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THE PETITION SEEKING LEAVE TO COMMENCE AN ACTION AGAINST THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) IN THIS PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE NOTICE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE ACTION WERE MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this pedestrian accident action seeking coverage by the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) should not have been dismissed without a hearing:

A petitioner seeking leave of court to commence an action against the MVAIC has the initial burden of demonstrating that he or she is a “[q]ualified person” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5202 and by making an evidentiary showing that he or she has satisfied certain other statutory requirements … . In a special proceeding, to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised, the court is empowered to make a summary determination (see CPLR 409[b]). If, however, triable issues of fact are raised, an evidentiary hearing must be held (see CPLR 410).

Here, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the petitioner is an uninsured resident of New York, and, therefore, a “[q]ualified person” pursuant to article 52 of the Insurance Law (Insurance Law § 5202[b]); whether the accident, which the petitioner admitted that he did not report to the police within 24 hours as required by Insurance Law § 5208(a)(2)(A), was, nonetheless, reported to the police “as soon as was reasonably possible” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5208(a)(2)(B); and whether the petitioner served a notice of claim upon the MVAIC within 90 days of the accident (see Insurance Law § 5208[a][2][A]), which issues could not have been resolved without an evidentiary hearing … . Matter of Laszlone v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 08657, Second Dept 12-19-18

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

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NO EVIDENCE THREE WEAPONS IN A SAFE WERE POSSESSED BY THREE SEPARATE ACTS, SENTENCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONCURRENT, DECISIONS TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD NO LONGER BE FOLLOWED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was no indication the three weapons in a safe were possessed by three separate acts. The sentences therefore should have been concurrent:

… [T]he defendant’s convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree … were based upon his act of constructively possessing three guns in a safe on December 2, 2009 … . Since these convictions were based upon the defendant’s constructive possession of guns in the same location at the same time, and there was no proof of any separate act by the defendant which constituted possession of one of the guns, as opposed to either of the other two guns, the convictions were based upon the same act, and the sentencing court was required to impose concurrent sentences … . … [T]he mere fact that the defendant possessed three guns does not prove three separate acts of possession, and, to the extent that our decisions in People v Horn (196 AD2d 886) and People v Negron (184 AD2d 532, 533) can be read to so hold, those cases should no longer be followed. In an analogous context, the Court of Appeals held, to the contrary, that a sentencing court was not authorized to impose consecutive sentences on a defendant’s convictions of three counts of possessing a sexual performance by a child, despite the defendant’s possession of separate images depicting child pornography, because the People failed to allege or adduce facts demonstrating separate acts of downloading the digital images (see People v Dean, 8 NY3d at 930-931). Similarly, possession of three guns without further proof of separate and distinct acts of possession cannot support consecutive sentences for three counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree … . People v Smith, 2018 NY Slip Op 08695, Second Dept 12-19-18

SENTENCING

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FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING FUTURE PARENTAL ACCESS PETITIONS WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court in this modification of custody proceeding, determined father should not have been precluded from submitting future parental access petitions:

A party seeking modification of an existing custody or parental access order must demonstrate that there has been a change in circumstances such that modification is required to protect the best interests of the child… . “One who seeks a change in [parental access] is not automatically entitled to a hearing but must make a sufficient evidentiary showing of a material change of circumstances to warrant a hearing”… . However, where a facially sufficient petition has been filed, a full and comprehensive hearing is required to afford the parent a full and fair opportunity to be heard … .

Here, the Family Court should not have dismissed the father’s petition without a hearing. His evidentiary submissions were sufficient to warrant a hearing … .

The Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in enjoining the father from filing any future parental access petitions without prior express written permission from the court. The court’s conclusion that the father had previously filed an “excessive number of petitions” was not supported by the record, nor was there any evidence that the father’s continued litigation had become abusive and vexatious … . Matter of Gonzalez v Santiago, 2018 NY Slip Op 08653, Second Dept 12-19-18

 

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THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CHANGED WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED PEOPLE V PAYNE, BEFORE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BECAME FINAL, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE HEARD DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE CONVICTION AND SHOULD HAVE REVERSED THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION AND DISMISSED THE COUNT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the law on the proof requirements for depraved indifference murder changed when People v Payne (3 NY2d 266) was decided, not later when People v Feingold (7 NY3d 288) was decided; (2) defendant’s judgment of conviction did not become final until after People v Payne was decided; (3) therefore defendant’s motion to vacate his judgment of conviction should have been heard on the merits; and (4) the evidence of depraved indifference murder was not sufficient to support the verdict:

As noted, the motion court determined that the law regarding depraved indifference murder did not change until People v Feingold, and that the defendant is therefore not entitled to any benefit under the new law … . However, in People v Wilkens (126 AD3d 1293) and People v Baptiste (51 AD3d 184), the [3rd] and [4th] Departments of the Appellate Division each held that the law changed on October 19, 2004, when the Court of Appeals decided People v Payne. We agree with the [3rd] and [4th] Departments that People v Payne signaled the change in the law of depraved indifference murder. …

Under the unique circumstances of this case, where the cases here relied upon … had not yet been decided at the time that the direct appeal was perfected, we find that the failure to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal was justified. …

… [T]he trial evidence was not legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilt of depraved indifference murder … . People v Hernandez, 2018 NY Slip Op 08690, Second Dept 12-19-18

 

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FATHER MADE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR A MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY BASED UPON LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, REMITTED FOR A CONTINUED HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s petition to modify the custody arrangement should not have been dismissed and the matter was remitted for a continued hearing. Father’s proof had made out a prima facie case based upon the loss of employment:

… [F]ather petitioned to modify the order of custody and parental access to remove the requirement that the parental access be professionally supervised at his expense, on the ground that he had recently lost his job and could not afford the cost of professional supervision. At a hearing on his petition, the father testified that he had lost his job in February 2016, a few months after the order of custody and parental access was made, and since that time, he had exercised parental access with the child on a limited basis due to the cost of professional supervision. He admitted that the cost of professional supervision was prohibitive even when he was employed but that, since losing his job, his parental access had further decreased. …

A party seeking modification of an existing custody or parental access order must demonstrate that there has been a change in circumstances such that modification is required to protect the best interests of the child … . The best interests of the child are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances … . In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case, the court must accept the petitioner’s evidence as true and afford the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn therefrom … .

Here, accepting the father’s evidence as true and affording him the benefit of every favorable inference, the father presented sufficient prima facie evidence of a change of circumstances which might warrant modification of parental access in the best interests of the child. Matter of Gonzalez v Santiago, 2018 NY Slip Op 08652, Second Dept 12-19-18

 

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CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES NOT SUPPORTED BY ALLEGATIONS OR PLEA ALLOCUTION, NO ALLEGATION THE THREE CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON COUNTS WERE SEPARATE ACTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined consecutive sentences should not have been imposed for the three counts of criminal possession of a weapon to which defendant pled guilty. There were no allegations of three separate acts of possession:

Sentences imposed for two or more offenses may not run consecutively where, inter alia, “a single act constitutes two offenses” … . Conversely, consecutive sentences may be imposed when, among other things, “the facts demonstrate that the defendant’s acts underlying the crimes are separate and distinct” … . The People bear the burden of establishing the legality of consecutive sentencing … .

Here, no facts were alleged in the Superior Court Information or adduced at the defendant’s plea allocution which establish three separate acts of possession … . Accordingly, there was no basis for imposing consecutive sentences for three counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree … . People v Bailey, 2018 NY Slip Op 08674, Second Dept 12-19-18

SENTENCING

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INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE FAILURE TO TURN OVER REQUESTED INVOICES IN DISCOVERY WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS, BUT PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ABOUT THE INVOICES AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that requested invoices which were alleged not to exist could not be the subject of evidence at trial:

Durante’s affidavit demonstrated that the requested invoices of Croton could not be located and that the invoices of Iron Age were not in the respondents’ possession or control … . Under the circumstances of this case, there was no clear showing that the respondents’ failure to produce the invoices was willful and contumacious, since, inter alia, the respondents complied, albeit tardily, with the appellants’ discovery demands and demonstrated that the invoices requested could not be located, or were not in their possession or control (see CPLR 3101[d][2] … ). Nevertheless, the respondents should have been precluded from later offering evidence regarding the requested invoices of Croton that were not produced … . Accordingly, that branch of the appellants’ motion which was to preclude the respondents from introducing at trial evidence of the requested invoices of Croton that were not provided should have been granted. Cap Rents Supply, LLC v Durante, 2018 NY Slip Op 08458, Second Dept 12-12-18

SPOLIATION

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CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO FATHER AND ALL CONTACT BETWEEN MOTHER AND CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, JUDGE, SUA SPONTE, SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS FOR CUSTODY OR VISITATION BY MOTHER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined the court should not have transferred custody to father and suspended all contact between the child and mother for a year without conducting a hearing. The First Department further held that the judge should not have, sua sponte, prohibited mother from filing future petitions for custody or visitation without leave of court because no party requested that relief:

… [T]he court erred when, without holding an evidentiary hearing, it made a final order transferring physical and legal custody to the father and suspending all contact between the mother and the child for a year. Determination of the child’s best interests requires examination of the totality of the circumstances … . We have consistently held that “an evidentiary hearing is necessary before a court modifies a prior order of custody or visitation,” even where the court is familiar with the parties and child, and particularly where there are facts in dispute … . Furthermore, while we have stated that a hearing on modification of a custody arrangement in the child’s best interests “may be as abbreviated, in the court’s broad discretion, as the particular allegations and known circumstances warrant. . . ,’ it must include an opportunity for both sides, and the children’s attorney when there is one, to present their respective cases, and the factual underpinnings of any temporary order [must be] made clear on the record'” … .

Here, the court made a final determination without taking any testimony or entering any documents into evidence. The court’s reliance on statements made by the ACS caseworker during a court conference was inappropriate, since the mother’s attorney had requested, but was denied, a full hearing at which counsel could have cross-examined the caseworker. Matter of Michael G. v Katherine C., 2018 NY Slip Op 08568, First Dept 12-13-18

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION AND WHETHER THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE WAS SERVED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT)

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. There exist questions of fact on whether plaintiff has standing and whether the RPAPL 1304 notice was served:

The borrower raised a meritorious standing defense based on questions as to the sufficiency of the content of the conclusory lost note affidavit, which does not state that a thorough and diligent search was made based on a review of the business records or anything else, does not state that any search was made or by whom, and does nothing to indicate when approximately the note was lost … .

The borrower also raised a plausible notice defense regarding plaintiff’s service of the requisite 90-day notice under RPAPL 1304 … . AS Helios LLC v Chauhan, 2018 NY Slip Op 08565, First Dept 12-13-18

 

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THE MURDER COUNT, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE PEOPLE DID NOT SEEK PERMISSION TO RESUBMIT IT AFTER THE GRAND JURY DEADLOCKED ON THE CHARGE, DID NOT TAINT THE CONVICTION ON THE MANSLAUGHTER COUNT UNDER A SPILL-OVER ANALYSIS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a concurring opinion, reversing the appellate division, determined the murder count in the second indictment should have been dismissed because the People did not seek court permission to re-present it after the grand jury which issued the first indictment deadlocked on that charge. But the court further held the murder count, on which defendant was acquitted, did not taint the manslaughter conviction under a spill-over analysis. The manslaughter count was a valid count in the first indictment (both indictments were tried together):

The People’s failure to obtain court permission to resubmit a murder count to a new grand jury after the first grand jury deadlocked on that charge violated Criminal Procedure Law § 190.75 (3), and Supreme Court erred in denying defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the murder count in the second indictment on that ground.  * * *

Under the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the manslaughter count. The People assert that all of the evidence admitted to prove defendant’s guilt of murder in the second degree was also admissible to prove his guilt of manslaughter in the first degree, and defendant does not contend otherwise. … [T]he presence of the tainted murder count here did not result in the admission of any prejudicial evidence that the jury would have been unable to consider if the murder count had been dismissed … . People v Allen, 2018 NY Slip Op 08537, CtApp 12-13-18

 

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