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CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined a child’s out of court statements about father’s physical abuse of mother was sufficiently corroborated by similar evidence concerning the children in a prior neglect proceeding:

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A preponderance of the evidence established that the father neglected the subject children by perpetrating acts of domestic violence against the mother in their presence … . Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, the child’s out-of-court statement was sufficiently corroborated. Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi) provides, in part, that “previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence, but if uncorroborated, such statements shall not be sufficient to make a fact-finding of abuse or neglect. Any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements, including, but not limited to the types of evidence defined in this subdivision shall be sufficient corroboration.” Family Court Act § 1046(a)(i) provides, in part, that “proof of the abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any other child of . . . the respondent.” The child’s statement was corroborated by, among other evidence, proof of the father’s prior neglect of the children by perpetrating acts of domestic violence against the mother in their presence … . Additionally, contrary to the court’s further determination, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the father’s acts of domestic violence against the mother in the children’s presence impaired, or created an imminent danger of impairing, the children’s physical, mental, or emotional condition ,,, . Moreover, a negative inference is properly drawn from the father’s failure to testify ,,, , Matter of Jubilee S. (James S.), 2017 NY Slip Op 03006, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

FAMILY LAW (CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/HEARSAY (FAMILY LAW, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL.

The Second Department. over a dissent, rejected defendant’s argument that he did not consent to the release to the prosecution of recordings of his phone conversations from jail. Defendant acknowledged he was aware the conversations could be monitored and recorded, but noted that the stated reason for recording in the jail handbook was for jail security. The Second Department instructed that the better practice would be to notify inmates the recordings could be turned over to the prosecution:

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We note that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison,” and certainly “pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that . . . are enjoyed by convicted prisoners” … . Since any concern that the notice provided to inmates by the DOC is inadequate can be readily ameliorated by an express notification that the recorded calls may be turned over to the District Attorney, the better practice going forward may be for the DOC to include such a warning … . Rather, the trial court must weigh the probative value of the recordings against the potential for prejudice to the defendant … . “[D]ue to the possibility of prejudice inherent in the prosecutor’s use of inmate recordings, the trial judge’s role as gatekeeper remains unchanged and necessary to ensure compliance with constitutional mandates and the usual rules of evidence and criminal procedure” … . People v Diaz, 2017 NY Slip Op 03013, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL)/RECORDINGS (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT REJECTS ARGUMENT DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE RELEASE TO THE PROSECUTION OF RECORDINGS OF HIS PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL)

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SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED.

The Third Department, hearing an Article 78 petition, over an extensive two-justice dissent, annulled the determination of SUNY Postdam which found student petitioner guilty of sexual misconduct and expelled him. The court noted its discomfort with several procedural issues and with the punishment imposed. The Third Department held that the determination was not supported by substantial evidence:

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The complainant’s account was set forth by others who had conversed with her, with the Hearing Board considering written notes prepared by respondent Annette Robbins, SUNY’s director of student conduct and community standards, and the hearing testimony of a campus police officer. * * *

… [H]earsay must be “sufficiently relevant and probative [if it is] to constitute substantial evidence” … and, “when the hearsay evidence is seriously controverted, common sense and elemental fairness suggest that it may not constitute the substantial evidence necessary to support the [challenged] determination” … .

Petitioner testified at the hearing and, while the broad contours of his account matched those of the complainant, their accounts differed on the critical issue of consent. * * *

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… [W]e feel the need to comment on the circumstances leading to its imposition. Upon petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Hearing Board, the Appellate Board, sua sponte and without any explanation, recommended enhancing the penalty to expulsion. …  While nothing in the student code of conduct expressly prohibits the Appellate Board from recommending, and SUNY’s president from ultimately imposing, a more severe sanction upon a disciplined student’s appeal, nor does the student code of conduct explicitly advise an appealing student that such a consequence may inure as a result of an appeal. We are troubled by the absence of any such clear articulation that an enhanced penalty may result from a student’s choice to appeal the underlying determination and believe that, in this context, fairness warrants a clear and conspicuous advisement to that effect. Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. At Potsdam, 2017 NY Slip Op 02708, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/EVIDENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  (SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (MISCONDUCT, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/HEARSAY (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)

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INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY, DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN WHICH NON-PARTIES INVOKED THE FIFTH AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN READ TO THE JURY.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, determined defendant insurance company was entitled to the fraudulent incorporation defense in support of its refusal to pay no-fault benefits to plaintiff corporation for MRI’s administered by plaintiff corporation. The Business Corporation Law required that plaintiff corporation be run by physicians. There was substantial evidence the corporation was being run by two non-physicians with a physician as a cover. The Second Department found that the jury instructions explaining the criteria for the fraudulent incorporation defense were proper. The Second Department noted that the deposition testimony in which the two non-physician operators of plaintiff corporation refused to answer questions (invoking the Fifth Amendment) should not have been read to the jury because they were non-party witnesses. However, the error was deemed harmless. With respect to the fraudulent incorporation defense, the court wrote:

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… [T]he jury charge, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the correct legal principles on “fraudulent incorporation” … . The instructions asked the jury to consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff was operating as a proper professional medical corporation in compliance with state regulations or whether, in order to obtain money that insurers were otherwise entitled to deny, the plaintiff was organized under the facially valid cover of [a physician] but was, in actuality, operated and controlled by [two non-physicians] to funnel profits to themselves. Carothers v Progressive Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 02614. 2nd Dept 4-5-17

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY)/CORPORATION LAW (INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY)/EVIDENCE (DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN WHICH NON-PARTIES INVOKED THE FIFTH AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN READ TO THE JURY)/FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE  (INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY)

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SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a surveillance tape which depicted the defendant’s car pulling out into traffic as plaintiff’s (Nesbitt’s) car was closely approaching should have been considered by the motion court and summary judgment should have been awarded to defendant. The tape was sufficiently authenticated by defendant’s statement the tape accurately depicted what happened:

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Here, in support of his motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted, among other things, a surveillance tape that depicted Nesbitt’s vehicle leaving the gas station and entering Middle Country Road as the defendant’s vehicle approached. The Supreme Court refused to consider this evidence on the ground that it was not properly authenticated. The court improvidently exercised its discretion in declining to consider the surveillance tape, because the defendant adequately authenticated the tape by averring that it accurately depicted what had occurred at the time of the accident … .

The surveillance tape and the additional evidence submitted by the defendant in support of his motion established, prima facie, that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was Nesbitt’s conduct in entering the roadway when the defendant’s vehicle was so close … . Nesbitt v Gallant, 2017 NY Slip Op 02665, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)/EVIDENCE  (SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)/SURVEILLANCE TAPE (EVIDENCE, CAR ACCIDENT, SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)

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THERE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT FINDING THAT THE NEW YORK TRANSIT AUTHORITY WAS NEGLIGENT AND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES, PLAINTIFF HAD FALLEN OFF A SUBWAY PLATFORM AND ALLEGED HE WAS STRUCK BY A TRAIN.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a dissenting memorandum, determined there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict that the New York Transit Authority was negligent and the negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The matter was remitted to the Appellate Division. Only the dissent discussed the facts. Plaintiff, who had just left a methadone clinic and had no memory of the accident, alleged he was struck by a subway train after he had fallen off a subway platform:

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FROM THE DISSENT:  Plaintiff — while “high on Xanax and Klonopin” — left a methadone clinic, fell off a subway platform, and was struck by a train. The jury returned a verdict apportioning fault 60% to plaintiff and 40% to defendant New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), and awarding plaintiff a total of approximately $2 million in damages. Supreme Court set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. I agree with both lower courts, and therefore I dissent.

Plaintiff entered the subway station around 11:15 a.m. and was discovered injured on the tracks at 11:58 a.m. During those forty-three minutes, at least two trains passed through the station. Neither train operator saw plaintiff, although the operator of the second train reported observing white sneakers on the train tracks. Plaintiff had no memory of the incident, but contended at trial that the second train caused his injuries, and that the driver of that train had acted negligently. Obey v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02590, CtApp 4-4-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (THERE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT FINDING THAT THE NEW YORK TRANSIT AUTHORITY WAS NEGLIGENT AND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES, PLAINTIFF HAD FALLEN OFF A SUBWAY PLATFORM AND ALLEGED HE WAS STRUCK BY A TRAIN)/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, (THERE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT FINDING THAT THE NEW YORK TRANSIT AUTHORITY WAS NEGLIGENT AND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES, PLAINTIFF HAD FALLEN OFF A SUBWAY PLATFORM AND ALLEGED HE WAS STRUCK BY A TRAIN)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INTRODUCE TAPED THIRD-PARTY CONFESSION, THE RELIABILITY PRONG OF THE STATEMENT AGAINST PENAL INTEREST CRITERIA WAS VERY WEAK.

The Fourth Department determined the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on ineffective assistance grounds was properly denied. The basis of the ineffective assistance claim was his attorney’s failure to put in evidence a third party’s taped confession to the crime (to which defendant had pled guilty). The Fourth Department explained the tape recording did not meet the criteria for a statement against penal interest:

“The declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule recognizes the general reliability of such statements . . . because normally people do not make statements damaging to themselves unless they are true’ ” … . “The exception has four components: (1) the declarant must be unavailable to testify by reason of death, absence from the jurisdiction or refusal to testify on constitutional grounds; (2) the declarant must be aware at the time the statement is made that it is contrary to penal interest; (3) the declarant must have competent knowledge of the underlying facts; and (4) there must be sufficient proof independent of the utterance to assure its reliability … . “The fourth factor is the most important’ aspect of the exception” … , and “[t]he crucial inquiry focuses on the intrinsic trustworthiness of the statement as confirmed by competent evidence independent of the declaration itself” … . Where, as here, the declaration exculpates the defendant, “[s]upportive evidence is sufficient if it establishes a reasonable possibility that the [declaration] might be true” … . …

In support of her conclusion that the confession was inadmissible, trial counsel testified that all she had was a voice on a tape recording and, based on her discussions with the prior attorney, “there was some question as to whether [the third party] was even voluntarily in [the prior attorney’s] office” when he made the confession. Defendant testified that the third party was a friend of one of his sisters, and that the third party and defendant’s sister smoked crack cocaine together. … [T]he prior attorney made arrangements for the third party to be appointed counsel, but the third party disappeared shortly thereafter and, despite diligent efforts, including maintaining the investigator’s search, trial counsel was unable to locate him even up through defendant’s trial. People v Conway, 2017 NY Slip Op 02530, 4th Dept 3-31-17

 

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TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH THE INITIAL AGGRESSOR EXCEPTION TO THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the trial court properly charged the initial aggressor exception to the justification defense in this homicide case. The evidence was not clear about the timing, but the victim (McWillis) pursued the defendant with a plastic mop handle and swung at the defendant close in time to the shooting:

Here, as the Appellate Division dissent noted, “[n]o matter what the court charged in relation to the initial aggressor issue, [the jury could have reasonably concluded] there was simply no evidentiary support for a finding that defendant was justified in using deadly physical force against McWillis when faced with McWillis’s either threatened or actual use of a mop handle” … . Our law has “never required that an actor’s belief as to the intention of another person to inflict serious injury be correct in order for the use of deadly force to be justified, but [it has] uniformly required that the belief comport with an objective notion of reasonableness” … . Thus, the jury could have concluded that defendant’s choice to respond to a swinging plastic mop handle with a loaded and operable gun was not reasonable, especially in light of his prior comments to police about taking the law into his own hands … . People v Valentin, 2017 NY Slip Op 02470, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS ASSAULT CASE.

The Court of Appeals determined the trial court properly refused to charge the jury with the justification defense in this assault case:

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the defense of justification. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendant, as we must … , we conclude there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would have permitted the factfinder to conclude that defendant’s conduct was justified … . That is, we agree with the People that there is no evidence that objectively supports a belief that defendant was in danger of being physically harmed by the victim at the time defendant used force against him … .

Here, after “knocking [the victim] out,” defendant was able to freely and safely walk away from the bodega. Moreover, there simply is no evidence that, once he returned to the bodega, defendant needed to leave that store to strike the victim to defend himself. Even if defendant’s trial testimony establishes that he actually believed that the victim was lying in wait for him with a weapon … , there is no reasonable view of the evidence that “a reasonable person in . . . defendant’s circumstances would have believed” the victim to have threatened him with the imminent use of unlawful physical force … . Put simply, the surveillance footage reflects that defendant’s ambush of the victim with the milk crate cannot be considered self defense. People v Sparks, 2017 NY Slip Op 02469, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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ALTHOUGH THE MURDER WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE BURGLARY CHARGE, THE PEOPLE JUSTIFIED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BY PRESENTING PROOF THE TWO CRIMES ENCOMPASSED DISTINCT ACTS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Klein, determined there was sufficient evidence the burglary and murder were separate acts to justify consecutive sentences. The defendant was charged with breaking and entering his girlfriend’s home, dragging her downstairs and then murdering her:

“By definition, the act of causing death is subsumed within the element causing . . . physical injury” … and, thus, the act constituting murder here was a material element of that burglary count. The People therefore concede that, with respect to the latter burglary charge, they were required to identify facts establishing that defendant committed this offense and murder through separate and distinct acts. Because “the People offer[ed] evidence of the existence of . . . separate and distinct act[s]” with respect to that count of burglary in the first degree — indeed, with respect to both counts — “the trial court ha[d] discretion to order consecutive sentences” … . People v Brahney, 2017 NY Slip Op 02465, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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