You are here: / Evidence
, ,

THE ADDITIONAL FIVE-YEAR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES PURSUANT TO PENAL LAW 265.09 (2) DID NOT APPLY TO FIVE COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT; THE APPEAL OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE PRESERVATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined several of the additional consecutive five-year sentences pursuant to Penal Law 265.09( 2) were illegal. The court noted that preservation is not required for the appeal of an illegal sentence:

… [Penal Law 265.09(2)] provides in relevant part that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, when a person is convicted of criminal use of a firearm in the first degree as defined in [Penal Law § 265.09 (1)], the court shall impose an additional consecutive sentence of five years to the sentence imposed on the underlying class B violent felony offense where the person convicted of such crime displays a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious injury may be discharged, in furtherance of the commission of such crime” … . …

… [T]he sentence enhancement provision does not apply to his conviction of burglary in the first degree under count 2… and robbery in the first degree under count 5 … . Given that the use or display of a firearm is an element of each of those crimes and “the use or display of that same firearm cannot also be the predicate for criminal [use] of a firearm in the first degree” … , neither of those crimes may serve as “the underlying class B violent felony offense” upon which the court could impose an additional consecutive sentence of five years … .

… [T]he sentence enhancement provision does not apply to his conviction of burglary in the first degree under count 3… . * * * Defendant’s conviction under Penal Law § 265.09 (1) (a) “did not involve the display of a loaded, operable weapon” … , and the victim—the only person other than defendant who was present in the room where the shooting occurred—had no recollection of defendant’s entry into the apartment or of the events that transpired during the shooting that caused his physical injuries … . People v Clea, 2025 NY Slip Op 05590, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when the five-year consecutive-sentence enhancement for display of a fireman is not allowed by Penal Law 265.09 (2).

 

, ,

THE SEARCH OF THE UNCONSCIOUS OR SLEEPING DEFENDANT’S POCKETS WAS NOT A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST OR A SEARCH PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW; THE SEIZED COCAINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea and dismissing the drug-possession indictment, determined the police officer’s search of defendant’s pocket while he was unconscious was not a valid search incident to arrest a was not justified under the Mental Hygiene Law. The police entered the apartment with the tenant’s permission to search for a person for whom they had an arrest warrant. The tenant told the police the defendant had the same first name as the name on the warrant but that defendant was not the person they were looking for. Defendant was sitting at the kitchen table either unconscious or asleep. When the police officer couldn’t wake the defendant up, the officer searched his pockets and found cocaine:

The officers called an ambulance for defendant, but when the ambulance arrived, the medical personnel were able to wake defendant and determined that he did not need medical care. During his testimony at the suppression hearing, the officer asserted that Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 permitted him to search defendant inasmuch as he was planning to call an ambulance to transport defendant. The suppression court determined that the officer’s search of defendant’s person was justified by Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 and that the search was analogous to a search incident to arrest.

… The People correctly concede that the officer did not believe that defendant had committed a crime before he searched defendant’s pockets, and thus the search was not conducted incident to a lawful arrest … . … [W]e cannot conclude that the police officer was acting pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 22.09 because, contrary to the People’s assertion, there was insufficient evidence that defendant was in danger of harming himself or others … . People v Ruise, 2025 NY Slip Op 05589, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: For a warrantless search of a person to be justified under the Mental Hygiene Law there must be evidence the defendant is in danger of harming himself or others.

 

, ,

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED A DEFECTIVELY MAINTAINED AND/OR INSTALLED TRAFFIC SIGNAL ALLOWED A SIGNAL HEAD IN EACH DIRECTION TO SHOW A GREEN LIGHT, THEREBY CAUSING THE INTERSECTION COLLISION; ALTHOUGH THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TRAFFIC SIGNAL, THE PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE “FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE INTERSECTION IN A SAFE CONDITION” AND “CREATION OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION” CAUSES OF ACTION, AND THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION WAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court and reinstating the complaint, determined the complaint and bill of particulars sufficiently alleged negligence and questions of fact were raised about whether the county failed to properly maintain a traffic signal and created a dangerous condition. The plaintiff alleged a pipe holding the traffic signal broke allowing it to rotate 90 degrees such that at least one of the signal heads in each direction showed a green light, causing the intersection collision. The fact that the county demonstrated it did not have notice of the defective traffic signal did not affect the viability of the “failure to maintain the intersection in a safe condition” and the “creation of a dangerous condition” causes of action:

“A municipality has a duty to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition” … . “[T]he municipality breaches such duty if it permits a dangerous or potentially dangerous condition to exist and cause injury” … . Here, to meet its burden on that part of the motion seeking summary judgment, defendant was required to “demonstrate that it maintained the intersection in a reasonably safe condition and that it neither created the alleged defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of same” … .

