You are here: / Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
,

THE FOIL PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS, INCLUDING UNSUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS; WHETHER SUCH A DOCUMENT SHOULD BE REDACTED OR WITHHELD MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT-BY-DOCUMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the personal privacy exemption in FOIL did not provide a blanket exemption for civilian complaints against police officers, including unsubstantiated complaints. Rather, whether the personal privacy exemption applies must be determined on a record-by-record basis:

FOIL’s personal privacy exemption permits an agency to withhold from public access any record that “if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [b]). We agree with respondents that FOIL, as amended in conjunction with the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, does not deny law enforcement officers the benefit of this exemption. However, the Appellate Division correctly concluded—consistent with uniform appellate precedent—that there is no categorical or blanket personal privacy exemption for records relating to complaints against law enforcement officers that are not deemed substantiated … . * * *

Rather than withhold all such records, Public Officers Law § 87 (2) requires an agency to evaluate each record individually and determine whether “a particularized and specific justification” exists for denying access on the ground that disclosing all or part of the record would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy … . Where redactions would prevent such an invasion and can be made without unreasonable difficulty, the agency must disclose the record with those necessary redactions … . The Appellate Division properly directed respondents to undertake this process, subject to further judicial review … . Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v City of Rochester, 2025 NY Slip Op 01010, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: The personal privacy exemption in FOIL does not provide a blanket exemption for civilian complaints against police officers, even unsubstantiated complaints. Whether a document should be redacted or withheld under the personal privacy exemption must be determined document-by-document.​

 

,

THE FORMER EXEMPTION FROM A FOIL REQUEST FOR POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS WAS REPEALED IN 2020; THE REPEAL APPLIES RETROACTIVELY SUCH THAT DISCIPLINARY RECORDS CREATED PRIOR TO THE REPEAL ARE NO LONGER EXEMPT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined that the repeal of the exemption from a FOIL request for police disciplinary records applies retroactively to documents created before the repeal:

… [W]e conclude that the Legislature intended for the statutory repeal to have retroactive effect. For starters, there is no indication that the repeal was intended to affect the usual manner in which FOIL operates. FOIL requires agencies to “make available for public inspection and copying all records” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2]), and it defines “records” with reference to whether an agency possesses information, but without reference to the date the information was created (id. § 86 [4] [defining “record” as “any information kept” or “held . . . in any physical form whatsoever”]). The amendments impose various redaction requirements and personal privacy protections for law enforcement disciplinary records specifically, yet they do not, for example, single out records created before a certain date for special treatment, or direct that disclosure of any record is tethered to the date it was created. Had the Legislature intended to deviate from FOIL’s presumption that information kept or held by an agency is disclosable by exempting records created prior to the repeal, or to mandate that an agency responding to a FOIL request ascertain and apply the law that governed when each responsive record was created, then surely it would have said as much. Matter of NYP Holdings, Inc. v New York City Police Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 01009, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: The exemption from a FOIL request for police disciplinary records was repealed in 2020. The repeal applies retroactively to police disciplinary records created prior to the repeal.

 

,

NYPD PROPERLY REQUIRED TO RELEASE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ITS USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES INCLUDING FACIAL RECOGNITION, IRIS RECOGNITION AND MOBILE X-RAY TECHNOLOGIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, rejected the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) argument that the FOIL request for documents relating to the NYPD’s use of surveillance technologies (such as facial recognition, iris recognition and mobile x-ray technology) was unduly burdensome:

An overarching problem with the NYPD’s evidence of burdensomeness, which consisted entirely of [NYPD attorney] Murtagh’s testimony, is that it is nonspecific. To begin, Murtagh did not set forth the number of SPEX [special expense purchase] Contracts that are encompassed by the request. He also did not set out an approximate number of pages that contain potentially exempt information. * * *

The NYPD’s assertion of the burdensomeness exemption also rests on the necessity of reviewing approximately 165,000 pages of hard-copy documents. While this is a considerable task, it is eased by Supreme Court’s determination that the production could go forward quarterly, on a rolling basis. Additionally, the review is facilitated by the fact that the relevant documents are all in one place, and there is no need to search the NYPD’s precincts and departments. While Murtagh stated that only he and one colleague were qualified to review this universe of documents, he failed to explain why other NYPD employees could not be trained to do so. Finally, Public Officers Law § 89(3)(a) provides that an agency may use an “outside professional service to provide copying, programming or other services required to provide the copy.” Murtagh stated that the documents are too sensitive to be shown to an outside contractor. Again, he did not grapple with the POST Act’s [Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act’s] effect on the documents’ sensitivity. Assuming that some portions of the contract documents fall within FOIL’s exemptions, Murtagh did not explain why a nondisclosure agreement would be insufficient to protect the exempt portions of the documents. Matter of Legal Aid Socy. v Records Access Officer, 2025 NY Slip Op 00723, First Dept 2-6-25

Practice Point: Here the NYPD’s argument that the FOIL request for documents relating to the use of surveillance technologies was unduly burdensome was rejected.​

 

, , ,

A FOIL REQUEST FOR A ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS (ZBA) MEMO SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE PETITIONER HAD UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT TO ANNUL A ZBA RULING; MATTER REMITTED FOR REVIEW OF THE MEMO TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE AS INTER-AGENCY OR INTRA-AGENCY MATERIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the denial of the petition, determined the FOIL request for a memo prepared by the Chair of the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) should not have been dismissed on the ground the petitioner had unsuccessfully sought to annul a determination by the ZBA. The matter was remitted for a review of the memo by the judge to determine whether it was exempt from disclosure as inter-agency or intra-agency material:

Supreme Court erred in dismissing this proceeding on the basis that it was rendered academic by the dismissal of a separate CPLR article 78 proceeding in which the petitioner was one of the parties seeking to annul a determination by the ZBA. “FOIL does not require that the party requesting records make any showing of need, good faith or legitimate purpose. The underlying premise [is] that the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government” … . “[T]he standing of one who seeks access to records under [FOIL] is as a member of the public, and is neither enhanced nor restricted because he [or she] is also a litigant or potential litigant” … .

… [E]xemptions are construed “narrowly, and an agency has the burden of demonstrating that an exemption applies ‘by articulating a particularized and specific justification for denying access'” … . When relying upon an exemption, “it is the agency’s burden to demonstrate that the requested material falls squarely within a FOIL exemption” … . “To meet its burden, the party seeking exemption must present specific, persuasive evidence that the material falls within the exemption. Conclusory assertions that are not supported by any facts are insufficient” … . Here, the exemption at issue provides that each agency shall make its records available for inspection, “except that such agency may deny access to records or portions thereof that . . . are . . . intra-agency materials which are not . . . statistical or factual tabulations or data” … . … Factual data “simply means objective information, in contrast to opinions, ideas, or advice exchanged as part of the consultative or deliberative process of government decision making” … . Matter of Supinsky v Town of Huntington, 2025 NY Slip Op 00324, Second Dept 1-22-25

Practice Point: A FOIL request should not be denied on the ground the person making the request is, was or could be a litigant in a matter related to the request.

Practice Point: Intra-agency and inter-agency material, meaning opinions, ideas or advice exchanged as part of a deliberative process, is exempt from FOIL disclosure.

 

,

PETITIONER ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED THE RECORDS SOUGHT FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT MAKE ANY EFFORT TO ASSIST PETITIONER IN IDENTIFYING THE RECORDS AS REQUIRED BY THE REGULATIONS; DENIAL OF THE PETITION REVERSED AND MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the denial of the petition to compel the disclosure of Nassau County Police Department records and remitting the matter, noted that the applicable regulations require the Department to assist the petitioner in identifying the records sought:

… [P]etitioner made a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law … for certain records pertaining to the creation or maintenance of the Department’s current databases. Specifically, the petitioner requested: (1) “Any Requests for Proposals (RFPs), Requests for Qualifications (RFQs), and contracts pertaining to the creation or maintenance of the Department’s current database(s)”; (2) “The data dictionary, glossary of terms, record layout, entity relationship diagram, user guide, and any other records that describe the Department’s database(s)”; and (3) “The instruction manual or any other type of guide, distributed to law enforcement personnel dictating how they should use the database(s).”

… [T]he Department’s Legal Bureau denied the request on the ground that the petitioner did not reasonably describe the database to which he was referring. …

… [T]he petitioner’s requests were not vague or unlimited. They were circumscribed as to subject matter—the records pertaining to the creation or maintenance of the Department’s current databases—and the time period … . …

… [R]egulations enacted under FOIL by the Committee on Open Government provide that, upon receipt of a FOIL request, agency personnel are required to “assist persons seeking records to identify the records sought, if necessary, and when appropriate, indicate the manner in which the records are filed, retrieved or generated to assist persons in reasonably describing records” (21 NYCRR 1401.2[b][2]). Here, there is no evidence that, before denying the petitioner’s request, the Department made any effort to work with the petitioner to more precisely define the information desired, if possible … . Matter of Lane v County of Nassau, 2025 NY Slip Op 00220, Second Dept 1-15-24

Practice Point: Here the petitioner adequately identified the police department records at issue and the police department made no effort to assist petitioner in identifying the records as required by the applicable regulations. The FOIL petition should not have been denied.

