing papers:

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An insurance broker may be held liable under theories of breach of contract or negligence for failing to procure insurance upon a showing by the insured that the agent or broker failed to discharge the duties imposed by the agreement to obtain insurance, either by proof that it breached the agreement or because it failed to exercise due care in the transaction … .

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because they submitted insufficient evidence that they procured the amount of coverage that the plaintiff engaged them to procure … . Giamundo v Cleveland Dunn 2nd, 2018 NY Slip Op 00411, Second Dept 1-24-18

INSURANCE LAW (INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (INSURANCE LAW, INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/INSURANCE BROKER (NEGLIGENCE, (INSURANCE BROKER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERED REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS PROCURED, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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