… [W]e conclude that plaintiff raised triable issues of fact by submitting the affidavit of his expert … . We also agree with plaintiff that questions of fact exist with respect to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies here … . Duncan v Town of Greece, 2025 NY Slip Op 05588, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: The municipality’s lack of notice of a dangerous condition, here an allegedly defective traffic signal, does not affect the viability of causes of action alleging the failure to maintain the intersection in a safe condition and/or the municipality’s creation of the dangerous condition.​

 

,

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSES OF CLAIMANT’S HEARING LOSS DID NOT SUPPORT THE MEDICAL EXPERTS’ CONCLUSIONS THAT THE LOSS WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE OPERATION OF HEAVY MACHINERY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the conflicting evidence of the causes of claimant’s hearing loss did not support the experts’ conclusions that the hearing loss was “likely” caused by exposure to noise from the operation of heavy equipment:

… [T]he medical opinion evidence on the issue of causation need not be expressed with certainty or in absolute terms … , and we acknowledge that the Board is vested with the exclusive authority to weigh conflicting medical opinions and to evaluate the medical evidence before it … . That said, the medical opinions upon which the Board bases its finding of a causal relationship nonetheless must be supported by a rational basis … . Here, each of the foregoing physicians indeed expressed that it was “likely or “very obvious” that claimant’s hearing loss was attributable to work-related noise exposure. However, given the other documented sources of noise exposure … , the conflicting medical histories provided by claimant and, most notably, the testimony of the carrier’s consultant, who made clear that the results of claimant’s audiograms were decidedly inconsistent with noise-related hearing loss, we are unable to conclude that these generalized statements of causation are otherwise supported by a rational basis in the record as a whole. Under these circumstances, the Board’s finding that claimant sustained a work-related binaural hearing loss is not supported by substantial evidence … . Matter of Spada v Keeler Constr. Co., 2025 NY Slip Op 05553, Third Dept 10-9-25

Practice Point: In the context of a hearing loss alleged to have been caused by prolonged exposure to noise from heavy machinery, the medical experts’ conclusions must be supported by evidence in the record. Here the experts’ conclusions that the hearing loss was attributable to the operation of heavy machinery were weakened by conflicting causation-evidence in the record and the finding of causation was reversed.

 

, ,

THE CONFLICTING EXPERT REPORTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S PREEXISTING CONDITIONS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Michael, determined Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the question whether plaintiff’s decedent, Kenneth Moore, suffered “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law 5102(d) in a traffic accident. The conflicting expert evidence raised questions of fact about whether the accident exacerbated preexisting conditions, including arthritis

… [A] preexisting condition does not foreclose a finding that the plaintiff’s injuries were causally related to the subject accident … . Where a defendant meets its prima facie burden in establishing that the preexisting condition is the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence addressing causation … .

To meet his burden, the plaintiff must address the evidence of preexisting conditions “and explain why [his] current reported symptoms [are] not related to the preexisting conditions” or how the accident aggravated his underlying degenerative conditions … . * * *

… [P]laintiff’s evidence, including conflicting expert reports; testimony as to Moore’s increased pain and diminished physical capabilities; and medical records showing a new course of treatment, new diagnoses, and aggravated injuries, raised issues of fact as to whether Moore’s worsened physical condition was causally related to the accident … . Moore v Maley, 2025 NY Slip Op 05304, First Dept 10-2-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an an explanation of how to deal with a plaintiff’s preexisting conditions when assessing whether plaintiff has suffered “serious injury” in a traffic accident within the meaning of the Insurance Law.

 

, , ,

AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WHEN THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY TO PROVE ISSUES IN DISPUTE, NOT THE CASE HERE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the husband’s attorney, Smith, should not have been disqualified on the ground he would be called as a witness at trial. The appellate division determined Smith’s testimony was not relevant to the financial issues in the divorce action. Therefore Smith should not have been disqualified on the basis that his testimony would be necessary at trial:

The advocate-witness disqualification rules contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide guidance, but are not binding authority for courts in determining whether a party’s attorney should be disqualified during litigation … . “Disqualification of a law firm during litigation implicates not only the ethics of the profession but also the substantive rights of the litigants. Disqualification denies a party’s right to representation by the attorney of its choice” … . In considering whether to disqualify counsel, the court must consider a litigant’s right to select his own counsel and the fairness and effect of disqualification in the particular factual setting … . Whether to disqualify an attorney rests in the sound discretion of the trial court … . However, an attorney should be disqualified only when his or her testimony is necessary to prove the issues in dispute … . The party seeking or supporting disqualification need not show that counsel’s continued representation would prejudice his or her client where the court finds that counsel’s testimony is necessary on his or her client’s behalf … . De Luca v De Luca, 2025 NY Slip Op 05146, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Here the proposed testimony by the attorney was not necessary to prove issues in dispute. Therefore the attorney should not have been disqualified.

 

,

EXCESSIVE ABSENCES FROM SCHOOL SUPPORTED THE EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT FINDINGS, BUT NEGLECT BECAUSE OF MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined that, although the petitioner demonstrated the parents educationally neglected the children, the petitioner did not demonstrate father neglected the children because of his mental illness:

A preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court’s finding that parents educationally neglected the children (see Family Court Act §§ 1012[f][i][B], 1046[b][i]). During the fall 2022 term and the previous school year, both children were absent more than half of the school days, and evidence of excessive unexcused absences from school will support a finding of neglect … . Even crediting the father’s testimony that he made efforts to ensure the children attended school, we find that petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that the father educationally neglected the children … . Despite years of outreach from the children’s schools, the father failed to follow up, attend important meetings, or obtain proffered services. School records indicated that the children’s academic progress suffered due to excessive absences and tardiness; both children were failing classes and not progressing towards annual goals. Under these circumstances, even though the father spoke with school personnel, inquired about assistance, and ultimately requested a reevaluation for one of the children, he nevertheless failed to take adequate steps to prevent the children from experiencing significant educational delays resulting from poor attendance … .

… [P]etitioner did not satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the father neglected the children because of his mental illness … . Although the father did not dispute that he suffered from depression, he testified that he was engaged in mental health treatment, including therapy and medication, and petitioner did not provide either documentary evidence or expert testimony demonstrating that the father’s mental illness interfered with his “judgment and parenting abilities” or connecting the father’s depression with his inadequate efforts to ensure the children attended school, thereby placing the children at imminent risk of physical, mental or emotional impairment” … . Matter of S.M.W. (J.R.M.), 2025 NY Slip Op 05181, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a rare discussion of the criteria for “educational” and “mental-illness” neglect of children.

 

, ,

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD DID NOT MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS UNDER THE “ABC” TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board and remitting the matter, determined the Board did not properly apply the so-called “ABC” test to decide whether claimant was an employee or an independent contractor:

… [O]ur review of the Board’s decision reflects that it did not set forth sufficient findings of fact regarding its assessment of whether the three-part ABC test was satisfied in order to determine if claimant himself was an independent contractor. To that end, to establish a person as an independent contractor under the three-part ABC test, it must be demonstrated that “(a) the individual is free from control and direction in performing the job, both under his or her contract and in fact; (b) the service must be performed outside the usual course of business for which the service is performed; and (c) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business that is similar to the service at issue” (Labor Law § 861-c [1]). * * *

In our view, given the limited findings by the Board, it is unclear whether the Board considered the ABC factors in determining that claimant’s status as an employee was not rebutted. As such, and aware that the role of this Court is not to independently review and weigh the conflicting evidence to determine whether the various factors of the ABC test … — including who directed and controlled the work being performed in installing the trusses — were met, the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and the matter must be remitted to the Board for proper consideration of whether the ABC test was satisfied in order to rebut the presumption of an employer-employee relationship. Matter of Trickey v Black Riv. Plumbing, Heating & A.C., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05133, Third Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the “ABC” test for whether a claimant is an employee or independent contractor.

 

,

DEFENDANT PERFORMED A RAP SONG DURING A RECORDED PHONE CALL MADE FROM JAIL; AN INVESIGATOR WAS CALLED AS AN EXPERT TO INTERPRET THE LYRICS; HIS INTERPRETATION MATCHED THE PEOPLE’S FACTUAL THEORY OF THE CASE; BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATOR WAS NOT ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT, DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction on the ground he was not afforded a fair trial, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Warhit, determined the “expert” evidence offered to interpret the meaning of a rap song defendant performed over a recorded phone call during his pretrial incarceration was inadmissible. The police investigator called upon to interpret the lyrics was not qualified to do so:

… [T]he investigator was unqualified to offer expert opinion testimony regarding the meaning of the rap lyrics. Additionally, while the investigator’s initial interpretations of the lyrics were often varied and reflected the lyrics’ inherent ambiguity, the investigator’s ultimate proffered opinions precisely and remarkably mirrored the People’s exact factual theory of the case. Moreover, the investigator’s interpretations of the lyrics also implied that the defendant had committed prior bad acts and crimes that were not charged in the indictment. Accordingly, we find that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of this evidence … . * * *

… [T]o be qualified to offer expert opinion testimony, the witness must possess “the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the information imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable” … . “The expert’s opinion, taken as a whole, must also reflect an acceptable level of certainty in order to be admissible” … .

… [T]he People failed to establish that their proffered expert witness was qualified to render an expert opinion as to the meaning of the rap lyrics. After the Supreme Court gave the People “ten minutes” to “get somebody,” the People proffered the investigator as their expert. Although the investigator testified that he had attended trainings regarding gangs, including “gang lingo,” this case did not involve gangs … . Additionally,]the investigator acknowledged that rap lyrics are not always literal and cannot be interpreted like a regular conversation. The investigator’s testimony regarding his exposure and/or familiarity with rap music from watching YouTube videos and “music videos posted by alleged gang members, and their ilk,” which he stated could largely be understood using “common sense,” was insufficient to demonstrate that he possessed the requisite skill, training, knowledge, and/or experience necessary to render a reliable opinion regarding the meaning of the rap lyrics at issue in this case … . People v Reaves, 2025 NY Slip Op 05107, Second Dept 9-24-25

Practice Point: Although rap lyrics have been admitted in evidence in criminal trials, here the investigator who interpreted the lyrics was not qualified to do so. It was reversible error to admit the “expert’s” opinion about the meaning of the lyrics.

 

, , ,

THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE NOT INTERTWINED; THE VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT THAT THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; IN RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, THE JUDGE PROPERLY TOLD THEM THEY COULD FIND THAT THE ACCIDENT DID NOT HAPPEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the verdict finding the defendant negligent but that the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident should not have been set aside. The plaintiff alleged repair to the steering mechanism of his van was negligently done, that he suddenly lost the ability to steer the van and it crashed into a concrete barrier which was parallel to the roadway. The evidence was such that the jury could have found the accident did not happen in the way alleged by the plaintiff. The damage to the van did not appear to be consistent with the accident as described by plaintiff. When the jury sent a note asking whether they could find that the accident didn’t happen, the trial judge properly told them they could so find:

The narrow question we must address to determine this appeal is whether the Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as, upon finding that the defendants were negligent, found that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff … . We answer this question in the negative, holding that the court erred by, in effect, granting those branches of the plaintiff’s motion where, as here, issues of negligence and proximate cause are not inextricably intertwined as a result of there being a rational view of the evidence that the plaintiff’s accident did not occur as claimed. Additionally, this appeal provides the opportunity to state our view that, in a personal injury action where there were questions about whether the alleged injury-producing event actually occurred as claimed by the plaintiff here, it was not error for the court to respond to a jury note by instructing that the jury could consider whether the alleged accident occurred. * * *

If, as the Supreme Court concluded in this instance, the jury’s deliberation involved an uncomplicated determination of whether the defendants had negligently installed the pitman arm of the plaintiff’s van, which, in turn, resulted in the plaintiff’s loss of steering and the accident as described, then the jury’s finding of negligence without a finding of proximate cause would be inconsistent. But the trial evidence was not so uncomplicated as to be subject to only one view of the events. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, as we must in these instances, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences upon which the jury could parse the alleged negligent repair from the alleged proximate cause and determine that while the defendants were negligent, they were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed accident … . Krohn v Schultz Ford Lincoln, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05072, Second Dept 9-24-25

Practice Point: Here the jury concluded the defendant’s repair of plaintiff’s van was negligent, but they also concluded the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. That verdict should not have been set aside. The evidence was such that the jury could have found that the accident as described by the plaintiff didn’t happen. The judge properly instructed them in response to a note that they could so find.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy