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19-Year Preindictment Delay Okay; Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Probative of Motive, Intent and Identity; Admissions Are Direct, Not Circumstantial, Evidence

A 19-year preindictment delay did not violate defendant’s speedy trial and due process rights. The charge was murder. The defendant was at liberty until indicted. The People established good cause for the delay in that the case was not ready to bring to a grand jury until the statements of three witnesses and DNA test results were obtained. The Fourth Department held that there was no need for a Singer hearing to determine the reason for the delay because there was no issue of fact with respect to the cause of the delay and the record provided County Court with a sufficient basis to determine whether the delay was justified. The admission of prior incidents of domestic violence against the victim (defendant’s wife) was proper because the evidence was probative of defendant’s motive, intent and identity. The defendant was not entitled to a circumstantial evidence charge because the admissions he made about killing his wife constituted direct evidence. People v Rogers, 1425, KA 11-00012 4th Dept. 2-1-13

 

 

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No “Reasonable Suspicion,” Defendant Should Not Have Been Stopped and Detained.

A new trial was ordered and the defendant’s motion to suppress identification evidence was granted by the Second Department.  A police radio broadcast described a robbery in progress by two males wearing black jackets, one wearing blue jeans, the other wearing black jeans. The complainant described the robbers only as “wearing dark clothing,” one taller than the other, and one with a hood.  The Court held that these descriptions were not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant, who was dressed in a dark gray and dark green camouflage jacket and was standing alone 20 blocks from the crime scene.  People v Polhill, 2010-01680, Ind. No. 943/09 Second Dept. 1-30-13

DeBour, street stops

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Spoliation, Discovery Abuse Sanctions, Equitable Estoppel.

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter discussing a breach of contract case with a convoluted history, the First Department dealt with the spoliation of evidence and the appropriate sanctions for spoliation under the CPLR.  It was alleged that a document was deliberately scorched so its authenticity could not be determined by scientific tests.  The Court remanded the case for a hearing on the spoliation issue and determined that, under the facts of the case, if spoliation is demonstrated at the hearing, striking the pleadings would not be an appropriate sanction.  The Court suggested a monetary sanction. Although most of the decision deals with the factual history of the case, there are substantive discussions of sanctions for discovery abuse under CPLR 3126 and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Melcher v Appolo Medical Fund Management, LLC, et al, 4759-4764, Index 604047/03 First Dept. 1-29-13.

 

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Insufficient Proof of Value in Grand Larceny Case.

In a Grand Larceny 3rd case, based on the theft of cell phones, the value of the stolen phones was proved by the testimony of the store manager who did not provide “a basis of knowledge” for her statement of value.  The Second Department noted that “ ‘[c]onclusory statements and rough estimates of value’ that are unsupported by a basis of knowledge are insufficient…”. The conviction was reduced to petit larceny, which requires no proof of value.  People v Sutherland, 2011-06497, Ind. No. 12436/08 Second Dept. 1-23-13

 

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Throwing Objects Off Balcony Evinces Depraved Indifference.

The defendant, who claimed to have been intoxicated at the time, threw bottles and plates off a 26th floor hotel balcony overlooking 7th Avenue during morning rush hour.  He was convicted of first degree reckless endangerment, which requires a “depraved indifference to human life.” In affirming the conviction, the First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, included a substantive discussion of the relationship among the legal concepts “depraved indifference,” ” recklessness,” and “specific intent to cause harm.”  In addition, the Court found sufficient “exigent circumstances” to justify the warrantless entry by the police into defendant’s hotel room. People v Green, 7860, Ind. 4295/05 First Dept. 1-22-13.

 

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“Weight of the Evidence” Review.

The Third Department upheld the defendant’s rape conviction in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Spain.  The case is interesting because it is a true “weight of the evidence” analysis where the appellate court conducted “a full review of the testimony adduced at trial,” acting in the role of a jury. There was a strong dissent which argued the conviction should be reversed because the trial judge did not turn over to the defense certain records concerning the complainant’s mental health after an in camera review.  People v McCray, 103682 Third Dept 1-17-13

 

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Preservation of Error, DNA Expert, Confrontation Clause.

Defendant’s claim that a DNA analyst’s expert testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because it was based on reports made by non-testifying witnesses was rejected, principally because the claim was deemed unpreserved.  There is a substantive discussion of preservation requirements. The Court, however, noted that the Court of Appeals held a similar DNA report was nontestimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.  People v Rios, 7651, Ind. 1037/08 First Dept. 1-15-13.

 

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Assault in Medical Facility, Spoliation of Evidence.

Plaintiff, a patient at defendant medical center, was assaulted by another patient.  Shortly after the incident plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to the medical center asking that it preserve all records of the incident, including videotape.  The letter was apparently never forwarded to the defendant’s risk management department and any videotape of the incident was overwritten in the ordinary course of business.  The trial court, pursuant to CPLR 3126, sanctioned the defendant by striking the defendant’s answer “to the extent of precluding the defendant from introducing evidence at trial that the alleged perpetrator was being supervised by its employees at the time of the incident.”  The Second Department discussed the sanctions available for spoliation of evidence and held that, because the plaintiff was not prevented from establishing her case by the spoliation, the imposed sanction was too harsh.  The appropriate sanction was an adverse inference charge to the jury.  Jennings v Orange Regional Medical Center, 2012-00209, Index No. 5601/10 Second Dept. 1-9-13

 

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Post-Conviction Review of Redacted Portions of Officer’s Notes Ordered.

After conviction, the inference that redacted portions of the arresting officer’s memo book constituted Rosario material warranted an in camera review of the memo book to determine whether the deleted portions constituted Rosario material and whether the nondisclosure prejudiced the defendant.  People v Perry 8933 Ind. 1054/09 First Dept. 1-3-13

 

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Pat-Down Search Justified by the Objective Existence of Probable Cause to Arrest, Even Though the Officer Did Not Intend to Arrest at the Time of the Search.

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, the First Department determined that a pat-down search was justified because probable cause for arrest existed (for DWI) even though the officer did not intend to arrest the defendant, whom he had just directed to step out of his car, at the time of the search.  The Court wrote:

This appeal addresses whether suppression should have been granted where the police stopped defendant’s car for a traffic infraction, and, based on what the arresting officer heard and observed, defendant was asked to exit the car and patted down; he was placed under arrest only after a knife was found in his pocket.  Because the arresting officer candidly admitted that he had not intended to arrest the driver before discovering the knife, defendant contends that the officer lacked the requisite predicate for the search and that therefore we must suppress the knife and other fruits of the search that followed.  We disagree.

The arresting officer’s factual testimony … established that the necessary predicate existed for each step taken by the officer.  Because … we find that at the time of the patdown the officer actually had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated, the search was permissible and the fruits of the search were admissible.  While we rely on the factual testimony of the arresting officer, we are not bound by his subjective assessment at the time regarding the nature and extent of his authority to act. *  *  *

…[W]e conclude that, even if the police are incorrect in their assessment of the particular crime that gives them grounds to conduct the search, or if they incorrectly assess the level of police activity that is justified by their knowledge, where the facts create probable cause to arrest, a search must be permissible.  People v Reid, 7360 Ind. 717/09 First Dept. 1-3-13.

 

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