 

,

THE FOIL REQUEST FOR THE EMAIL ADDRESSES OF ALL NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES PROPERLY DENIED UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY EXEMPTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, affirming Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s FOIL request for the email addresses of all New York City employees, determined the information was covered by the cybersecurity exemption from disclosure under FOIL. The petitioner is a foundation which seeks to inform those city employees who are public-employee-union members of their right to opt out of union membership:

… DCAS’s [NYC Department of Citywide Administrative Services’] General Counsel “articulat[ed] a particularized and specific justification for denying access” … under the cybersecurity exemption by explaining that “disclosure would create a substantial risk to the information technology infrastructure of the City of New York, including computer hardware, software, and data.”

The City Cyber Command’s Deputy Chief Information Security Officer further explained that disclosing “all New York City employees’ email addresses would relinquish control of the City’s information technology assets and jeopardize the security of those assets and of City infrastructure” by “mak[ing] it substantially easier for threat actors to successfully attack City . . . employees” in “[p]hishing and other email-based attacks.” Phishing and other confidence-based attempts at fraud prey on a target’s trust. The other information sought herein concerning employee’s names, titles, and other employment-related information could be used in conjunction with an email address to dupe unsuspecting targets. Of course, we do not find that the Foundation has any intention of phishing or committing any other type of fraud; it seeks to advance its mission. We note these facts only to point out the risks that can ensue from mass release of public employee contact information should the information fall into the wrong hands.

For these reasons, DCAS “articulate[d] a legitimate concern covered by the exemption”— that disclosure of email addresses could “breach or compromise [the agency’s] information technology infrastructure” or enable attackers to “gain access to or manipulate information maintained by” DCAS … . Matter of Freedom Found. v New York City Dept. of Citywide Admin. Servs., 2024 NY Slip Op 04483, First Dept 9-19-24

Practice Point: Here the FOIL request for the email addresses of all NYC employees was properly denied under the cybersecurity exemption because of the possibility of “phishing and other email-based attacks.”​

 

THE NEWSPAPER’S FOIL REQUEST FOR POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS, INCLUDING RECORDS OF UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS AND RECORDS CREATED BEFORE THE REPEAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50-A, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner-newspaper’s FOIL request for police disciplinary records, including records of allegations ruled unsubstantiated and records created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law 50-a, should have been granted:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in concluding that the privacy exemption under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b) creates a blanket exemption allowing the respondents to categorically withhold the disciplinary records of unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct … . Inasmuch as the respondents withheld the requested records containing unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct in their entirety and did not articulate any particularized and specific justification for withholding any of the records, the respondents did not meet their burden of establishing that the privacy exemption applies … . The respondents further failed to establish that “identifying details” in the records containing unsubstantiated allegations or complaints of misconduct “could not be redacted so as to not constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” … .

… [E]ffective June 12, 2020, the New York State Legislature repealed Civil Rights Law § 50-a and amended the Public Officers Law to make specific provisions relating to the disclosure of law enforcement disciplinary records and the types of redactions to be made thereto prior to disclosure … . Thus, the statutory exemption under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) no longer applies to law enforcement personnel records. The bill repealing Civil Rights Law § 50-a also made several amendments to FOIL concerning disciplinary records of law enforcement agencies … . Of particular relevance here, Public Officers Law § 86 was amended by adding subdivisions (6) and (7), defining “[l]aw enforcement disciplinary records” and a “[l]aw enforcement disciplinary proceeding.”

Here, as the petitioner made the subject FOIL requests after the legislative amendments were enacted, the petitioner was not seeking retroactive application of the statutory amendments to a pending FOIL request … . Moreover, for the reasons set forth in Matter of Newsday, LLC v Nassau County Police Dept. (222 AD3d at 92-93), we reject the respondents’ contention that in amending the Public Officers Law to provide for the disclosure of records relating to law enforcement disciplinary proceedings, the Legislature intended to exclude from disclosure any law enforcement disciplinary records that were created prior to June 12, 2020 … .. Matter of Gannett Co., Inc. v Town of Greenburgh Police Dept., 2024 NY Slip Op 04071, Second Dept 7-31-24

Practice Point: Absent proof of some privacy exemption, police disciplinary records, including those involving unsubstantiated allegations and those created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law 50-a, may be provided pursuant to a FOIL request.

 

THE PURPOSE OF PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR CONTACT INFORMATION ABOUT EACH COUNTY EMPLOYEE WAS TO CONVINCE THE EMPLOYEES TO OPT OUT OF JOINING A UNION; NO GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION; THE FOIL PRIVACY EXEMPTION APPLIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the privacy provisions in the Public Officers Law shielded the county from the petitioner’s request for information about each employee. “With respect to each employee, petitioner sought the employee’s first name, middle name, last name, gender, public office address, job title, hire date, agency or department, work email address “or naming convention and domain,” work telephone number, and bargaining unit. In addition, petitioner sought “to receive the responsive information electronically in machine-readable format.” The Fourth Department found that the request was made to facilitate petitioner’s campaign to prevent county employees from joining a union:

It is evident here that petitioner’s intent, which “drives [our] analysis” … , in requesting the employees’ names, contact information, and union status, is to contact union members to urge them to opt out of union membership. Indeed, petitioner states in its brief on appeal that it “contacts public employees for the purposes of its educational mission through . . . a project” that it calls ” ‘Opt-Out Today.’ ” There is no indication that petitioner “intends to use the names to, for example, expose governmental abuses or evaluate governmental activities” … . Nor, as petitioner asserts, does the “natural and obvious meaning” we assign to the term “solicitation” conflict “with the legislative intent and . . . general purpose and manifest policy underlying FOIL” … . “If anything, it is precisely because no governmental purpose is served by public disclosure of this information that section 87 (2) (b)’s privacy exemption falls squarely within FOIL’s statutory scheme” … . Matter of Freedom Found. v Jefferson County, 2024 NY Slip Op 03944, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Here the disclosure of contact information for county employees did not serve a governmental purpose and was prohibited by FOIL’s privacy exemption.

 

, ,

RECORDS OF POLICE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS WHICH DID NOT RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF A FOIL REQUEST (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined records of police disciplinary proceedings which did not result in disciplinary action were a proper subject of petitioner’s FOIL request. The records had been denied on the ground disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal property pursuant Public Officers Law 87(2)(b). Petitioner, who prevailed, was entitled to attorney’s fees:

… [C]ontrary to the respondents’ contention, the withheld records were not categorically exempt from disclosure. “[T]here is no categorical exemption from disclosure for unsubstantiated allegations or complaints of police misconduct” … . “Upon repealing Civil Rights Law § 50-a, the Legislature amended . . . Public Officers Law to specifically contemplate the disclosure of ‘law enforcement disciplinary records,’ which it defines to include ‘complaints, allegations, and charges against an employee'” … . “If the Legislature had intended to exclude from disclosure complaints and allegations that were not substantiated, it would simply have stated as much” … . “It did not, and instead included ‘complaints, allegations, and charges’ in its definition of disciplinary records, along with ‘the disposition of any disciplinary proceeding,’ without qualification as to the outcome of the proceeding” … .

Accordingly, disclosure of the withheld records was required unless those records “‘[fell] squarely within the ambit of one of [the] statutory exemptions … . Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v Village of Freeport, 2024 NY Slip Op 03824, Second Dept 7-17-24

Practice Point: Records of police disciplinary proceedings which did not result in disciplinary action are not exempt from a FOIL request.​

 

,

THE REGULATION WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE TRANSCRIPTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD (PERB) HEARINGS ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE STENOGRAPHER CONFLICTS WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE PUBLIC-ACCESS PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FOIL (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) regulation (4 NYCRR 208.3 (c)) which provides that PERB hearing transcripts are the property of the stenographer conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act and the public-access principles underlying FOIL:

“It is established as a general proposition that a regulation cannot be inconsistent with a statutory scheme” … . Here, 4 NYCRR 208.3 (c) is inconsistent with State Administrative Procedure Act § 302 (2), which imposes a duty on the agency to furnish a copy of the transcript to a party upon request.…  Moreover, it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of FOIL, which “imposes a broad standard of open disclosure in order to achieve maximum public access to government documents” … . Courts must construe FOIL liberally, to “require[ ] government agencies to make available for public inspection and copying all records” … . Accordingly, Supreme Court improperly granted PERB’s motion to dismiss and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for PERB to file an answer pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f). Matter of DeWolf v Wirenius, 2024 NY Slip Op 03790,, Second Dept 7-11-24

Practice Point: A regulation cannot be inconsistent with a statutory scheme.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy